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
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
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THE ROLE OF THE U.S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND IN PROJECT NEW ARRIVALS

RECEPTION AND CARE OF REFUGEES FROM VIETNAM

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FORT McPHERSON, GEORGIA

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THE ROLE OF THE U.S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND
IN PROJECT NEW ARRIVALS
RECEPTION AND CARE OF REFUGEES FROM VIETNAM

By
FRANK W. PEW



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FORT McPHERSON, GEORGIA
1 SEPTEMBER 1981

FOREWORD

This monograph discusses in some detail the background of previous attempts by the U.S. Government, and the U.S. Army in particular, in the reception and care of refugees involved in a mass evacuation from a Communist dominated country. It covers the initial planning by FORSCOM to receive, house, and care for the Vietnamese Refugees until their removal from military jurisdiction. It covers political implications of the program and the selection of appropriate military installations for its implementation. It covers in some detail the many problems created for FORSCOM by the vastness of the program. It also includes the impact of this program on the overall readiness of FORSCOM's Active and Reserve Component units. It covers in some detail the actual operations at the Orote Point Camp, Guam; Fort Chaffee, Ark.; and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa.

This monograph was initiated by Mr. Warner Stark, formerly assigned to the FORSCOM Historical Office, and completed by the undersigned. I wish to thank Ms. Judy Harrison and Miss Wanda Washington of the FORSCOM Historical Office staff for their invaluable typing support. I also wish to express my deep sense of gratitude to Mr. Jean R. Moenk, Chief Historian, U.S. Army Forces Command, for his professional assistance, keen editorial judgment, and constant encouragement during the entire process.

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Fort McPherson, Georgia
1 September 1981

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Chapter I

BACKGROUND

The Collapse of South Vietnam

Cease-Fire Negotiations

During the cease-fire negotiations in late 1972, the North Vietnamese Army continued to prepare a logistical base and lines of communication to support a future twenty division offensive in the Republic of South Vietnam.¹ The cease-fire agreement, which was signed on 27 January 1973, facilitated this buildup by giving the North Vietnamese what amounted to free rein in Laos, the northern and western highlands of South Vietnam, and eastern Cambodia. Following the signing of the cease-fire agreement, North Vietnam accelerated its buildup of both the logistics base and an all-weather year-round lines of communication system. This latter consisted of a newly constructed 300-mile corridor in Laos and the Route 14 complex in the western highlands of South Vietnam. By the end of 1974, the U.S. Defense Attache in Saigon reported that the North Vietnamese had increased their military strength to unprecedented levels. This buildup included the movement of some 1,000 armored vehicles and 600 artillery pieces into South Vietnam. At the conclusion of these materiel movements, the North Vietnamese Army could exercise fire superiority at the place and time of its choosing. It also had on hand sufficient stocks of food and ammunition to support an offensive for a year at 1972 levels.

Decrease in U.S. Aid

Following the cease-fire, South Vietnam gradually reduced the strength of its armed forces, believing this action to be safe within the cease-fire guarantees. Once it had become obvious that North Vietnam was strengthening its overall military capability, South Vietnam began to rebuild its armed forces to the authorized 1.1 million man level. This program, however, coupled with a reduction in U.S. aid from \$1 billion to \$700 million in August 1974, proved to be too late and too little to counter the North Vietnamese buildup. South Vietnamese finances received another, almost mortal blow in the form of a sudden major increase in the price of oil which caused a heavy drawdown in those funds available for the purchase of necessary hardware.

1.

Unless otherwise indicated, the entire section is based on: (1) U.S. House of Representatives, Special Sub-Committee on Investigations, Hearings on the Vietnam Emergency, 1975, Part III - Vietnam Evacuation: Testimony of Ambassador Graham A. Martin, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 1976, pp. 538 - 42 (Cited hereafter as Martin Testimony); (2) Timmes, MG C.J., "Vietnam Summary: Military Operations After the Cease-Fire Agreement," Part I, Military Review, LVI (Aug 76), pp. 63 - 75, and Part II, Military Review, LVI (Sep 76), pp. 21 - 29; (3) DOD, Vietnam Report, Defense Attache, 12 Dec 72 - 21 Aug 74. (SECRET --Info used is UNCLASSIFIED).

Reaction by South Vietnam

Despite these fiscal handicaps, the South Vietnamese had recaptured all of the strategic areas taken by the North Vietnamese earlier in the year. However, this proved to be a pyrrhic victory. The South Vietnamese Army suffered severe casualties and a heavy loss in morale due, in part, to their reduced firepower in the face of constantly increasing North Vietnamese firepower. It was obvious that North Vietnam intended to invade South Vietnam as soon as the opportunity presented itself. In January, apparently in a test case, North Vietnam overran South Vietnam's Phouc Long Province. When the war-weary United States failed to react, the North Vietnamese correctly concluded that an all-out invasion would not be opposed by Free World forces.

With the beginning of the all-out North Vietnamese invasion in March 1975, the President of South Vietnam, acting on the advice of his military leaders, ordered the immediate evacuation of Military Regions 1 and 2 in the North. South Vietnamese troops panicked and the withdrawal soon turned into a full-scale rout. The situation might have been stabilized if the President had issued explicit orders that he wanted an orderly withdrawal to establish a defensive perimeter north of Saigon. By 20 April 1975, as a result of poor strategic planning, poor leadership, and, perhaps, the failure of the United States to grant emergency military aid to resupply the South Vietnamese military forces, the military situation in South Vietnam was hopeless.

Presidential Attempts to Avert Disaster

As the South Vietnamese troops fell back in disorder in March 1975, President Gerald R. Ford proposed an emergency aid bill of \$722 million in military aid and \$327 million in civilian aid. During the week of 23 March, Congress passed a \$3.7 billion foreign aid bill which reduced the President's request for aid to Vietnam by \$449 million and adjourned without voting on the emergency aid proposals. President Ford then dispatched the Army Chief of Staff, General Fred C. Weyand, to Vietnam on a fact finding mission. Upon his return, General Weyand reported that an additional \$722 million was required to stabilize the deteriorating military situation in South Vietnam. He stated that, if these funds were provided immediately, the South Vietnamese would be able to hold their reestablished but reduced military lines. When the Congress reconvened, the President appeared before them to argue the case for immediate emergency aid in order to permit a negotiated peace and the safe evacuation of American citizens, but Congress refused to act. Meanwhile, the Republic of South Vietnam slowly crumbled.²

2.

(1) HQDA, Department of the Army After Action Report, Operations NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS: U.S. Army Support to the Indochinese Refugee Program, 1 April 1975 - 1 June 1976, 25 Jan 77, p. I-A-3 (cited hereafter as DA, ARR-NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS); (2) Congressional Record, 94th Congress, 1st Session, pp. H2683 - 85; (3) Anon., "Thieu's Risky Retreat," Time, (March 31, 1975), pp. 30 - 31; (4) Martin Testimony, pp. 541 - 42.

Early Evacuations from Vietnam

When it became clear that Vietnam's northern provinces were ready to fall in early March 1975, the U.S. Agency for International Development began arranging for the evacuation of refugees from those areas to the south of Vietnam. This mission was assigned to the U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), who immediately initiated plans for the evacuation of refugees from the old imperial capital city of Hue. However, that city fell before any plans could be implemented. The Pacific Commander then concentrated on getting refugees out of the Da Nang area. Whereas the Hue evacuation had been a reaction to a crisis and had been undertaken relatively informally, the evacuation from Da Nang and those following were not. On 25 March, the U.S. Defense Attache Office, Saigon, requested that the Military Sealift Command provide support for evacuations from Da Nang. Three days later, the U.S. Secretary of State requested that the Department of Defense assist in the evacuation of Vietnamese civilians from Da Nang by both air and sea. On 29 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific, as the Department of Defense Vietnamese Refugee Coordinator for the requested support. On 1 April, the Saigon Evacuation Coordination Center was opened to assist in the management of American support.³

During the first week of April, Communist forces captured Da Nang and all of Quang Nam province, along with the province of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, and Lam Dong. During that hectic week, World Airways embarked on an operation directed by the U.S. State Department to airlift 10,000 refugees from Da Nang to Cam Rahn Bay. This plan was soon terminated when civil confusion and violence at the Da Nang airfield caused a cessation of air operations. At the same time, however, some 35,000 refugees were evacuated from Da Nang to Cam Rahn Bay by the U.S. Military Sealift Command. By the second week in April, when it had become apparent that South Vietnam would soon fall, the U.S. Navy began assembling a massive evacuation fleet off the coast of Vietnam. This fleet included 9 amphibious vessels, several vessels of the Military Sealift Command, and 4 aircraft carriers -- the U.S.S. Enterprise, the U.S.S. Hancock, the U.S.S. Coral Sea, and the U.S.S. Midway, -- for a total of 40 ships, not counting Vietnamese, Cambodian, and friendly third country vessels.⁴

3.

(1) Comptroller of the U.S., Report to the Subcommittee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Review of Preliminary Estimates of Evacuation Costs, Temporary Care, and Resettlement Costs of Vietnamese and Cambodian Refugees, May 27, 1975, pp. 5 and 16 - 17 (cited hereafter as Comptroller of the U.S. Report, May 27, 1975); (2) HQ CINCPAC, History of Pacific Command Support to Operation NEW LIFT (1 Apr - 1 Nov 75), undated, pp. I-1 - I-3 (cited hereafter as CINCPAC, Support to NEW LIFE).

4.

CINCPAC, Support to NEW LIFE, pp. I-1 - I-3.

Early Funding Actions

In order to fund these and other related missions, the Agency for International Development allocated \$31,272,000 to its Mission Program, referred to as Humanitarian and Refugee Relief, with some \$16 million identified for airlift and sealift evacuation. Although some of the remaining funds, about \$15 million, were used for continuing operations, most of these funds were intended for emergency relief. Presidential Determination 75-13, 8 April 1975, transferred \$5 million from the Agency for International Development to the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs which initially was responsible for evacuating and resettling the Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees.⁵

Presidential Initiatives

Up to this point there had been no indication that the U.S. Government planned to evacuate anyone other than Americans from the collapsing Republic of South Vietnam. The first public mention of bringing Vietnamese refugees into the United States came in President Ford's State of the Union address. He told the Congress: "...I must, of course, as I think each of you would, consider the safety of nearly 6,000 Americans who remain in South Vietnam and the tens of thousands of South Vietnamese employees of the United States Government, of news agencies, of contractors, and businesses for many years whose lives, with their dependents, are in very grave peril. There are tens of thousands of other South Vietnamese intellectuals, professors, teachers, editors, and opinion-leaders who have supported the South Vietnamese cause and the alliance with the United States, to whom we have a profound moral obligation."⁶

President Ford urged Congress to pass an emergency aid bill designed to protect American lives by ensuring their evacuation, should it be necessary. He requested that Congress expedite this request and come to a decision by 19 April. He also asked for similar action on his request to revise the immigration laws to "cover those Vietnamese to whom we have a very special obligation and whose lives may be in danger, should the worst come to pass." However, Congress saw no compelling reason to pass such legislation at that time, thus forcing the President to find alternate funding sources.⁷

5.

Comptroller of the U.S., Report, May 27, 1975, pp. 16 - 17.

6.

U.S., Congressional Record, 94th Congress, 1st Session, H2685.

7.

Ibid.

State Department Actions

In late March, the Department of State developed plans for the evacuation of both Americans and "high risk" Vietnamese and Cambodian nationals from the two countries. The Department directed the U.S. Embassy in Saigon to provide weekly status reports concerning the total numbers of Americans and others for whose emergency evacuation the United States was responsible. The rationale for this order was as follows:⁸

"....instructions were aimed at obtaining information from the U.S. Embassy in Saigon which was related to the categories and priorities of those Vietnamese to whom the United States had a moral obligation to evacuate and who would be most endangered under a Communist regime. This included close relatives of American citizens, Vietnamese employees of the United States Government and their families, ranking government officials of South Vietnam and their families, and others whom the Embassy felt should be included."

By this time, however, all Americans who desired evacuation had been removed from the two northern military regions of Vietnam except for those captured at Ban Me Thout and subsequently released. Only the southern regions, Military Regions 3 and 4, remained under South Vietnamese control. At the same time, the State Department instructed the Embassy in Saigon to recommend that all nonofficial Americans consider evacuating their dependents and to urge less essential nonofficial American personnel to leave the country. The department also requested that the Embassy develop and forward a priority listing of evacuees.

Granting of Parole Authority. At the beginning of April, the U.S. Embassy in Saigon had no authority to evacuate Vietnamese citizens except those who met rigorous standards of relationship to American citizens. This lack of authority obstructed the Embassy's capability to evacuate many Americans who had acquired Vietnamese dependents and who chose not to leave Vietnam without them. As late as 14 April, the Embassy was authorized to parole (waive visa requirements) only the 2,547 orphans being airlifted to the United States in Operation BABYLIFT. On that date, the State Department notified the U.S. Embassy in Saigon that the President had obtained limited parole authority from the Attorney General for selected Vietnamese. This parole authority permitted entry into the United States for those Vietnamese who already had relatives (not necessarily U.S. citizens) physically present in this country. Despite the fact that the military situation had become chaotic by the following day, it appeared that neither the President nor the Secretary of State was anxious to withdraw Americans from the beleaguered country. Moreover, during the following week, the State Department instructed the Embassy to attempt to broaden the categories of Vietnamese who could be

8.

The President's Advisory Committee on Refugees, Background Papers, 19 May 1975, p. 12.

admitted to the United States. This expanded guidance extended parole status to any Vietnamese who was not currently under a travel ban. This action specifically exempted soldiers, police, and men of draft age. In order to qualify for parole status under these broadened requirements, an individual had to have been closely associated with the United States' presence in the area, i.e., employees of the United States Government and relatives of either American citizens or resident aliens in the United States.⁹

Evacuation by the Embassy. The relatively late granting of parole authority did not mean that Vietnamese were not being evacuated from the country. As Ambassador Martin noted "...we were getting thousands of people out each day, most quite illegally from both Vietnamese or United States legal requirements." Specifically, he noted that the Secretary of State had requested the Embassy to do what it could to evacuate the Vietnamese employees of American press and television offices. Mr. Bill Ellis, Bureau Chief for the Columbia Broadcasting System in Saigon, and Mr. John Hogan, the Embassy Attache, developed a plan which resulted in the illegal evacuation of 595 such persons. He also observed that, in early April, he had received some very critical cables from the Department of State concerning the Vietnamese being spirited out of Vietnam by U.S. Defense Attache personnel using U.S. military aircraft which brought in military supplies from the Philippines. These aircraft returned to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines where the Vietnamese debarked. The State Department directed Ambassador Martin to find a way to return them since the Philippine Government was very upset about harboring them on its territory. However, events moved too quickly to effect their return. Most of these early evacuees were subsequently moved to Guam when it was opened as a refugee safe haven. During the period 1 through 20 April, 2,684 Americans and 2,819 other nationals were evacuated from Vietnam during Operation BABYLIFT.¹⁰

Operation BABYLIFT

On 1 April 1975, Ms. Charlotte Behrendt, daughter of Mr. Edward J. Daly, President of World Airways, Inc., telephoned Col. Robert V. Kane, Commander, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif., to request assistance in providing temporary care for several hundred orphans being flown from Vietnam to the United States by her father. The aircraft was scheduled to land at Oakland International Airport, across the bay from the Presidio, on the following day. Colonel Kane was unaware of the fact that the plane had departed Saigon without either American or Vietnamese approval. He agreed to do what he could to help the children and requested approval from Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command. This request for approval was promptly answered in the affirmative. On the following day, some forty-five orphans arrived and were sheltered

9.

(1) Ibid.; (2) Martin Testimony, pp. 543 - 44.

10.

Martin Testimony, pp. 548 - 49.

elsewhere. In the meantime, Department of the Army and FORSCOM became aware of an official program to evacuate orphans on a much larger scale. On 1 April, the State Department requested assistance from Department of the Army in providing temporary care for about 2,000 Vietnamese and Cambodian orphans to be airlifted into the United States from Vietnam. This effort, known as Operation BABYLIFT, was supported by the Agency for International Development and managed by civilian volunteer agencies. In view of the troubled circumstances surrounding this particular evacuation, it was not surprising that some of the evacuees were not orphans. They had been placed on the evacuation flights by terrified parents. At least one child was returned to its mother after a legal adoption had taken place in the United States. Operation BABYLIFT had no connection with the later placement of some 645 unaccompanied Vietnamese children who were found in the Refugee Centers.¹¹

On 2 April 1975, the Secretary of the Army granted authority to FORSCOM to use Army facilities at the Presidio of San Francisco for sheltering orphans. Subsequently, the Department of the Army selected Fort Lewis, Wash., another FORSCOM installation, as an additional support installation. It also selected Fort Benning, Ga. -- U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) installation -- to provide shelter to 196 orphans for a month prior to their placement in adoptive homes. In addition to housing the orphans, the installations provided logistical, administrative, and communications support to the civilian agencies administering the program. On 2 April 1975, the Presidio of San Francisco published a Support Plan for Vietnamese Orphans which provided for that installation assuming responsibility for communication facilities, housing, food service, transportation, equipment, supplies, and security. The plan also ensured a successful coordinated effort between the various adoption agencies, the Air Force, the Agency for International Development, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Red Cross, the Army Community Service, and numerous local community volunteers, a significant number of whom were young adults from on-post families as well as students from the University of San Francisco. A volunteer organization known as Orphan Airlift, Inc., assumed responsibility for the coordination and overall responsibility for all other aspects of the operation such as the identification, processing, and release of orphans; medical services; volunteers; records; internal communications; interagency liaison; and so on.¹²

11.

HEW Refugee Task Force, Report to the Congress, 15 Mar 76, pp. 8 - 9.

12.

(1) HQ, Presidio of San Francisco, After Action Report - Support Plan for Vietnamese Orphans (SPOVO), Phase I & II, 30 Jun 75, pp. 1 - 2; (2) AID, Operation BABYLIFT Report, Apr - Jun 75, undated, pp. 16 - 22.

TABLE 1

OPERATION BABYLIFT PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO			
Date/Time of Arrival	Airfield/Carrier	Orphans	Escorts
	<u>Totals</u>	<u>1,393 (1,205)</u>	<u>281 (143)</u>
3 Apr/0035	Oakland Int'l Airport World Airways	59 (58)	-0- (14)
5 Apr/1740	San Francisco Int'l Airport Pan American	13 (18)	-0- (6)
5 Apr/2130	San Francisco Int'l Airport Pan American	319 (319)	-0- (21)
7 Apr/1100	Travis A.F.B. USAF	64 (65)	-0- (21)
8 Apr/1345	Travis A.F.B. USAF	269 (291)	95 (73)
13 Apr/unk	Transfer from Travis	12	-0-
21 Apr/2240	Oakland Int'l Airport World Airways	76 (76)	88 (0)
22 Apr/0215	Oakland Int'l Airport World Airways	128	12 a/
24 Apr/1916	Travis A.F.B. USAF	24 (24)	-0-
27 Apr/1916	Oakland Int'l Airport World Airways	199 (199)	10 (0) b/
27 Apr/2100	Travis A.F.B. USAF	65 (55)	8 (8)
28 Apr/0530	Travis A.F.B. USAF	35 (35)	54 (0)
28 Apr/2245	Travis A.F.B. USAF	65 (65)	7 (0)
29 Apr/0300	Travis A.F.B.	65	7
<p><u>Note:</u> Figures in parenthesis are AID counts</p> <p>a. Not shown in AID Report</p> <p>b. Montagnard orphans under Danish sponsorship</p>			
<p><u>Source:</u> (1) HQ, Presidio of San Francisco, After Action Report - Support Plan for Vietnamese Orphans (SPOVO), Phase 1 & 11, 30 Jun 75, pp. 1-2; (2) AID, Operation BABYLIFT Report, Apr-Jun 75, undated, pp. 16-22. (Both UNCLASSIFIED).</p>			

Shelter operations at the Presidio of San Francisco were conducted in two phases. Phase I began with the arrival of the first fifty-nine orphans in the early hours of 3 April (Table 1). Thereafter orphans arrived so rapidly that the single building set aside for them proved to be totally inadequate and installation officials quickly opened two additional buildings. Phase I ended on 13 April with the departure of the last orphan to an adoptive home. Phase II began on 21 April with the arrival of additional orphan flights and ended on 4 May when the last group of eighteen children departed, thus ending Operation BABYLIFT. During this shelter operation, the Presidio of San Francisco housed, clothed, fed, and processed 1,393 out of a total of 2,547 orphans for further movement. Fort Lewis processed 229 orphans while Fort Benning cared for 231. The remainder were cared for by either the U.S. Navy or the Holt Foundation in Oregon.¹³

Later Evacuations

New Categories for Evacuation

On 25 April, four days before Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese, the State Department defined three categories of Vietnamese who were targeted for evacuation. The first category consisted of some 4,000 orphans. In the second category were 10,000 to 75,000 relatives of U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens. The third category consisted of some 50,000 "high risk" Vietnamese including past and present U.S. Government employees; officials whose cooperation would be necessary for the evacuation of U.S. citizens; individuals with a knowledge of sensitive U.S. intelligence operations; vulnerable political or intellectual figures; communist defectors; employees of U.S. firms operating in Vietnam; employees of voluntary agencies; certain labor officials; and participants in U.S. Government sponsored programs.¹⁴

Ambassador Martin, on the scene in Saigon, considered the 50,000 "high risk" figure to be too low. He decided, unilaterally that, that number included only heads of families, not the families themselves. Since the Vietnamese family was based on a broadly extended family, rather than on the Western nuclear family, the Ambassador's action automatically increased the potential number of evacuees by a factor of eight to a new total of 400,000 persons. This generally accepted factor of eight was employed by the Department of Defense when it estimated possible requirements for shelter and rations. It should be noted that the initial evacuation concept of 50,000 refugees closely identified with

13.

(1) HQ, Presidio of San Francisco, After Action Report - Support Plan for Vietnamese Orphans (SPOVO), Phase I & II, 30 Jun 75, pp. 1 - 2; (2) AID, Operation BABYLIFT Report, Apr - Jun 75, undated, pp. 16 - 22.

14.

(1) U.S. Senate, Report of the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Refugees, 9 Jun 75, p. 6; (2) Martin Testimony, pp. 543 - 44.

the United States and representative of the mid- to high-level socioeconomic strata of Vietnamese society would present the least problem to the American society in terms of evacuation and assimilation. The actual evacuation did not, however, proceed as these preliminary plans provided. The situation deteriorated rapidly and uncontrollably in the face of a massive and ungovernable exodus from the collapsing nation. This flight brought on a host of problems which made the Defense Department's refugee program most difficult to manage.¹⁵

During the period mid-March to mid-April, the U.S. Government had no established policy for determining how the evacuations should be conducted; who should be evacuated and in what priority; what should be done to or for the refugees once they were safely out of Vietnam; and which agency should be responsible for those refugees once they arrived in the United States. In the absence of definite guidance, decisions were made on an ad hoc basis in the field and in Washington. Thus, it was not surprising that planeloads of refugees often mysteriously appeared on Guam or even in the United States without any warning or preparations being made for their arrival. A case in point was the arrival in early April of 150 Vietnamese at the Los Gatos Christian Church in Los Gatos, Calif. Neither the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Regional Office in San Francisco nor its headquarters in Washington, D.C., had any idea where these people had come from, other than the obvious fact they were from Vietnam. Neither office had received advance warning of their arrival; neither office knew if this was an isolated group or the first of many; and, finally, the Regional Office in San Francisco had no directives from Washington regarding what should be done with these people or any other such group which might have arrived or might be arriving.¹⁶

Creation of the Interagency Task Force

In order to correct such situations, President Ford announced the establishment of the Interagency Task Force for Indochina (IATF) under the direction of the State Department on 19 April. At the same time, the President announced the appointment of Ambassador L. Dean Brown as his Special Representative for Indochinese Refugees and Director of the Interagency Task Force. The task force was staffed by senior officials representing all of the major affected Federal agencies and departments in Washington. One of the first actions of the task force was to establish a 24-hour a day watch group at the State Department operations center. Ambassador Brown was replaced on 27 May by Mrs. Julia V. Taft of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, who served as the Director, Interagency Task Force, until its dissolution on 31 December.

15.

Martin Testimony, pp. 543 - 44.

16.

Ibid.

The task force was responsible for coordinating the many actions and programs undertaken by the U.S. Government to support the refugees, both in the Pacific area and in the continental United States. These programs included responsibility for reception, processing, relocation, and resettlement.¹⁷

Initial Defense Department Refugee Structure. In conjunction with the establishment of the Interagency Task Force, the Department of Defense began planning for the reception of at least 200,000 refugees and created its own task force to oversee, monitor, and coordinate that Department's activities. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), Mr. Morton I. Abramowitz, initially headed the group which was charged with providing direction and guidance to the military services. This Defense Task Force formulated all major decisions affecting service support to the refugee program. Mr. Abramowitz also served as the senior Defense Department representative to the Interagency Task Force. The Defense Department executive for the Defense Task Force was Vice Admiral Thomas J. Wechsler, USN, the Joint Chiefs of Staff J-4 (Logistics). Within the Army Staff, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans served as the overall coordinating agency. Maj. Gen. Charles R. Sniffen, Director of Operations, acted as the single manager for all phases of the Army's support of refugee operations, with day-to-day assistance from the U.S. Army Military Support Agency (later redesignated the Military Support Division, Operations Directorate), and other selected members of the Army Staff.¹⁸

Preliminary Funding. On 28 April 1975, the day before the fall of Saigon, President Ford notified Congress that he intended to exercise his authority under Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to authorize the use of Indochina Postwar Reconstruction Funds for the purpose of financing the evacuation of certain South Vietnamese nationals and nationals of other foreign countries. He exercised this authority through the issuance of Presidential Determination 75-17. This determination allotted \$98 million to the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs between 23 April and 2 May 1975 as follows:¹⁹

17.

(1) U.S. Senate, Report of the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Refugees, 9 Jun 75, p. 6; (2) Interagency Task Force on Indochina Refugees, Report to the Congress, 15 Jun 75, p. 12.

18.

DA, AAR-NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, pp. I-A-5 - I-A-6 and I-B-1 - I-B-8.

19.

(1) Comptroller of the U.S., Report, 27 May 75, p. 17; (2) Comptroller of the U.S., Report to the Congress: U.S. Provides Safehaven for Indochinese Refugees (OSD Case 4099), 16 Jun 75, pp. 5 - 6 (hereafter cited as Comptroller of the U.S., Report, 16 Jun 75); (3) U.S. Congressional Record, 94th Congress, 1st Session, H3348.

Presidential Determination 75-17

<u>Total</u>	<u>\$98,000,000</u>
Unobligated Cambodian Economic Stabilization Fund Money	6,000,000
Unobligated Cambodian Mission Funds for Humanitarian and Refugee Assistance	4,300,000
Unobligated Cambodian Commodity Import Program Funds	15,000,000
Unobligated Vietnam Commodity Import Program Funds	40,000,000
Unobligated Vietnam Mission Funds for Humanitarian and Refugee Assistance	17,700,000
Unallotted/Unobligated Funds	15,000,000

This sum did not include \$4 million previously transferred from the Agency for International Development to the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs pursuant to the previously noted Presidential Determination 75-13. Later, in May 1975, Congress authorized an additional \$405 million for the transportation, care, and resettlement of Indochinese refugees.

Final Evacuation

By mid-April 1975, the military situation in South Vietnam had deteriorated to the point where defeat was imminent. As noted above, refugee evacuations had already begun so that, in addition to the orphans taken out in Operation BABYLIFT, some 7,000 to 8,000 other persons, both Vietnamese and Americans, had already fled the country. While most of these had landed at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, that government was not happy with the development and had pressured the United States to locate another safe haven. In the meantime, events overtook the planning. Beginning in late April and continuing through the fall of Saigon on 30 April, two waves of refugees poured out of South Vietnam. Their exodus was marked by panic and represented an almost blind flight from the collapsing nation. They literally swamped United States safe haven facilities and seriously aggravated the problems encountered by the Defense Department in caring for greater numbers of people in less time than originally planned. The first wave, which began in the last days of April and ended with the fall of Saigon, consisted of some 86,000 Vietnamese and Americans. It included the Ambassador, the Embassy Staff, several high ranking Saigon civilian and military officials, and a few

TABLE 2

CUMULATIVE SEALIFT SUMMARY
EVACUATION OF VIETNAM

	US	VN	OTHER	TOTAL
<u>TOTAL MSC MOVEMENT</u>	<u>89</u>	<u>179,136</u>	<u>180</u>	<u>179,405</u>
MSC INTRA-VIETNAM MOVEMENT		120,787		120,787
MSC MOVEMENT TO SUBIC BAY, P.I.	84	17,066	152	17,302
MSC MOVEMENT TO GUAM	5	41,283	28	41,316
<u>TOTAL USN/REPUBLIC OF CAMBODIA MOVEMENT</u>	<u>805</u>	<u>6,487</u>	<u>136</u>	<u>7,428</u>
USN/ROC Navy MOVEMENT-SUBIC BAY, P.I.	805	6,403	136	7,344
USN MOVEMENT TO GUAM		84		84
<u>TOTAL VIETNAMESE MOVEMENT</u>		<u>6,057</u>		<u>6,057</u>
VN MOVEMENT TO SUBIC BAY, P.I.		3,140		3,140
VN MOVEMENT TO GUAM		2,917		2,917
REPUBLIC OF LAOS MOVEMENT TO SUBIC BAY, P.I.		9	738	748

RECAPITULATION

<u>Total number of refugees moved by ship</u>	<u>193,638</u>
Military Sealift Command	179,405 (120,787=Intra-Vietnam)
USN/Cambodian	7,428
Vietnamese	6,057
Laotian	748

Source: HQ, CINCPAC, History of Pacific Command Support to Operation
NEW LIFE (1 Apr - 1 Nov 75), undated, p. II-53. (UNCLASSIFIED)

TABLE 3

AIRLIFT STATISTICS, APR 1-30

Day and Type of Aircraft	Daily Evacuees			Cumulative Evacuees		
	United States	Other	Total	United States	Other	Total
1 - C-141	a	a	a	a	a	a
2 - C-141	a	a	a	a	a	a
3 - C-141	a	a	a	a	a	a
4 - C-141	a	a	a	a	a	a
5 - C-141	a	a	a	a	a	a
6 - C-141	258		258	258		258
7 - C-141	246		504	504		504
8 - C-141	81		585	585		585
9 - C-141	141	372	513	726	372	1,098
10 - C-141	138	666	804	864	1,038	1,902
11 - C-141	194	647	841	1,058	1,685	2,743
12 - C-141	84	100	184	1,142	1,785	2,927
13 - C-141	143	52	195	1,285	1,837	3,122
14 - C-141	94	50	144	1,379	1,887	3,266
15 - C-141	86	348	434	1,465	2,285	3,700
16 - C-141	86	61	147	1,551	2,296	3,847
17 - C-141	74	106	180	1,625	2,402	4,027
18 - C-141	612	374	986	2,237	2,776	5,013
19 - C-141	300	b	300	2,537	2,776	5,313
20 - C-141	147	43	190	2,684	2,819	5,503
21 - C-141/C-130	249	334	583	2,933	3,153	6,086
22 - C-141/C-130	550	2,781	3,331	3,483	5,934	9,417
23 - C-141/C-130	488	3,824	4,312	3,971	9,758	13,729
24 - C-141/C-130	190	5,574	5,764	4,161	15,332	19,493
25 - C-141/C-130	501	4,354	4,855	4,662	19,686	24,348
26 - C-141/C-130	381	6,376	6,757	5,043	26,062	31,105
27 - C-141/C-130	219	7,359	7,578	5,262	33,421	38,683
28 - C-130	128	6,109	6,237	5,390	39,530	44,920
29 - C-130/Helo)	c					
30 - Helo)	1,373	5,595	6,968	6,763	45,125	51,888

a. Data not available

b. Unknown

c. Includes 855 marines of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade

Vietnamese employees of the U.S. Embassy. On the last day alone, 6,968 people were evacuated by air (some from the Embassy's rooftop) and an additional 6,000 by barge (Tables 2 and 3).²⁰

This relatively orderly exodus was followed by a second, unplanned for, panicked wave of humanity fleeing from the Communist takeover. Over 65,000 people fled in assorted vessels, commandeered aircraft, or ground transport to safe havens outside of South Vietnam. While the U.S. State Department had had some tenuous control over the earlier evacuations, it had absolutely none over this last wave. The Department was forced by events to react as best it could under the circumstances. Even when there was time to initiate an orderly evacuation, the Department vacillated until it was too late. Because of this situation, the Defense Department, too, was forced to react with crisis management techniques. While these methods succeeded, they caused a great number of problems, especially for the Army which handled most of the refugees coming through Guam and more than half of those subsequently sheltered in the United States.²¹

Defense Department Planning

Preliminary Planning

By early April 1975, the Department of Defense was alerted by the National Command Authority to be prepared to clothe, feed, and house as many as 1.5 million refugees if Vietnam should fall to the Communists. Since the Army was the largest of the uniformed services and the best equipped to handle large numbers of people, Defense Department planners knew that it would have to bear the brunt of any refugee support program. By mid-April, the possibility that a considerable percentage of Army personnel and logistics effort would have to be directed toward this end created a certain amount of consternation in the Army's upper echelons. If the Army, with less than 785,000 troops, was directed to provide support for that many refugees, it could neither maintain its worldwide security missions nor maintain unit readiness at acceptable levels. At that time, Army planners believed that one solution to the personnel problem might lie in using Army Reserve Component personnel or units, a hope that later proved futile due to the restrictions of existing legislation on the use of the Reserve Components.²²

20.

(1) U.S. Senate, Report of the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Refugees, 9 Jun 75, pp. 7, 14 - 15; (2) Martin Testimony, pp. 578 - 87, 616 - 17; (3) Times, "Vietnam Summary," Part II, pp. 27 - 29.

21.

Times, "Vietnam Summary," Part II, pp. 27 - 29.

22.

(1) Intvw, CPT E.D. Miller, FORSCOM Hist Ofc MOBDES w/Mr. Anthony Auletta, DA DCSOPS Civil Affairs, Sp Op Div, 24 Jul 75; (2) Msg 201801Z Apr 75, JCS to Distr #6802, no subj; (3) DA, AAR-NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, pp. I-A-2 - I-A-4.

Due to the overall vagueness of the refugee situation, the Defense Department engaged only in preliminary planning up to late April, since the State Department had been unable to provide any firm guidance concerning the operation. As the military situation in Vietnam grew bleaker, the State Department seemed reluctant to either take any positive action or to provide much more than the most general guidelines. The Department of the Army, as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, closely monitored known developments but took no steps to prepare for eventualities. The Department forwarded pertinent messages to U.S. Army Forces Command in order to keep the command generally informed. FORSCOM, in turn, was unable to take any positive preparatory steps since it had no idea what form the problem was going to take.²³

State Department Guidance

On 22 April, about a week before Saigon fell, the State Department finally provided some much needed guidance regarding the evacuations from Vietnam and subsequent operations. The Department stated that the emergency in Indochina warranted assistance from the United States under the provisions of Department of Defense Directive 5100.46, "Responsibilities for Foreign Disaster Relief Operations." Secretary of State Henry Kissinger requested that the Defense Department -- under the overall coordination of the Interagency Task Force -- arrange for the withdrawal of up to 50,000 evacuees as designated by State Department officials. The Defense Department was to move these refugees as expeditiously as possible to safe havens outside the United States or to installations in U.S. territories. The Department was also to be prepared to hold the refugees at the territorial installations until such time as the State and Justice Departments provided instructions for their final disposition. According to initial plans, this would be for a 90-day period with the possibility of a further extension. In carrying out these instructions, the Defense Department was empowered to obtain any required assistance from other governmental departments and agencies.²⁴

FORSCOM Participation

Coordination with Department of the Army

On 23 April 1975, Department of the Army directed FORSCOM to initiate planning for the reception and staging of refugees from South Vietnam. At that time, Maj. Gen. Charles R. Sniffen personally provided firm guidance to Brig. Gen. W. Russell Todd, the FORSCOM Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. General Sniffen had just discussed the refugee problem with Maj. Gen. Maurice F. Casey, USAF, Deputy Director, J-4 (Strategic Mobility), Joint Chiefs of Staff, and was passing the

23.

DA, AAR-NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, pp. 1-A-2 - 1-A-4.

24.

Msg 222143Z Apr 75, DA to FORSCOM, subj: Indochina Evacuees.

TABLE 4

EMERGENCY FACILITIES SITE SELECTION

Installation	Potential Spaces ^a																																												
	<table> <tr> <td data-bbox="987 562 1047 583">Total</td><td data-bbox="1215 562 1301 583">369,573</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 636 683 657">Fort McCoy [Sparta, Wis.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 636 1301 657">46,800</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 659 794 680">Camp Roberts [Paso Robles, Calif.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 659 1301 680">40,500</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 682 745 703">Fort Pickett [Blackstone, Va.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 682 1301 703">38,250</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 705 756 726">Fort Chaffee [Fort Smith, Ark.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 705 1311 726">37,463^b</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 728 695 749">Fort Lewis [Tacoma, Wash.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 728 1311 749">29,650^c</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 751 733 772">Amarillo AFB [Amarillo, Tex.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 751 1311 772">23,625^d</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 774 806 795">Fort Indiantown Gap [Annville, Pa.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 774 1301 795">21,600</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 798 707 819">Fort Drum [Watertown, N.Y.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 798 1301 819">21,600</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 821 695 842">Fort Knox [Fort Knox, Ky.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 821 1301 842">14,400</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 844 816 865">Fort Leonard Wood [Waynesville, Mo.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 844 1301 865">12,600</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 867 778 888">Fort Riley [Junction City, Kans.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 867 1301 888">12,375</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 890 723 911">Fort Dix [Wrightstown, N.J.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 890 1301 911">11,250</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 913 683 934">Fort Meade [Odenton, Md.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 913 1301 934">11,250</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 936 683 957">Fort Hood [Killeen, Tex.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 936 1311 957">10,000^c</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 959 789 980">Fort Wolters [Mineral Wells, Tex.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 959 1311 980">8,046^d</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 982 716 1003">Fort Irwin [Barstow, Calif.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 982 1301 1003">8,010</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 1005 778 1026">Fort AP Hill [Bowling Green, Va.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 1005 1301 1026">7,000</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 1029 695 1050">Forbes AFB [Topeka, Kans.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 1029 1301 1050">6,378</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 1052 683 1073">Laredo AFB [Laredo, Tex.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 1052 1301 1073">3,473</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 1075 849 1096">Clinton-Sherman AFB [Burns Flat, Okla.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 1075 1301 1096">3,113</td></tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="386 1098 728 1119">Walker AFB [Rosewell, N.Mex.]</td><td data-bbox="1227 1098 1301 1119">2,190</td></tr> </table>	Total	369,573	Fort McCoy [Sparta, Wis.]	46,800	Camp Roberts [Paso Robles, Calif.]	40,500	Fort Pickett [Blackstone, Va.]	38,250	Fort Chaffee [Fort Smith, Ark.]	37,463 ^b	Fort Lewis [Tacoma, Wash.]	29,650 ^c	Amarillo AFB [Amarillo, Tex.]	23,625 ^d	Fort Indiantown Gap [Annville, Pa.]	21,600	Fort Drum [Watertown, N.Y.]	21,600	Fort Knox [Fort Knox, Ky.]	14,400	Fort Leonard Wood [Waynesville, Mo.]	12,600	Fort Riley [Junction City, Kans.]	12,375	Fort Dix [Wrightstown, N.J.]	11,250	Fort Meade [Odenton, Md.]	11,250	Fort Hood [Killeen, Tex.]	10,000 ^c	Fort Wolters [Mineral Wells, Tex.]	8,046 ^d	Fort Irwin [Barstow, Calif.]	8,010	Fort AP Hill [Bowling Green, Va.]	7,000	Forbes AFB [Topeka, Kans.]	6,378	Laredo AFB [Laredo, Tex.]	3,473	Clinton-Sherman AFB [Burns Flat, Okla.]	3,113	Walker AFB [Rosewell, N.Mex.]	2,190
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a. Individual space is normally computed on the basis of 90 square feet per person except under mobilization conditions when it is reduced to 40 square feet per person. The barracks and dormitory facilities listed were surveyed applying the 40 square feet factor and the yardstick for family housing units was based on six occupants per unit when calculated.

b. Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap, the two US Army sites utilized as reception centers for Indochinese evacuees, had peak refugee populations of 25,055 and 16,809, respectively.

c. Available spaces at Fort Lewis include 9,400 site facilities (tents and huts) and all spaces at both Fort Hood and Fort AP Hill consist of site facilities exclusively.

d. Fort Wolters and Amarillo AFB have been turned over to the control of local authorities and their utilization would consequently be subject to negotiation. Prior to its transfer, Amarillo AFB had 10,500 dormitory spaces computed on the criteria of 90 square feet per person.

Source: (1) Memo, DA/DOMS to FORSCOM, 211700Z Apr 75, subj: Emergency Facilities;
(2) HQDA, AFEN Action Report - NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS. (Both UNCLASSIFIED).

information on to FORSCOM for planning purposes only. General Sniffen reported that the major refugee staging area would be on Guam and would be scheduled to receive 50,000 refugees. Only those refugees with some form of sponsorship would be brought directly to the United States. Consequently, no major staging facilities would be required within the continental United States. He did caution General Todd, however, that this concept of operations represented an ideal case and that Lt. Gen. Donald F. Cowles, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, wanted to be certain that both the Department and FORSCOM were prepared to shelter and feed at least 20,000 refugees (this figure was for planning purposes only) in resettlement camps within the United States. In order of preference, the Department had selected Camp Roberts, Calif.; Fort Chaffee, Ark.; and Fort Pickett, Va.; as potential refugee centers. General Sniffen also noted that the State Department wanted to keep the refugees on the East Coast or in the South, but no reason was given for these geographical locations. Since General Sniffen was scheduled to see the Vice Chief of Staff, General Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., that afternoon, he wanted to know which installation was immediately available to handle the refugees. General Todd suggested Camp Roberts. General Sniffen concluded by alerting FORSCOM to the fact that it might have to support the refugee operations on Guam. He noted that such support might be required from FORSCOM's 25th Infantry Division (-), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and from Tripler Army Medical Center and other Army units in Hawaii, including the Reserve Components. General Sniffen did not assign any definite requirements for FORSCOM at that time.²⁵

Later that same day, Department of the Army notified FORSCOM that Guam had just been identified as a refugee safe haven with the mission of sheltering 25,000 refugees. In addition, there were 6,000 refugees in the Philippines whom that government wanted out as soon as possible. Therefore, all future evacuation flights from Vietnam would go straight to Guam except for those carrying major medical cases which would go to Japan or Hawaii. FORSCOM's major concern with operations on Guam would be with logistical, medical, and housekeeping support. The Department pointed out that there were no firm requirements as yet and no determination as to any source of Army assets to support the operation on Guam. FORSCOM was to be prepared to handle an overflow of refugees from Guam on the order of 50,000 to 200,000 people for 90 days or more. The State Department had identified 190,000 persons whom it would like to evacuate, but the probability of that happening grew more unlikely by the hour. FORSCOM was to identify and to use semiactive installations capable of handling 20,000 to 25,000 refugees each, based on forty square feet of living space per individual. (Table 4). Planning should be based upon an average of eight individuals per family and all funds expended in the operation would be reimbursed. FORSCOM would be in

25.

(1) MFR, BG W.R. Todd, FORSCOM ADCSOPS, 23 Apr 75, subj: Secure Voice Phone Call from MG Sniffen, DA, 23 Apr 75; (2) Intvw, Mr. M.W. Stark, FORSCOM Hist Ofc w/BG W.R. Todd, FORSCOM ADCSOPS, 21 May 76.

complete charge of the operation, with other Major Army Commands providing support as required. While the use of some Reserve Component units might become necessary, their involvement was to be kept to a minimum.²⁶

Initial FORSCOM Planning

On the basis of this preliminary guidance, FORSCOM immediately developed operational plans for Camp Roberts, Calif., Fort Chaffee, Ark., and Fort Pickett, Va. FORSCOM also established an Emergency Operations Committee which developed the required plans by consolidating the targeted installation's facilities and manpower, and then filling in whatever else was required for the operation of such basic functions as medical, food service, engineer, security, and administrative support. The committee decided that the required military personnel would have to come from elements of the Strategic Army Forces (STRAF). If General Support Forces (GSF) were employed, Strategic Army Force units would only have to fill the void at the vacated installations. The committee then chose Fort Hood, Tex., to provide the required support personnel since that installation had a corps' population including the 13th Corps Support Command. In addition, Strategic Army Force units on that installation occupied a lower position on the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) than the majority of units in the Strategic Army Forces. The Emergency Operations Staff was reluctant to use troops from either Fort Bragg, N.C., another major FORSCOM installation with extensive support capabilities, or Fort Riley, Kans., since the former had high priority units dedicated to the Airborne "D" Package, while the latter was dedicated to the support of REFORGER. After identifying overall functional areas and possible problems, the Emergency Operations Committee added a notional troop list for each plan. The three operations plans were prepared well in advance of the message directing their execution.²⁷

Previous Experience - Operation MERCY. FORSCOM's initial planning efforts were aided considerably by historical information concerning the Army's role in Operation MERCY during 1956 and 1957. That operation, which had handled 30,673 Hungarian refugees, had been directed at Camp Kilmer, N.J., by Lt. Gen. Thomas W. Herren, First U.S. Army Commander. That flight of refugees had stemmed from student demonstrations against the government in Budapest, Hungary, in late October 1956. The rebellion was crushed by the Soviet Forces, killing many Hungarians in the process. After seizing Budapest, the Soviets erected a puppet government on 4 November and by the end of April 1957, some 175,000 Hungarians had

26.

MFR, Col. W.M. Stevenson, C/EOC, 23 Apr 75, subj: Secure Voice FONECON Planning Guidance for Handling Vietnamese Refugees.

27.

Intvw, Mr. M.W. Stark, FORSCOM Hist Ofc w/Lt. Col. L.E. DiValentino, DCSOPS Plans Div, 19 May 76.

sought asylum in Austria. On 9 November 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower initiated a number of steps which resulted in the admission of 30,673 of these people to a safe haven in the United States.²⁸

Unit Selection. Some of the units chosen to support the refugee operation were selected on an area support concept. Units within a specified general area were identified to support operations at one of the three potential sites. The FORSCOM Emergency Operations Committee weeded out those units with overriding assignments such as the Airborne "D" Package and REFORGER. The remaining units were then tentatively assigned to a proposed refugee center. The supporting military police units were chosen as follows:²⁹

35th MP Battalion

Stationed at Fort Sill, Okla. Chosen to provide initial MP support to Fort Chaffee, Ark., until arrival of 720th MP Battalion (-), Fort Hood, Tex.

720th MP Battalion (-)

Stationed at Fort Hood, Tex. One company REFORGER Package. Remainder of battalion chosen to support Fort Chaffee, Ark.

759th MP Battalion

Stationed at Fort Dix, N.J. Chosen to support Camp Pickett, Va.

Despite the care taken to avoid using high priority units of the Strategic Army Forces in the refugee support operation, FORSCOM, nevertheless, had to deploy some such units. In fact, two of these units were critical to the Airborne "D" Package -- the 46th Support Group (CS) and elements of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion -- both stationed at Fort Bragg, N.C. The 46th Support Group was replaced in the Airborne "D" Package by the 43d Support Group from Fort Carson, Colo. The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, however, was the only such unit in the Active Component and, therefore, could not be replaced. Since elements of the

28.

(1) U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, Special Text 41-174; "Operation MERCY"; (2) 41st Mil Govt Co, Milita. Government Report: Operation MERCY, 1957.

29.

(1) Intvw, Mr. M.W. Stark, FORSCOM Hist Ofc w/MAJ C.R. Fritts, DCSPER-EOC, 1 May 75; (2) Intvw, Mr. M.W. Stark, FORSCOM Hist Ofc w/CPT A.J. Haas, DCSOPS-RO, 23 Jun 76.

96th Civil Affairs Battalion were necessarily deployed in support of all three Army-operated refugee centers, FORSCOM searched for ways to fill the needed civil affairs positions with Reserve Component civil affairs personnel.³⁰

Projected Impact on Reserve Component Training. Since each of the installations proposed by the Department of the Army was essentially a Reserve Component Training Center, the disruption of Reserve Component Annual Training for Calendar Year 1975 (Annual Training 75) was a source of major concern to FORSCOM. An impact statement prepared by the Reserve Component Training Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, showed that, while 12,451 Reservists were scheduled to perform Annual Training 75 at Camp Roberts, Calif., from 14 March through 2 August 1975, no problems would develop from rescheduling this training to other available sites. Fort Chaffee, Ark., on the other hand, was scheduled to host 28,388 Reservists for Annual Training 75; consequently, major problems would develop from attempting to reschedule their training. No major training problems were foreseen in the use of Camp Pickett, Va., since only 11,000 Reservists were due for training at that location. FORSCOM did not prepare an impact statement for Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa., since, at that time, official opinion at the Washington level was that the refugees would be kept in California or somewhere in the South. As matters eventually developed, no major problems occurred in this area with regard to the use of Fort Chaffee or Fort Indiantown Gap. All of the units scheduled to train at Fort Chaffee were able to do so with the exception of the 69th Infantry Brigade (Mech), Kansas Army National Guard, which transferred its training activities to Camp Ripley, Minn. When Fort Indiantown Gap was subsequently selected as a refugee center, Reserve training was modified so that troops were billeted in tents rather than in barracks.³¹

Assignment of Operational Responsibilities

Late in the evening of 23 April 1975, the Defense Department -- in conjunction with the State Department -- formally directed the development of contingency plans and described the responsibilities of the various government agencies for the refugee operation. Overall responsibility for the control of the Vietnamese Evacuee Program rested with the State Department which had already established the Interagency Task Force to coordinate the operation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff J-4 (Logistics) was responsible for directing and coordinating the movement of refugees to the processing centers in the United States, if and when such action was requested and funded by the State Department and directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The U.S. Commander in Chief,

30.

Intvw, Mr. M.W. Stark w/CPT A.J. Haas, DCSOPS-RO, 23 Jun 76.

31.

Memo, DCSOPS RC Tng Div to C/FOR, 28 Apr 75, subj: Impact of Operation NEW LIFE on Annual Training at Fort Pickett, Camp Robert (sic), and Camp Shelby.

Pacific, and the U.S. Air Force Military Airlift Command were responsible for moving the refugees from Vietnam to designated ports of entry within the continental United States. The military services were responsible for developing the necessary plans and procedures for accommodating the evacuees after they reached the United States. The Army operated on the assumption that it would be required to receive, process, billet, and support anywhere from 50,000 to 200,000 refugees for a period of 90 days or more. The State Department would reimburse the Department of Defense for all expenses incurred in support of the program and was responsible for coordinating the participation of all Federal agencies and civilian relief organizations in the clearance, processing, support, and resettlement of the refugees.³²

Army Responsibilities. The Army was responsible for identifying possible refugee centers and developing plans for their establishment and operation. The Department of the Army designated the U.S. Army Forces Command as its action agent with operational control of all Army forces committed in support of the operation. The Department directed all other Major Army Commands to support FORSCOM to the fullest extent possible. FORSCOM, in turn, would identify installations for possible use as refugee centers, concentrating on those assigned to the standby mobilization base or those used to support Reserve Component training, as well as those used to support special training projects. The Department also provided guidance for the development of the necessary concept plans for the establishment and operation of the selected processing centers. Existing facilities would be used to the maximum with a space planning factor of forty square feet per individual. Camp capacities would be limited to 20,000 to 25,000 persons each and the number of camps to be used would be kept to a minimum. FORSCOM was to act on the assumption that the average Vietnamese evacuee would be relatively healthy, primarily from the middle strata of Vietnamese society, and accompanied by his family. For this reason, family integrity would have to be maintained with plans taking into account an average family of eight individuals. Regional considerations for the establishment of the processing centers, in order of preference were: the western United States, the Southwest, the South, and the remainder of the continental United States. The support to be rendered by FORSCOM would include, but not be limited to, billeting, messing, essential medical treatment, transportation, installation security, and camp administration. The Department directed FORSCOM to use the evacuees to the maximum extent possible to meet essential manpower needs.³³

32.

Msg 240124Z Apr 75, DA to Distr, subj: Contingency Planning for Possible Army Support of RVN.

33.

Ibid.

FORSCOM Relationships with Other Commands and Agencies. The Department of the Army also directed the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to be prepared to provide resources in support of the operation. TRADOC would provide FORSCOM with any support as might be agreed upon by the two commands. The U.S. Army Materiel Command, in coordination with the Defense Supply Agency, was to identify and be prepared to procure, on short notice, those items which might be required to meet any shortfall. The former command was required to provide all support requested by FORSCOM. The U.S. Army Health Services Command would provide input to FORSCOM concerning the establishment and operation of adequate medical treatment facilities at each processing center and would take further steps to identify all available community medical support which could be used. Finally, the Health Services Command was responsible for developing all health guidance to include preventive medicine operations. The establishment and operation of all telephone and teletype communications at each center was the responsibility of the U.S. Army Communications Command. Any major problems arising from these arrangements and relationships were to be referred to the Department of the Army for resolution.³⁴

Alerting the Units

Early in the evening of 24 April 1975, shortly before receiving the Department of the Army directive, FORSCOM alerted the commanders of Fort Sill, Okla.; Fort Lee, Va.; and Fort Ord, Calif., (all TRADOC installations) to the possibility of refugee support operations at subinstallations under their control, i.e., Fort Chaffee, Ark.; Fort Pickett, Va.; and Camp Roberts, Calif.; respectively. Camp Roberts, Fort Chaffee, and Fort Pickett were to be filled in that order. Refugees were to be delivered to the airfield closest to the respective processing center with FORSCOM assuming responsibility for their support immediately upon deplaning. Each of the commanders concerned would assume command of the refugee operations for their respective subinstallation and would provide a general officer (brigadier general) as the camp commander. If Fort Pickett was chosen as a processing center, FORSCOM would provide the camp commander. All resources of the major installation would be used to support the refugee operation. Since the operation was to be funded on a reimbursable basis by the State Department, audit trails would have to be established and maintained from the very beginning. The commanders were cautioned that, until FORSCOM gave formal notification, they were not to obligate any funds nor to alert any units. They were also warned that this information was not as yet in the public domain and only those who needed to know were to be told of the plans. All other inquiries were to be answered with a "no comment." In order to facilitate planning at the major installation level, each commander was provided a notional list of type units required.³⁵

34.

Ibid.

35.

Msg 242220Z Apr 75, FORSCOM to Ft Sill, Ft Lee, and Ft Ord, subj: Contingency Planning for Possible Army Support of RVN Evacuees in CONUS.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR VIETNAMESE REFUGEE OPERATIONS UNIT AND MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS FOR CAMP ROBERTS

UNIT REQUIREMENTS

Command and Control

503d Logistics Group, Fort Lewis, Wash.

Support Units

497th Transportation Company, Fort Lewis, Wash. (60 trucks)
1st Engineer Battalion (-), Fort Ord, Calif.
51st Engineer Detachment (Utilities), Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.
45th Engineer Detachment (Utilities), Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.
Shower Units (11 Available).
Commissary -- Fort Ord will provide necessary commissary set-up.
Supply and Service Company (Perhaps 62d Supply and Service Company (DS)
(Type B) (Can support up to 15,000 troops))

Military Police

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 504th Military Police
Battalion, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.
571st Military Police Company, Fort Ord, Calif.

Medical

1st Medical Group, Fort Sam Houston, Tex.^a
21st Evacuation Hospital (-), Fort Hood, Tex. (w/special augmentation)
926th Medical Detachment (Team LB), Fort Benning, Ga.
690th Medical Company (Ambulance), Fort Penning, Ga.
702d Medical Company (Clearing), Fort Geo. G. Meade, Md.^a
461st Medical Detachment (Team GC), Fort Dix, N.J.

Adjutant General

23d Adjutant General Detachment (Replacement), Fort Penning, Ga.

Civil Affairs

96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Bragg, N.C.

Public Information

28th Public Information Detachment, Fort Carson, Colo.
49th Public Information Detachment, Fort Bragg, N.C.
27th Public Information Detachment, Fort Monroe, Va.

Judge Advocate General

Two Active Army JAG Officers

MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS

25,000 Blankets and Mattresses
106,000 Sheets
106,000 Pillow Cases
32,000 Blankets
3,000 Tents
3,000 Coats

a. Deployed to support operation on Guam, 29 Apr 75.

Source: Untitled Staff Paper, 24 Apr 75. (UNCLASSIFIED).

FORSCOM Contingency Planning

By the evening of 24 April 1975, FORSCOM had completed tentative contingency plans for all three proposed locations. Since Camp Roberts was considered to be the prime location, its plan was typical of all three; only the detailed troop lists differed for the three camps. Tentatively, FORSCOM intended to use the 593d Logistical Group, Fort Lewis, Wash., to operate the Camp Roberts Refugee Center. In addition, FORSCOM intended to dispatch a forward echelon of its headquarters staff to Camp Roberts to help establish the operation. The units actually operating the camp would be augmented with specialized personnel who were not organic to these units such as chaplains, interpreters, and cooks. FORSCOM's contingency planning was based on a refugee population of 12,000 to 15,000 at Camp Roberts. Once the 15,000 figure was reached, FORSCOM would give immediate consideration to the establishment of a second refugee center at Fort Chaffee in order to be able to accept the next increment of 25,000. The planned units and materiel to support the operation at Camp Roberts were as shown on Table 5.³⁶

TRADOC's False Alarm

Some of the confusion surrounding the refugee evacuations and their final disposition at the time was well illustrated on Saturday afternoon, 26 April, when TRADOC contacted FORSCOM with a refugee problem. Maj. Gen. Thomas U. Greer, the Fort Dix, N.J. commander, had been contacted earlier that day by the commander of McGuire Air Force Base, N.J., with a request that Fort Dix assume responsibility for 1,000 Vietnamese refugees who claimed U.S. sponsorship. Based upon this contact, General Greer believed that he would indeed be responsible for sheltering these refugees for an unspecified time and wanted some guidance on what to do. FORSCOM provided him with a copy of Operation Plan Pickett as a general guide. On the following day, Department of the Army directed FORSCOM to prepare a specific operations plan for Fort Dix. Fort Dix was not to implement the plan, however, unless directed by FORSCOM. In the end nothing came of the matter since no refugees ever arrived at that installation.³⁷

36.

Untitled Staff Working Papers, 24 Apr 75.

37.

(1) Point Paper, DCSOPS-OE/WR, 26 Apr 75, subj: Significant Events - Operation NEW LIFE; (2) Fact Sheet, DCSOPS-OE/WR, 27 Apr 75, subj: Resume of Important Events for Period 1500 - 1600 Hours, 26 - 27 Apr 75.

Operation NEW LIFE

Refugee Support on Guam

FORSCOM's large-scale involvement in the Southeast Asian refugee operation (called Operation NEW LIFE) was begun on Guam by FORSCOM's U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii (USASCH), which was augmented by units and individuals from the continental United States. The selection of Guam as the initial American Refugee Center was based on a number of factors. In early April 1975, the U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific, requested all component commanders and U.S. Government agencies in the Pacific area to provide advice as to the numbers of refugees which could be accommodated at various locations in Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, and Taiwan. At the very time this information was being gathered, the military situation in South Vietnam deteriorated very rapidly. By mid-April, the Pacific Commander had become convinced that the number of refugees would range somewhere from 100,000 to 200,000. He therefore recommended that the State and Defense Departments consider using Pacific Command facilities such as the Trust Territories and Wake. He based this recommendation on the fact that the climate at these locations was similar to that of Vietnam and that the establishment of safe havens in territories controlled by the United States would greatly reduce both logistical and political problems. On 19 April 1975, the State Department made discreet inquiries among the nations in the Pacific area to determine the availability and acceptability of refugee staging areas on their territory for six months pending resettlement of the refugees in the United States. At this point, the Philippine Government requested that the United States cease transporting Vietnamese refugees to U.S. installations within its territory. By 20 April, the number of refugees departing Vietnam had reached such proportions that the United States had to provide some arrangements for a safe haven and staging area in the Western Pacific. On 22 April 1975, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the immediate establishment of a refugee safe haven at Orote Point on Guam under the code name, "NEW LIFE." The Pacific Command was to construct a camp capable of housing up to 50,000 refugees for a period of at least 90 days while they were being processed for transshipment to the continental United States. While the Pacific Command had overall responsibility for the operation, the U.S. Army Forces Command was required to furnish Army support from its resources on Guam, Hawaii, and in the continental United States.³⁸

38.

(1) Msg 231556Z Apr 75, DA to Distr, subj: Operation of Refugee Support Center - Guam (Operation NEW LIFE); (2) CINCPAC, Support to NEW LIFE, pp. I-6 - I-8.

COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS - OPERATION NEW LIFE




TABLE 6

OPERATION NEW LIFE
US ARMY CINCPAC SUPPORT GROUP SUPPLY REQUESTS

Nomenclature	Quantity	Lifted
Reefer, 854 cubic feet	4	4
Typewriter, Vietnamese type	5	5
Mimeograph	4	4
Cot, Folding	4	4
Can, Water, 5 gallon	44,622	44,622
Towel, Bath	97,104	97,104
Mess Kit	34,677	11,480 ^a
Tent, GP, MED	2,279	2,279
Range, Field	150	100 ^a
Heater, Immersion	500	500
Screen, Latrine	161	36 ^a
Tent, Kitchen	26	12 ^a
Bag, Water	844	844
Loudspeaker System	20	20
Nails (5, 8, 10, 12 P Mix)	15,000	15,000
Shorts, Athletic (S, XS)	100,000	100,000
Shirts, Tee (S, XS)	100,000	100,000
Cloth (Black, White) yards	100,000	100,000
Needles	12,000	12,000
Thread, Cone, 1060 yards	151	151
Can, Garbage	4,402	4,487
Hammer, Claw	1,500	1,500
Saw, Hand, Wood	1,500	1,500
Rope, Manila	100,000	100,000
Can, Gas, 5 gallon	100	100
Scissors	1,000	1,000
Cook Set	50	50
Mount Radio	6	6
Mixing, Machines	8	6 ^a
Loudspeakers	12	12

a. Remaining quantity cancelled by USACSG

Source: HQDA, After Action Report-NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, p. V-B-5.
(UNCLASSIFIED).

Command and Control. The Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned overall responsibility for Operation NEW LIFE to the U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific, whose Representative for Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI) was directly responsible for the Operations on Guam. FORSCOM selected the 45th Support Group, a subordinate element of the 25th Infantry Division, to operate the refugee facility. Although the division commander continued to exercise routine command over the group, the Pacific Commander exercised operational command through the Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, a subordinate element of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army. The Commander, 45th Support Group, commanded all assigned or attached Army personnel engaged in Operation NEW LIFE on Guam, with the exception that operational control of the 1st Medical Group was retained by the U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific. This operational control of the medical group was never further delegated. In actual practice, the Chief of the Naval Regional Medical Center coordinated all Army medical activities in support of Operation NEW LIFE (Chart 1).³⁹

FORSCOM Support Planning. Operation NEW LIFE proved to be a practical exercise in crisis management. The decision to support a large number of refugees on Guam was not made until the evacuation from Vietnam was well underway. In order to assemble the necessary personnel, supplies, and equipment and to prepare the facilities, the efforts of all three military services were required. The Army's efforts were concentrated on operating the Orote Point Camp on Guam. While the camp's peak refugee population was 39,331, it processed in excess of 130,000 refugees, thus making it the largest single refugee facility. The Commander, 45th Support Group, administered the camp with a composite staff which employed over 2,000 Army personnel. Whenever possible, both personnel and materiel were drawn from available FORSCOM resources in Hawaii.⁴⁰

Initial Support. Support activities were initiated on 20 April 1975 when the Pacific Commander directed the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii, to assemble, pack, and ship large quantities of tentage, mess kits, blankets, towels, mattresses, and other items of equipment to Guam for the refugee center then under construction (Table 6). Subsequently, the Pacific Commander called for a similar but smaller shipment for a refugee center on Wake. The Wake Island Center was erected by a civilian contractor and was managed by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF).⁴¹

39.

(1) Msg 231556Z Apr 75, DA to Distr, subj: Operation of Refugee Support Center - Guam (Operation NEW LIFE); (2) HQ U.S. Army CINCPAC Spt Gp, After Action Report - Operation NEW LIFE, pp. 1 - 5, Tab 3.

40.

HQ U.S. Army CINCPAC Spt Gp, Annual Report of Major Activities, CY 1975, pp. 62 - 64. (SECRET -- Info used is UNCLASSIFIED).

41.

Ibid.

TABLE 7

OPERATION NEW LIFE
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT UNITS: OROTE POINT, GUAM

Units	Strength	Home Station
<u>Total</u>	<u>2,236</u>	
HQ, 45th Spt Gp	655	Hawaii
Co D, 411th Engr Bn (USAR)	106	Guam
515th Ord Co	130	Guam
1st Bn, 27th Inf	419	Hawaii
1st Bn, 5th Inf (Augmented)	500	Hawaii
8th Psy Op Bn (-)	26	Fort Bragg, N.C.
96th Civil Affairs Bn (-)	14	Fort Bragg, N.C.
Tripler Army Med Cen (WAC Augmentation)	34	Hawaii
Medical - mission		
HHD, 1st Medical Gp	50	Fort Sam Houston, Tex.
-Command and Control		
73d Med Det (Vet Svc)	6	Fort Jackson, S.C.
-Veterinary Food Insp Svc		
172d Med Det (Environ San)	9	Fort Ord, Calif.
-Environmental Sanitation		
155th Med Det (Epidemiology)	9	Fort Bragg, N.C.
-Epidemiology Svc		
714th Med Det (Entomology Svc)	9	Fort Bragg, N.C.
-Epidemiology Svc		
440th Med Det (RE)	14	Fort Meade, Md.
-Ambulance Support		
702d Med Co (Clearing)(+) a	104	Fort Meade, Md.
-Outpatient Medical Care		
423d Med Co (Clearing)(+)	138	Fort Lewis, Wash.
-Outpatient Medical Care		
49th Med Det (GC)	6	Fort Lewis, Wash.
-Medical Equip Maint		
Army Medical Lab b	7	Fort Sam Houston, Tex.
-Area Clinical Lab Support		

- a. Augmented with: 1 medical surgical care nurse, 1 pediatric nurse, 1 pediatrician, & 1 obstetrician/gynecologist.
- b. The Army Medical Laboratory was organized specifically for this mission, following generally the TOE of the Army Medical Laboratory using a medical equipment set, Army Medical Laboratory. There were seven personnel - 1 Parasitologist, 1 Bacteriologist, 1 Biochemist, 1 Chief Medical Lab NCO, & 3 Enlisted Lab Technicians. The unit was attached to HQ, 1st Medical Group but functioned as a separate entity.

Source: (1) HQDA, After Action Report-NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, p. V-B-1.
 (2) HQ, USACSG, After Action Report Operation NEW LIFE, p. 25;
 (3) Intvw, Mr. M.W. Stark w/MAJ R.B. Judy, FORSCOM Surgeon's Office, 9 May 75. (All UNCLASSIFIED).

Personnel Support. On 23 April 1975, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group directed the Commander, 25th Infantry Division, to send ten field kitchens to support the refugee messes at Camp Asan on Guam which was operated by the U.S. Marine Corps. This request was followed by the first large-scale personnel requirement for 600 military personnel, including 100 females who would assist with the processing, bath, laundry, medical, and administrative support, where and as appropriate. In response to this requirement, FORSCOM directed the 25th Infantry Division to provide 500 male personnel, including a 15-man support detachment from the 45th Support Group. Inasmuch as the division could furnish only 75 female personnel, the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii, furnished an additional 20, while assorted tenant activities furnished the remaining 5. The male personnel were provided by the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division. Upon deployment, the Commander, 45th Support Group, was designated as the Commander, Orote Point Camp. As the refugee population increased, the Pacific Commander requested an additional 600-man augmentation consisting of 500 combat and combat support soldiers and 100 cooks. FORSCOM again directed the 25th Infantry Division to provide the 500-man contingent, while the cook contingent was assembled from FORSCOM and TRADOC installations in the continental United States. FORSCOM also provided medical support from the United States -- the 1st Medical Group, Fort Sam Houston, Tex., which was augmented by various medical teams, detachments, and individual specialists as shown in Table 7.⁴²

Miscellaneous Unit Support. In view of its location, the 515th Ordnance Company stationed on Guam became involved in the operation from the start. The company initially supported refugee operations at Camp Asan on Guam which was operated by the Commander, U.S. Marine Barracks, Guam. At first, the entire company was involved, but the commitment was gradually reduced as the refugee population declined. On 30 April 1975, the Commander, 45th Support Group, requested that personnel of Company D, 411th Engineer Battalion (USAR), located on Guam, be called to voluntary active duty to assist in the operation. Beginning on 12 May, members of that unit served on three consecutive 2-week tours as follows:⁴³

12 - 25 May	4 Officer, 46 EM
26 May - 8 June	32 EM
10 - 23 June	28 EM

Individuals from this unit were principally engaged in repair and utilities work at the Orote Point Camp.

42.

(1) HQ, U.S. Army CINCPAC Spt Gp, After Action Report, Operation NEW LIFE, 8 Dec 75, pp. 4 - 5; (2) HQ, U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii, After Action Report, Operation NEW LIFE, 29 Jul 76, pp. 1 - 4, Incl 4, Incl 6; (3) Msg 240314Z Apr 75, USASCH to FORSCOM, subj: Opn Refugee Support Center - Guam (Operation NEW LIFE).

43.

HQ, U.S. Army CINCPAC Spt Gp, After Action Report, Operation NEW LIFE, 8 Dec 75, p. 5.

Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations Support. On 23 April 1975, the Pacific Commander requested that a civil affairs/psychological operations team of some forty personnel be provided to assist the 45th Support Group in the areas of civil affairs, displaced persons, loudspeaker operations, printing, and audio-visual activities. FORSCOM provided a team of 43 personnel from the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance (USAJFKCENMA), Fort Bragg, N.C. — 26 from the 8th Psychological Operations Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group; 14 from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion; and 3 linguists from the Center, itself. The team arrived on Guam on 3 May, where it was designated as Civil Affairs Task Force 2 (CATF 2).⁴⁴

Medical Support. The Naval Regional Medical Center on Guam was responsible for the overall coordination of medical activities in support of Operation NEW LIFE to include refugee hospitalization. The Navy did not have sufficient medical personnel to perform all the necessary ancillary functions such as screening of patients, outpatient services, preventive medicine, and veterinary services. Since there were not enough spare Army medical personnel in the Pacific area, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group requested support from the continental United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff J-4 (logistics) directed that Army medical units be sent to Guam. Department of the Army, in turn, directed FORSCOM to deploy the appropriate units within forty-eight hours. On 25 April 1975, FORSCOM directed Headquarters, 1st Medical Group, to deploy from Fort Sam Houston, Tex., to Guam, along with selected medical units from various installations in the continental United States. (See Table 7).⁴⁵

Mess Support. A total of 350 Army cooks from numerous sources were eventually employed in support of Operation NEW LIFE. Sources included such Major Army Commands as FORSCOM and TRADOC in the continental United States; U.S. Army, Japan (USARJ); and Eighth U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK). The first cooks deployed, as noted above, were eleven men and their equipment from the 25th Infantry Division on 23 April. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group directed the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii, to provide an additional 130 mess personnel in support of Operation NEW LIFE. That command, however, could furnish only 80. Consequently, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group requested that Department of the Army provide the additional cooks. The Department, in turn, directed FORSCOM to deploy fifty cooks by 4 May. Due to the widespread shortage of cooks throughout the Army, FORSCOM insisted that no single installation provide more than eight cooks. This group was the

44.

(1) Ibid.; (2) Msg 290527Z Apr 75, USACSG to DA, subj: Refugee Control-Operation NEW LIFE.

45.

(1) Msg 212054Z Apr 75, FORSCOM to DA, subj: Medical Support of RVN Refugees; (2) Point Paper, DCSOPS-OE/WR, 26 Apr 75, subj: Significant Events — Operation NEW LIFE; (3) HQ, U.S. Army CINCPAC Spt Gp, After Action Report, Operation NEW LIFE, 8 Dec 75, pp. 25 - 26.

beginning of a food service personnel drawdown which would eventually deplete such resources in the continental United States and the Pacific Area. FORSCOM staff members predicted that any additional extensive tasking for mess personnel in support of the refugee operation would result in serious messing problems at all command installations. They recommended that the requirement be ultimately met with civilian contract personnel.⁴⁶

Deployment of Personnel and Units

On 21 April 1975, the Commander, 25th Infantry Division, dispatched the Commander, 25th Supply and Transport Battalion, to establish liaison with the Pacific Commander's representatives on Guam.⁴⁷ On 25 April, the division commander directed the Commander, 45th Support Group, to assume command and control of all Army elements on Guam in support of Operation NEW LIFE.

Deployments. The support group commander and his staff arrived on Guam on 28 April accompanied by a contingency of cooks from the 25th Infantry Division and the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii. The 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, deployed from Hickman Air Force Base, Hawaii, on 28 April along with a contingent of female soldiers drawn from the 25th Infantry Division, the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii, and Tripler Army Medical Center. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 1st Medical Group, deployed from Fort Sam Houston, Tex., on 26 April, arriving on Guam on 28 April. Civil Affairs Task Force 2 arrived on the island from Fort Bragg, N.C., on 3 May. During the period 27 April through 7 May, food service personnel from various sources deployed to Guam. Due to an expected heavy influx of refugees by the end of the first week of May, a second battalion of troops -- the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division -- departed Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, on 5 May and arrived on Guam on 7 May.

46.

(1) Msg 240314Z Apr 75, USASCH to FORSCOM, subj: Operation Refugee Center -- Guam (Operation NEW LIFE); (2) Msg 260434Z Apr 75, USACSG to DA, subj: Operation Refugee Support Cen - Guam (Operation NEW LIFE); (3) Incl 2 to Fact Sheet, DCSOPS-OE/WR, 26 Apr 75, Purpose: Resume of Important Events for Period 1400 - 1600 Hours, 25 - 26 Apr 75; (4) EOD Journal Entry #JE17, telecon DA AOC, Chamberlin to EOS, Ballard, 250230Z Apr 75.

47.

The entire paragraph is based on: (1) HQ, U.S. Army CINCPAC Spt Gp, After Action Report, Operation NEW LIFE, 8 Dec 75, pp. 10 - 11; (2) HQ 45th Spt Gp, "After Action Report, Operation NEW LIFE," 28 Jul 75, p. 2; (3) Msg 250406Z Apr 75, USACSG to FORSCOM, subj: Operation Refugee Support Center - Guam (Operation NEW LIFE); (4) Msg 260813Z Apr 75, DA to FORSCOM, subj: Operation Refugee Support Center - Guam (Operation NEW LIFE).

In most cases the preparation time for deployment was extremely short. Nevertheless, the units deploying from Hawaii were able to move personnel, equipment, and vehicles without any major problems. Medical units deploying from the continental United States arrived with their personnel and equipment intact with the exception of the 702d Medical Company and the 440th Medical Detachment from Fort George G. Meade, Md. Equipment belonging to these two units was shipped separately and arrived two days after the personnel. Civil Affairs Task Force 2 deployed from Fort Bragg, N.C., with no major problems.

Problems with Mess Personnel. The deployment of mess personnel from many sources caused many problems. The U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group complained that a number of cooks who deployed from the continental United States had not been given a thorough Preparation of Replacements for Overseas Movement (POR). Consequently, many of them arrived with no fatigue uniforms, no pay records, and no orders. In addition, many of the arriving groups of cooks were poorly organized and inadequately briefed concerning their mission. The problem did not lie with the cooks themselves but with the procurement methods used. The U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group message of 25 April requesting additional cooks had stated that the command needed sixty-nine additional cooks as soon as possible for operations on Guam. It also stated that these personnel would be on temporary duty (TDY) for a minimum of ninety days with funding provided by the State Department. Temporary duty personnel were required to have field uniforms in their possession upon arrival on Guam and were authorized to bring summer uniforms and civilian clothes for off-duty wear. They were also required to have their immunizations up to date and were to be airlifted to their destination as soon as possible. FORSCOM alerted the appropriate installations, which, in turn, identified the personnel needed and began preparations for deployment. All actions occurred on 26 April and most personnel were airborne two days later. The attendant confusion was understandable, considering the fact that these men came from 2 different major Army Commands -- FORSCOM and TRADOC; that they represented 8 different installations; and that they had been selected and deployed in less than 36 hours. With the limited guidance provided, the FORSCOM staff was not certain as to what these troops should take with them, especially on a temporary duty deployment. As a result, records remained behind at home stations, as did fatigues since FORSCOM interpreted "field uniform" to mean cook's whites. In most instances the cooks were simply identified, given whatever records were deemed necessary by their deploying installations, and put on an airplane. Those responsible for the deployments could not tell them any more than that they were going to Guam for ninety days to cook. Very few military personnel at the installation level knew what was happening on Guam, since the whole operation was still classified. The cooks were not organized in a cohesive manner for travel but detailed on an individual basis and sent by their respective commanders in response to an emergency requirement from higher headquarters. Under those circumstances, anything less than confusion would have been remarkable.

Camp Organization and Operations

Construction at Orote Point


The 30th Naval Construction Regiment turned an abandoned, jungle covered, pre-World War II airstrip at Orote Point, into a tent city sufficiently large to keep pace with the influx of refugees through an almost continuous construction effort from mid-April to mid-May 1975. By the time the "regiment" completed the project it had erected 3,000 tents with wooden floors; 17,400 linear feet of chain link fence; hundreds of portable latrines; several miles of water lines; and 45 miles of communications and electric power lines. When Col. John D. O'Donohue, Commander, 45th Support Group, assumed command at 0700 on 1 May, the camp had sufficient capacity for the 17,048 refugees then in residence and those predicted to arrive in the next few days. As the camp commander, Colonel O'Donohue was responsible for providing mess facilities for all refugees; billeting them in general purpose medium tents; providing personal demand items such as soap, toilet paper, baby food, and other health and comfort items; maintaining sanitation to include the cleaning of latrines and the removal of refuse; supplying medical support to include outpatient care, preventive medicine, and veterinary services; coordinating with both Federal and volunteer agencies; conducting in- and out-processing to include billet assignments and flight manifesting; and ensuring adequate locator services, security, repair and utilities support, and recreation services. Orote Point Camp had a transient population of over 90,000 refugees during the period 24 April to 24 June 1975, with a peak population of 39,331 occurring on 15 May. The refugee population of the camp at 5-day intervals during its operation was as follows:⁴⁸

1 May	17,048
5 May	19,323
10 May	28,416
15 May	39,331
20 May	38,229
25 May	37,631
30 May	35,820
4 June	30,599
9 June	19,647
14 June	18,525
19 June	11,362
24 June	-0-

⁴⁸.

HQ, 45th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW LIFE, p. 9, Tab A, Incl 12.

OROTE POINT REFUGEE CAMP COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS 8 MAY-13 JUNE 1975



A. ALSO CAMP S4
B. ALSO CDR. CATF NR. 2

COMMAND ———
COMMAND LESS OPCON - - - - -
OPCON/OPCOM
COORD/PLNG ——— C/p ———

SOURCE: HQ 45TH SPT GP, GUAM, AFTER ACTION REPORT: OPERATION NEW LIFE, 28 JUL 75, TAB C, INCL 11. (UNCLASSIFIED).

Initial Camp Organization

Immediately upon arrival on Guam, Colonel O'Donohue and his staff began working with the Commander, 30th Naval Construction Regiment, to take over the operation of the Orote Point Camp.⁴⁹ Colonel O'Donohue's point of contact within the Operation NEW LIFE command structure was Col. G. M. McCain, USMC, Commander, U.S. Marine Barracks, Guam. Colonel McCain was Coordinator of the Guam Refugee Centers and, in turn, was responsible to Admiral G. Steve Morrison, USN, the representative of the Pacific Commander on Guam. The 30th Naval Construction Regiment had the dual responsibility of constructing and operating the center until the 45th Support Group was ready to assume full responsibility for its operation. Once on the scene, Colonel O'Donohue reorganized his unit along functional lines, which included center security, administration, construction, and repairs and utilities. In order to administer the center efficiently, the colonel organized his staff into two elements (Chart 2). The first element, a standard military staff, provided staff supervision and support for the attached Army units with particular emphasis on S-1 (Personnel) and S-4 (Logistics) activities. The second staff element, the Camp Coordinator's Staff, was organized under the Deputy for Refugee Affairs, the principal executive agent for command of the camp itself and the general point of coordination for the activities of the camp staff. In addition, this latter staff provided interface with the CINCPAC Representative for Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; the Commander, U.S. Navy, Marianas; and the numerous civilian agencies in support of the operation. The civilian agencies included the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which processed refugees bound for the United States and formulated the necessary immigration policies; the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), which helped to process refugees desiring settlement in Europe or Asia; the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which observed the operation for the United Nations and arranged repatriation for those refugees who desired to return to Vietnam; the American Red Cross, which distributed clothing and comfort items, organized and operated locator and postal services, and augmented the recreational services; the Canadian Immigration Service, which processed 3,000 Vietnamese wanting to live in Canada; the Department of Labor, Government of Guam, which helped to find jobs for the refugees who desired to remain on Guam; and the Office of the Civil Coordinator (OCC), which represented the State Department involved in family reunification programs and other processing procedures. Other agencies represented on Guam included the United States Information Service (USIS), the Agency for International Development (AID), the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS), the Center for Disease Control (CDC), the International Rescue Committee of the Red Cross, and the Catholic Relief Agency.

49.

The entire paragraph is based on: (1) LTC G.G. Gonsalves, Jr., Operation NEW LIFE: Camp Orote -- A Study in Refugee Control and Administration, Doctrine, and Practice -- (Unpublished Master's dissertation, USAC&GSC, 1976), pp. 12, 28 - 30; (2) HQ, 45th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW LIFE, pp. 5 - 9.

TABLE 8


45TH SUPPORT GROUP AUGMENTATION REQUEST - GUAM 3 MAY 1975

1st Battalion, 27th Infantry (-)	
1 HQ Company	88
3 Rifle Companies	412
Vehicles --- 15 1/4 ton trucks & 13 2 1/2 ton trucks	
Support Element	
Maintenance team	unk
Light Truck Platoon	21
Vehicles -- 16 2 1/2 ton trucks	
Class II, IV, and IX Supply Point	4
Property Book Team	3
Movement Control Element	3
Vehicle -- 1 1/4 ton truck	
Signal Augmentation	12
Equipmt: 1 MTC-7 Truck mount, 30 TA312, 32 mi. wire & poleclimbers for wiremen	
Command/Control Staff Element	5
Add'l Equipment - 12 1/4-ton trucks, 1 with radio	
Augmentation for Staff, 45th Support Group	
S-1: 1 officer/ 2 admin NCOs / 1 admin clerk/driver	4
S-2: 1 MI officer/ 2 CPS NCOs / 1 clerk/driver	4
S-3: 1 S-3 officer/ 1 MP officer/ 1 Opns NCO/ 1 MP NCO/ 2 clerk/drivers	6
S-4: 1 Engineer officer/ 2 supply NCOs/ 1 supply clerk/driver	4
HQ Section: 1 NCO (MOS 11G, E-8)	
Mess Augmentation (by deploying command)	Total
	105 a
FORSCOM	65
U.S. Army Japan	5
USASCH	10
Eighth U.S. Army	25

a. 5 additional mess personnel were provided from Pacific area resources.

Source: (1) LTC G.G. Gonsalves, Jr., Operation NEW LIFE: Camp Orote -- A Study in Refugee Control and Administration, Doctrine and Practice (Unpublished Master's dissertation, USAC&GSC, 1976), pp. 27-29; (2) Staff Paper, subj: Operation NEW ARRIVALS, as of 1600 EDT 4 May 75. (Both UNCLASSIFIED); (3) Msg 030400Z May 75, USACSG to Cdr 25th Inf Div & USASCH, subj: Army Augmentation for Operation NEW LIFE.

OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 45TH SUPPORT GROUP
8 MAY - 12 JUNE 1975



A. BECAME CAMP S3 ON 18 MAY 1975.

B. ALSO COMMANDER, CATF 2.

C. OPCON TO CINCPAC.

D. VOLUNTEER PERSONNEL.

SOURCE: 45TH SUPPORT GROUP, GUAM, AFTER ACTION REPORT: OPERATION NEW LIFE 28 JULY 75.
 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Since the overall situation remained in a state of flux throughout the entire operation of the Orote Point Camp, the Deputy for Refugee Affairs soon assumed responsibility for the family reunification and civilian hire programs. While reorganizing the support units prior to his assumption of command, Colonel O'Donohue came to the conclusion that the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, would not be able to fully support camp operations without assistance. This unit was responsible for five functional areas — social welfare, public health, supply and support (mess and work details), public safety, and personnel processing. The battalion's duties were doubly difficult since it was required to continue all of its normal housekeeping duties as well. Vehicular and equipment maintenance, guard duty, and routine personnel actions could not be suspended for the operation. This double burden often overtaxed the battalion's capabilities. Then too, refugee processing and care suffered because of the unit's organizational and skill deficiencies. It was, after all, an infantry battalion. It was because of this situation that the 45th Support Group commander requested the deployment of Civil Affairs Task Force 2 (CATF 2).

Augmentation Requirements

On 3 May 1975, the 45th Support Group was informed that a large number of Vietnamese refugees would arrive on Guam on three ships from the Philippines on or about 8 May. This was expected to increase the camp's refugee population from 16,698 to well over 30,000. Since the Army troops on hand were already working 7 days a week and 12 to 14 hours a day to support half the expected population, it was obvious that augmentation was necessary. Colonel O'Donohue therefore requested the immediate deployment of additional support forces — an infantry battalion (-) to provide additional administrative and security support; a 19-man augmentation for Headquarters, 45th Support Group; a support package of about 41 men; and 100 additional cooks (Table 8). The 25th Infantry Division supplied most of these forces -- about 500 personnel -- including the 1st Battalion (-), 27th Infantry. The additional mess personnel were supplied as indicated.⁵⁰

Command and Control Reorganization

The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, and most of the requested augmentee personnel arrived on Guam on 7 May, causing the camp commander to review all tasks and redefine the functions, organization, and structure of all units except the 1st Medical Group. The reorganization resulting from this review was as shown on Chart 3. The Camp Coordinator's Office and the major attached units were given the following responsibilities. The Camp Coordinator/Deputy for Refugee Affairs remained the principal

50.

(1) Msg 031947Z May 75, USASCH to FORSCOM, subj: Operation Refugee Support Center - Guam (Operation NEW LIFE); (2) Msg 030331Z May 75, USACSG to DA, subj: Army Augmentees for Operation NEW LIFE; (3) Msg 031650Z May 75, DA to FORSCOM, subj: Army Augmentees for Operation NEW LIFE.

executive agent for command of the camp and coordination of camp staff activities. The Camp S-1 was responsible for coordinating the in- and out-processing of the refugees, coordinating Naval Exchange activities, banking and gold buying facilities, and the hire and payment of refugees under the civilian hire program. The Civilian Liaison Element was responsible for interface with all civilian agencies, refugee visits to the Naval Hospital to see sick relatives, and family reunification. The Camp S-3's primary function was the development of appropriate plans -- civil disturbance and typhoon evacuation, camp security, and the operation of an administrative holding area. The Camp S-4 (Engineer) was responsible for the staff supervision of repair and utilities activities. The Camp S-5 -- Civil Affairs Officer -- was also the Commander of Civil Affairs Task Force 2 and was responsible for supervising media operations, establishing a refugee administrative government within the camp, and setting up an educational program. The subordinate elements of the 45th Support Group were responsible for the following missions: the 1st Medical Group provided outpatient care, preventive medicine, and veterinary support; the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, operated the supply yard, the mess halls, the in- and out-processing, the baby care centers, the cleaning of latrines, and the locator service; the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, provided security, repairs and utilities, trash hauling, recreation and entertainment, and fire prevention; and Company D, 411th Engineer Battalion (Guam USAR) provided technical assistance to the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, and provided manpower for repairs and utilities. It should be noted that, of all the Army units supporting Operation NEW LIFE on Guam, only the 1st Medical Group, Civil Affairs Task Force 2, and the Engineers had missions reasonably similar to their stated military functions.⁵¹

Difficulties in Coordination

The camp coordinator's two most difficult tasks were coordinating the operations of the two infantry battalions and the civilian agencies and the establishment of construction priorities. The lack of coordination between the infantry battalions caused him to act as a mediator on several occasions. For example, while the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, was in the process of setting up additional refugee tents, the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, began assigning refugees to the very same tents before they were ready for occupancy. Another example involved the two battalions and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The latter had established specific criteria for indicating whom they wanted in the processing line and in what order. The 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, controlled the call-up for processing and ensured that those in line met the criteria. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, however, provided the gate guards and controlled the refugee lines. The Camp coordinator frequently had to settle the frequent arguments between the refugees in the processing line, the soldiers monitoring the processing lines, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service representatives. These conflicts between the camp coordinator's staff and the two infantry battalions were

51.

Gonsalves, Operation NEW LIFE, pp. 48 - 51.

as much related to the organizational structure as to the nature of the mission itself. The camp coordinator had staff responsibility in the camp, but he did not have command authority. Inasmuch as the responsibilities of the 45th Support Group commander kept him away from the camp much of the time, the camp coordinator had to make decisions which affected all operations even though he did not have an opportunity to consult with the camp commander in advance. The two infantry battalion commanders often resisted any decisions affecting their operations which Colonel O'Donohue had not made personally. As a consequence, practically all decisions or orders from the camp coordinator met resistance which, in turn, affected the reaction time and cooperation between the military and the civilian agencies.⁵²

Civilian Agency Command and Control Problems. Coordination and cooperation problems were not confined to the military. Civilian personnel and agencies, both Federal and otherwise, experienced some of the same problems in their relations with the military and each other. The civilian personnel most influential in operations at Orote Point were those of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Office of the Civil Coordinator. Mr. Norman L. Sweet, the Senior Civil Coordinator, coordinated the efforts of all civilian agencies on both Guam and Wake Island. As the senior State Department civilian on Guam with responsibility for the operation, his military counterpart was Admiral Morrison. Mr. Sweet's staff was primarily concerned with the activities at the Orote Point Camp, the largest in the Pacific area. The Civil Coordinator's specific missions were: assisting the Immigration and Naturalization Service with the prescreening of refugees and helping to resolve ambiguous cases; assisting the camp commanders by helping to resolve camp administrative problems; assisting military medical teams by identifying sick and/or injured refugees and by advising on preventive medicine and health education measures; carrying out in-camp surveys regarding category grouping for the Immigration Service, attitudinal studies, and locator system evaluations; and identifying and assigning interpreters and translators and other cadre personnel for refugee centers on Guam, Wake, and in the continental United States. He was also required to coordinate the activities of the voluntary agencies and multinational organizations; to perform liaison with the Guam Government regarding the refugee relief effort; to improve the morale of the refugees; to assist in processing applicants for movement to third countries; to assist in the movement of third country national (TCN) evacuees to their own countries; and to ensure the proper placement of orphan refugees.⁵³


52.

Ibid., pp. 51 - 52.

53.

Ibid. pp. 53 - 54.


OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 45TH SUPPORT GROUP 13 JUNE - 3 JULY 1975



- A. ALSO CAMP S4.
- B. ALSO COMMANDER, CATF 2.
- C. OPCON TO CINCPAC.
- D. VOLUNTEER PERSONNEL.

SOURCE: 45TH SUPPORT GROUP, GUAM, AFTER ACTION REPORT:
OPERATION NEW LIFE, 28 JULY 75. (UNCLASSIFIED).

CIVIL AFFAIRS TASK FORCE 2



SOURCE: LTC G. G. GONSELVES, JR., OPERATION NEW LIFE: CAMP OROTE - A STUDY IN REFUGEE CONTROL AND ADMINISTRATION, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE. (UNPUBLISHED MASTER'S DISSERTATION, U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, 1976), P. 33. (UNCLASSIFIED).

Construction Priorities. The camp coordinator's other problem, that of construction priorities, also involved getting both the civilian and military agencies to cooperate. Each agency had its own list of priorities for construction and none was anxious to lower its own priorities to facilitate the start or completion of another. This problem, like the others associated with the relationships among military and civilian agencies and personnel, will be seen again in subsequent discussions concerning other functional areas.⁵⁴

Final Camp Organization

The final camp organization (Chart 4) was effected in response to the reduction of the refugee population. Significant changes included the elimination of the camp coordinator's position and the withdrawal of the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry. Upon the termination of the camp coordinator's position, all former members of his staff began working directly for the camp commander who had assumed control of the Orote Point Camp by 13 June. The organization of the 1st Medical Group also changed when some personnel assigned to the 423d Medical Company redeployed on 15 June. Most of the civilian agencies working in the camp based their personnel reductions on the rate of the drawdown of the refugee population. Some of the civilian agencies did not use this criteria, however, as their activities were based on function rather than on population strength. For instance, when the Canadian Immigration team had achieved its quota of 3,000 refugees, it terminated operations and departed. Since large numbers of refugees remained at the camp until 24 June, all military and civilian services had to be maintained through the last day of the operation. Consequently, the remaining American military and civilian personnel engaged in such support activities were unable to begin their redeployment until 27 June.⁵⁵

Camp Administration

Refugee Help in Operations

In view of a shortage of American manpower, the staff decided to meet some of these needs through use of the refugees themselves. The staff believed that a refugee organization working for the camp staff could effectively assist in locating facilities, meeting schedules, and solving the refugees' personal problem. The formation of this refugee government became the prime mission of Civil Affairs Task Force 2 (CATF 2). That portion of the task force which formed the camp government was as shown on Chart 5. The Civil Affairs personnel were successful in gathering a number of volunteers through a general appeal to the total refugee population. These volunteers included some former high ranking government executives, professional men, and military personnel. After a slate of

⁵⁴.

Ibid., p. 55.

⁵⁵.

Ibid., pp. 82 - 83.

candidates was chosen, an election was held for a mayor, an advisory council of five, and four camp area leaders. Each of the latter appointed a leader for each block of tents in his area. The camp government's principal role was to provide the American camp commander and his staff with feedback on the effects of camp policy on the refugees. The refugee camp government also assisted the American authorities in recruiting volunteer refugee labor, and in assisting civilian agencies in the administration of their respective programs. In the first few weeks of the operation, the camp refugee government played a key role in keeping the refugee population informed of the many changes in American policy. The major difficulty encountered by the Americans with the camp refugee government was in keeping refugee personnel in key positions long enough for them to gain some influence over the ever changing camp population. The effectiveness of the refugee government was important because many security, sanitation, and morale problems could not be solved without the assistance and cooperation of the refugee leadership and the general population. In some cases, the American administration had to provide certain incentives to refugee camp leaders to persuade these persons to remain in the camp past their assigned processing dates. It was not an easy task since life at Orote Point Camp in itself provided very few positive incentives. The task force developed four incentives in an attempt to overcome the negative aspects of living in a dusty, crowded camp for an extended period: a separate tent for housing, which also served as an office; a position at the head of the food line at each meal; control over some of the goods provided the refugees; and a position at the head of the Immigration and Naturalization Service processing line. These incentives were never really enough to ensure stability among the refugee leadership. It was not until 15 May, when the population finally stabilized at a peak of 39,331, that a measure of stability within the camp government became evident.⁵⁶

Dissemination of Information

American camp authorities experienced great difficulty in disseminating timely information to such a large number of constantly changing refugee personnel. For instance, while there were 19,323 refugees in camp on the morning of 5 May, 2,815 had processed out of the camp within 24 hours, while an additional 5,348 refugees had arrived, giving a new total of 21,856. In an attempt to cope with this situation, Civil Affairs Task Force 2 established bulletin boards throughout the camp, operated a Vietnamese language newspaper, and set up a public address system using volunteer refugees to make announcements. Due to the sheer size of the camp, none of the information systems reached all of the camp refugee population. In fact, the camp population eventually grew beyond the capabilities of the available loudspeaker systems.⁵⁷

56.

Gonsalves, Operation NEW LIFE, pp. 32 - 34; 56.

57.

Ibid., pp. 34 - 36.

Typhoon Season Precautions

Safe Haven in Guam. Once camp operations had stabilized on 15 May, the American staff concentrated its efforts on improving the effectiveness of the refugee government and in developing responsive plans to protect the refugee population in the likely event of a typhoon. Since the summer period on Guam was considered to be the typhoon season and, with some 40,000 refugees living in tents, the possibility of a need for a sudden mass evacuation was self-evident. The American camp staff, aided by Admiral Morrison's staff, soon developed emergency plans to evacuate the camp refugee population to designated buildings within the naval base. Each building was prestocked with food, water, and medical supplies to support a certain number of refugees and military staff. Since there were only twenty-one busses available at the Orote Point Camp, they were reserved for the transportation of small children, pregnant women, and the sick. The remaining refugees would have to walk to the shelters. The American concern for protecting the refugee population during a typhoon increased the importance of getting the refugees, particularly the children, pregnant women, and sick off Guam as soon as practicable. The Immigration and Naturalization Service cooperated in this endeavor by agreeing to out-process those categories of personnel on an expedited basis. State and Defense Department officials in the continental United States assisted by directing the Army (FORSCOM) to open a second refugee camp as soon as possible.⁵⁸

Safe Haven in Hawaii. In the meantime, on 15 May 1975, the U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), determined that Hawaii would be designated as a safe haven in the event that a typhoon threatened either Guam or Wake Island, or both. The U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group directed the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii, to identify those Army facilities which could accommodate the evacuees, if and when needed. The U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii, completed its Typhoon Safe Haven Operation Plan on 24 May, which provided that the 25th Infantry Division would be responsible for the necessary administration and other required support of the proposed safe haven. The division would also receive assistance from the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii, and Tripler Army Medical Center. The Support Command envisioned that the safe haven would be phased into operation in four stages, each of which would accommodate 2,500 refugees for an overall total of 10,000 persons. The 25th Infantry Division was to be prepared to accept the initial 2,500 evacuees within 48 hours of notification. All evacuees were to be housed in general purpose (GP) tents with twenty persons to a tent. Since the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii, had only sufficient bedding and tentage on hand to accommodate 3,600 persons, the remainder would have to be provided from FORSCOM stocks in the continental United States. The plan,

58.

Ibid., pp. 58 - 59.

moreover, was based on the assumption that divisional personnel then on temporary duty on Guam would be returned to Hawaii to assist in operating the typhoon safe haven.⁵⁹

Refugee Processing

Upon arrival in Guam, the evacuee filled out an evacuee information card under the supervision of the Air Force if he arrived by plane or the Navy if he arrived by ship. He was then moved to the Orote Point Camp, where he was assigned billeting space and the data from his information card was posted in the camp's locator system. The evacuee then began processing with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, based on a first-in, first-out system. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service used the time of arrival of each evacuee on Guam as a basis for calling refugees forward for immigration processing. When this processing was completed, the refugee was assigned a flight manifest number for the camp of his choice in the United States. Once the evacuee received a call for his departure from Guam, he was further manifested and moved to Anderson Air Force Base to board the aircraft. While the official policy for departure from Guam was a first-in, first-out basis, the constantly changing priorities announced by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and other civil agencies in Washington repeatedly upset the processing of the refugees on Guam. As mentioned earlier, the American concern for protecting the refugees in the event of a typhoon made urgent the removal of the refugees, especially those families with young children, pregnant women, and the sick from the island as soon as possible. After gaining the cooperation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in this matter, Civil Affairs Task Force 2, assisted by the refugee camp government, conducted a census to find out just where these particular people were located. The results were as follows:⁶⁰

59.

(1) Msg 152143Z May 75, USACSG to USASCH, subj: Typhoon Planning for NEW LIFE Refugees; (2) Msg 152240Z May 75, USACSG to USASCH, subj: Typhoon Planning for NEW LIFE Refugees; (3) Msg 240917Z May 75, USASCH to 25th Inf Div, subj: Contingency Planning -- Operation NEW LIFE.

60.

(1) Gonsalves, Operation NEW LIFE, pp. 55, 58 - 60; (2) HQ, 45th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW LIFE, pp. 11 - 12.

Census Recapitulation, 27 May 1975 Orote Point Camp					
Area	Refugees	Children One Year of Age	Women Seven Months Pregnant	Family Units	Tents
<u>Total</u>	<u>37,668</u>	<u>1,242</u>	<u>167</u>	<u>5,328</u>	<u>2,823</u>
A	7,286	92	45	798	462
B	11,918	486	24	1,794	835
C	8,650	350	24	1,356	797
D	9,814	314	74	1,380	729

Based upon the above results, the priorities for out-processing were then established as follows: first, the families of persons already medically evacuated to the United States; second, women seven months or more pregnant, with their immediate families; third, families with a child one year of age; fourth, refugees with sponsors awaiting them; and, finally, unsponsored personnel. These changes were not made without incident since it relegated those with first-in, first-out priorities to later departures. All the refugees were anxious to be transferred to camps in the United States and, as a result, pregnant women received a great deal of pressure to surrender their priority position in the processing line. It was not uncommon for a pregnant woman to claim total strangers as members of her extended family, thus permitting them to gain a priority position in the out-processing line. Often she charged them \$20.00 apiece to make such a declaration. In one case, a man disguised himself as a pregnant woman to gain a priority position in the line. The change in policy for processing through the Immigration and Naturalization Service coupled with the attempts by military personnel to define who would be allowed to accompany and out-process with young children and pregnant women constituted continuous problems. The problems centered on the conflict arising from the need to protect the lives of children and pregnant women in the event of a typhoon and the equal need to ensure that refugee family members traveled together to the United States. Because of a lack of facilities and unavoidable time pressures, it was not always possible to accomplish both objectives.⁶¹

Third Country Processing

Related to the problems of processing refugees through the Immigration and Naturalization Service were the difficulties associated with the processing of refugees to third countries. This type of processing required separate processing lines and separate areas at the

⁶¹.

(1) Gonsalves, Operation NEW LIFE, pp. 55, 58 - 60; (2) HQ, 45th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW LIFE, pp. 11 - 12.

Orote Point Camp for those already processed but awaiting transportation to their selected country. In addition to the 3,000 refugees processed and accepted by Canada, the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration stated that some 1,000 refugees chose France and Australia while smaller groups went to Belgium, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Thailand, Taiwan, Iran, Zaire, and the Ivory Coast. In all, between 4,000 and 5,000 refugees eventually left Guam for countries other than the United States.⁶²

Family Reunification and Locator Programs

The family reunification and locator programs were designed to make matters easier for the refugees and to expedite the overall processing. The Family Reunification Program reunited family members separated during the frantic evacuation from Vietnam. The staff Civil Liaison Element, working with the American Red Cross and other organizations, located and identified members of separated families at Wake Island and among the camps on Guam. The fewest number of people in a separated family were then moved either by the Air Force or by surface transport on Guam to the location of the largest portion of the family. This program resulted in the reunification of over 6,000 refugees with family members in other locations. In order to locate specific refugees, the camp staff established a locator system which was operated by personnel of the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry. When a refugee left the camp, changed tents, or was medically evacuated, the change was noted on the camp's copy of his locator card. Because of the constant and rapid turnover of refugees, plus some unauthorized moves within the huge camp and errors in recording names during the initial in-processing, the system was, not surprisingly, seldom current. The American Red Cross established a similar locator system for all refugees on Guam but it, too, was hard pressed to remain current for the same reasons as given above.⁶³

Refugee Hire Program

The Refugee Hire Program was initiated to use the refugees in a number of activities, thus reducing the need for troop support. Employment areas included camp government, media operations, medical operations, baby care centers, mess halls -- food servers and kitchen police, general administration, and, especially, trash removal and garbage collection. Because of the continuous and rapid turnover in the camp's refugee population, the 45th Support Group found it most difficult to retain qualified and trained refugee personnel, particularly interpreters. Initially, the refugee personnel used to perform the previously mentioned tasks were volunteers but the ongoing requirement to retain capable personnel necessitated the hiring of a more or less permanent work force to ensure effective continued operations. In response to this

62.

HQ, 45th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW LIFE, pp. 11 - 12.

63.

Ibid., pp. 9 - 10, 12 - 13.

obvious need, the Office of the Civil Coordinator and the Interagency Task Force in Washington, authorized the employment of 350 persons to augment the military forces running the camp. United States citizens were given first priority in hiring; then Vietnamese citizens who had been former employees of the U.S. Government; and, finally, other refugees. Unfortunately, the job positions had to be requisitioned through logistics channels and procured through the local civilian employment office in such a manner that over 300 man-hours were required to accomplish the necessary coordination and implementation. In the end 104 refugees were hired as interpreters and civil government workers. The remaining 246 positions were not filled. Civilian contract labor was used to clean latrines and collect trash, two major tasks for which the direct Refugee Hire Program had been developed.⁶⁴

Camp Security

The task of providing camp security, including provost marshal type operations and controlling visitor and vehicle access to the refugee center was first assigned to the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, which was subsequently replaced on 8 May by Company C, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry. Admiral Morrison's decision not to use regular Military Police as the security force was based on a number of considerations. First and foremost, he wished to avoid any appearance that force was required to control the refugees. Moreover, he felt this was the best approach to maintain unity of command and to keep both military personnel requirements and the American uniformed presence to a minimum. Company C personnel performed typical military police duties, but were not authorized to make arrests. Personnel of the Naval Investigative Service made all necessary arrests. Company C controlled the entrance and exit of visitors and vehicles and established 24-hour moving vehicle and walking patrols along with seventeen guard posts throughout the camp. Their primary means of communication consisted of radio augmented by telephone lines which connected the command post with the guard posts. From 27 May until the camp was closed, each patrol was augmented with three refugee volunteers who assisted the guards in communicating with the refugees. As a means of distinguishing the personnel of these security patrols, each member wore a white plastic "hard-hat." This distinctive headgear proved to be of great value since the refugees quickly recognized the white hat as a symbol of assistance.⁶⁵

64.

Ibid., p. 9.

65.

(1) Ibid., pp. 13 - 14; (2) Gonsalves, Operation NEW LIFE, pp. 36 - 38, 61 - 68.

U.S. Law and the Refugees

Since all refugees in the camp were considered to have the same rights and privileges as American citizens, the state of the law made it questionable as to whether a commander could authorize the search of individual refugees or other civilians although they were physically located on a military reservation. As a consequence of this general interpretation of civil rights, a search warrant, based on an affidavit, had to be obtained from a Federal or Guam judge in those cases where prosecution in a Federal or territorial court was contemplated. If the camp commander believed there was cause to search the person or property of an individual refugee, he had to contact the Navy Investigative Services which then coordinated the obtaining of the search warrant. Jurisdiction for the punishment of crimes was held by local, state (territorial), and Federal systems. Complaints were processed and resulting investigations were performed by the Naval Investigative Service or the Armed Services Police. As it turned out, all such investigations were terminated due to insufficient evidence or a legal recommendation not to prosecute. Of the 240 incidents recorded, only 9 were considered major, which included 3 cases of U.S. citizens taking food out of the camp; 2 major thefts -- both unconfirmed; 2 major assaults; 1 Navy Exchange theft; and 1 theft of \$1,200 worth of traveler's cheques. The majority of incidents were minor in nature and consisted principally of stolen suitcases or clothing, minor assaults, and stolen documents. Numerous rumors of prostitution and black market activities reached the security forces, but no specific instances were ever uncovered. The refugees did engage in the sale of personal property but this was done openly and did not involve stolen goods. Incidents recorded were as follows:⁶⁶

Incidents, 8 May - 8 June 1975 Orote Point Camp							
Dates	Theft	Assault	Nar- cotics	Prosti- tution	Other	Total	Average Popu- lation
<u>Total</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>203</u>	<u>33,219</u>
8 - 10 May	15	0	1	0	5	21	28,630
11 - 17 May	26	4	1	2	16	49	34,936
18 - 24 May	27	6	0	0	11	44	37,649
25 - 31 May	23	7	0	0	11	41	36,824
1 - 8 June	18	6	0	0	24	48	28,055

⁶⁶.

- (1) Gonsalves, Operation NEW LIFE, pp. 36 - 38 and 61 - 68;
(2) HQ, 45th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW LIFE, pp. 13 - 14.

Administrative Holding Area

The continuing number of incidents and other evidences of refugees with adjustment problems prompted the establishment of the Administrative Holding Area. The establishment of this facility prompted some controversy and resulted in the formation of a special committee on law and order. Committee membership included the Staff Judge Advocate from Admiral Morrison's staff; the Orote Point Camp Coordinator; the Chief, Naval Investigative Service; the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; the senior Immigration and Naturalization Service representative; and a representative from the Office of the Civil Coordinator. Permission to build the Administrative Holding Area was granted only after considerable consultation with, and the receipt of formal guidance from the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service in Washington. The authorities in Washington finally determined that refugees could be held in the Administrative Holding Area against their will and without a trial or Federal court order. While some consideration was given to deputizing the military security personnel under the Immigration and Naturalization Service, none of the parties involved believed this was necessary if the holding area was located on Federal property and the gate stayed open. Admiral Morrison ordered that no person be confined to the area for more than twenty-four hours. The refugees placed in the area were free to walk out at any time but left their papers and evacuee status cards which had been taken up by security personnel upon their arrival in the holding area. The refugees had to have these papers in their possession to leave Guam or to gain local employment. Consequently, they did not stray very far. The Administrative Holding Area, Orote Point Camp Area E (frequently mislabeled Section E) opened on 31 May under the command of Colonel O'Donohue and only he could place a refugee in it. Other camp commanders on Guam and Wake Island could send refugees to the Orote Point Camp for this purpose, but Colonel O'Donohue made the final decision to place them in the Administrative Holding Area. Official guidance concerning the categories of refugees who could be placed in the holding area included those awaiting trial for suspected offenses but had been released back to military custody by the civil authorities; those suspected of offenses for which investigative procedures were underway; those paroled to the compound by the local civil courts; and those whose camp commanders, for good cause, considered to be a threat to persons, property, or self. Placement of any evacuee into or removal from the Administrative Holding Area was accomplished through the recommendation of the Chief Security Officer along with the concurrence of the Orote Point Camp commander or his designated staff personnel such as the Executive Officer, S-3, S-4, or the Night Staff Duty Officer. Evacuees who were categorized as a threat to persons, property, or self were placed in the Administrative Holding Area only if it could be reasonably determined that, after counseling by security personnel, the particular evacuee would pose such a threat in the immediate future. Families of evacuees placed into the Administrative Holding Area could, if they so requested, be permitted to enter and leave the holding area.⁶⁷

67.

HQ, 45th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW LIFE, pp. 13 - 14.

While the crime rate remained relatively constant throughout the operation, those managing the refugee camps on Guam believed that the known existence of the Administrative Holding Area at the Orote Point Camp acted as a deterrent to the more common minor offenses. This belief was supported by the fact that the population at the Orote Point Camp stabilized in the first week of June and that the only newcomers were problem cases transferred from other camps on the island. Camp authorities viewed this lack of a measurable increase in incidents as a positive sign of the efficacy of the establishment of the Administrative Holding Area.⁶⁸

Logistics

Logistical Responsibilities

Since Operation NEW LIFE required a considerable and diverse amount of logistical support -- so much so that one service could not provide it all -- the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the individual military services to provide logistical support as follows:⁶⁹

Class of Logistical Support by Service Operation NEW LIFE		
Class	Materiel	Service
I	Subsistence	U.S. Navy
II	Clothing, Equipment, Housekeeping, etc.	U.S. Army
III	Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants	JCS
IV	Construction Materials	U.S. Army -- except for U.S. Navy work implements and JCS General Supply Warehousing
V	Ammunition -- Not Applicable	
VI	Personal Demand Items	JCS
VII	Major End Items	Service User
VIII	Medical Supplies and Medical Repair Parts	U.S. Navy/U.S. Air Force
IX	Repair Parts and Components	Service User

68.

Ibid.

69.

(1) Msg 020822Z May 75, USACSG to DA, subj: Daily Sitrep No. 4, 020800Z May 75, U.S. Army Spt to Operation NEW ARRIVALS; (2) U.S. Army CINCPAC Spt Gp, After Action Rpt - Operation NEW LIFE, 8 Dec 75, pp. 8 - 9.

Requests for off-island supply for refugee support had to be submitted through Admiral Morrison's staff to the U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific, with an information copy to the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, when appropriate. However, medical supply responsibilities were assigned to the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army medical units received their medical supplies from the U.S. Navy's Regional Medical Center on Guam. In the case of Army supplied items, the U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific, issued a directive to the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group which, in turn, filled the request from within Pacific Area resources or passed it on to the Department of the Army. These requirements were normally passed on to the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group Liaison Officer on Guam prior to dispatching the message to permit a rapid response to the request. The resupply of Army units on Guam engaged in Operation NEW LIFE was accomplished directly by the units themselves or personnel supporting the operation.⁷⁰

Logistics Operations

Logistics operations at the camp level were divided between the Navy and the Army. The Navy was responsible for requisitioning major bulk items such as blankets, cots, mattresses, trash cans, and construction materials, while the Army was responsible for requisitioning and distributing all other supply items including such consumables as toilet paper, diapers, soap, and baby food. A full appreciation of the effort required to support the Orote Point Camp can be gained by examining a partial list of the types and amounts of supplies and equipment required for the operation. Selected items included 24,133 mess kits, 41,600 coils of rope, 51,943 cots, 60,620 towels, and 73,239 blankets. Even these few selected figures were not completely accurate because the 45th Support Group had fewer than ten trained supply personnel on hand and they were also required to maintain a supply room and a document register, to receive supplies, and to perform a host of other supply-oriented administrative tasks. Since the supply personnel were otherwise engaged, the Class I and consumable issue points at the Orote Point Camp were operated by infantry personnel from the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry. Not surprisingly, these troops did not possess sufficient expertise in supply procedures. In addition, a critical shortage of trained forklift operators meant that infantrymen had to operate and maintain these vehicles. While these untrained personnel managed to move massive amounts of supplies, they damaged several forklifts in the process and equipment maintenance was poor.⁷¹

70.

(1) Msg 020822Z May 75, USACSG to DA, subj: Daily Sitrep No. 4, 020800Z May 75, U.S. Army Spt to Operation NEW ARRIVALS; (2) U.S. Army CINCPAC Spt Gp, After Action Rpt - Operation NEW LIFE, 8 Dec 75, pp. 8 - 9.

71.

Gonsalves, Operation NEW LIFE, pp. 39 - 40, 70 - 72.

Logistics Problem Areas

Logistics problem areas included the availability of water, the issue of clothing and comfort items, and the provision of basic eating utensils. The availability of an adequate water supply was a problem for all from the very beginning of Operation NEW LIFE because the rainy season did not begin when anticipated. The heavy influx of refugees and a resulting large use of water only added to this problem. Camp authorities used all available media to promote water conservation from the first week of Army operations. Water trailers were placed at key locations throughout the camp for the use of the refugees and each family was issued plastic containers to carry water to its tent. A major problem in the distribution of clothing and comfort items arose when the volunteer agencies established a central clothing distribution point. The refugees in their eagerness to get their "fair share" of the items all but rioted. In order to counteract this action, the Camp Commander directed the agencies to establish four separate and dispersed locations throughout the camp. Each location was placed under the control of a refugee area leader. This distribution system proved to be so successful that it was continued throughout the operation. Finally, there was a widespread shortage of plastic knives, spoons, and forks which caused serious problems for the camp's administrative staff, not to mention the refugees and food service people. These items were in short supply throughout the Pacific Area, making their procurement in sufficient quantities virtually impossible. Metal utensils were also difficult to find. Perhaps more importantly, the latter would have been most difficult to clean three times a day since the washing facilities were inadequate. After consulting with medical and supply personnel, the camp authorities decided to purchase and issue each refugee his own chopsticks. Each refugee used his pair at every meal and cleaned them himself. Although the decision to use chopsticks appeared quite simple, it involved the coordinated efforts of and decisions by the refugees, camp staff, medical, supply, and mess personnel.⁷²

Mess Operations

Of all the Orote Point Camp operations, mess halls were the most completely integrated prior to the change of command from Navy to Army administration. Army cooks were employed in mess operations almost from the moment they reached the island since the Navy construction regiment did not have enough cooks to man the camp's single mess hall which served 3 meals a day to more than 5,000 refugees. In addition, the Navy personnel were unfamiliar with the operation and maintenance of Army field ranges so that Army cooks had to be on duty at the Navy's mess hall 24 hours a day to ensure that these ranges remained in operating condition. On 30 April, the Navy completed construction of a second mess hall but, by then, there were over 16,000 refugees present in the camp. The table

72.

Ibid., pp. 29 - 40, 70 - 72.

below shows the construction completion and initial operation dates of the eight mess halls which the Navy constructed to meet the needs of the camp's expanding population.⁷³

<u>Date</u>	<u>Mess Hall No.</u>
24 April	2
30 April	1
1 May	3
3 May	4
6 May	5
7 May	6
12 May	7
14 May	8

These eight mess halls served over five million pounds of food during the course of Operation NEW LIFE with each mess hall averaging more than 10,000 meals per day. Meals were served from 0700 to 1000 and from 1300 to 1900 each day. One mess hall remained open during the night to serve refugees arriving after normal messing hours. Food resupply was based on the total camp population. The Commander, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, submitted ration requests to the Mess Steward, Naval Station Galley, who in turn ordered items and quantities of food from the Commander, Naval Supply Depot, Guam. The depot developed a messing plan which delineated the rations available and provided guidance for ordering. This ration availability list formed the basis for both dietary and menu planning for all mess halls. Naturally, periodic shortages of items occurred which required that substitutions be made. Since the menu was basically limited, the Army cooks tried to vary it to some degree, but with little real success. Their plans to include fresh fruits and vegetables in the daily diet failed, since all of the mess halls were not equipped to serve vegetables at each meal, and the lack of sufficient chill space on Guam meant that there was no place for storage. Finally, the quantity of fresh fruit and vegetables available on Guam was not sufficient for the camp's needs. The net result was that each mess served fresh vegetables three times a week at one meal, while fresh fruit was never served. The storage and distribution of large amounts of food and other supplies required to sustain the refugee population became a major problem, especially in view of the fact that there were not enough supply personnel to help with the operation. The Commander, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, managed to keep the supplies moving but it was a struggle at times.⁷⁴

73.

(1) Ibid., pp. 20 - 21, 40 - 41, 85 - 86; (2) HQ, 45th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW LIFE, pp. 11 - 12.

74.

HQ, 45th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW LIFE, pp. 11 - 12.

The number of Army mess personnel available was sufficient to supervise mess operations and prepare food, but not to have them act as food servers or kitchen police. While the camp commander's sole recourse was to recruit refugee volunteers for these two jobs, this system did not function very well. The refugees considered clean-up tasks to be demeaning and the extra food rations distributed in the way of compensation proved to be ineffective. Initially the camp authorities believed that the refugee hire program would solve the problem. In actual practice, however, most of the 104 refugees hired under this program were used to fill needed relatively high or midlevel positions. This situation left the camp commander with refugee volunteers, whose presence could not be counted on, to perform the kitchen duties. Since they were volunteers and their turnover was constant, there was no way to get them food handler certificates -- thus inviting the spread of disease. Despite these handicaps, there were enough volunteers to keep the operation going.⁷⁵

Medical Operations

The Army's medical mission was to provide outpatient care along with preventive medicine and veterinary support. The two medical clearing companies, the 423d and the 702d Medical Clearing Companies, provided outpatient treatment. These small hospitals were housed in Southeast Asia huts and tents within the camp itself. The four preventive medicine units, the Army Medical Laboratory, and the 49th Medical Detachment (GC) were collocated with the 423d Medical Company. The 440th Medical Detachment (RB) was attached to the 702d Medical Company and was responsible for providing direct support to the two clearing companies. Each clearing company maintained at least one dispensary, depending on the camp's total population. Since none of the medical units operated a dining facility, the Army Food Service Advisor performed duties as the Food Advisor for the eight refugee mess halls. The 1st Medical Group, the command and control element for medical operations within the Orote Point Camp, was located in three Southeast Asia huts and three tents on the edge of the camp.⁷⁶

Throughout the operation, the 1st Medical Group maintained coordination with representatives of the U.S. Public Health Service, the Center for Disease Control, and the Government of Guam. This rapport proved to be mutually beneficial, particularly in resolving communicable disease and laboratory support problems. Outpatient visits for the entire population totaled 92,699 with the daily sick call reaching a high of 5,273 on 14 May. Total outpatient visits generally reflected the level of camp population which peaked on 15 May at 39,331. The most common medical problem in the refugee population was conjunctivitis and medical personnel

75.

Ibid.

76.

HQ, 1st Medical Group, After Action Report, Operation NEW LIFE, 25 Jun 75, pp. 11 - 13.

treated a total of 37,189 such cases. Upper respiratory infections and diarrhea, with and without fever, were also significant problems. Patients requiring hospitalization were sent to the U.S. Navy Hospital, Guam, about ten miles from the Orote Point Camp, in ambulances of the 440th Medical Detachment. This arrangement worked well since the Navy had augmented the hospital staff with additional temporary duty personnel to handle the refugee workload. Experience showed that the outpatient rate decreased as time went on. According to the 1st Medical Group, it was probably due both to the resolution of initial health problems and, as the camp stabilized, to a healthier population.⁷⁷

Preventive Medicine

The preventive medicine effort was a crucial factor in the medical support of Operation NEW LIFE. With a crowded refugee population whose sanitary standards were low, and with refugees living in tents and using temporary latrines with no sewage system, a potentially explosive situation existed. Constant monitoring, inspections, and application of stringent preventive measures by medical personnel were essential and instrumental in precluding an outbreak of serious disease. Of all the functions assigned to the camp, latrine cleaning was the least glamorous but the most necessary to prevent diseases from breaking out. The 30th Naval Construction Regiment constructed 1,000 temporary latrines which had to be cleaned and inspected on a daily basis. Two procedures were required to clean these latrines. The interiors and exteriors had to be washed and disinfected and then the sewage had to be removed. The camp authorities tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain refugee volunteers to perform these tasks. They then contracted for sewage disposal trucks from civilian sources on Guam but maintenance downtime and the small number of available vehicles made sewage removal a constant problem. Latrine washing and disinfecting was finally performed by personnel from the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, with an inspection and grading system devised by the Preventive Medicine Officer, 1st Medical Group, to upgrade the cleaning operations. The inspector checked the latrines that had been cleaned and computed a percentage based on the number of latrines that needed recleaning to the number inspected. A percentage of 5 percent or higher was considered unsatisfactory. When the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, redeployed to Hawaii, latrine cleaning was turned over to a civilian contractor. Several days of inspection and constant supervision resulted in the contractor's performance improving from poor to marginal. Because of this poor performance, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, was directed to assist in the latrine cleaning operation. This measure resulted in a return to the previous high standard of cleanliness.⁷⁸

77.

Ibid.

78.

(1) Ibid.; (2) HQ, 45th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW LIFE, pp. 12, 14 - 15.

Trash removal was an important aspect of cleanliness, as well as a major undertaking, since over 2,700 truckloads of trash were removed during the operation. At first, the refugees would not assist Army personnel in policing trash or even putting it in the garbage bags provided. A program of giving candy to the refugee children for helping to fill plastic bags with trash was very successful for a short time. However, Civil Affairs Task Force 2 was soon obliged to conduct an intensive sanitation, water conservation, and fire prevention campaign in order to alleviate the overall situation. This program was successful in reducing trash littering in the camp. In addition, a civilian contract for trash clearance was awarded to the same company that had been awarded the latrine cleaning contract. The contractor's performance in emptying garbage cans and hauling refuse was just as poor as his latrine cleaning performance. The contractor was unable to get ahead of the trash problem and was barely able to stay level with it. Once again, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, was directed to provide personnel to help the contractor in gaining and maintaining the previous high standards of sanitation within the Orote Point Camp.⁷⁹

Fire Prevention

As noted above, a very important aspect of the program to improve the camp environment was a strong fire prevention program. This program was essential, since a number of refugees started individual fires within the camp in order to cook food or to warm themselves at night. The canvas tents with wooden floors which housed the refugees were quite flammable. Roving patrols from the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, put the fires out whenever they found them. Camp officials positioned a fire truck in the center of the camp area which was connected to a hot line to the battalion's operations center in order to facilitate an immediate response to a fire alarm. They positioned fire extinguishers in all buildings and established a single dump where trash could be burned. Because of these stringent precautions, no major fires occurred in the billeting areas. One large fire did start in the trash dump area, but fire fighting personnel soon brought it under control before it could threaten people in the camp.⁸⁰

Close-Out of the Orote Point Camp

Background

As the refugee population began to decline during the latter half of May, the Commander, U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group, recommended to the Department of the Army and others concerned in the operation that priority be given to closing the Orote Point Camp. This recommendation was prompted by several considerations. First was the poor physical

79.

HQ, 45th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW LIFE, pp. 14 - 15.

80.

Ibid.

condition of the camp, noted as early as 8 May by Admiral Wechsler, the J-4 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It should be noted that all concerned with the camp's operation knew that the facility was deteriorating under them but they could not, in the face of overwhelming numbers of refugees and the limited manpower available, do anything about it. They were hard pressed indeed to provide minimum services and comforts to their charges. What is more, all of the refugees at the Orote Point Camp were housed in tents and therefore extremely vulnerable to such normal natural disasters in that area at that time of year such as typhoons. Finally, there was the heavy involvement of Army forces with the potential adverse impact on the readiness of the 25th Infantry Division. Consequently, the U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific, directed Colonel O'Donohue to develop and implement a gradual withdrawal of Army elements from Guam as the refugee population dwindled. Army operations at the Orote Point Camp were to end simultaneously with the departure of the last refugee.⁸¹

Colonel O'Donohue's problem in developing such a plan was that a scheduled withdrawal of refugees was virtually impossible. The transfer of refugees from Guam depended upon two factors, the first, of which concerned the capability of the refugee camps in the United States to receive the refugees. This capability was, in turn, dependent upon the rate of refugee out-processing from those same camps into American society. By this time, a fourth refugee camp had been opened in the continental United States, thus raising the overall reception capacity to 60,000. As of 30 May, there were already 45,759 refugees in the continental United States and about 60,010 in the Pacific Area. Of that latter number, 44,966 were on Guam, including some 24,000 at the Orote Point Camp. The second factor in reducing the refugee population was the number and availability of suitable transport aircraft to take the refugees to the continental United States. Since the latter factor could not be predicted with any degree of success, any estimates of population reduction based on the transfer of the refugees from Guam were meaningless for planning purposes. Thus, Colonel O'Donohue based his plan on the only certain factor for emptying his facility -- the transfer of refugees to other camps on Guam.⁸²

81.

(1) Msg 311742Z May 75, Cdr USACSG to Distr, subj: Army Support to NEW LIFE; (2) HQ FORSCOM, FORSCOM AC Readiness Summary, 20 Jun 75, Tab J; (3) MFR, COL W.W. Ballard, C/EOS to BG Todd, ADCSOPS, 9 May 75, subj: Operation NEW ARRIVALS; (4) Ltr, Cdr 714th Med Det (Pvnt Med) to Cdr 44th Med Bde, 22 May 75, subj: Status Rpt - Operation NEW LIFE.

82.

(1) Gonsalves, Operation NEW LIFE, pp. 80 - 83; (2) Msg 310812Z May 75, Cdr USACSG to DA, subj: Daily Sitrep, 31 May 75, U.S. Army Spt to Operation NEW LIFE.

Colonel O'Donohue had his plan in action by the first week in June. He made every effort to keep military strength and resources to a minimum and redeployed men and equipment as soon as conditions permitted. The first military reduction occurred on 7 June when elements of the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, departed for their home station at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Because of the large numbers of refugees remaining in the Orote Point Camp through 24 June -- the final group to leave numbered over 3,400 -- support services were required up to the last day of operations. During the remaining weeks, Colonel O'Donohue was able to further reduce the Army's involvement at the camp by employing refugee volunteers to help close the camp. These volunteers gathered cots and other materials and helped to police sections as they were emptied. With this welcome help and careful management on his part, he was able to reduce the military strength on 8 June to 1,510 as compared with a 15 May peak strength of 1,870. By 23 June, military strength was further decreased to 899.⁸³

Problem Areas

Three relatively minor but time consuming problems occurred during these last weeks at the Orote Point Camp. First, a little more than 1,000 refugees wanted to return to Vietnam rather than go to the United States. These people required separate housing and administrative processing. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees noted that the new Vietnamese Government would probably approve their return home on a case-by-case basis, all of which would take time. Because final approval in this matter would take time, the refugees requesting repatriation were transferred to other camps on Guam. Eventually, the Navy placed all refugees requesting repatriation at Camp Asan, which was operated by the Commander, U.S. Marine Barracks, Guam. The next problem involved those refugees who were scheduled to go to the United States but who refused to be assigned to certain camps. For example, they considered Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa., too cold, and rumors that it was an American Indian reservation led them to believe they would be subjected to treatment similar to that experienced by American Indians who lived on reservations. The Orote Point Camp authorities were thus forced to launch an intensive information program to convince the refugees that Fort Indiantown Gap was not an American Indian reservation and that they could expect excellent treatment there. Finally, on 17 June 1975, the Orote Point Camp staff discovered a serious discrepancy in the number of refugees who had completed out-processing and were awaiting transportation from the camp and the number of refugees who still required out-processing. A population census revealed that only some 2,500 refugees, rather than an anticipated 5,000 refugees, still required out-processing. This discrepancy was due both to the inadequate locator system and to the large number of refugees who had left the camp for resettlement in a third country. The records of refugees processed for third country destinations had not been processed through the camp locator system.⁸⁴

83.

Gonsalves, Operation NEW LIFE, pp. 80 - 83, 85 - 87.

84.

Ibid., pp. 87 - 89

Final Close-Out of the Orote Point Camp

Army operations at the Orote Point Camp ended in the late evening of 24 June when the last refugee departed. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, conducted a final police of the area and removed equipment from the tents and the administrative areas during the period 25 through 27 June. The 30th Naval Construction Regiment removed the tents, tent floors, and utilities. In planning for the return of the equipment from Guam, the 45th Support Group found that such items as tents, cots, and mess gear would require classification prior to disposition. Consequently, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group directed the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii, to provide an equipment inspection and classification team to inspect and classify all equipment which had been used in Operation NEW LIFE. The team arrived on Guam on 2 June and began operations immediately. Items provided from commands within the Pacific Area, including reserve stocks, were returned to their source. The remaining items were cleaned and turned in to the Naval Supply Depot, Guam, for disposition through normal supply channels. The team completed its assigned work and redeployed to Hawaii on 30 June. On that same day, all organizational (TOE) equipment which was to be returned either to Hawaii or the continental United States by ship was cleaned and sent to the dock storage area for shipment. FORSCOM's 515th Ordnance Company, stationed on Guam, assumed the mission of inspecting and classifying the equipment which still remained on the island.⁸⁵

Final Redeployments of Military Personnel

In the meantime, the redeployment of Army military personnel continued. Medical personnel and their equipment redeployed from 27 June through 2 July. Personnel and equipment of Civil Affairs Task Force 2 departed on 30 June. The redeployment of mess personnel -- other than those who volunteered to support the U.S. Marine Corps operations at Camp Asan on Guam -- was accomplished concurrently with the medical units. The final redeployment occurred on 3 July when Headquarters, 45th Support Group, and the personnel and equipment of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, departed for Hawaii. The final closing of the camp and the movement of personnel and equipment to their home stations was accomplished without difficulty and within seventy-two hours from the time of departure of the last refugee.⁸⁶

85.

HQ, 45th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW LIFE, pp. 19 - 20.

86.

Ibid.

Chapter II

EARLY FORT CHAFFEE OPERATIONS

CONUS Implementation Phase

Background

Late in the evening of Saturday, 26 April, the Department of the Army informed FORSCOM that the President had decided to provide shelter for Vietnamese refugees at military installations within the United States. The President's desires in the matter were contained in a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) message which was on its way to FORSCOM. According to Department of the Army, FORSCOM would be required to select 2 installations, each capable of housing 20,000 refugees for approximately 90 days, as well as 2 alternate installations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would then choose one of these installations by 1600, Sunday, 27 April. Thus, FORSCOM could expect only twelve hours notice, at the most, to get the selected installation operational, since the first refugees would arrive on the following Monday or Tuesday. Later that same day, the Department informed FORSCOM that the entire matter was "Close Hold". FORSCOM was to wait for the JCS decision before taking any action. FORSCOM requested permission to alert the units and installations involved since time was of the essence, but this request was denied.¹

The Beginning of Operation in the Continental United States

The JCS message arrived early Sunday morning, informing FORSCOM that the incoming Vietnamese refugees would be sheltered at military installations in the United States pending action by a number of voluntary agencies to arrange for sponsors and onward movement to a final destination. Installations selected for the operation should have adequate space for these agencies as well as nearby adequate public transportation facilities. In general, the refugee centers would be evenly spaced across the country but would have to have a mild climate. The Department of Defense directed the Army, Navy (Marine Corps), and the Air Force to nominate two centers each, with each center capable of handling a maximum of 20,000 refugees. The nominations were to be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by 1600 that same day. The first refugees were scheduled to arrive either the following day or the day after. All Defense Department funds expended in the operation would be reimbursed by the State Department. No public announcement was to be made prior to receiving appropriate clearances from the Interagency Task Force (ITF).²

1.

(1) FORSCOM EOC Journal, FONECON record, DA/AOC (COL Dunne) to FORSCOM EOS (COL Ballard) 272300Z Apr 75; (2) FORSCOM EOC Journal, FONECON record, DA/AOC (MG Sniffen) to FORSCOM EOS (COL Ballard), 272330Z Apr 75.

2.

Msg 270157Z Apr 75, DA to Distr, subj: Evacuation of Refugees
-- Operation NEW LIFF.

The FORSCOM Nominations

FORSCOM immediately nominated Camp Roberts, Calif., and Fort Chaffee, Ark., as the primary Army Refugee Center sites, with Fort Pickett, Va., and Camp Shelby, Miss., as two alternates. Later the same day, FORSCOM received information that Lt. Gen. Donald H. Cowles, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), Department of the Army, had discussed the FORSCOM nominations with the Army Chief of Staff, who intended to present the nominations at a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, scheduled for 1030 on Monday morning. The Chief of Staff also intended to impress upon Ambassador L. Dean Brown, Chief of the Interagency Task Force, that at least thirty-six hours would be needed from the execute order to the time the first refugees arrived at Camp Roberts and forty-eight hours from the execute order to the time the first refugees arrived at Fort Chaffee. In addition, Ambassador Brown would have the responsibility of contacting the appropriate state governors once the Joint Chiefs of Staff had selected the sites for the Refugee Centers. FORSCOM passed this information on to the two potential Refugee Center commanders at Fort Sill, Okla., and Fort Ord, Calif. The Fort Sill commander reported that his personnel were ready to start operations at Fort Chaffee at any time but that they would require as much lead time as possible. He explained that the Fort Chaffee hospital, for example, was in a standby condition and would require at least twenty-four hours to ready it for operations.³

Camp Roberts Dropped from Consideration

The Department of the Army informed FORSCOM that, although Camp Roberts was the best choice available, it would not be used as a Refugee Center because of Governor Jerry Brown's opposition. The Fort Ord Commander reported that apparently no one had consulted with Governor Brown prior to the opening of Camp Pendleton, Calif. -- a U.S. Marine Corps base -- as a Refugee Center, and that the governor was concerned that the refugees would settle in California, thus adding to his many internal domestic problems such as high unemployment, and sky-rocketing welfare costs.⁴

3.

(1) Msg 270822Z Apr 75, FORSCOM to DA, subj: Evacuation of Refugees -- Operation NEW LIFE; (2) MFR, BG W.R. Todd, FORSCOM ADCSOPS, 27 Apr 75, subj: Telephone Conversation with MG Sniffen, DA DCSOPS.

4.

(1) Point Paper, DCSOPS, 272030Z Apr 75, Significant Events, Operation NEW LIFE; (2) Intvw, Mr. M.W. Stark, FORSCOM Hist Ofc w/CPT A.J. Haas, FORSCOM DCSOPS-RO, 3 Jun 76; (3) MFR, BG W.R. Todd, FORSCOM ADCSOPS, 27 Apr 75, subj: Telephone Conversation with MG Sniffen, DA DCSOPS.

TABLE 9

TROOP LIST -- OPERATION NEW LIFE
FORT CHAFFEE

Unit	Strength	Home Station
HHC, 46th Support Group (CS)	97	Ft. Bragg
20th Adjutant General Detachment (Repl)	35	Ft. Campbell
524th Adjutant General Company (Pers Svc)	116	Ft. Benning
96th Civil Affairs Battalion (-)	46	Ft. Bragg
5th Engineer Battalion (Combat AR)(-)	341	Ft. Leonard Wood
471st Transportation Company (Lt Trk)	176	Ft. Sill
FHD, 720th Military Police Battalion	60	Ft. Hood
411th Military Police Company	176	Ft. Hood
62d Composite Service Company (S&S)(Type B)	189	Ft. Hood
27th Public Information Detachment (Fld Svc)	5	Ft. Monroe
28th Public Information Detachment (Fld Svc)	5	Ft. Carson
49th Public Information Detachment (Fld Svc)	5	Ft. Bragg
330th Movement Control Center	8	Ft. Bragg
47th Medical Hospital (-)	124	Ft. Sill
<u>Add-ons:</u>		
44th Military History Detachment	3	Ft. McPherson
714th Medical Detachment	8	Ft. Bragg
225th Medical Detachment	N/A	N/A
330th Movement Control Team	7	Ft. Bragg
TC Movement Control Team	7	Ft. Bragg
<u>To prepare to move but deploy only on order:</u>		
401st Military Police Company	176	Ft. Hood
593d Engineer Company	N/A	Ft. Bragg

Source: (1) Msg 281853Z Apr 75, FORSCOM to Distr, subj: Operation NEW LIFE - Chaffee; (2) Msg 282136Z Apr 75, FORSCOM to Distr, subj: Operation NEW LIFE; (3) Msg 282358Z Apr 75, FORSCOM to XVIII Abn Corps and Ft Bragg, subj: Operation NEW LIFE - Chaffee. (All UNCLASSIFIED).

Fort Chaffee Selected -- Operation NEW LIFE Begins

During the afternoon of Monday, 28 April, Department of the Army informed FORSCOM that Fort Chaffee had been selected as the U.S. Army's Refugee Center. That installation was to be prepared to accept up to 1,000 refugees per day for a maximum camp population of 20,000. FORSCOM designated Brig. Gen. James W. Cannon, Commander, III Corps Artillery, as the Refugee Center commander and directed all units identified as supporting units in OPLAN Chaffee to deploy immediately (Table 9). FORSCOM directed the respective home stations to immediately fill all unit personnel shortages. Units within a 325-mile radius of Fort Chaffee were to move by motor convoy, while those at a greater distance were to submit requests for Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAM).⁵

At 2330 that evening, Department of the Army directed FORSCOM to immediately halt the deployment to Fort Chaffee. Units en route to the installation could proceed, while units still in the loading process were to remain in place until further notice. By 0830 the following day, some 224 military personnel had arrived at Fort Chaffee, including elements of the 35th Military Police Battalion, Fort Sill, Okla., which was to provide camp security until the arrival of the 720th Military Police Battalion, Fort Hood, Tex. At Fort Sill's request and with Department of the Army concurrence, FORSCOM had directed the deployment to Fort Chaffee of a 2-man advance party from the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 46th Support Group, Fort Bragg, N.C. In view of the Department's directive, FORSCOM informed Fort Sill not to incur any further costs for either supplies or services until directed to do so. The Department of the Army would issue further guidance on the matter following a Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting scheduled for 0930 on 29 April.⁶

Announcements by the Defense Department

On 29 April 1975, the Department of Defense announced that three military installations in the continental United States had been selected to serve as Refugee Centers for Indochinese refugees: Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.; Fort Chaffee, Ark.; and Camp Pendleton, Calif. These installations were to be used for the temporary housing of a maximum of 20,000 refugees each for a minimum of 90 days. In addition, the Department announced that the President had ordered the final evacuation of Saigon. Operation EAGLE PULL was underway at that time and was expected to be completed shortly.⁷

5.

(1) Msg 290758Z Apr 75, FORSCOM to Distr, subj: Deployment Instructions; (2) Fact Sheet, ODCSOPS OE/WE, 29 Apr 75.

6.

(1) Msg 290758Z Apr 75, FORSCOM to Distr, subj: Deployment Instructions; (2) Msg 290616Z Apr 75, FORSCOM to DA, subj: SITREP 3, Operation NEW LIFE.

7.

Msg 291656Z Apr 75, SECDEF to Distr, subj: DOD News Briefing.

Deployment Ban Lifted

Following the Department of Defense announcements, the Department of the Army directed FORSCOM to continue troop deployments to Fort Chaffee. On 30 April, the Secretary of State directed that Fort Chaffee be ready to receive several hundred refugees by 0900 on 2 May. In effect, this gave FORSCOM some forty-eight hours in which to establish this Refugee Center. The State Department indicated that the primary goal of the operation was to move refugees as quickly as possible from overseas to Refugee Centers in the United States where they would be held for processing. The host military installation commander would be responsible for the general support, security, and safety of his Refugee Center. A senior civilian official, designated by the Interagency Task Force, would be responsible for coordinating all civil activities at the center. Any problem which could not be resolved between the military and civilian authorities at the installation/Refugee Center level, would be referred to the Secretary of State for resolution.⁸


Department of the Army Guidance

Shortly after the resumption of FORSCOM's troop deployments to Fort Chaffee, the Department of the Army informed the command that the airfield at Fort Smith, Ark., would be used for the arrival of refugees. If, however, the aircraft used in the operation were unable to land at Fort Smith, they would be diverted to the larger airfield at Little Rock, Ark. In the meantime, the U.S. Air Force deployed one of its movement control teams from Fort Bragg, N.C., to Little Rock to provide aircraft control. Early on the morning of 30 April, the Department of the Army directed FORSCOM to be prepared to receive some 1,000 refugees the first day and some 2,000 refugees per day thereafter. The FORSCOM commander was responsible for providing for the general support, security, and safety of the Refugee Center. In addition, he retained administrative responsibility for the logistical support and services required to operate the Refugee Center and was responsible for housing and providing for the refugees during their processing by Federal and voluntary agencies. Included in this responsibility was the establishment of appropriate office facilities along with adequate communications for use by the Federal, state, local and voluntary agencies. At this point in time, the name of the operation for all involved Department of the Army elements was changed from Operation NEW LIFE to Operation NEW ARRIVALS. The Department also informed FORSCOM that Mr. Donald G. MacDonald, a retired FSO-1 (Foreign Service Officer 1) (General Officer Level), had been

8.

(1) Fact Sheet, DCSOPS OE/WR, 30 Apr 75, Purpose: To Provide Current Information on Operation New Arrivals (formerly NEW LIFE); (2) Msg 300400Z Apr 75, Sec of State to Distr, subj: Operation NEW LIFE Interagency Relationships.

INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS - FORT CHAFFEE



SOURCE: INFO FURNISHED BY FORSCOM DCSOPS FOC, 20 APR 75. (UNCLASSIFIED).

called back to duty and appointed to coordinate the efforts of the various Federal and civilian agencies at Fort Chaffee. Command and interagency relationships were as shown on Chart 6.⁹

FORSCOM Commander's Guidance

On the morning of Wednesday, 30 April 1975, Brig. Gen. W.R. Todd briefed General Bernard W. Rogers, the FORSCOM commander, concerning Operation NEW ARRIVALS. He identified three possible problem areas involving press relations, responsive support to senior State Department representatives, and insufficient communications facilities. General Todd explained that he had already discussed these three potential problem areas with the Fort Sill commander. General Rogers then issued some general guidance, noting that a great deal of what the command was doing was based on perception and that all involved had to ensure that they took care of the refugees' human needs. Under no circumstances could the impression be given that the refugees were being incarcerated in any way. FORSCOM's mission, therefore, was to provide the maximum possible assistance to the civilian coordinator and to respond to his requests if such were within the command's capability.¹⁰

Command and Control

As noted above, the President had formed the Interagency Task Force, composed of representatives of the Federal agencies involved, to control and coordinate the refugee program. In actual operation, this approach was characterized by informal directions, guidance, and exchange of ideas which, in essence, stripped the operation of red tape and kept the massive effort from stalling. On the other hand, this informality proved to be a major weakness, since it produced a general lack of documentation, particularly at the operating level, which made the reconstruction of rationale, recommendations, and approvals very difficult. It also had an adverse effect on the conduct of the operation since the civilian agencies rotated their senior officers every thirty days. This latter practice disrupted the continuity of action, forcing the replacement personnel to retrace steps already taken.¹¹

9.

(1) Msg 300713Z Apr 75, DA to Distr, subj: Operation NEW ARRIVALS; (2) Point Paper, DCSOPS OE/WR, 291130Z Apr 75, subj: Significant Events - Operation NEW LIFE; (3) Fact Sheet, DCSOPS OE/WR, 301130Z Apr 75, subj: Resume of Important Events -- Operation NEW ARRIVALS.


10.

MFR, BG W.R. Todd, FORSCOM ADCSOPS, 30 Apr 75, subj: Briefing for GEN B.W. Rogers, Commander, FORSCOM.


11.

HQ FORSCOM, Operation NEW ARRIVALS - After Action Report (Interim), pp. A-1 - A-2, (hereafter referred to as FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS - AAR (Int)).

CIVILIAN AGENCIES



FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION - MILITARY TASK FORCE TASK FORCE NEW ARRIVALS - FORT CHAFFEE



SOURCE: HQ 46TH SPT GP, AFTER ACTION REPORT, OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS, FORT CHAFFEE,
26 APRIL 1975 - 21 MAY 1975, VOL. I, P. B-6-6. (UNCLASSIFIED).

The civilian agencies were organized as shown on Chart 7. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was responsible for conducting security clearances and establishing legal alien status for the refugees. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) provided social security, public health, and social rehabilitation services. The Department of Labor influenced sponsorship selection for the purpose of diverting refugee settlement away from labor surplus areas. The American Red Cross matched up separated families and provided some emergency relief. The Fort Chaffee Operation NEW ARRIVALS Operation Center was a joint State Department - Army Civil Affairs function responsible for camp communications and for coordinating the movement of the refugees through the processing cycle until their final sponsorship and release. On the military side, the Joint Chiefs of Staff worked with the Interagency Task Force in scheduling the inflow of refugees and providing the military support required. This arrangement lasted until 3 November 1975 when the Department of the Army replaced the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Operation NEW ARRIVALS.¹²

Task Force Organization

As the Department of the Army action agent for support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS, FORSCOM exercised operational control over all Army forces committed to that operation. Since Fort Chaffee was a subinstallation of Fort Sill, the task of executing Operation Plan Chaffee was assigned to that installation's commander. In addition, Fort Sill was the Basic Support Installation both for Fort Chaffee and the Operation NEW ARRIVALS Task Force. If Fort Sill was unable to supply the task force's needs, task force representatives, in turn, contacted FORSCOM for assistance. Task Force NEW ARRIVALS (TFNA) headquarters at Fort Chaffee was constructed around Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 46th Support Group as shown on Chart 8. Upon arrival at Fort Chaffee, the 46th Support Group determined that the organizational structure of the task force headquarters was not, in their opinion, entirely adequate, since it did not identify a unit or group capable of serving as the headquarters and staff for the commander. In order to provide this needed capability, the group realigned its normal organizational staff. A second command and control element, consisting primarily of personnel assigned to the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (-), was given the dual mission of augmenting logistical support and providing for the camp's internal management structure.¹³


12.

HQ, 46th Spt Gp, After Action Report - Operation NEW ARRIVALS, Fort Chaffee: 28 April 1975 - 21 May 1975, Vol 1, undated, p. B-6-1, (hereafter referred to as 46th Spt Gp, AAR - NEW ARRIVALS, Ft Chaffee, Vol 1).

13.

Ibid., pp. 4 - 8, B-4-1, and B-4-5.

MAP 1



FORT CHAFFEE

General Cannon decided that Fort Sill personnel, who had accompanied him to Fort Chaffee in order to assist in the discharge of his duties until the arrival of the 46th Support Group, should be incorporated into the latter unit upon its arrival so as to provide additional expertise. In addition, he attached other filler personnel to the group to provide specialties not generally found in its table of organization and equipment (TOE). He established an S-5 (Civil Affairs) Section using personnel from Fort Sill. The 720th Military Police Battalion, whose commander was also the Task Force Provost Marshal, and the 411th Military Police Company provided initial security forces. General Cannon attached the 47th Field Hospital to the task force to provide overall health care with its commander acting as the Task Force Surgeon. He also attached the 5th Engineer Battalion to provide engineer support with its commander becoming the Task Force Engineer. In order to centralize the logistics effort, the group's Logistical Operations Section was consolidated with the S-4 (Supply). The remaining staff sections of the group performed basically as prescribed in its table of organization and equipment.¹⁴

The comparatively late arrival of the civilian agencies complicated the initial organization of the Joint Civilian/Military Task Force. This tardiness resulted in the civilian staff elements falling behind the military staff in assuming their designated responsibilities. Fort Chaffee's physical layout caused still further difficulties. (Map 1). The Task Force was required to locate major organizational elements, including representatives of the Voluntary Agencies (VOLAG), the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in separate buildings. This physical separation created communications problems which initially disrupted interagency coordination. The comparatively tardy arrival of the Voluntary Agencies was partly the fault of the agencies and partly the fault of the Senior Civil Coordinator. By the afternoon of 30 April, the only noticeable civilian preparations for operations at Fort Chaffee had been the appointment of the Senior Civil Coordinator, Mr. D.G. MacDonald, and his assistant, Mr. Frank Van Dam. In addition, it was generally known that none of the Voluntary Agencies would be ready to commence operations until 11 or 12 May. Despite urging in Washington to have the Voluntary Agencies report to Fort Chaffee as soon as possible, Mr. MacDonald had deferred their arrival until after the refugees had actually started arriving. He did not want the agencies to arrive "too early" and sit around for three or four days while their offices were being set up. He got the Voluntary Agencies to agree to come to Fort Chaffee on 4 May, two days after the first refugees were scheduled to arrive. In the meantime, the Voluntary Agencies at Camp Pendleton had notified their counterparts that they had been unable to operate during the first several days after their arrival due to the widespread confusion at the camp. Based upon this information, the Voluntary Agencies did not honor their informal date of 4 May arrival, but arbitrarily delayed their arrivals until

14.

Ibid.



Fort Chaffee, a TRADOC sub-installation of Fort Sill, was a World War II post with 35-year old temporary wooden buildings. Most of the structures had not been occupied for more than ten years.



A typical view of the refugee area depicts security measures used by Military Police to monitor vehicular and pedestrian traffic at the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center.



Due to Fort Chaffee's physical layout, the Task Force headquarters was required to locate major organizational elements in separate buildings, which posed initial communications problems.



A Vietnamese boy examines his newly acquired play things. Toys for refugee youngsters were distributed by volunteer agencies.

11 May. Some few of the agencies did send 1-man delegations to Fort Chaffee before this date who discovered that operational requirements were pending and tried unsuccessfully to get full staffs in earlier.¹⁵

Operations at Fort Chaffee

Barracks Renovation

Fort Chaffee, a subinstallation of Fort Sill, a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) installation, was located just outside of Fort Smith, Ark. This was a World War II post, with 35-year old temporary wooden buildings, manned by sixty-two military and civilian personnel and used for Reserve Component training. Most of the buildings were closed, while the hospital was in a standby condition. By 2 May, 1,728 military personnel assigned to 25 military units had arrived at the installation with the mission of making it an operable Refugee Center. Their most important and immediate task was to prepare some 202 wooden barracks for housing refugee families. Although a few of these barracks had been used to house Reservists in the summer months, most had not been occupied for more than ten years. Each building was capable of housing eighty to ninety refugees. Personnel from the 3d Battalion, 9th Field Artillery, and the 5th Engineer Battalion began installing bunks in the barracks on 29 April. Once the bunks were in place, engineer troops, assisted by the Fort Chaffee Directorate of Facilities and Engineering (DFAE), installed partitions. Whenever there was a lull in the installation work due to a temporary shortage of bunks or partitions, they hooked up water and gas lines. The utilities in the barracks required extensive renovation. On many occasions, when the water was turned on in those barracks which had not been modernized in any way since World War II, the pipes in the latrines and showers burst. The Task Force secured emergency repair parts from Fort Sill and, in order to speed up the work, they cannibalized other Fort Chaffee barracks for fixtures and parts. Despite the feverish pace of the work crews, the refugees began arriving faster than the barracks could be prepared. This situation was made more difficult by the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, which was in charge of billeting the refugees, when it failed to fill the barracks to capacity. Once it became apparent that the incoming flood of refugees was about to exceed the capacity for renovation, the Task Force decided to billet the excess refugee population in unused administration and supply buildings until the barracks were ready. This proved to be a poor decision since these buildings did not have enough toilet facilities and the refugees refused to use the facilities in nearby barracks, since Vietnamese customs were such that the barracks' occupants would have considered such usage to be a major invasion of privacy and a breach of etiquette. The problem was solved through the introduction of portable toilets and a vigorous public information program to convince the refugees that the

— 15. —

Interview, MAJ. R. L. ...
Fort Chaffee, 26 May 1975

MAJ. R. L. ...

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
THE ROLE OF THE US ARMY FORCES COMMAND IN PROJECT NEW
ARRIVALS RECEPTION A. (U) ARMY FORCES COMMAND FORT
MC PHERSON GA F W PEW 01 SEP 81 SBI-AD-E750 451


2/4

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A



Engineer carpenters fabricate wooden partitions to be used in the preparation of barracks in the Refugee Center.



Privacy partitions are loaded for delivery to refugee barracks by engineer soldiers.



501st Infantry soldiers install additional bunks and mattresses to provide a total of 110 bunks and 60 wall lockers per barracks.



An engineer utilities repair soldier prepares the Fort Chaffee hospital heating system for operation under the supervision of a Fort Chaffee civilian engineer employee.

sharing of facilities was a necessity until the last barracks would be renovated by 14 May. The extent of the required conversion effort was as follows:¹⁶

Barracks Partitioned and Bunks Installed			
Date	No. Barracks	Capacity	Refugee Population
29 April	0	0	0
2 May	51	5,406	345
9 May	183	18,814	12,157
14 May	237	24,512	22,451

In addition to getting the barracks ready, the task force had to solve a number of corollary problems. Forms had to be designed and printed, and supplies such as linens, pillows, blankets, toilet paper, bunks, and bunk adapters -- to name just a few items -- had to be located within government stocks or purchased and shipped to Fort Chaffee from locations throughout the United States. The items requisitioned from governmental sources competed with orders from refugee operations in the Pacific Area with the result that both operations suffered delays and shortages. While the task force was engaged in trying to procure essential supplies, they discovered that the laundry service available at Fort Chaffee could not support the demand. The Task Force requested that the post laundry facilities be opened, but the request was denied by higher headquarters because of the costs involved. In order to cope with the situation, the Fort Sill Quartermaster Laundry hired additional laundry personnel and operated an additional shift. The linen turn-in, direct exchange of linen, and laundry runs to Fort Sill, 200 miles away, were accomplished by the Laundry Platoon of the 62d Supply and Service Company.¹⁷

Sewage Treatment

Proper sewage disposal became an immediate environmental issue. Fort Chaffee's sewage disposal treatment facility was designed to support a population of only 7,500. As an interim remedial measure to handle the refugee reception center's rapidly growing population, additional aerators and chlorine treatment chambers were installed in early May in an


16.

(1) HQDA, AAR-NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, pp. I-C-1 - I-C-2; (2) HQ, 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS, Ft Chaffee, Vol. 1, pp. 5, 7, and C-6-1; (3) HQ, 5th Engr Bn, After Action Report - Operation NEW ARRIVALS, 20 Jan 76, pp. 1 - 4.

17.

HQ, 5th Engr Bn, After Action Report - Operation NEW ARRIVALS, 20 Jan 76, pp. 1 - 4.

DESIGNATION OF SUPPLY ACTION OFFICERS TASK FORCE NEW ARRIVALS - FORT CHAFFEE



SOURCE: HQ 46TH SPT GP, AFTER ACTION REPORT, OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS, FORT CHAFFEE,
16 APRIL 1975 - 21 MAY 1975, VOL I, P. C-4-4. (UNCLASSIFIED).

effort to support 15,000 personnel. At the same time, the 593d Engineer Company, assisted by elements of the 5th Engineer Battalion, began the construction of a 2-cell lagoon covering fifty-two acres with an aeration system capable of supporting a population of 40,000. General Cannon directed that the construction be carried out on a 7-day workweek with two 12-hour shifts per day. Despite this taxing schedule, the project was not completed until 6 September, some sixty days behind schedule. The delay was caused by a combination of heavy rains and organic soil which made working conditions very difficult. The effort proved very expensive in terms of wornout and damaged engineer equipment. The total cost was \$250,000 which was not reimbursed by the Department of State. However, it was funded by the Defense Department as a needed improvement to the installation's utility system.¹⁸

Supply

The Task Force S-4 was responsible for the coordination and control of all logistical functions such as supervising the preparation of the installation for the refugees, exercising property control, and providing food services, personal services, bath and laundry, and supplies. The latter function included stocking enough supplies to support 15,000 refugees, monitoring requisitions, conducting storage and distribution of supplies and equipment, ensuring supply security, and establishing supply procedures for units and organizations attached to the Task Force. The S-4 was also responsible for maintenance activities and for providing adequate transportation. In order to make the task manageable, the Task Force S-4 consolidated the thirty or so supporting units and agencies into six composite groups as shown on Chart 9. Once this organization was established, the S-4 directed the 62d Supply and Service Company to perform the bulk of the supply operations.¹⁹

Security

Initial security was provided by the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 720th Military Police Battalion, the 411th Military Police Company, and the 401st Military Police Company (-). As the operation gradually stabilized and the refugee population began to decline, these units returned to their home station of Fort Hood, Tex.; however, they were replaced by units from other locations. These forces provided

18.

(1) HQDA AAR-NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, pp. I-C-I - III-A-II; (2) HQ, 5th Engr Bn, After Action Report - Operation NEW ARRIVALS, 20 Jan 76, pp. 3 - 4; (3) MFR, FORSCOM Engineer (AFEN-ME) to BG W.R. Todd.

19.

HQ, 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS, Ft Chaffee, Vol. 1, pp. C-1, C-4-1 - C-4-2.

installation security to include perimeter and gate security for the refugee housing area, support to Reserve Component Annual Training 1975 (AT 75), and support to the continued operation of battalion functions at both Forts Chaffee and Hood.²⁰

Jurisdictional matters were simplified when the servicing Staff Judge Advocate declared Fort Chaffee an exclusive jurisdiction post which meant that the Military Police were designated as the official law enforcement agency for Fort Chaffee. There was some initial confusion, however, since the Provost Marshal had entered into an agreement with State Department security personnel to leave with the latter those refugee incidents stemming from cultural practices or stress of the circumstances such as the long trip, fatigue, lost family members, guilt, and the like. As a result, several minor offenses were referred to the State Department which should have been referred to the military police. The situation was aggravated somewhat by the mistaken belief among the civilian elements of the Task Force, including some State Department security personnel, that the military police had no jurisdiction over civilians. Reindoctrination of both groups and a publicity program for the Vietnamese explaining military police functions and services resolved the problem.²¹

The military police recognized the necessity for establishing clearly defined boundaries for the refugee housing area but decided, early in the operation, to avoid the appearance of confinement or physical restraint. For this reason the use of physical barriers around the refugee area was never seriously considered. Instead, they designated roadways as boundaries for the refugee area and ensured their effectiveness through the use of continual announcements to the refugees through their newspaper, barracks chiefs, maps, flyers, and loudspeaker patrols. The military police placed signs designating the area as "Private Family Housing," thus avoiding the purely military terminology such as "Off Limits" and "Restricted Area." Finally, they placed "Pedestrian Walkway" signs on sawhorses along the main boundary road which assisted in keeping the Vietnamese in and unauthorized visitors out. Other military police security measures included circulation control posts marked by 1-man MP shelters along the boundary and mobile MP patrols around the housing area.²²

20.

HQ, 720th MP Bn, After Action Report - Task Force NEW ARRIVALS,
9 Jun 75, pp. 1 - 4.

21.


Ibid.

22.

Ibid.



Fort Chaffee's sewage disposal treatment facility was designed to support a population of 7,500. Elements of the 5th Engineer Battalion construct a 2-cell lagoon that will be capable of supporting a population of 40,000.



47th Field Hospital supplies arrive to furnish medical support to the Fort Chaffee Hospital and the Refugee Center.

Inasmuch as the refugee housing area was readily accessible by automobile, the military police had to secure it from unnecessary traffic. This was accomplished by forcing visitors to enter and leave Fort Chaffee through a single gate entrance. Both incoming and outgoing traffic was subject to identification, registration, and search, as appropriate. These measures caused a great deal of confusion and resentment among longtime users of the post. The military police were also responsible for the identification of Vietnamese attempting to enter Fort Chaffee for various purposes. The Immigration and Naturalization Service assisted the military police in effecting proper identification of these people.²³

Medical Support

Medical support for the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center was furnished by the 47th Field Hospital from Fort Sill, Okla., for most of the operational period. Upon its arrival at Fort Chaffee, this unit had to prepare appropriate sections of the installation's inactive hospital for use, and to secure from various supply sources those items of equipment which were initially not on hand. By 1 May, the unit had been able to prepare 134 of 238 beds for occupancy. The following day the hospital received its first patient. Initial shortages of medical personnel were filled from personnel available at Fort Sill and from the Office of the Surgeon General, which provided professional filler personnel such as pediatricians, dentists, nurses, and a number of special skill enlisted personnel drawn from the Health Services Command and Class II activities of the Surgeon General. On 10 May, the 47th Field Hospital was designated as the primary evacuation point within the United States for refugee hospital patients evacuated from camps in the Pacific Area. Patients requiring medical care beyond the capabilities of the 47th Field Hospital were evacuated directly to medical facilities with appropriate medical treatment capabilities such as the Fort Sill Hospital or the Brooke Army Medical Center at Fort Sam Houston, Tex. Later, toward the end of May, the 47th Field Hospital concluded arrangements through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to send patients with severe medical problems to the Sparks Regional Medical Center in Fort Smith and the University of Arkansas Medical Center. Patients with long-term medical problems were sent to the Public Health Service Hospital in New Orleans, La. The Armed Forces Medical Regulating Office (AFMRO) played a key role in assigning refugee patients to the appropriate medical facilities. The preventive Medicine Section was stationed in the refugee living area where it supervised and improved the overall sanitation of the area.²⁴

23.


Ibid.

24.

TF Surgeon, After Action Report, undated, pp. unnumbered.



Initial shortages of medical personnel are filled from specialists available at Fort Sill and from the Office of the Surgeon General.



Six buildings for refugee worship and one for U.S. military and civilians are established to provide for spiritual needs at the Refugee Center.

Mess Operations

One of the most important functions of Task Force NEW ARRIVALS was feeding both the refugees and the support personnel. This seemingly routine task turned out to be one of the major problems of the overall operation. Upon arrival at Fort Chaffee, the task force identified 39 mess halls suitable for refugee use and 7 which could be used for support personnel, including an active Officers' Field Ration Mess and 2 U.S. Army Field Ration Messes. Although all of the mess halls were fully equipped, several required extensive repairs before they could be used. Initially, the Task Force S-4 opened 3 large consolidated mess halls, 2 of which had a seating capacity of 1,500 each while the remaining building could accommodate 1,200. The installation then opened the smaller company-sized messes (capacity 150 each) at the rate of 4 per day as the reception center filled. When the first refugees arrived on Thursday, 1 May, the task force had the capability of feeding a total of 8,000 refugees and 2,000 support personnel with the 42 cooks then at Fort Chaffee and the 51 cooks en route with deploying units.²⁵

Communications Support

The Task Force Communications-Electronics Officer found that the Fort Chaffee Telephone Exchange consisted of a 12,000-line Army operated facility with 150 lines being used for on-post communications. The off-post capacity consisted of 7 AUTOVON trunks -- 6 of which were incoming lines -- and 8 outgoing city trunks to Fort Smith. There was only one teletype circuit which could handle only unclassified information. The task force quickly installed adequate communications for the operation, including 400 telephone extensions on the post and at the Fort Smith airport. In addition, the task force established two communications centers, one of which was a Special Security Office (SSO) center, as well as several radio nets needed for military police, medical, movement control, and administrative purposes. The Voluntary Agencies were given access to the WATS system through their own phones. A data circuit connected to a central data bank in Gaithersburg, Md., was installed for computer purposes. Finally, two Xerox 500 telecopier machines were installed, one in the Task Force Operations Center and the other in the Public Information Office.²⁶

Religious Support

To provide for the spiritual needs of the refugees, the FORSCOM Chaplain provided seven chaplains and twelve chaplain's assistants to staff the Task Force Chaplain Section. The ministry to the refugees was actually performed by three Vietnamese Catholic priests, two Buddhist

25.

HQ, 46th Spt Gp, AAR, NEW ARRIVALS, Ft Chaffee, Vol. 1, pp. C-2-1 - C-2-2.

26.

Ibid., pp. D-1 - D-3.

monks, and two Vietnamese speaking American Protestant missionaries. The Task Force identified and equipped -- from both military and local civilian religious resources -- six buildings for refugee worship and one for U.S. military and civilian worship. The rapid increase in the refugee population led to an average daily attendance of 2,200 at religious services. One religious activity which encountered great difficulty was that of arranging refugee marriages, because of the limitations on refugee movements and the requirements of various state laws. Numerous briefings were given to religious groups in the Fort Smith area which served to solicit support and sponsorship as well as goodwill in that community.²⁷

Public Affairs

Because of the national interest in the refugee program at the time that Fort Chaffee became a Refugee Center, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs assumed the responsibility for all Public Affairs activities within the military departments in this area. Thus, the initial FORSCOM Public Affairs activities were confined to the limits imposed by the Defense Department. FORSCOM did provide a Defense Department public spokesman at Fort Chaffee and established and staffed the Fort Chaffee Press Center. The FORSCOM Information Officer assumed the responsibility of Defense Department spokesman and moved three FORSCOM Public Information Detachments (PID) to Fort Chaffee to support the Press Operations Center. The center began operations on 29 April in a locally unfavorable public affairs environment. The local population was very much concerned that the incoming Vietnamese refugees would introduce unknown exotic communicable diseases; would prevent the conduct of Reserve Component Annual Training activities and its attendant payrolls, purchases, and troop spending; and would furnish unwanted competition in the local job market. On 30 April, Generals Ott and Cannon lunched with Fort Smith civic leaders and pointed out the positive economic aspects of the refugee center's operation. Additional meetings were held to clarify and to expand on this positive theme. Mr. MacDonald presided over an important press conference which was favorably received and which assisted materially in reversing the initial community-wide unfavorable reactions. This feeling was reversed so much so that when the first planeload of refugees arrived, they were met by a host of local and state dignitaries, including the governor. Shortly after the Senior Civil Coordinator arrived at Fort Chaffee, he appointed an Interagency Task Force Public Affairs spokesman, thus permitting FORSCOM's Information Officer to return to his regular duties. Since press interest declined considerably after the initial refugees arrived, the Press Center mission gradually changed from media support to sponsorship support.²⁸

27.

HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS - AAR (Int), pp. P-1 - P-3.

28.

Ibid., pp. N-1 - N-2.

Although Task Force spokesmen managed to win over an influential segment of local public opinion, there were many who continued to object to the establishment of the refugee reception center. These persons expressed their dislike in repeated threats of bombing and arson. Both Generals Ott and Cannon believed the threats to be serious enough as to warrant the immediate presence of the Task Force Provost Marshal (720th MP Battalion commander). Since the Air Force was unable to provide transport aircraft on such short notice to move the battalion as well as the 411th MP Company from Fort Hood to Fort Chaffee, the FORSCOM commander directed that CH-47 helicopters be used for the purpose. By 1 May, 14 officers and 177 enlisted personnel had been flown to the Refugee Center. Fortunately, the threats against the installation failed to materialize.²⁹

Establishment of Refugee Processing Procedures


In the absence of guidance from the State Department and higher headquarters, a Fort Sill in-processing team set up its own procedures under the general direction of the Task Force S-1 (Personnel). The team first determined that it had to establish both the facilities and methods for the in-processing of 20,000 to 40,000 refugees. Once these initial tasks were completed, the 524th Personnel Service Company, then en route from Fort Benning, Ga., could assume actual operational responsibilities and the Fort Sill team could return to its home station. Since the team believed that the State Department would require historical and family data from the evacuees, they devised an information sheet in both an English and a bilingual version to record such information. These forms were subsequently modified as the information requirements changed. The task force kept track of the refugees through the use of an Identification Control Log Book. Each refugee received an identification number which reflected the month of arrival (1 digit), the day of arrival (2 digits), and the sequence number in which the individual processed that day. A family number was also assigned, where appropriate. Refugees were then issued a photo identification card which reflected the assigned identification number, date of birth, and the billet building number. Billets were assigned to the head of the household, where appropriate, for himself and the members of his family. A billeting card was then furnished to the head of household showing the assigned billets and an alphabetical file was maintained on each family. Originally, occupational data was also maintained, but this was later discarded. Finally, the Fort Sill team made arrangements for interpreters to conduct an initial reception briefing for the refugees and to conduct the refugees through the processing.³⁰

29.

FORSCOM EOC Daily Action Log, FONECON's Fort Sill to FORSCOM 300048Z Apr 75 and 300200Z Apr 75.

30.

HQ, 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS, Fort Chaffee, Vol. 1, pp. 7, F-1 - F-7.



The first flight of Vietnamese refugees arrives at the Fort Smith, Ark. Airport on 2 May 1975.



Refugee passengers landing on the first flight at the Fort Smith Airport are arriving from Guam.



VIPs observe as the first Vietnamese land at the Fort Smith Airport on 2 May. In uniform from left are: Maj. Gen. David E. Ott, Commanding General, Fort Sill, Okla.; Brig. Gen. James W. Cannon, Commander, TFNA-Fort Chaffee; Arkansas Governor David Pryor; and Fort Smith Mayor Jack Freeze.



A lone sign of dissent is visible alongside numerous Vietnamese refugee welcoming signs at the Fort Smith, Ark. Airport.



Refugees arrive by MAC (Military Airlift Command) or civilian charter aircraft at the Fort Smith Airport, about eight miles from Fort Chaffee.



Refugees arriving on Boeing 747 charter aircraft land at the larger airport in Little Rock, Ark. They will be transported by Air Force C-130 aircraft from Little Rock to Fort Smith, Ark.

Arrival of Refugees

The first planeload of refugees arrived at the Fort Smith airport at 0957 on 2 May 1975. On hand to greet the new arrivals were the Governor of Arkansas, the Mayor of Fort Smith, the Senior Civil Coordinator, the Task Force Commander, the Fort Sill Commander, the local high school band, and about 300 local residents. The small number of dissenters present were unable to attract any enthusiasm for their cause. Following the welcoming ceremonies, the refugees were bussed to Fort Chaffee to begin their processing into American society.³¹

Processing of the Refugees

The refugees arrived by either Military Airlift Command (MAC) aircraft or civilian charter at the Fort Smith Airport, about eight miles from Fort Chaffee. Those refugees arriving on Boeing 707 charter aircraft landed at the larger airport at Little Rock, Ark., about 150 miles from Fort Chaffee. These latter refugees were then transported by Air Force C-130 military aircraft from Little Rock to Fort Smith.³²

Upon arrival at the Fort Chaffee Reception Center, the refugees were taken directly to the briefing area in Building 137. Since this building could accommodate a maximum of eighty persons, only the heads of households were admitted while their dependents waited in a play area. Interpreters joined the refugees in the briefing area and remained available throughout the entire processing procedure. Once the head of household had executed a bilingual form requiring a variety of personal and family data, he moved on to the first of six processing stations. The first station was staffed with ten clerks who prepared an English version of the information sheet from the bilingual version. They also prepared the typed portions of the camp identification cards and placed all completed cards and forms in a manila folder labeled with the head of household's name. The head of household then moved on to the second station where personal identification numbers and family identification numbers were assigned. At the third station, family quarters were assigned and the head of the household retrieved his family from the play area to accompany him through the remainder of the processing cycle. At the fourth station, identification photos were taken and affixed. At the fifth station, a noncommissioned officer inspected the refugee's folder

31.

Unless otherwise indicated, the entire section is based on: (1) Msg 020512Z May 75, Cdr USFACFS to Cdr FORSCOM, subj: Oplan New Arrivals - Ft Chaffee; (2) Fact Sheet w/incls, DCSOPS OE/WR, 021000Z May 75, Purpose: Resume of Important Events, Operation New Arrivals, for period 011900Z - 021000Z May 75; (3) Msg 022035Z May 75, DA to Distr, subj: Operation New Arrivals; (4) Msg 030945Z May 75, Cdr USFACFS to Cdr FORSCOM, subj: Daily Sitrep - New Arrivals - Ft Chaffee.

32.

HQ, 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS, Fort Chaffee, Vol. 1, pp. F-1 - F-7.



By 8 May the 524th Adjutant General Company is processing more than 2,000 refugees daily.



Volunteer refugee interpreters assist with interviews at the processing stations.

to ensure that all forms had been properly completed. Xeroxed copies of the individual refugee information data sheets were placed into appropriate distribution channels for other interested agencies. At the last station, military personnel assigned to the 20th Adjutant General Detachment picked up the refugees and escorted them to their designated billets, where personnel of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion issued each person a meal ticket and linen.³³

The personnel manning the processing center were divided into two teams, each of which worked 12-hour shifts and were capable of processing eighty-three refugees per hour. On 2 May, 341 refugees arrived and were processed by the Fort Sill team while personnel from the 524th Adjutant General Company observed and were instructed concerning the procedures used. The following day the two sets of personnel alternated in processing refugees so that by day's end the 524th Adjutant General Company was able to assume complete responsibility for the processing operation. On 4 May, the Task Force instructed the processing center to be ready to accept and process some 2,000 refugees a day. In order to meet this sudden and expanded requirement, 7 additional clerks were added to the processing line; the Fort Sill team was reactivated; and the 524th Adjutant General Company was divided into 2 teams, thus permitting each of the 3 teams to work 12 hours and be off 24 hours. This 3-team system remained in effect through 8 May, and was able to process some 2,000 refugees per day provided the incoming aircraft landed at least at 1-hour intervals. On 8 May, the Task Force directed the processing center to increase its processing capability to 3,000 refugees per day. In order to meet this still further increased requirement, the Fort Sill team was moved to an alternate site where it provided only required minimum processing such as the issuing of identification numbers, assigning billets, and issuing temporary identification cards. The Fort Sill team split into 3 shifts of 16 personnel each in order to provide 24-hour coverage. Upon the completion of this minimum essential processing, the refugees were bussed to their billets and later recalled to the primary processing center for their final in-processing. This system was used until 15 May when the processing center was notified that less than 1,000 refugees per day would be arriving for the remainder of the operation. The two elements of the processing center were then reconsolidated, and twenty-five members of the Fort Sill contingent deployed back to their home station, while the remainder were retained on standby status. Based upon operational experience gained up to this point, the task force made a number of minor processing changes to speed up the flow and to satisfy computer keypunch requirements.³⁴

33.

Ibid.

34.

Ibid.

Processing by the Civilian Agencies

Once the preliminary processing center cycle was completed, the refugees began processing through a series of steps administered by civilian agencies leading to sponsorship and resettlement in American society. The initial step consisted of a medical examination and the preparation of a medical history. These were accomplished by a combined team of medical and medical administrative personnel from the 47th Field Hospital and the U.S. Center for Disease Control (CDC), Atlanta, Ga. All refugees over the age of fourteen were given a chest X ray for tuberculosis, while all refugees under the age of fourteen were given appropriate skin tests. Refugees registering positive results were required to have chest X rays taken. All children under the age of fifteen were required to undergo vaccination and inoculations considered necessary for children residing in the United States, such as oral polio and the triple DPT immunization. The refugees then went to an area manned by the Immigration and Naturalization Service where they received their Immigration I-94 Forms (Arrival and Departure Documents). An interpreter explained that this form had to be retained until the owner became a permanent resident of the United States. On each form was the alien number assigned to each refugee. This number and the refugee's name, provided he or she was over sixteen years of age, along with biographical data was sent to Washington for security clearance check. The clearance had to be approved by the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. This particular element of the overall processing was necessarily cumbersome and contributed to the slow rate of out-processing.³⁵

Processing by Participating Agencies. The next step involved processing through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare complex. Here the refugees received a Social Security Number and card along with an explanation of the purpose and importance of these items. The refugee was then passed to an interviewer from the Social and Rehabilitation Service of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, who gave the refugee a list of voluntary agencies with which the United States Government had contracted to resettle refugees. These agencies included the Christian Missionary Alliance, the Church World Service, the Hebrew Immigration Aid Service, the International Rescue Committee, the Latter Day Saints Social Services, the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, the Tolstoy Foundation, and the United States Catholic Conference. Once the refugee chose one of these agencies, he was informed that the in-processing part of his life at Fort Chaffee was completed and that his file would be sent to the Voluntary Agency (VOLAG) of his selection. There the Voluntary Agency would begin the casework necessary to find him a sponsor. Once this was accomplished, the refugee was out-processed and provided transportation to his sponsor's location.

35.

DA, AAR-NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, pp. 1-C-7 - 1-C-10.



The news media, representing nationwide coverage, are present to record the arrival and initial processing of the first group of Vietnamese refugees at Fort Chaffee.



An American National Red Cross caseworker renders assistance to a Vietnamese refugee at the Fort Chaffee Center.



Senator Dale Bumpers (D, Ark.) greets a U.S. military personnel specialist while touring the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center.



An American couple talks with a representative of a Vietnamese refugee family that they plan to sponsor.

Sponsorship Responsibilities. In their search for refugee sponsors, the Voluntary Agencies had to find persons who were willing to assume major moral responsibilities, although there were no legal commitments, as such. In order to become a sponsor, an interested individual contacted an authorized voluntary agency with a letter of intent to sponsor an individual or family. In addition, he had to provide character references as well as a statement provided by his bank attesting to his financial solvency. If the person then became a sponsor, he was expected to undertake certain responsibilities to ensure that the refugee or refugee family became self-sufficient and did not become public charges. The sponsor was expected to receive the refugee and his family and provide them with adequate shelter and clothing until they became self-sufficient. He had to provide them with pocket money, assist them in finding employment, and ensure that the children were enrolled in school. While the sponsor was expected to pay all medical costs or pay for appropriate medical insurance, some refugee families were eligible for emergency medical aid under the Medicaid Program. Once the refugee obtained employment, the sponsor was obligated to assist him in locating permanent housing, obtaining some furniture, and arranging for utilities. In addition, the sponsor was supposed to assist the refugee in handling culture shock and adjusting to American culture patterns and customs, learning English, and becoming acquainted with United States laws and requirements.³⁶

Out-processing of the Refugees

Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office

Initially, refugee out-processing moved very slowly at all of the Refugee Centers in the continental United States, including Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa., both of which were under FORSCOM control.³⁷ In an effort to speed up the operation through the greater use of its own materiel and personnel resources, the Defense Department increased the communications facilities available to the refugees and allowed reception center commanders to loan military personnel to the Voluntary Agencies for administrative support purposes. In yet another important step, the Secretary of Defense authorized the establishment of a Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office (JRICO) in early June. The mission of the Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office was to provide information to the military community on the requirements and procedures for becoming a sponsor; to provide information on the location and status of specific evacuees; to conduct direct liaison with the Interagency Task

36.

FIG SOP for JRICO Sect, 25 Jul 75.

37.

Unless otherwise indicated, the entire section is based on: (1) HQDA, AAR-NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, pp. II-B-3 - II-B-5; (2) FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS-AAR, p. R-5; (3) HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS FIG, Vol. 2, Sec 1, p. 8; (4) HQ TFNA & Ft Chaffee, AAR, Vol. IV, pp. IV-XI-1 - IV-XI-2, IV-VI-1 - IV-VI-6; (5) Intvw, CPT E. Miller, FORSCOM Hist Ofc, w/Mr. R. Friedman, SCC, FIG, 25 Jun 75; (6) Msg 120307Z Jun 75, Sec State to Distr, subj: Procedures for Military Assistance in Resettling Vietnamese and Cambodian Refugees.

Force and maintain access to their computer data files on refugees; to coordinate with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Refugee Centers, Volunteer Agencies, and other organizations on refugee affairs as required; and to respond as required by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Army Staff, FORSCOM and other agencies on matters pertaining to refugee location, sponsorship, resettlement, and related concerns in support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS. The Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office was organized and coordinated as a joint activity. It had Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force elements and maintained close liaison with the Navy Indochina Clearing Office (NICO). All elements of both the Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office and the Navy Indochina Clearing Office were staffed by members of the respective service's Reserve Components. The Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office was located at the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army. The latter office provided facilities and administrative support along with the necessary access to computers.

In the course of its operations -- 4 June 1975 through 30 January 1976 -- the Army element of the Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office received and processed 1,020 sponsorship or location cases. Some 500 members of the Army community made offers to sponsor refugees. In many more other instances, service members obtained initial information from the Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office and went ahead on their own to sponsor a refugee. In those cases where the Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office found a sponsor, it initially attempted to act as a Voluntary Agency and complete the required out-processing. However, the Voluntary Agencies soon protested this practice since it meant that they lost the \$500.00 stipend the Federal Government paid for each refugee out-processed. In other words, they regarded the Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office actions in this area as unfair competition. In response to their various complaints, the State Department soon intervened and directed that all sponsors be linked with a voluntary agency for final out-processing. By late June, for example, the Senior Civil Coordinator at Fort Indiantown Gap noted that the Voluntary Agencies there were locating only 35 percent of the sponsors but were receiving credit for all of the sponsorships. While the Voluntary Agencies received a \$500.00 stipend for each refugee out-processed, they lost 15 percent of that sum if the refugee returned to the center. They then lost a further percentage of the stipend each week until that refugee was subsequently successfully out-processed. The refugee out-processing, therefore, got off to an uncertain start to such an extent that the Voluntary Agencies at Fort Indiantown Gap had to be closed for two days in June so that they could reorganize for greater efficiency. After that, matters cleared up and out-processing accelerated, reaching very acceptable rates through the summer and into the fall.

Demographic Problem Areas

Although the initial out-processing at the Refugee Centers was slow, it was not totally the fault of the Voluntary Agencies. An important part of the problem was that the demographic characteristics of the refugee population described by the State Department early in the operation did not bear up under close scrutiny. In the beginning, the State Department announced that the Vietnamese evacuees would be the so-called



Space provided for a typical family is based on 40 square feet per individual or 96 persons per building.



A refugee family takes a break from the processing routine to relax in the shade of nearby trees near the processing center.

PRIMARY JOB SKILLS OF INDOCHINA REFUGEES
HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS: MARCH 1977

Occupational Categories	All Heads of Households ^a	Head -of Household Family Unit One Person ^b	Cases On Cash Assistance ^c
	<u>30,628</u>	<u>12,712</u>	<u>5,521</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>
001 - 199 Medical, Professional, Technical, and Managerial Occupations	9,578	2,712	962
200 - 299 Clerical and Sales Occupations	3,572	1,307	532
300 - 399 Service Occupations	2,324	964	535
400 - 499 Farming, Fishery, Forestry, and related occupations	1,491	253	262
500 - 599 Processing Occupations	128	49	19
600 - 699 Machine Trades Occupations	2,670	1,713	289
700 - 799 Bench Work Occupations	1,249	528	280
800 - 899 Structural Work Occupations	2,026	1,026	279
900 - 999 Miscellaneous Occupations (includes Transportation)	5,165	2,647	1,300
000 Not Indicated	2,425	1,513	1,063

a. A computer survey indicated a total of 37,844 Heads of Households. Primary Job Skills were indicated for 30,628.

b. A computer survey indicated a total of 16,819 Heads of Households of Family Units consisting of One Person. Primary Job Skills were indicated for 12,712.

c. A computer survey indicated a total of 6,725 Cases were entered on the Cash Assistance data bank for the period March through June 1976. Primary Job Skills were indicated for 5,521.

Source: HCV Task Force, Report to the Congress, March 21, 1977, p. 25. (UNCLASSIFIED).

"high risk" individuals whose lives were endangered because of their close association with the American presence in Vietnam. As a result, Defense Department planners assumed that the refugee family heads would have a basic knowledge of English, American ways, and would possess salable skills, thus making their assimilation into American society relatively easy. The State Department had neither anticipated nor foreseen the actual massive influx into the evacuation system of Vietnamese who had experienced little or no contact with Americans, who possessed limited job skills, or who were completely unfamiliar with the English language (Table 10). The actual situation was further complicated through the inclusion of significant numbers of Cambodians and other ethnic groups, some of whom were completely rural and unsophisticated. This difference between the actual and the anticipated demographic characteristics of the refugee population resulted in increased support requirements and extended stays in the resettlement centers. The small percentage of refugees in the "high risk" category generally had American contacts and were able to arrange their own sponsorship. The remainder required a more intensive effort.

Communication Problems

As one might expect, communication with the refugees soon became a major problem. In view of the fact that most of the American personnel engaged in operating the FORSCOM camps had no knowledge of either the Vietnamese or Cambodian languages and the number of qualified linguists was limited, both Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap published national language newspapers to carry announcements and other items of general interest. These newspapers were produced by psychological operations personnel assigned to the centers. In addition, at Fort Chaffee, psychological operations personnel, augmented by Vietnamese volunteer refugee personnel, operated a Vietnamese language radio station. Although both of these imaginative programs were instrumental in improving communication, the language problem continued to cause a general slowdown in out-processing.

Case Load Problems

As the population of both centers declined so did the out-processing rates. The efforts of Task Force personnel to discover the underlying causes met without success until September. At that time, authorities at Fort Chaffee discovered that the United States Catholic Conference was overbooked with some 10,000 refugees seeking sponsors. A subsequent survey taken in October at Fort Indiantown Gap revealed that about 56 percent of the approximate 5,000 refugees at that installation were also registered with the Catholic Conference. At both centers, the remainder of the refugees were distributed, more or less equally, among the remaining Voluntary Agencies. The Catholic refugees were reluctant to transfer to another Voluntary Agency, especially one associated with another religion, as they feared sponsors from these organizations would force them to change their religion. The Task Forces at both centers requested that all Voluntary Agencies, religious leaders, and military chaplains on hand guide and counsel the refugees concerning their fears in this matter. In addition, at both centers, the Task Force employed the clergy to convince the refugees of religious freedom in America and to give special guidance to the refugees who were reluctant to accept a sponsor.

Sponsorship Commitment Problems

A number of the refugees, particularly those at Fort Chaffee, showed little inclination to enter into a sponsorship commitment. Once the problem had been identified, the Task Force used automatic data processing techniques to obtain the date of arrival of each refugee. If the results indicated a significant interval during which the refugee had made no attempt to register for sponsorship, the head of the family was called into the area assistance center with all meal cards and other papers. These were confiscated and held until the head of the family returned with a properly stamped I-94 Immigration and Naturalization Service Form (Arrival and Departure Document) showing that he had completed registration with one of the Voluntary Agencies. In an additional move, in October 1975, Fort Chaffee began a refugee village roll-up plan combined with an attendant cutback in refugee post exchange privileges. This cutback proved to be a psychologically important move in convincing the refugees that Fort Chaffee would soon close, forcing them to find other means of subsistence.

Refugee Placement Problems

As the population dwindled further, Task Force personnel found that there were two principal groups left at each camp -- single males and families with more than seven members. These two groups presented the Voluntary Agencies with their greatest challenge in terms of locating sponsors. One successful technique used for the single males was to sponsor them out in groups of three or more. One member of the group had to have a command of the English language and acted as the quasi-head of household. The sponsor then found employment for the English speaker first with the understanding that he must share his income with the others. In the case of large families, some were willing to split and go to two locations, a technique which was successful to some degree. As the operations closed, the large families remaining were sent to halfway houses across the country.

Problems Concerning the Arrival of the Refugees

The processing procedures described above worked as long as the incoming refugees remained within the predicted numbers per day and their arrival aircraft were staggered at least at 1-hour intervals. On 6 May, however, the Air Force scheduled 2,256 refugees into the Fort Smith airport on flights less than forty-five minutes apart. The resultant overloading caused a number of problems in the overall reception process. Transportation problems between the airport and Fort Chaffee served only to aggravate the problem. Each disruption meant that a planeload or more of passengers had to be temporarily detained in a hot and uncomfortable airplane hangar, the only facility available. Upon arrival at Fort Chaffee, the refugees had to wait in seemingly endless lines for processing.³⁸

38.

Morning Briefing, COL W.M. Stevenson, C/FORSCOM EOC, 6 May 75.

In response to FORSCOM inquiries concerning Air Force scheduling problems, the Chief of Staff, Twenty-second Air Force, Military Airlift Command, responded that the originally scheduled aircraft flow had provided for adequate arrival spacing but that the flow had been disrupted both by bad weather en route and aircraft malfunctions. He stressed that, if the Fort Chaffee authorities were unable to handle the overload, he would divert the excess incoming aircraft to the El Toro Marine Corps Air Station at Camp Pendleton, Calif. He agreed to limit future refugee traffic to 2,000 refugees per day for Fort Chaffee. On the following day, despite this assurance, a total of 2,201 refugees arrived on flights scheduled as little as twenty-five minutes apart. In reaction to yet another FORSCOM complaint in this matter, he agreed to pass the information to Headquarters, Military Airlift Command, for a Joint Chiefs of Staff decision on trimming the arrival schedules so as to ensure 1-hour arrival intervals and no more than 2,000 refugees per day. Despite repeated subsequent representations of this matter, FORSCOM never did succeed in getting the Air Force to meet its scheduling requirements.³⁹

Interpreter Problems

From the very beginning urgent requirements existed for Vietnamese and Cambodian linguists to support the refugee processing operation. Since many of the refugees could neither speak nor understand English, FORSCOM treated the requirement in a top priority manner. It soon identified large numbers of military personnel proficient in these languages based upon records maintained by the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center. Thus, FORSCOM had no problem in meeting the initial requirement for thirty linguists. In addition, eight Vietnamese Army officers, who had been in training at the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School at the time of the collapse, were sent to Fort Chaffee to act as interpreters while other Vietnamese military personnel were identified and readied for deployment to Fort Chaffee. In the end, all of these personnel worked in various administrative positions rather than as interpreters since they feared reprisals against their families who were still in Vietnam.⁴⁰

Once the interpreters were in place at Fort Chaffee, the Task Force discovered that fully 75 percent of those identified by the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center as being proficient in the Cambodian or Vietnamese languages neither spoke nor understood them. FORSCOM was forced to make an extensive search for truly qualified interpreters, and then move them at considerable expense from many sources to Fort Chaffee.

39.

FONECON Record, 6 May 75, MAJ F.P. Hofrichter, FORSCOM EOC, to COL Miller, CofS, 22d AF (MAC).

40.

(1) Intvw, Mr. M.W. Stark, FORSCOM Hist Ofc w/CPT N. Jurgeвич, DCSPER-EOS, 1 May 75; (2) HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS-AAR, p. R-2; (3) HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS, Ft Chaffee, Vol. 1, p. 6.

Ironically, the majority of successful linguists at both Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap were not even listed on official Army linguist rosters. They were discovered at Army installations through advertisements in the Daily Bulletin and word-of-mouth requests through unit command channels to locate military personnel with Vietnamese wives. This method was comparatively inefficient at best, since it placed the accomplishment of mission requirements at the mercy of individual volunteers and did not provide a method for proficiency testing. Since it failed to produce sufficient interpreters, other means had to be found. Inasmuch as Federal law precluded the Army from hiring foreign nationals in any capacity, the Interagency Task Force arranged for sixty volunteer Vietnamese refugees located on Guam to act as interpreters for the Refugee in the continental United States. Each of the three centers, Fort Chaffee, Fort Indiantown Gap, and Camp Pendleton received twenty volunteers. The remaining interpreter shortages at both Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap were met through assets of the Army Security Agency (ASA) as well as a reduction of linguist spaces, the latter of which caused some slowdown in the refugee processing rate. FORSCOM was unable to find a satisfactory solution to this problem during the operation, although conditions did improve as the refugee population began to drop and the interpreter levels remained the same.⁴¹

Support Problems

Once Operation NEW ARRIVALS began in the continental United States, a number of unforeseen problems surfaced, including such matters as food service, the All Volunteer Army enlistment contracts, and postal operations. In addition, the readiness of some of FORSCOM's participating units was adversely affected. In many cases these problems required immediate resolution, a process involving rapid decisions by Department of the Army. Just as the problems were being resolved, the refugee population in the Pacific suddenly expanded to the extent that it led to the opening of a second Army-operated facility (Fort Indiantown Gap) which was also placed under FORSCOM.

Food Service

One of the most serious problems experienced by FORSCOM in supporting refugee food service requirements was the need for sufficient cooks and other mess personnel to staff the refugee mess facilities, as well as to continue to provide the normal daily mess support to Army elements within the United States, and to provide the additional mess facilities and support for the summer training of the Reserve Components, the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), and scheduled Joint Training Exercises (JTX). As noted in Chapter I, in addition to the cooks and other food service personnel furnished from the assets of the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii, for duty on Guam, FORSCOM had to furnish an additional 121 cooks and food service personnel from Army assets elsewhere in the United States, Alaska, and the Canal Zone for that same operation. This

⁴¹.

Ibid.

TABLE 11

MESS PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS (BY INSTALLATION/COMMAND)		
Installation/Command	Fort Chaffee	Guam
<u>Total</u>	<u>209</u>	<u>121</u>
Alaska	10	0
Fort Belvoir	3	0
Fort Benjamin Harrison	1	8
Fort Benning	0	20
Fort Bliss	3	0
Fort Bragg	10	6
Fort Campbell	10	0
Fort Carson	8	6
Fort Devens	7	0
Fort Dix	0	12
Fort Eustis	0	7
Fort Gordon	3	5
Fort Hood	18	8
Fort Sam Houston	8	0
Fort Jackson	2	0
Fort Leavenworth	1	0
Fort Leonard Wood	2	0
Fort Lewis	10	8
Fort McClellan	0	10
Fort McPherson	3	0
Fort George G. Meade	8	6
Fort Monroe	2	0
Fort Ord	3	5
Panama	30	0
Fort Polk	3	5
Fort Riley	5	6
Fort Rucker	0	9
Fort Sill	32	0
Fort Stewart	5	0
MILPERCEN Replacement Stream	12	0
U.S. Army Communications Command	8	0
U.S. Army Materiel Command	4	0
REQUIREMENTS BY MAJOR COMMAND		
<u>Total</u>	<u>209</u>	<u>121</u>
U.S. Army Forces Command (CONUS)	122	50
U.S. Army Forces Command (Overseas)	40 ^a	0
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command	23	71
U.S. Army Communications Command	8	0
U.S. Army Materiel Command	4	0
U.S. Army Military Personnel Center	12	0
^a . Alaska and Panama.		

meant the cook situation within FORSCOM was already serious before the Fort Chaffee Refugee Reception Center opened. Requirements for providing cooks on Guam and at Fort Chaffee were as shown on Table 11.⁴²

On Thursday, 1 May 1975, when the first refugees arrived at Fort Chaffee, the Task Force had the capability of feeding a total of 10,000 persons with the 41 cooks on post and the 41 cooks scheduled to arrive with the units deployed to Fort Chaffee. Since FORSCOM suspected that more cooks would soon be needed, the command requested assistance from Department of the Army. The Department, in turn, directed the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center to locate additional cooks from sources in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. At the same time, the Fort Chaffee Civilian Personnel Officer requested that FORSCOM clarify the Army's policy on hiring foreign nationals -- i.e., Vietnamese -- to assist in cooking and serving meals. FORSCOM was forced to respond that Federal law prohibited the hiring of refugees if they were to be paid from appropriated funds. The only route now left open, it appeared, for obtaining Vietnamese help was through volunteers. On 2 May, the Fort Sill commander, General Ott, informed FORSCOM that he needed nine more cooks in addition to the forty-three currently at Fort Chaffee. He also noted that twenty-one of the forty-three cooks were from Fort Sill and he needed them back at that station as soon as possible to operate a new mess facility. He requested that the 21 cooks be returned to Fort Sill and that an additional 9 cooks, along with replacements for the returning 21 Fort Sill cooks, be provided for Fort Chaffee by 9 May. It was at this critical point that the 45th Support Group on Guam requested another 100 cooks to meet unexpectedly heavy food service requirements. As matters evolved, the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group was able to furnish thirty-five cooks and FORSCOM, in response to a departmental authorization, levied the remaining sixty-five cooks from TRADOC sources. Concurrently, FORSCOM squeezed out thirty additional cooks from its own slim resources for temporary duty at Fort Chaffee.⁴³

On Sunday 4 May, the Task Force at Fort Chaffee informed FORSCOM that it needed an additional 189 food service personnel to support the projected refugee population of 20,000. FORSCOM had already deployed 30 cooks to Fort Chaffee and this action had exhausted the command's supply of such personnel. FORSCOM consequently turned to the Department of the Army for further assistance, which identified 144 mess personnel available on a worldwide basis. The Department also insisted that the Task Force define its mess personnel requirements more closely. The Task Force did so but could only reduce the required number from 189 to 180.

42.

Fact Sheet, DCSOPS OE/WR, 30 Apr 75, Purpose: To present input for resume of Important Events Fact Sheet of Operation NEW ARRIVALS.

43.

(1) Msg 031650Z May 75, DA to FORSCOM, subj: Army Augmentees for Operation New Arrivals; (2) Fact Sheet, DCSPER EOS, 4 May 75, subj: To Provide Input for Resume of Important Events Fact Sheet for Operation NEW ARRIVALS.



A U.S. Army cook prepares rice which is served with virtually all meals. The refugee menu however, later underwent some alterations with the addition of coffee, sweet rolls, fresh milk and ice cream, and the reduction in the amount of bread and rice.



The Task Force identified 39 mess halls suitable for refugee use. Although all of the mess halls were fully equipped, several required extensive repairs before they could be used.



Volunteer refugee cooks prepare a sauce to be served with a meal. Five baby food centers were established also for infants under six months to receive formulas and strained foods.



A mature refugee woman appears absorbed in thought as she returns from the Post Exchange to the housing area.

Of the 180 personnel then required, FORSCOM was able to deploy the aforementioned 30 and with departmental assistance, an additional 71 from other CONUS Major Army Commands, the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center replacement stream, Alaska, and the Canal Zone. In short, the Army had run out of mess personnel for this purpose. By 7 May, FORSCOM took the position that the cook problem had to be resolved that day and directed the staff to explore the possibility of establishing civilian food service contracts where needed. As a matter of fact, the Fort Chaffee Task Force had already begun exploring such a contract.⁴⁴

The overall food service situation continued to deteriorate rapidly. On 8 May, the Commander, 9th Infantry Division and Fort Lewis, requested relief from any further requirements to provide cooks and other mess personnel for Fort Chaffee. At that time, Fort Lewis had only 678 of its authorized 774 cooks on hand, while operational requirements including those at Fort Chaffee further reduced this understrength to 617. He pointed out that all available mess personnel were required at Fort Lewis to support current operational requirements such as ROTC summer training, Reserve Component Annual Training, and directed pilot test programs. Other installations soon followed suit. A FORSCOM personnel survey completed at that time revealed that the command was operating with less than 85 percent of its authorized mess personnel and, further, that 438 of the FORSCOM/TRADOC personnel in this critical shortage area were already committed either to Guam or Fort Chaffee. On Friday, 9 May, the Fort Chaffee Task Force submitted a new total mess personnel requirement of 210. Since there was simply no way to meet the requirement using military personnel, the only solution was to contract with a civilian food service vendor. From the FORSCOM viewpoint, this was especially true, since the command had become privy to an as yet unconfirmed rumor that another Refugee Center (eventually Fort Indiantown Gap) would have to be opened. FORSCOM was well aware that one major advantage of a civilian contract was that the contractor could hire foreign nationals whereas the Army was forbidden by law to do so.⁴⁵

Food Service Contracting. On 7 May 1975, FORSCOM directed that a civilian contract for food support for Operation NEW ARRIVALS be implemented immediately at Fort Chaffee. General Cannon was aware of this decision but reserved the right to implement the service, since he believed that FORSCOM would be able to provide him with both food service and procurement representatives if needed. In order to expedite the process, FORSCOM, on 9 May, sent the Task Force commander a set of basic

44.

(1) Fact Sheets w/Incls, DCSOPS OE/WR, Purpose: Resume of Important Events, Operation NEW ARRIVALS, 4 May and 7 May 75; (2) FORSCOM EOS Briefing Notes, 7 May 75, COL Stevenson to Chiefs of Sections.

45.

(1) Fact Sheet, DCSPER EOC, 9 May 75, Purpose: To provide information for BG Todd on cook requirements to support Task Force NEW ARRIVALS at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.

guidelines for preparing the proposed food service contract. The contract was to be prepared by military food service personnel at Fort Chaffee and, in turn, provided to purchasing and contracting personnel available to the Task Force. The request was to be based on feeding 20,000 refugees only. Army support forces at Fort Chaffee would continue to rely solely on the military-operated food service. As the contractual support took over, "displaced" Army food service personnel would be reported through personnel channels for disposition. The Task Force was further advised that a list of approved bidders for such contractual services was maintained by and available from the U.S. Army Troop Support Command, Fort Lee, Va. After reviewing FORSCOM's instructions in this matter, the Task Force requested that they be furnished an experienced food service representative to review the contract they had been preparing and to assist in its award.⁴⁶

Fort Chaffee purchasing and contracting personnel expanded the installation's existing Dining Facility Attendants contract to include sufficient cooks and dining facility managers to feed 15,000 refugees for 90 days in 11 of 27 mess halls. On 11 June, Department of the Army authorized the civilianization of the remaining 16 mess halls. By 22 June, civilian contract personnel were operating all of the refugee messes. Under this contract the civilian kitchen police costs amounted to \$1,436,656 and cook and dining hall manager costs amounted to \$2,476,044. Labor costs per meal were 34¢ for a total of \$2.51 for subsistence and preparation costs per refugee ration. Shortly after the initial contract was signed, the Task Force began releasing temporary duty food service personnel to their home stations. In an effort to control refugee food consumption in early June, the Task Force secured permission to extend the basic contract to include civilian headcounters for each mess hall. The cost of implementing this necessary program came to \$2,165.00 per day for a total of \$534,848.86.⁴⁷

Menu Deficiencies. The refugee menu approved by the Defense Department was inadequate in terms of both quantity and nutrition and was especially deficient in Vitamins A and C and protein. The menu called for a diet of pork, fish, chicken, rice, bread, powdered milk, fresh fruit, limited condiments, and tea. Eleven pounds of meat or fish per 100 persons was served at each meal — the fish for breakfast, the meat for lunch and dinner. Since this amount of meat was insufficient to be served as an entree, the cooks were forced to extend it by mixing the meat and rice, a dish that the refugees found unpalatable. While no fresh vegetables appeared on the menu, fresh fruit was served at the rate of 36 pounds per 100 persons a day. In order to serve this amount of

46.

(1) MFR, Telecon, COL March, DIO, Fort Sill, to Mr. D.D. Hill, FORSCOM DCSLOG, 9 May 75; (2) HQ 593d Spt Gp, After Action Report, 30 Jun 75, pp. 3, 4, 6.

47.

HQ, TFNA and Ft Chaffee, After Action Report, Fort Chaffee, Ark., 28 Apr - 20 Dec 75, Vol. IV, pp. IV-I-1 - IV-I-2.

TABLE 12

REFUGEE FOOD SERVICE				
Menu to 23 May 75		Menu after 25 May 75		
Breakfast	Orange or grapefruit juice Scrambled eggs (powdered) Bread Margarine Milk	Orange or grapefruit juice Scrambled eggs (powdered) Bread Margarine Milk Fresh fruit (bananas)		
Lunch	Rice Pork Vegetables Bread Milk Tea Canned fruit	Rice Pork Fresh vegetables (carrots, cucumbers, celery Salad (choice: cabbage, spinach, or Chinese cabbage) Bread Milk Tea or Kool-aid Fresh fruit		
Dinner	Rice Fish or chicken Bread Milk Tea Fresh fruit	Rice Fish or chicken Salad (as lunch menu) Bread Milk Tea or Kool-aid Fresh fruit (apples)		
FOOD SERVICE COSTS & COMPARISONS				
Date	Cost	Serving Size	Variety	Nutritional Content
3 May	.60	Small	None	Marginal
5 May	.82	Small	None	Marginal
17 May	1.25	Adequate	Fair	Exceed MDR ^a
25 May	1.61	Large	Good	Exceed MDR ^a
16 June	1.74	Adequate	Good	Exceed MDR ^a
a. MDR is Minimum Daily Requirement				
DINING FACILITIES				
Date	# Open	Feeding Capacity	Refugee Pop.	# Cooks
29 Apr	0	0	0	11
2 May	1	4,000	345	34
9 May	11	13,200	12,157	101
14 May	23	23,000	22,451	217
22 May	27	26,800	25,086	307
24 Jun	27	25,500	23,277	0
RATION CONSUMPTION				
Date	Headcount	Refugee Pop.	Average Rations	
	Meals/Rations			
11 May	62,078/20,693	17,896	2,797	
12 May	83,780/27,927	20,566	7,361	
13 May	82,471/27,490	21,155	6,335	
14 May	84,624/28,208	22,181	6,027	
15 May	87,804/29,268	22,341	6,927	
16 May	90,961/30,232	23,351	6,881	
Source: 46th Spt Gp, After Action Report, Vol I, pp. B-6-16, E-6-17, C-2-C-1, C-2-D-1. (UNCLASSIFIED).				

fresh fruit three meals a day the cooks had to cut it into 4 - 6 pieces and give each person one piece per meal. Fort Chaffee Food Service personnel, after coordinating with the Task Force, requested assistance from FORSCOM in improving the refugee menu. FORSCOM reacted on 7 May by directing the addition of a limited quantity of fresh vegetables, dehydrated eggs, margarine, lime Kool Aid, and citrus juices while increasing the pork issues to 20 pounds per 100 people per day and the fish to 15 pounds per 100 per day. While these initial changes improved the menu somewhat insofar as nutrition and portion size went, it remained monotonous and insufficient. In its continued efforts to overcome this undesirable situation, the Task Force S-4 Food Section, aided by a dietitian, devised another new menu which was implemented on 25 May. The refugees enjoyed this menu because of its increased variety and larger servings but it resulted in a surplus of some food items such as hot sauce, soy sauce, dehydrated milk, sugar, salt, powdered eggs, and bread. The overall problem was finally solved by the Task Force when it established an advisory council made up of volunteer refugees, the Task Force Surgeon, and expert technical advice from the U.S. Army Troop Support Agency. The council recommended additional changes to the menu which, when implemented on 16 June, eliminated both the monotony and surpluses feature of the preceding diet. See Table 12 for the various menu changes.⁴⁸

Baby Food Centers. A number of problems arose with the procurement and distribution of baby foods, including the development of an acceptable infant formula. Initially, as the mess halls opened, baby foods were delivered for distribution. This approach proved to be a burden for the sparsely staffed mess halls and was aggravated by the fact that the overworked cooks did not know what kind of baby food to give out or to whom it should be given. The result was that at least some of the baby food was consumed by hungry adults. The Task Force S-5 (Civil Affairs) uncovered other problems -- mess facilities were opened without his knowledge; there was no systematic restockage and firm usage data was lacking; there were serious problems in distribution control; and initially, there existed an utter lack of knowledge concerning the Vietnamese infant's diet. This latter difficulty created major problems since the familiar American lactose based baby formula could not be used. Vietnamese infants simply lacked the ability to digest cow's milk and diarrhea resulted when it was ingested. The lactose formula was subsequently replaced with a soy-based formula. Another problem concerned strained egg yolks; since eggs were not an internal part of the Vietnamese diets, many children developed allergic reactions. On 21 May, an Army Community Health Nurse established a list of baby foods and formula which met the nutritional needs of children up to two years of age.

48.

(1) HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS, Ft Chaffee, Vol. 1, pp. C-2-5, C-2-A-1, C-2-C-1, C-4-1; (2) HQ 593d Spt Gp, After Action Report, 30 Jun 75, p. 3; (3) 1st Cook Co (Prov), After Action Report, 2 Aug 75, Tab M.

Basically, infants under six months got formula and strained foods. Children six months of age and older were fed junior foods and formula.⁴⁹

In order to cope with the problems mentioned above, the 1st Cook Company (Provisional) at Fort Chaffee established five Baby Food Centers in the refugee living area and apart from the mess facilities. Each center was staffed by one military cook, one Department of the Army civilian employee, and one Red Cross volunteer. Each of the five centers was supervised by a lieutenant from the 1st Cook Company's Food Service Section while the Public Health Nurse monitored sanitation, preparation, and adequacy of supply. Several problems involving vendor delivery problems were satisfactorily resolved. The 1st Cook Company continued operating these centers until the Task Force was able to employ twelve civilians, including two kitchen police personnel, to assume the operations. By 13 June, only one lieutenant and one supervisor remained in the baby centers, but the Public Health Nurse continued her duties. On 17 June, the Director of Services, Fort Chaffee Garrison, took over the operation. Shortly thereafter, he contracted out these services.⁵⁰

Meal Cards and Baby Cards. Because of the initially inadequate menu and the lack of positive controls on the number of meals one person could eat in one day, it was no wonder that mess hall headcounts were frequently higher than the total camp population. This unacceptable situation was soon noted by Task Force personnel who observed refugees eating in one mess hall and immediately departing to eat in yet another. This resulted from a combination of inadequate food portions and boredom and was facilitated by the fact that, as of 13 May, only half of Fort Chaffee's refugee population had been issued meal cards. The cards were printed in such a way that they limited their individual bearers to eating in a designated mess hall, but did not limit the number of meals which could be consumed in a day. In order to solve this problem, the 593d Support Group, after effecting coordination with the 1st Cook Company and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, issued revised meal cards indicating meals consumed by date along with initially devised infant food cards. Since they did not bear any control numbers and were easily reproduced it became necessary a few days later to print yet another new issue. These were printed in red to discourage unauthorized reproduction and had control numbers assigned. These new cards were scheduled for redistribution every sixty days and the refugees were required to turn them in along with their identification cards upon their departure from

49.

- (1) HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS, Ft Chaffee, Vol. 1, p. C-2-6; (2) HQ 593d Spt Gp, After Action Report, 30 Jun 75, pp. 2 - 3; (3) 1st Cook Co (Prov), After Action Report, 2 Aug 75, Tab A.

50.

MFR, Ft Chaffee Dir of Svcs to DIO, 8 Jul 75, subj: Baby Care Centers.

REFUGEE MEAL CARD

MEAL CARD

IG-1

NAME

BLDG NO.

ID CARD NO.

NGƯỜI MANG THẺ NÀY ĐƯỢC PHÉP ĂN TẠI NHÀ ĂN CHỈ ĐỊNH DƯỚI ĐÂY

L

THE BEARER OF THIS CARD IS AUTHORIZED TO EAT AT THE INDICATED
MESS HALL ONLY

B 1	B 2	B 3	B 4	B 5	B 6	B 7
L D	L D	L D	L D	L D	L D	L D
B 8	B 9	B 10	B 11	B 12	B 13	B 14
L D	L D	L D	L D	L D	L D	L D
B 15	B 16	B 17	B 18	B 19	B 20	B 21
L D	L D	L D	L D	L D	L D	L D
B 22	B 23	B 24	B 25	B 26	B 27	B 28
L D	L D	L D	L D	L D	L D	L D
B 29	B 30	B 31		M	A	Y
L D	L D	L D				

SOURCE: HQ 46TH SPT GP. AFTER ACTION REPORT, OPERATION NEW
ARRIVALS, FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, 20 MAY 1975 -
25 NOVEMBER 1975, VOL. 2, SEC. 1, P. C-4-E-1.
(UNCLASSIFIED).

Fort Chaffee. This no nonsense approach, which should have been followed from the very beginning, brought the excess meal consumption under control in short order. (Chart 10).⁵¹

Enlistment Contract Problems

A significant problem concerning All Volunteer Army personnel arose when personnel who had enlisted under either the Station of Choice (SOC), Unit of Choice (UOC), or Special Unit Enlistment (SUE) options were deployed from their home stations in support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS. The problem first surfaced on Guam and later affected all Army Refugee Center operations. FORSCOM, however, had to deploy personnel with these enlistment guarantees in order to fill the immediate pressing requirements for specific skills, especially for cooks and medical personnel, to man the rapidly established Refugee Centers. The problem lay in the fact that the All Volunteer Army enlistment regulations then in effect stipulated that personnel who enlisted for the Station of Choice enlistment option, or who enlisted for their present duty assignments, would be guaranteed a 12-month period of stabilization which precluded temporary duty in excess of thirty days. In a similar fashion, Unit of Choice enlistees were guaranteed a 16-month stabilization period with their units as well as the same temporary duty restrictions. Both of these enlistment contracts made provisions for the waiver of these guarantees in time of national emergency, but current stringent definitions of what constituted such an emergency made deployment of these personnel most difficult in a situation short of war. The Station of Choice problem was particularly evident in the support military occupational specialties where large-scale commitments of temporary duty personnel were unusual. The Unit of Choice problem revolved about individual filler personnel who were used to round out the deploying force. FORSCOM realized that some determination had to be made regarding these personnel in order to avoid breaches of contract resulting in further personnel losses for the Army. FORSCOM queried Department of the Army regarding this matter on 25 April. However, it was not until 27 May that the Department of the Army decided to adjust the periods of stabilization which would permit the use of special enlistment option personnel. This decision was not made until the requisite 30-day temporary duty limit had almost expired, resulting in general confusion at the unit level concerning the deployment of such personnel.⁵²

51.

(1) HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS, Ft Chaffee, Vol. 1, p. C-2-5; (2) HQ 593d Spt Gp, After Action Report, 30 Jun 75, pp. 2 - 3.

52.

(1) HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS-AAR, undtd, p. R-2; (2) Msg 251150Z Apr 75, FORSCOM to DA, subj: Adjustment of Guaranteed Periods of Stabilization.

On 27 May, the Department of the Army ruled that personnel requirements necessitated the immediate deployment of certain units in support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS and that the needs of the Army dictated that members assigned or attached to those units would remain so assigned or attached. In the case of station of choice enlistees, the clear intent was to permit them to remain at their station of choice for the guaranteed period of twelve months. Regulations then current stipulated that an enlistment contract was broken if the individual was placed on temporary duty status away from his home station for more than thirty days unless he waived his contractual rights. In the case of the unit of choice or special enlistment option enlistees, no grounds for a broken enlistment contract existed, provided that the individual soldier remained with his particular choice. If an element of a unit -- e.g., a Supply and Support Company or a particular battalion -- was deployed away from the parent unit (a division for example), no grounds for a broken enlistment contract would exist as that particular unit remained under the control of the parent unit. In order to maintain the credibility of the All Volunteer Army's recruiting program, however, the Department of the Army noted that any individual, regardless of the enlistment option applicable to his case, who was reassigned to another unit for the sole purpose of deployment with that unit would have grounds for a broken enlistment contract, provided that he had been placed on temporary duty for more than thirty days without first having waived his enlistment contract. Filler personnel, in particular, were placed in this category because so many of them were unit of choice personnel. Those special enlistment option military personnel who executed the proper waivers to their enlistment contracts and remained on temporary duty more than thirty days were given credit for this service through the subsequent adjustment of their assignment eligibility and availability (AEA) codes to ensure that, prior to their expiration of term of service (ETS), they received the guaranteed twelve or sixteen months of service at the station or unit of choice for which they had enlisted. In an attempt to eliminate future personnel problems in this area, the Department of the Army also specified that any further deployment of units containing special enlistment option or unit of choice personnel would be accomplished by taking individuals without special enlistment agreements; by taking individuals who had already completed their guaranteed periods of stabilization; by taking individuals who volunteered and signed the requisite waivers; or by taking individuals who would sign waivers if their assignment eligibility and availability codes were properly adjusted.⁵³

Postal Operations

The military support elements, the volunteer agencies and other governmental activities, and the more than 40,000 refugees at Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap required efficient mail delivery and postal finance services. At Fort Chaffee the 47th Army Postal Unit provided postal and finance delivery (locator and directory) services to the

⁵³.

Msg 272040Z May 75, DA to FORSCOM. subj: Recruiting Stabilization.

refugees and assigned Task Force personnel while the 553d Army Postal Unit provided similar services at Fort Indiantown Gap. Mail service for assigned military personnel and units was generally provided by the garrison activity. Initially, directory service for the refugees proved difficult due to the obvious language barrier. This problem was solved by recruiting several Vietnamese personnel as directory clerks. A second problem occurred with redirecting mail after Operation NEW ARRIVALS was terminated. In accordance with Army Regulation 65-1, mail must be forwarded by the Army Postal Service for a period of sixty days after the inactivation of an installation or camp. FORSCOM failed, however, to have an adequate number of mail handlers on hand to ensure that the mail was forwarded in a timely and accurate fashion. The volume of refugee mail at the Refugee Reception Centers was completely unanticipated at both Department of the Army and FORSCOM levels. Once the problem was identified, FORSCOM entered into negotiations with the U.S. Postal Service for assistance in the matter. However, that agency's response was slow since no groundwork had been laid at the Washington level. Since there was no central point of contact available, the Department of the Army finally had to make separate agreements with the individual regional offices in Memphis and Philadelphia. Even then the U.S. Postal Service would not assume responsibility for refugee mail service at Fort Indiantown Gap. It did assume the responsibility for refugee mail service at Fort Chaffee on 25 August.⁵⁴

Readiness Impact -- Active Component Units

The short reaction time for deployment to support the opening of the Army's two Refugee Centers in the continental United States required FORSCOM to employ units of the Army's high priority Airborne D Package. Only two of the units used, however, were actually critical to that force package -- the 46th Support Group (Composite Service) and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, both of which were stationed at Fort Bragg, N.C. While the 46th Support Group was replaced in the Airborne D Package by the 43d Support Group (CS), stationed at Fort Carson, Colo., the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion was the only such unit in the Active Army.

From the very beginning of the operations, FORSCOM realized that there would be an immediate need for both civil affairs and psychological operations personnel. The civil affairs personnel possessed expertise in the in-processing, housing, and feeding of refugees, as well as establishing temporary forms of government and their organic forms of civil activities necessary to sustain large numbers of homeless people. Psychological operations personnel possessed the proficiency and equipment to formulate and execute an effective information program of related activities involving loudspeaker operations and the printing of leaflets and newspapers. At the time Operation NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS began, the

54.

(1) Msg 241315Z May 75, TFNA-Ft Chaffee to FORSCOM, subj: Postal Support for Refugees; (2) DF AFAG-AO, AG to DCSOPS, 20 Jan 76, subj: After Action Report, Operation NEW ARRIVALS; (3) FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS-AAR, pp. L-2 - L-3.

Active Army's capabilities in these two fields consisted of two units stationed at Fort Bragg -- the 4th Psychological Operations Group of four battalions, one of which was stationed overseas, and the aforementioned 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. FORSCOM deployed both units early on in the operation. In the first week of May, FORSCOM had 28 military personnel from the 4th Psychological Operations Group and 14 military personnel from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion on duty at Fort Chaffee. On 7 May, FORSCOM deployed 14 military personnel from the civil affairs battalion and 26 military personnel from the psychological operations group to Guam in response to an urgent request from the Orote Point Camp commander. On the following day, the Fort Chaffee Task Force commander requested that FORSCOM provide seven additional civil affairs and six additional psychological operations personnel. FORSCOM granted this request but assumed that there were still sufficient civil affairs and psychological operations personnel remaining at Fort Bragg to staff both the Air Force Refugee Center at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., and a second Army Refugee Reception Center -- Fort Indiantown Gap -- if needed. Shortly after this Fort Chaffee request, Department of the Army directed FORSCOM to provide a 20-man Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations Team (to include a light mobile printing plant) to the Air Force for operations at Eglin Air Force Base. Additional drawdowns on the strengths of these specialized units occurred when FORSCOM was subsequently directed by Department of the Army to open Fort Indiantown Gap as a Refugee Reception Center.⁵⁵

These personnel drawdowns had a mixed effect on the units involved. The 4th Psychological Operations Group continued to function normally, but the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion's ability to maintain acceptable readiness standards as part of the Airborne D Package was severely taxed. Between Operation NEW ARRIVALS and its normal support missions, such as the U.S. Atlantic Command's Exercise SOLID SHIELD 75 which occurred concurrently, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion was hard pressed. In fact, without the participation of the 490th Civil Affairs Company (USAR) in SOLID SHIELD, civil affairs participation would have been practically nil. By the second week in May, the battalion had committed personnel and equipment to Operation NEW ARRIVALS as follows: 14 personnel to Guam; 43 personnel to Fort Chaffee; and 35 personnel to Fort Indiantown Gap. This left a rear detachment of only 27 personnel at Fort Bragg. Since it was the only such unit in the Active Army, it could not be replaced. There were, however, a number of Civil Affairs units in the U.S. Army Reserve -- 3 Area A General Officer Commands, 10 Area B Commands, 15 Civil Affairs Groups, and 24 separate companies. FORSCOM, however, was reluctant to use these Army Reserve units for a number of very good reasons. First, those individuals participating in the Army

55.

(1) Msg 071903Z May 75, TFNA-Ft Chaffee to FORSCOM, subj: Requirement for Additional Personnel and Equipment; (2) Msg 082121Z May 75, FORSCOM to XVIII Abn Corps and Ft Bragg, subj: Requirement for Additional Personnel and Equipment - Operation NEW ARRIVALS; (3) Msg 092145Z May 75, DA to FORSCOM, subj: Army Psyops Mobile Printing Support - Operation NEW ARRIVALS - Eglin AFB; (4) Fact Sheet, DCSOPS OE/WR, 8 May 75, subj: Operation NEW ARRIVALS.

Reserve program did so with the understanding that they would normally be mobilized only in time of national emergency. Performing housekeeping support duties for Vietnamese refugees in the United States scarcely fell into that category. While the units could be called up and employed for sixty days under current legislative authority, such a course of action would not only adversely affect the jobs and personal and family lives of those involved but would also result in the reduction of the enlistment commitment by one year of all those mobilized. This would further aggravate the personnel turbulence within the Reserve Component force structure. Finally, such a mobilization would have a severe adverse impact on the Reserve Component's troubled recruiting and retention programs. FORSCOM also disapproved of the idea of rotating Reserve Component units through its Refugee Reception Centers or incremental Annual Training of these units for 2-week periods. Department of the Army, however, because of pressure from both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Interagency Task Force, prepared a staff paper in mid-May which recommended that FORSCOM consider bringing selected volunteer reservists with Civil Affairs Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) on Active Duty for ninety days or more to replace similar Active Army personnel then on temporary duty at Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap. FORSCOM accepted this plan as the only means of getting its Strategic Army Forces civil affairs personnel out of the refugee business. On 20 May, FORSCOM implemented the Reserve program and directed its continental U.S. Armies to solicit volunteer Army Reservists with particular Civil Affairs skills. FORSCOM then screened these volunteers and requested the U.S. Army Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC) in St. Louis, Mo., to order the approved reservists to Active Duty for Training (ADT) for a period of sixty days with an option to extend. Full implementation of this plan called for a 40-man contingent at Fort Chaffee and a 30-man contingent at Fort Indiantown Gap. By mid-June there were 32 reservists at Fort Chaffee and 18 at Fort Indiantown Gap. The volunteer reservists continued from that point on and remained on the job until the centers were closed.⁵⁶

Readiness Impact -- Reserve Component Units

The primary mission of both Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap was the support of Reserve Component training. At the time that the military base support for Operation NEW ARRIVALS was established, both installations had already been assigned full training schedules for the summer

56.

(1) Memo, DAMO-OD to Dir of Opns, 14 May 75, subj: Concept Plan for Utilization of CA-USAR Personnel in Support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS; (2) Personal Correspondence, BG Todd to BG Cannon, 15 May 75, subj: Reserve Component Civil Affairs Personnel; (3) Point Paper, DCSOPS-RO, 10 Jun 75, subj: USAR CA Support to Operation NEW ARRIVALS; (4) Msg 201335Z May 75, FORSCOM to Distr, subj: Utilization of CA-USAR Personnel in Support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS; (5) Personal Correspondence, MG Smith to MG Camm, 29 May 75, subj: CA-USAR Personnel in Support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS; (6) HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS AAR, p. R-3.

months including the billeting of Reserve Component military personnel. FORSCOM solved any possible conflicts in this area by rearranging the appropriate schedules and assigning a few units to other areas. The major adjustment was the billeting of Army Reserve personnel in tents rather than in barracks at Fort Chaffee, a decision which did not adversely affect the quality of training conducted by the affected units in any major way.⁵⁷

57.

FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS -- AAR p. G-3.

Chapter III

EARLY FORT INDIANTOWN GAP OPERATIONS

Introduction

Background

By mid-May, the three Refugee Centers operated by the Defense Department -- Fort Chaffee, Ark., Camp Pendleton, Calif., and Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. -- were facing three major problems which required immediate action. These included the overwhelming number of refugees awaiting entry into the continental United States; the slow out-processing of the refugees; and the reluctance of the U.S. Air Force to expand the scope of its operations at Eglin Air Force Base. This meant that another Refugee Center would have to be opened in either the continental United States or Hawaii, or better arrangements would have to be made to hold the refugees in the Pacific area.¹

The Problem of Numbers

On 8 May, 120,584 refugees were either under the control of the United States Government, or about to come under that control. This figure did not include 7,599 refugees who had already been processed out to American sponsors or had chosen resettlement in a third country. The great number of refugees seeking sponsorship and refuge -- more than three times the State Department's earlier predictions on which the original safe haven program had been based -- caused grave concern within the United States Government. This concern was intensified throughout the Defense Department, particularly at the Department of the Army which anticipated that it would be required to play a major role in an expanded refugee reception center program. On 7 May, Maj. Gen. D.E. Ott, the Fort Sill commander, queried Lt. Gen. D.H. Cowles, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, concerning the possibility of Fort Chaffee having to expand its Refugee Center capacity above the previously established maximum of 20,000 refugees. General Cowles assured General Ott that this possibility had been discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff but that no additional Army requirements were foreseen. General Cowles also noted that no one anticipated either the Army or another agency being expected to take on more refugees. The very next day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Department of the Army to prepare immediately for a maximum influx of 3,000 refugees a day at Fort Chaffee. In response to departmental inquiries concerning the increase, FORSCOM indicated that Fort Chaffee could accept 3,000 refugees per day

1.

Unless otherwise indicated, the entire section is based on: (1) Fact Sheet, DCSOPS OE/WR, 8 May 75, subj: Operation NEW ARRIVALS, w/incls; (2) Msg 081505Z May 75, JCS to CSA, subj: Reception Capability; (3) Notes from EOS Briefing, 9 May 75; (4) Msg 072140Z May 75, LTG Cowles to MG Ott, subj: Refugee Support at Fort Chaffee; (5) Msg 081848Z May 75, DA to FORSCOM, subj: Operation NEW LIFE.

by 11 May. In the same message requesting increased acceptance rates, the Joint Chiefs of Staff inquired about the number of refugees Fort Chaffee could accommodate over the maximum of 20,000. In a subsequent message, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that the refugee flow into the United States had to be maintained at 6,000 per day to alleviate the overcrowded refugee conditions on Guam. Projections from that latter location showed it would soon achieve the 50,000 absolute maximum population mark. These projections, moreover, did not include an additional 20,000 seaborne refugees headed for the island. The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that consideration should be given to either enlarging the existing centers or opening additional centers within the United States, hence their specific question concerning Fort Chaffee's capacity. The Joint Chief of Staff's concern for getting the refugee off Guam and to the United States was prompted by Admiral Wechsler's recent visit to Guam where he found terrible living conditions which threatened to deteriorate even further as more refugees arrived.

Increased Out-processing

The immediate solution which the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted to maintain the refugee flow from the Pacific Area safe havens to the United States was to increase the output of refugees from the Refugee Centers. In a message dated 7 May, they stated that it was mandatory for both Camp Pendleton and Fort Chaffee to achieve a maximum daily output of 1,500 refugees per day, which meant that the Voluntary Agencies had to find at least 300 sponsors per day to accept that number. The Joint Chiefs were concerned since actual out-processing had dropped off substantially in recent days. They requested that the State Department send additional Foreign Service Officers to augment the Voluntary Agencies in resettling the refugees. They also authorized the Refugee Center installation commanders to provide additional communications support and, at their discretion, military personnel to help with the Voluntary Agencies' communications, as needed.²

By Saturday, 10 May, there were over 85,000 refugees in the Pacific Area and approximately 37,000 in the continental United States. Since out-processing could not keep pace with the influx, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decreased the inflow of refugees from 4,000 to 2,000 per day beginning on 13 May. They planned to maintain this reduced flow until the rate of out-processing improved in the domestic Refugee Centers. Inbound refugees caught in this change of policy were held overnight at arrival military air bases in California and then sent onward the next day as part of that day's inflow. This decision generated a great deal of rescheduling of inbound Pacific flights to balance the incoming numbers. Refugees still in the Pacific Area had to stay there until the out-processing rates in the United States improved. In a sudden turn-about, the Joint Chiefs of Staff then decided that a continued flow of

2.

Msg 070500Z May 75, Cdr TFNA Ft Chaffee to HQ FORSCOM, subj: Imaictaicing (sic) Refugee Outflow (Increasing the Refugee Outflow). (Address and subject garbled).

2,000 refugees per day to Fort Chaffee was excessive and so further reduced the inflow to 1,000 per day on 13 May. The reduced inflow remained in effect for three days until the Joint Chiefs of Staff again raised it to 2,000 per day.³

The idea that FORSCOM could somehow influence the speed of refugee out-processing at Fort Chaffee died hard in Washington. On 10 May, for example, the Department of the Army queried FORSCOM concerning Fort Chaffee's projected out-processing rate for the next five days. FORSCOM replied that this command did not have the information and that the Department should direct its queries to the State Department. Several more calls of the same nature were received during the next two or three days before higher headquarters gave up trying to influence the rate of refugee out-processing through FORSCOM.⁴

Increased Capacity of the Refugee Centers

Another alternative for getting the refugees out of the overcrowded Pacific Area was to increase the capacity of the currently established Refugee Centers. FORSCOM had already notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Fort Chaffee could hold a maximum of 24,000 refugees, a capacity which would be met by 11 or 12 May if the scheduled refugee input continued to hold up. As far as increasing the capacity of Eglin Air Force Base was concerned, the Air Force informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they refused to accept more than 2,500 refugees, a level which they reached on 11 May. The Marine Corps was more cooperative, however, and increased their capacity to 15,000, a level which they frequently exceeded in the following days.⁵

The ability of FORSCOM and Fort Chaffee to deal effectively with the incoming refugee tide was tested even more on 10 May when the Department of the Army directed FORSCOM to raise the capacity at Fort Chaffee to 27,000 refugees, a level which would be reached by 18 May. FORSCOM was not to make any announcements concerning this major increase until the Interagency Task Force had notified the appropriate Arkansas authorities. By 12 May, FORSCOM learned that representatives from twelve Voluntary

3.

(1) Msg 092357Z May 75, JCS to Distr, subj: Operation NEW LIFE; (2) Msg 101827Z May 75, JCS to Distr, subj: Operation NEW LIFE.

4.

(1) FONECON Record, 102230Z May 75, MAJ D.D. Carlsen, DA-AOC, to MAJ D.K. Lewis, FORSCOM EOS; (2) FONECON Record, 110420Z May 75, LTC D.A. Davis, DA-AOC, to LTC M. Schonberger, FORSCOM EOS.

5.

(1) Msg 081505Z May 75, JCS to CSA, subj: Reception Capability; (2) Intvw, Mr. M.W. Stark, FORSCOM Hist Ofc w/COL W.M. Stevenson, C, EOC, 10 May 75; (3) Info supplied by CPT A.J. Haas, DCSOPS Refugee Ops Off, 13 May 76.

Agencies were working at Fort Chaffee. By this date the camp's population was 18,000 and sponsors had been found for only 1,131 or approximately 5 percent. At Camp Pendleton, where the Voluntary Agencies were in full operation, 7,244 refugees (approximately 24 percent) out of a total of 25,890 refugees had been successfully out-processed. Eglin Air Force Base had been able to out-process 244 of its total of 2,898 refugees, or about 10 percent. None of these totals came close to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's requirements of 1,500 per day at Pendleton and Chaffee or the 500 per day at Eglin. FORSCOM also learned that in order to make more room on Guam for incoming refugees the Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed the Air Force to increase its refugee population at Eglin Air Force Base to 5,000. On the same day, seventeen representatives of the twelve Voluntary Agencies operating at Fort Chaffee met with the Senior Civil Coordinator, Mr. Henry Webb, and other key civil and military staff officials to discuss refugee relocation procedures, problem areas of mutual interest, and objectives. As of that date, the Volunteer Agencies represented at Fort Chaffee included the Christian Missionary Alliance; the International Rescue Committee; the Church World Service; the Tolstoy Foundation, Inc.; the Lutheran Immigration and Rescue Service; the U.S. Catholic Conference - Immigration and Refugee Services; the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints; the American Council for Nationalities Services; Travelers Aid - International Social Services; the United HIAS Service; the Church World Service; and the International Rescue Committee. Voluntary Agencies which were not involved in the out-processing of the refugees included the Salvation Army; the Young Men's Christian Association; the International Red Cross; and the VISTA Information Center.⁶

Proposed Use of Fort Indiantown Gap

The sheer number of refugees (about 80,000) awaiting entry into the United States by the second week of May and the unresponsive out-processing rates from the domestic Refugee Centers made it painfully obvious that either another camp had to be opened soon or better arrangements had to be made to shelter the refugees already on Guam. On 13 May, the Department of the Army queried FORSCOM concerning the possible use of Fort Indiantown Gap to house 20,000 to 50,000 refugees on a long-term basis. If selected for this purpose, the installation would have to be able to begin operations within ten to fourteen days. It would also have to have a hospital site available to support the refugee population; a facility for language and some skills training; schools for the children, either on or off post; and adequate airport facilities within a fifty mile radius. The climate would not be a limiting factor if all the other criteria could be met. A few hours later, FORSCOM informed the department that its answer was an unequivocal no, even though the Department had indicated that the actual operation of the proposed Refugee Center

6.

(1) Fact Sheet, DCSPER OE/WR, 13 May 75, subj: Operation NEW ARRIVALS; (2) Msg 130650Z May 75, TFNA-Ft Chaffee to FORSCOM, subj: Daily Sitrep-NEW ARRIVALS-Ft Chaffee; (3) Msg 120344Z May 75, JCS to DA, subj: Reception Capability at Fort Chaffee.

might be eventually taken over by a civilian federal agency. In its detailed response to the Department's query in the matter, FORSCOM pointed out a number of Fort Indiantown Gap's major disadvantages. These included the fact that the climate in Pennsylvania was cold and most of the buildings would have to be heated, thus substantially increasing the cost of operation; the installation's maximum capacity, based on forty square feet per individual, was 26,000 -- 24,000 less than the department's upper limit proposal; and the large number of activities already supported by the installation. FORSCOM also noted that the Army would be unable to supply any additional mess personnel to support this new center since there were 317 cooks currently at Fort Chaffee and 121 on Guam. Support of Reserve Component Annual Training required the services of 191 cooks and more were needed for the ROTC camps scheduled to be held at four installations in the summer.⁷

Of paramount interest to FORSCOM, at this relatively late date in terms of scheduling Reserve Component Annual Training, was the adverse effect which the selection of Fort Indiantown Gap might have. Since there was no support site available for tents, Reserve Component training would have to be relocated to other installations. Fort Indiantown Gap was scheduled to host 11,684 reservists during the 1975 Annual Training period, with a peak of 3,275 occurring during the period 29 June through 9 July. Of the four installations which could possibly take the extra reservists, only Fort Pickett, Va., had any surplus capacity. The other three, Camp A.P. Hill, Va., Fort Dix, N.J., and Fort Drum, N.Y., were already full. By this time, it was also too late to change the Annual Training dates without personal inconvenience to the individual reservists. Fort Indiantown Gap, moreover, was the only immediately available site for Inactive Duty Training (IDT) for the 6th Battalion, 68th Armor (USAR); the 157th Infantry Brigade (Mech) (USAR); the 28th Infantry Division (PA-ARNG); and the 99th Army Reserve Command. Fort Indiantown Gap had all the requisite tank tables (I - IV), artillery ranges, and large equipment sites required by these particular units.⁸

At the departmental level, FORSCOM's position was supported by the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, but not by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB). The National Guard noted that Fort Indiantown Gap was scheduled to host 5,545 guardsmen, Fort Pickett, 7,588, and Camp Roberts, Calif., 7,233. Based primarily upon this criteria, the National Guard Bureau recommended choosing a suitable Refugee Center based upon the training facility with the lowest requirement for the relocation of units and the alteration of training objectives; the number of units involved; proximity of other sites; and the cost of moving equipment required for Annual Training to alternate locations should units be required to locate. Using the above criteria, the Bureau recommended the following Refugee Center locations in order of priority: Fort Indiantown

7.

MFR, AFOP-OE, 13 May 75, subj: Possible Use of Fort Indiantown Gap to House RVN Refugees.

8.

Ibid.

Gap, Fort Pickett, and Camp Roberts. The Chief, Army Reserve, using somewhat similar criteria, came to the opposite conclusion. He determined that the least impact on the Army Reserve would come from using Camp Roberts while the use of Fort Indiantown Gap would have the most adverse impact.⁹

FORSCOM soon learned that other than military considerations were intruding on the choice of a fourth Refugee Center. Of the sites mentioned above, only one was in an area considered to be politically safe by the Department of the Army, i.e., Pennsylvania. California on the other hand, presented the greatest difficulty. It was well known that Governor Jerry Brown was unhappy with the earlier selection of Camp Pendleton. The state of Virginia also had a potential for political problems. Senator William L. Scott, the junior senator from Virginia, was the only senator who had voted against a senate resolution welcoming the refugees to America, while the state's senior senator, Richard Byrd, held a questionable attitude toward the refugees. The state of Pennsylvania, on the other hand, seemed more willing to accept the refugees. Pennsylvania's Senator Hugh Scott, the Senate Minority Leader, had already suggested the use of Fort Indiantown Gap as a Refugee Center.¹⁰

Site Survey by the Defense Department

On 14 May, the Secretary of Defense announced that Mr. Erich von Marbod, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, had been named to head the Defense Task Force for Support of Vietnamese Refugees. The Secretary also announced that Mr. von Marbod and a staff of five would visit Fort Indiantown Gap, Eglin Air Force Base, Fort Chaffee, and Camp Pendleton to survey, coordinate, and review both current and future Defense Department support of the refugee program.¹¹

In the mid-morning of 14 May, Col. Ervin V. Johnson, the Fort Indiantown Gap commander, was informed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Mr. von Marbod and his staff would arrive at the installation in the afternoon for a tour of the facilities. Colonel Johnson briefed the group concerning the areas which could be used for the expected refugees, and noted that some areas of the installation were already occupied by the Defense Mapping Agency, the Pennsylvania Army National Guard, the

9.

(1) Memo, OCAR to DA DCSOPS, 13 May 75, subj: Operation NEW ARRIVALS - Impact of Selection of Army Refugee Processing Centers on US Army Reserve Annual Training; (2) DF, NGB (NGB-ARZ-A) to DAMO-OD, 13 May 75, subj: Impact on National Guard Annual Training.

10.

Incl 3 to Memo, DCSOPS to Vice Chief of Staff, 15 May 75, subj: Possible Selection of Fort Indiantown Gap as a Fourth Refugee Center.

11.

Msg 141624Z May 75, SECDEF to Distr, subj: Defense Task Force for Vietnamese Refugees.

Pennsylvania Air National Guard, and the State Civil Defense and could not be used to house refugees. In general, Mr. von Marbod was favorably impressed with the condition of the available facilities. When shown a bad area, Mr. von Marbod consistently reacted with the comment that they were "...completely satisfactory and much better than tents." He explained to Colonel Johnson that the offer to house refugees at Fort Indiantown Gap was made by Senator Scott to the President and the Secretary of Defense. During the course of his remarks to Colonel Johnson, Mr. von Marbod frequently alluded to a maximum refugee population of 30,000, a figure derived from Defense Department Mobilization Plans. Colonel Johnson stressed the point that Fort Indiantown Gap, in its current status, could accommodate but 15,000 in its available permanent structures. Refugees in excess of this number would have to go into tents. At this point in the conversation, Colonel Johnson got the impression that a tentative decision to house the refugees at his installation had been made the night before, but that a final decision awaited the results of Mr. von Marbod's on-site inspection. Colonel Johnson tried to get some idea of when the camp would open and how many cadre would be required for operations. Mr. von Marbod informed Colonel Johnson that he would try to have an experienced cadre sent from Fort Chaffee as well as some "higher class" Vietnamese refugees to assist in setting up the Refugee Reception Center. Colonel Johnson observed that the winters were very cold in that part of Pennsylvania and that heating of the barracks would have to begin in September. Mr. von Marbod stated that the fact that Fort Indiantown Gap was "too far north" was foolishness and that the buildings could be heated. He further noted that the northeastern United States was heavily populated and that both individuals and families could be farmed out in the area. He concluded his remarks by stating that the Defense Department wanted to get out of the refugee business and turn the whole thing over to the State Department. He also noted that money would not be a problem and that they would be authorized to go sole source procurement for whatever was needed to operate the center. In addition, they could hire personnel off the street without regard to Civil Service lists.¹²

FORSCOM Response

FORSCOM tried to obtain some answers from the Department of the Army concerning the use of Fort Indiantown Gap as a Refugee Center, but the Department Staff knew less about the subject than FORSCOM. On 15 May, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans sent a memorandum to the Army Vice Chief of Staff which informed him of the plans for Fort Indiantown Gap and the possible implications for the Army. He believed that Mr. von Marbod's appointment and subsequent visit to the post meant that a fourth center would be opened there under Army auspices. However, the Department of the Army had not been asked to comment on any proposed locations for a fourth Refugee Center, nor did it appear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had participated in the selection process. If Fort

12.

MFR, COL E.V. Johnson, Cdr Fort Indiantown Gap, 15 May 75, no subj, p. 2.

Indiantown Gap was selected most of the Reserve Component units scheduled for training at that location would have to be rescheduled and relocated as soon as possible. Moreover, because of the experience gained at Fort Chaffee, the Army would need more than the 200 cadre and the few "high class" Vietnamese mentioned by Mr. von Marbod to operate the post.¹³

Visit by the Army Vice Chief of Staff

On 16 May, General Kerwin visited Fort Indiantown Gap to determine its suitability as a Refugee Center. Prior to his visit, Department of the Army requested that FORSCOM provide information for General Kerwin's use which would show the impact on the Army if that installation were chosen as a Refugee Reception Center. FORSCOM provided information which indicated that the installation could accommodate a total of 16,500 refugees and 4,260 Reservists, if necessary. Fort Indiantown Gap had plenty of chapel, theatre, and classroom space, a hospital with a minimum of 450 beds, and mess facilities which could accommodate up to 11,200 people at one time. However, some problems existed which required resolution. The sewage system leaked badly during heavy rains and the FORSCOM Engineer was just then sending a sanitary engineer out to survey the problem. The current mess hall equipment, refrigeration, and cold storage were all inadequate for the number of refugees which the installation might be expected to house. FORSCOM emphasized that three U.S. Army Reserve schools which had high facility use factors would probably have to move to another installation if the refugee center was established at Fort Indiantown Gap.¹⁴

Selection by the Defense Department

Despite FORSCOM's objections, it soon became obvious that Fort Indiantown Gap would become the fourth Refugee Center. This belief was confirmed at noon on 16 May when Department of the Army informed FORSCOM that Mr. von Marbod had returned from his inspection trip and intended to recommend to the highest authorities -- i.e., the President and the Secretary of Defense, -- that Fort Indiantown Gap be selected as a refugee center. Later that same day, the Department further informed FORSCOM that the official directive for establishing a Refugee Center at Fort Indiantown Gap would be issued on either the following Monday or Tuesday (19 or 20 May). The Department requested a copy of the Fort Indiantown Gap operation plan for refugee support and the name of the designated commander. FORSCOM had already prepared an operation plan for Fort Indiantown Gap which had been distributed to the field on a contingency

13.

Memo, DCSOPS to VCSA, 15 May 75, subj: Possible Selection of Fort Indiantown Gap as a Fourth Refugee Center.

14.

(1) FONECON, FORSCOM DA LNO, 16 May 75, subj: IGMR (EOC Sig #378); (2) MFR, BG W.R. Todd, ADCSOPS, 16 May 75, no subj (EOD Sig #379).

basis earlier that day. The plan was similar to the one previously written for Fort Chaffee except that it provided for another Federal agency to take over the operation. On 17 May, FORSCOM informed the Department of the Army that Brig. Gen. J.V. Mackmull, Assistant Division Commander, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Ky., would be the Task Force Commander for Fort Indiantown Gap.¹⁵

Surveys by the Department of the Army

On 18 May a Department of the Army Survey Team visited Fort Indiantown Gap to ascertain the installation's readiness to receive, process, and accommodate 15,000 refugees. After reviewing the post's capabilities with Colonel Johnson and his staff, the Survey Team concluded that 15,000 could indeed be housed without upsetting the scheduled Reserve Component training although the Reservists would have to be billeted in tents. They did identify some problem areas, however, which could impact adversely on the proposed operation. These resulted primarily from the fact that Fort Indiantown Gap had been in an inactive status since the Korean War. The two problem areas which caused the most immediate concern were the current mess facilities and the hospital. The mess facilities were World War II troop unit messes which could feed between 200 and 250 persons per meal. Some of these mess halls required equipment, especially steam tables, but seventy-two could be opened immediately. They were, however, not cost effective in manpower requirements. Since the Army was already overcommitted in cooks, the Survey Team noted that every effort would have to be made to contract for civilian food services. The hospital, a World War II 1,000-bed cantonment type, had not been used since the Korean War. According to the Survey Team, this hospital could have 125 beds ready within 72 hours after the Refugee Center opened, but that expansion to a 200-bed capacity or larger would require extensive repairs. While the Survey Team did not prepare any detailed cost estimates, it believed that an expenditure of \$4 to \$5 million would be required to get the post ready for the expected refugees. They did note that the installation's age and general condition might require substantially more than their estimate. On the other hand, if the Active Army would first use those areas which had been in relatively constant use during recent years, it could begin accepting refugees at the rate of 1,000 per day within 10 days of a decision to open a Refugee Center, although 14 days would be preferred.¹⁶

15.

(1) Msg 192130Z May 75, FORSCOM to Distr, subj: Change 1, FORSCOM OPLAN NEW ARRIVALS - FORT INDIANTOWN GAP; (2) EOD Journal (Sig #403), FORSCOM to DA-DOMS, 19 May 75, no subj; (3) Fact Sheet, DCSPER OE/WR, 19 May 75, subj: Operation NEW ARRIVALS.

16.

Memo, DAMO-() to Mr. von Marbod, 19 May 75, subj: Fort Indiantown Gap as Refugee Center.

FORSCOM Preparations

Faced with a number of problems associated with the preparation of Fort Indiantown Gap as a refugee center, FORSCOM decided to take advantage of the experience gained in opening Fort Chaffee by designating General Cannon as the Commander, Task Force NEW ARRIVALS - Fort Indiantown Gap (TFNA-FIG) in lieu of General Mackmull who assumed command of Fort Chaffee. FORSCOM then chose the experienced 46th Support Group to be the base unit for Fort Indiantown Gap. This unit was replaced at Fort Chaffee by the 593d Support Group from Fort Lewis, Wash.¹⁷

Implementing Decisions

Background

At 1855 on Monday, 19 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Department of the Army to execute FORSCOM Operation Plan NEW ARRIVALS - Fort Indiantown Gap. The actual execution was to be effective on receipt of a formal directive. The Department, in turn, alerted FORSCOM and stipulated that General Cannon and an advance party were to arrive at Fort Indiantown Gap no later than the following day (20 May). While the Department expected that the refugee population would peak at 14,000 to 15,000, FORSCOM would have to develop new contingency plans to expand the installation to the maximum possible. At the same time, FORSCOM would have to make every effort to ensure that the scheduled Annual Training for the Reserve Components was not interrupted at that installation. General Cannon was to be given about ten days to prepare for the first large-scale influx of refugees but was to be prepared at the same time to receive a smaller number -- approximately 500 per day -- sometime earlier. While no troop movement other than General Cannon's advance party was authorized at that time, FORSCOM could deploy the support units once it received the formal directive. Any requirements for personnel support -- such as medical, mess, and administrative -- which the Department of the Army could not provide were to be identified as rapidly as possible for joint tasking of the other services. All public affairs announcements and inquiries were to be referred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Later that evening, FORSCOM directed General Cannon and his staff to proceed to Fort Indiantown Gap and directed Colonel Johnson, the installation commander, to support the newly created task force with all the resources at his command. Anything beyond his capability to furnish would be coordinated with General Cannon who would notify FORSCOM.¹⁸

17.

HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS - AAR, p. A-2.

18.

(1) Msg 192315Z May 75, DA to FORSCOM, subj: Task Force New Arrivals (Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa.); (2) Msg 200040Z May 75, DA to Distr, subj: FORSCOM Oplan New Arrivals - Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa.; (3) Msg 200253Z May 75, FORSCOM to Distr, subj: Operation New Arrivals (Indiantown Gap).

TABLE 13

UNITS DEPLOYED 20 MAY 1975 IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS
FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

Unit	Home Station	Strength
<u>Total</u>		<u>1,834</u>
HHC, 46th Support Group	Ft Bragg	93
HHC, 593d Support Group	Ft Lewis	145
401st Adjutant General Co. (Pers Svc)	Ft Knox	116
553d Adjutant General Co. (Postal)	Ft Devens	12
Civil Affairs Battalion (-)	Ft Bragg	35
76th Engineer Bn (Const)	Ft Meade	236
57th Transportation Co (Lt Trk)	Ft Lee	117
278th Combat Support Co (Gen Spt)(-)	Ft Devens	18
HHD, 519th M.P. Bn	Ft Meade	60
209th M.P. Co	Ft Meade	177
437th M.P. Co	Ft Belvoir	177
40th Combat Support Co (S&S)	Ft Carson	189
581st Combat Support Co (Lt Maint)(-)	Ft Meade	61
13th Public Information Det	Ft Benning	3
23d A G Replacement Det	Ft Benning	35
60th Ordnance Det (EOD)(GSF)	Ft Dix	2
42d Field Hospital (-)	Ft Knox	154
247th Medical Det (RA)(-)	Ft Meade	4
485th Medical Det (LA)(-)	Ft Sam Houston	8
261st Medical Det (GC)	Ft Benning	6
926th Medical Det (Lab)	Ft Benning	8
330th Movement Control Team	Ft Bragg	8
4th Psychological Group	Ft Bragg	28
Co B, 1st Bn, 501st Inf	Ft Campbell	140

- a. At Fort Chaffee supporting NEW ARRIVALS there, transferred to FIG.
- b. Deployed to Fort Chaffee to replace the HHC, 46th Support Gp.
- c. 100 bed capability plus augmentation to be determined; 100 bed add-on at home station. 257th Medical Det. on call at Ft Jackson. Equipment requirements to be determined after a survey of facilities. Plan for a Surgeon General directed special augmentation of 50 officers and men. None of these counted in unit strength above.

Source: Msg 200127Z May 75, FORSCOM to Distr, subj: Operation New Arrival (Indiantown Gap). (UNCLASSIFIED)

Announcements by the Defense Department

At a news conference held at 1145 (EDT) on 19 May, the Defense Department announced that Fort Indiantown Gap would be opened as a Refugee Center as soon as it could be made ready. The Defense Department explained that this action was necessary to alleviate the harsh living conditions of the refugees on Guam and Wake Islands in the Pacific. Since the Defense Department was the only Federal agency capable of caring for large numbers of people on short notice, it would operate the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center until the responsibility could be transferred to another government agency.¹⁹

FORSCOM Seizes the Initiative

Since it was obvious that time was short and that there was a great deal of high level interest in getting Fort Indiantown Gap into operation, FORSCOM seized the initiative and directed the deployment of the support units to Fort Indiantown Gap. (Table 13). Upon their arrival at the installation they came under the operational control of General Cannon whose command post became operational at 1500 on 20 May. General Cannon and Col. R.L. Travis, Commander, 46th Support Group, accompanied by an 8-man advance party, were already at Fort Indiantown Gap surveying the installation. Although the Army had requested a 48-hour notice before the first refugees arrived, the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center was to be prepared to receive refugees at the rate of 1,000 per day no later than 28 May.²⁰

Pressure from Department of the Army

Pressure to move refugees into the newly designated Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center began immediately, notwithstanding the fact that the installation could not accept them. At 1830 on 20 May, the Department of the Army informed FORSCOM that the Interagency Task Force desired a date prior to 29 May for the receipt of the first refugees. The Department requested that General Cannon provide his own estimate of the earliest date on which 500 refugees could be accepted, after which the Refugee Center would receive 500 per day until 29 May when it would begin receiving 1,000 per day. The Interagency Task Force wanted Fort Indiantown Gap to begin accepting 3,000 refugees per day as soon as possible after the 1,000 a day reception rate went into effect. Later that day, General Cannon responded to FORSCOM concerning this matter and said that he could not take any refugees until ten days after the formal execute order. He also noted that he felt that he could not accept even 500 per day by 25 May. The reason for this was that, when he arrived at

19.

Msg 200052Z May 75, SECDEF to Distr, subj: Department of Defense News Briefing.

20.

Msg 200217Z May 75, FORSCOM to Distr, subj: Operation New Arrival (Indiantown Gap).

Fort Indiantown Gap, he found that absolutely nothing had been done to prepare for the operation. It should be pointed out at this time that this unsatisfactory condition was not Colonel Johnson's fault. No one had given him or anyone else at the installation the authority to expend funds or to prepare in any way for Operation NEW ARRIVALS. The necessary immediate civilian labor -- i.e., clerks, carpenters, and so on -- had not been hired or even advertised for; no mess halls had been opened; no funds had been released by the comptroller; and no equipment had been requisitioned because no one knew what might be required. After subjecting this information to a careful internal analysis, FORSCOM informed the Department of the Army on 21 May that the installation could accept 500 refugees per day beginning on 26 May but a more acceptable initial reception day would be 28 May.²¹

Operations at Fort Indiantown Gap

Background

As things turned out, General Cannon had less than nine days in which to prepare for the arrival of the first refugees. Fortunately, FORSCOM had directed the deployment of the support units without waiting for the formal execute order from higher headquarters. Despite the urgency of the situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not direct the actual establishment of the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center until 1850 on 21 May. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Department of the Army and the U.S. Army Forces Command to establish a Refugee Center at Fort Indiantown Gap as soon as possible so as to be ready to receive 500 refugees a day during the week of 26 May with the input increasing to 1,000 per day on or about 29 May. The Joint Chiefs also directed the development of an impact statement should the camp population be increased to 20,000 refugees, as well as a determination regarding the establishment of a separate area for 500 Cambodian refugees.²²

Deployment of Support Units

General Cannon and his advance party arrived at Fort Indiantown Gap on 20 May and, by the evening of 22 May, all elements of the 46th Support Group had arrived and were in the process of establishing the new camp. They employed the same techniques which had proven successful in the establishment of the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center. The Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 46th Support Group, once again assumed the duties as the Task Force headquarters and General Cannon's staff. The group

21.

(1) MFR, COL L.L. Ballard, DCSOPS EOD, 202330Z May 75, subj: FONECON BG Cannon, TF FIG, and Colonel Ballard, EOS; (2) MFR, COL L.L. Ballard, EOS, 202230Z May 75, subj: FONECON Colonel Chamberlain, AOC, and Colonel Ballard, EOS.

22.

Msg 212333Z May 75, JCS to Distr, subj: Refugee Reception Center, Fort Indiantown Gap.

headquarters was supported, in turn, by other specialized units which were deployed to Fort Indiantown Gap from various sources. These included elements of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Bragg, N.C., which later assumed duties as the center's management element; the 42d Field Hospital, Fort Knox, Ky.; the 76th Engineer Battalion; and the 519th Military Police Battalion; both of the latter from Fort George G. Meade, Md. The commanders of these latter units served as the Task Force Surgeon, Engineer, and Provost Marshal, respectively. Several other smaller support units, whose duties were eventually turned over to Government civilian employees and/or contractors, were also deployed. These included the 91st Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting), Fort Rucker, Ala., which was deployed to bolster Fort Indiantown Gap's fire fighting capabilities.²³

Task Force Organization


In general, the same command structure was employed at Fort Indiantown Gap as at Fort Chaffee with one major difference. The Task Force reported directly to Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command, rather than through an intermediate headquarters, thereby streamlining the operation. Upon his arrival at Fort Indiantown Gap, General Cannon discovered that a civilian complement was already on hand, including the Senior Civil Coordinator, Mr. Richard Friedman, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), and his chief assistant, Mr. Alan Francis. Consequently, an integrated management team representing both military and civilian agencies was able to commence operations on an equal footing. Internal staff coordination was assisted by the fact that, unlike Fort Chaffee, the Task Force headquarters, the civilian staff, and the Voluntary Agencies were all housed in a single building. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and its supporting agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) were housed separately in another building only a block away from the Task Force headquarters. The compact nature of these administrative facilities made it easier for the Senior Civil Coordinator to supervise and issue policy and guidance to his subordinates.²⁴

23.

HQ 46th Spt Gp, After Action Report, NEW ARRIVALS, Fort Indiantown Gap, 20 May - 25 November 1975, Vol. 2, Sec. 1, p. 4, (hereafter referred to as HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS - FIG).

24.

(1) HQ FORSCOM, FORSCOM OPLAN NEW ARRIVALS - Fort Indiantown Gap, 16 May 75; (2) Memo, DCSOPS to Cofs, 21 May 75, subj: Interagency Task Force (IATF), Indiantown Gap.



FORSCOM Supply and Transportation troops deliver mattresses to the refugee housing area at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa.



76th Engineer Battalion soldiers prepare barracks for occupancy. They also constructed two parking lots and provided additional support as required by the Task Force.

Preparation Phase

Background

Inasmuch as the Task Force had to cope with a number of critical problems in establishing the new Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Reception Center in a minimum of time, it was fortunate that they had already gained a considerable amount of expertise in this area while at Fort Chaffee. As it was, they were able to accomplish this difficult mission with an absolute minimum of wasted motion. The most immediate major problem involved the preparation of the barracks for occupancy. Four billeting areas were available to house the incoming refugees but they had already been scheduled for use by U.S. Army Reserve Schools and Training Divisions conducting military occupational specialty (MOS) training, noncommissioned officer (NCO) training, and Command and General Staff College courses. In addition, the Pennsylvania Army National Guard was conducting its Officer Candidate School (OCS) at that location. In response to this problem, FORSCOM directed First U.S. Army to reschedule these Reserve Component training activities to other installations to make room for Operation NEW ARRIVALS at Fort Indiantown Gap. The Task Force calculated the installation's capacity for housing refugees at 16,512, based on 40 square feet per individual or 96 persons per building. Just as in the case of Fort Chaffee, the Fort Indiantown Gap barracks, mess halls, and administration buildings were of World War II construction and, in many cases, required extensive renovation in order to be usable. All of the barracks required privacy partitioning and most were equipped with obsolete coal furnaces for which replacement parts were no longer manufactured. The mess halls were inadequately equipped and the administration buildings required partitioning, extra light fixtures, and a host of minor repairs. Warehousing space was in short supply and those available needed new roofing. The Task Force initiated immediate action for necessary contractual support to accomplish needed repairs while the military engineering effort was expended on preparing the buildings for occupancy. Due to the limited preparation time available, the Task Force found it necessary to forego formal advertising for procurements of \$10,000 or more.²⁵

Barracks Preparation


The task of preparing 172 barracks at Fort Indiantown Gap in 8 days for refugee occupation was not nearly as difficult as readying 234 buildings for refugee occupancy at Fort Chaffee in 3 days. One factor which made the job easier was that most of the supplies required for the job, such as lumber, bunks, and linen were either on hand or quickly available in the immediate area. Two units assumed the task of preparing the barracks, along with other additional duties. The 76th Engineer

25.

(1) HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, Vol. 2, Sec. 1, p. 4; (2) Fort Indiantown Gap, OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS, 16 May - 6 Jan 76, hereafter referred to as OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, pp. 4 - 5.



The task of preparing 172 barracks at Fort Indiantown Gap in 8 days was not nearly as difficult as readying 234 buildings at Fort Chaffee in 3 days for refugee occupancy.



501st Infantry soldiers from Fort Campbell, Ky. deliver mattresses to the refugee housing area at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa.



This view shows the interior of a typical refugee barracks before the partitions were installed.



Panels have been installed consisting of 12-foot semi-permanent aisle partitions and movable 8-foot partitions designed to establish living modules for four to eight persons.

Battalion prepared the barracks for occupancy, constructed two parking lots, and provided additional support as required by the Task Force. Company B, 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry, Fort Campbell, Ky., was attached to the engineer battalion for operational control and installed the bunks in place, while performing other duties as assigned.²⁶

Actual barracks preparation consisted of installing barracks partitions, bunks, and mattresses. The partitions consisted of 12-foot semipermanent aisle partitions and movable 8-foot partitions designed to establish living modules for four to eight persons. Preparations also included the installation of latrine partitions with doors and clotheslines in each building. The necessity for both of these latter items stemmed from experience gained at Fort Chaffee. Initially, all of the barracks at Fort Indiantown Gap contained sixty bunks and sixty wall lockers. Company B installed additional bunks and mattresses to provide a total of 110 bunks and 60 wall lockers per barracks. Five of the wall lockers in each barracks were used for the storage of cleaning materials. The initial barracks cleaning was performed by a local janitorial service contracted by the installation Director of Facilities Engineering (DFAE). This service swept the floors, mopped and sanitized the latrines, and put the bunks and wall lockers in their final positions within the living spaces.²⁷

Medical Preparations

As noted above, the Fort Indiantown Gap hospital was a World War II cantonment hospital of 1,000 beds which had not been used since the Korean War. However, the U.S. Army Health Services Command (HSC) had already equipped three wards of the hospital with seventy-one beds for emergency or mobilization use. An additional 125 beds could be made available within 48 hours; 75 more in 30 days; and 230 more in 90 days. Since specialized medical equipment such as X-ray machines were not available on the installation, the 42d Field Hospital had to order them through the Health Services Command. The 42d Field Hospital was responsible for establishing and operating a 100-bed hospital for the care and treatment of both Task Force personnel and refugees. The hospital deployed from Fort Knox, Ky., with 101 enlisted personnel and 5 officers along with all of their authorized (TOE) equipment, with the exception of tents and beds. The Health Services Command augmented the hospital at Fort Indiantown Gap with an additional forty enlisted personnel as well as sixty-two additional medical officers of various specialties. In addition, the Health Services Command attached four medical units to the 42d Field Hospital -- the 247th Medical Detachment (Air Ambulance), the 261st Medical Detachment (Medical Equipment Maintenance), the 485th Medical Detachment (Preventive Medicine), and the 926th Medical Detachment (Environmental Sanitation Service). Upon their arrival at

26.

HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, Vol. 2, Sec. 2, pp. G-1 - G-3, K-1.

27.

Ibid.



A former Cambodian Air force pilot, left, initiates processing as an interpreter, center, translates. Actual processing was accomplished by the 401st Adjutant General Company (Personnel Service), Fort Knox, Ky.



All refugee children under the age of fifteen are required to take prescribed vaccinations considered necessary for children living in the United States.



Processing by the Civilian Agencies is initiated with a medical examination and the preparation of a medical history. The 42d Field Hospital from Fort Knox, Ky. provided three levels of health care in support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS -- mobile medical units, community health centers, and hospital care.



A young refugee gets a new pair of shoes from the Salvation Army's clothing distribution point. A Seventh Day Adventist church volunteer gives him a helping hand.

Fort Indiantown Gap, the medical personnel had about forty-eight hours to establish the hospital and prepare to receive patients. This required an around-the-clock effort on the part of all medical personnel to clean and set up the old wards and ancillary care areas. By the evening of 25 May, however, the hospital was ready to care for its first patients.²⁸

Medical Care

The 42d Field Hospital provided three levels of health care in support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS -- mobile medical vans, community health centers, and hospital care. The operational concept was intended to extend medical care to the lowest level possible. The mobile medical vans were staffed with Public Health Nurses and medical corpsmen who conducted screening operations in the refugee living areas, seeing an average of 274 patients per day. Those found to have medical problems were then referred to either the hospital or the community health center. The Community Health Center, located in Refugee Area #5, constituted the mid-level of health care, with six operating clinics -- a medical/surgical clinic, a pediatric clinic, an obstetrics/gynecological (OB/GYN) clinic, an immunization clinic, a chest clinic, and a dental clinic. This facility cared for an average of 194 patients a day. The final level of medical care was the 100-bed (later increased to 135-bed) hospital with an average daily inpatient count of 30. During the course of Operation NEW ARRIVALS, the hospital had 535 dispositions. Refugee patients requiring care beyond the capability of the 42d Field Hospital were evacuated to either the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital, Baltimore, Md., or the Hershey Medical Center, Hershey, Pa., which was used for pediatric and obstetrics/gynecology referrals.²⁹

Mess Preparations

The Task Force S-4 Food Services Section found forty-three dining facilities immediately available in the refugee housing areas. Following a discussion with the Fort Indiantown Gap Director of Industrial Operations (DIO), the officer in charge made the decision to open thirty-two based on the experience gained at Fort Chaffee. This indicated that between 500 and 550 people could be fed three meals per day based upon the available equipment and a 2-hour serving period for each meal. In the meantime, the installation procured the necessary cooking utensils, paper products, cleaning supplies, and other expendables for 15,000 people.³⁰

28.

(1) OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, pp. 5 - 6; (2) HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, Vol. 2, Sec. 2, pp. B-1 - B-3.

29.

Ibid.

30.

HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, Vol. 2, Sec. 2, pp. C-4-1 - C-4-6.

Since there was a worldwide shortage of Army mess personnel, FORSCOM secured permission from higher headquarters to authorize the Fort Indiantown Gap Task Force to obtain a food service contract for refugee messing, using the Fort Chaffee food service contract as a guide. The initial \$3.2 million contract was awarded to a local business, Manpower, Inc., for a period of 120 days. The contractor agreed to be ready to operate the first mess facility as of 28 May. The Task Force, for its part, ensured that no more than six barracks would be assigned to any one dining facility. This action was taken to make certain that no more than 500 people would use each dining facility. The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion issued meal cards to each refugee patterned after those developed at Fort Chaffee. Although the first contractor operated dining facility opened on 28 May as scheduled, a number of contractor personnel problems occurred during the first two weeks of the operation. A number of food supervisors, dining facility managers, and head cooks were found to be unqualified for their positions and were quickly replaced. In addition, available Army Food Service personnel during the early weeks of the contractor's operation were not sufficient to provide technical advice concerning required Army forms and other administrative details.³¹

Menu. Just as in the case of Fort Chaffee, Fort Indiantown Gap's initial menu was nutritionally adequate but did not have enough variety. Based upon the unfolding Fort Chaffee experience, FORSCOM was able to assist the Task Force in making a number of improvements in the menu until the U.S. Army Troop Support Agency developed a 15-day menu which proved for the most part to be varied enough for Vietnamese adult tastes. The Troop Support Agency furnished a set of instructions with this menu which stated that the Task Force should use it as a guide and implement it as soon as possible. After slightly revising the menu to make it fully acceptable, the Task Force published the new menu on 22 July.³²

Infant Feeding. Again, based upon the Fort Chaffee experience, the Fort Indiantown Gap Task Force accorded the highest priority to the establishment of a Baby Food and Formula Distribution Center. Experience at Fort Chaffee showed, as noted above, that excessive quantities of baby food had been consumed by adult refugees seeking to supplement their initially meager diet at that installation. In order to preclude this situation at Fort Indiantown Gap, the Task Force initiated a very effective log system to control the issue of baby foods. This controlled system proved highly successful in ensuring that the infants were well fed while restraining baby food consumption by others. The first distribution center was opened on 25 May and was staffed by Army nurses, Red Cross volunteers, and five civilian employees. The second distribution center, similarly staffed, was opened a month later as the overall refugee population continued to grow. In July the Task Force transferred the operation of the centers to the Fort Indiantown Gap Director of

31.

Ibid.

32.

Ibid.

Industrial Operations. As far as feeding young children was concerned, the only major problem encountered involved widespread diarrhea due to the type of milk dispensed in the mess halls. At first, these children were issued special slips by doctors which enabled them to get soy bean milk (formula) from the baby food centers, even though they were too old to be included in this distribution. Later on, in the face of a growing problem and at the Army pediatrician's request, soy milk was issued to the mess halls and given to children under four years of age. This measure helped these children to adjust to their new diet to the point where it could be discontinued on 30 July.³³

Sewage Problems

The World War II sewage system at Fort Indiantown Gap was designed to handle 2.1 million gallons a day, which was sufficient to meet the installation's requirements. On the other hand, because the system was old and had not been used to capacity for some time, there was the possibility of a serious problem occurring due to water infiltration during heavy rains. The Task Force found that infiltration could cause the sewage to overflow the lines and flow into nearby Swatara Creek, which provided water for Hershey, Pa., and the surrounding communities. The Task Force, therefore, awarded a contract for a complete survey and repair of Fort Indiantown Gap's sewage system. Until the repairs were completed, the Task Force had to provide five chemical toilets per barracks to meet acceptable sanitary levels.³⁴

Military Police Support

The 519th Military Police Battalion, augmented by the Fort Indiantown Gap garrison military police assigned to the 225th Military Police Detachment, provided the necessary military police support. The battalion commander was also the Task Force Provost Marshal with the following missions: providing protection for, and control of, the refugees as directed by the Task Force commander; establishing access control points and external security of the refugee areas; establishing liaison and coordinating policies and procedures with other state and Federal law enforcement agencies for reporting and investigating criminal offenses committed by the refugees; and performing provost marshal activities, military police investigations, as well as escort, crowd, and traffic control duties.³⁵

33.

HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, Vol. 2, Sec. 1, pp. D-1 - D-2, D-1-1 - D-1-2.

34.


(1) Ibid., p. 5; (2) OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, pp. 5, 16 - 18.

35.

HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, Vol. 2, Sec. 1, p. 6; Vol. 2, Sec. 2, pp. A-1 - A-3, A-13 - A-14.



Information explaining Military Police functions and other services at the Refugee Center receives wide dissemination through effective use of announcements in the refugee newspaper. A Military Policeman distributes copies of the Fort Indiantown Gap Vietnamese language newspaper.



Internal staff coordination at Fort Indiantown Gap was enhanced by the fact that, unlike Fort Chaffee, the Task Force headquarters, civilian agencies, and the Voluntary Agencies were housed in a single building.



Military Police return a lost child to her parents in the refugee housing area.



A TRADOC soldier makes friends with two Vietnamese youngsters in the refugee area at Fort Indiantown Gap.

The Task Force Provost Marshal's initial efforts to establish either exclusive (as at Fort Chaffee), concurrent, or proprietary jurisdiction at Fort Indiantown Gap met negative results. This impasse was largely due to the fact that there was a legal question over who had jurisdiction over the refugees at the Refugee Reception Center. Fort Chaffee was a Federal reservation but Fort Indiantown Gap was state-owned land which had been leased to the Federal Government on a 99-year basis. Inasmuch as the roads in the installation were state-owned, with the exception of a few streets within the refugee areas, there was a serious question as to the legality of the military police dealing with the questions of jurisdiction on state roads. The Task Force finally resolved the question through the cooperation of state officials and a working arrangement was established. The military police were assigned responsibility for preventing crime and disorder, stopping outbreaks of violence, and detaining personnel accused of wrongdoings, pending the arrival of Pennsylvania State Police who would then assume responsibility for the case.³⁶

The above jurisdictional considerations were complicated by the fact that the status of the refugees was unclear to all in the early days of Operation NEW ARRIVALS. This was due to the fact that the refugees had no visas, immigration quotas did not apply, and they were admitted into the United States as nonresident aliens on parole status. Under these circumstances the refugees had to be kept within the center at all times and preferably without a show of force. In order to accomplish this mission, the Task Force stipulated that the refugees must remain in the cantonment area unless they had business elsewhere on the installation. In that latter case, the military police would issue appropriate passes. In addition, the military police delineated the refugee camp area with white engineer tape and placed military police posts at various points of access to control refugee entrance and exit. They also established an access badge system to control those entering the refugee living areas. Uniformed members of the Red Cross and the Salvation Army were allowed free access in pursuit of their duties.³⁷

Civil Affairs Support

Civil Affairs support was furnished by Civil Action Task Force IV from the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance. The Civil Action Task Force (CATF) consisted of thirty-six personnel from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion and a like number from the 4th Psychological Operations Group, which closed at Fort Indiantown Gap on 23 May. On that same day, the Fort Indiantown Gap Task Force formed a Composite Support Battalion (Provisional) made up of the Civil Action Task Force IV, the 40th Supply and Service Company, the 57th Transportation Company, a Class I Platoon (-), the 278th General Support Company, and the 581st Combat

36.

Ibid.

37.

Ibid.

Support Company. This provisional battalion was placed under the command of the Officer-in-Charge of Civil Affairs Task Force IV, who was also designated as the Camp Coordinator.³⁸

The personnel of this provisional composite support battaion were charged with the establishment and enforcement of camp rules and procedures which were intended to ensure health, safety, and security. In support of these objectives, the battalion established and operated a billeting system which ensured the maximum use of space and maintained family integrity. They established facilities and procedures for the distribution of personal comfort items and supplies of all kinds designed to maintain the health, cleanliness, and morale of the refugees. They also distributed needed stocks of clothing and planned and supervised food operations including the distribution of baby food, formula, and other related supplies. They carried out daily health and sanitary inspections of all billets, latrines, and mess halls and took those actions necessary to prevent the outbreak of communicable diseases. They initiated and coordinated the actions necessary to establish educational and recreational activities to include classes in English, day care centers, libraries, sewing centers, and a wide variety of sports programs. They also set up information programs to meet the immediate needs of providing facts about the United States, the refugee center, world news, the resettlement program, and locator information. Finally, they organized an intracamp transportation network to ease processing and facilitate the use of the camp's many services and activities. Personnel of Civil Action Task Force IV assumed control over, and the administration of, the refugees. Their principle task, in addition to the above, was to supervise the flow of the refugees to various Federal and Voluntary Agencies from the time of their arrival at the Refugee Reception Center to their departure for resettlement.³⁹

Supply Support

The primary staff responsibilities of the Task Force S-4 Staff Section, which managed supply operations at the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center, included supply, field services, facilities, food services, general maintenance, transportation, and cost reduction programs. The advance party arrived at Fort Indiantown Gap on 20 May to begin preparing the installation to receive refugees. Upon arrival, they learned that the installation's Director of Industrial Operations had attempted to fulfill some of the Task Force's requirements by ordering items listed in Annex D, OPLAN NEW ARRIVALS - Fort Indiantown Gap. His attempts to be of assistance proved unsuccessful, however, because he had not received the appropriate project billing code.⁴⁰

38.

HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, Vol. 2, Sec. 2, pp. D-1 - D-3; P-1.

39.

Ibid.

40.

HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, pp. C-1, C-1-1.

One of the Task Force's first supply support tasks was to determine the actual support requirements for the refugees, support troops, other Federal agencies, and the Voluntary Agencies. The major problem area involved the stockage levels of the refugees' barracks and dining facilities, but here experience gained at Fort Chaffee proved to be invaluable. That experience enabled the Task Force to develop the required levels at Fort Indiantown Gap in a relatively short time. Once the supply system was established, the Task Force organized all of its support elements into a hierarchy for their supply procedures and each element was assigned a supply action officer. As a result, all support elements received definitive and uniform guidance concerning supply actions and requisitioning procedures were simplified. Self-service centers were set up to meet the needs of the working agencies and the troops while normal supply, requests for local purchase, and Class III (petroleum, oils, and lubricants) support procedures were the same as those developed and used at Fort Chaffee. Once the refugees began arriving, logistical personnel of the Task Force acted as liaison between the subordinate units and Fort Indiantown Gap's Director of Industrial Operations, monitoring the status of critical requests and expected delivery times for all required supplies. It also maintained a close tally on all supply stocks to prevent the exhausting of required items.⁴¹

Laundry Support

The Quartermaster Laundry located at the New Cumberland Army Depot was under the control of the Fort Indiantown Gap Director of Industrial Operations. However, this facility was not able to immediately support the Task Force since it had only eleven employees and the Civilian Personnel Office experienced difficulty in hiring qualified laundry workers. Since there were no laundry pickup points at Fort Indiantown Gap, units located there had to transport items to be laundered in organic vehicles. This problem was soon solved through the hiring of additional laundry employees and the institution of linen exchange points in the refugee housing areas. The refugees soon started hoarding linens and the loss rate amounted to some 5 percent despite the best efforts of the Task Force to maintain a high level of supply discipline.⁴²

Civilian Hire

On Monday 12 May, FORSCOM had informed Fort Indiantown Gap that an Army Refugee Reception Center would open there shortly. The installation's Civilian Personnel Office immediately contacted the Civil Service Commission Area Office to gain an initial estimate of the number of temporary hires in various occupational categories which would be required to staff the proposed refugee center. The Civil Service Commission Area Office estimated that it would require some 325 temporary employees in

41.

Ibid.

42.

Ibid., pp. C-2-1 - C-2-2.

such categories as warehouseman, laborers, firefighters, carpenters, electricians, heavy equipment operators, painters, motor vehicle operators, automotive equipment mechanics, and a large variety of clerical personnel such as typists, stenographers, card punch operators, supply clerks, and accounting clerks. In all but two cases, certificates of eligibility were accompanied by appointing authority to permit rapid recruitment with maximum flexibility. The Civilian Personnel Office also made special arrangements with the Civil Service Commission Area Office to conduct Office Aid Examinations both for candidates who applied with the commission and for those who applied directly to the Fort Indiantown Gap Civilian Personnel Officer. Because the local news media had given extensive coverage concerning the pending Refugee Reception Center, the overall task of locating qualified applicants to be hired under the appointing authority was substantially reduced.⁴³

During the period 12 through 30 May, hundreds of temporary job seekers crowded the offices and hallways of the Fort Indiantown Gap Civilian Personnel Office to file applications for employment, a phenomenon explained by the local unemployment rate of 7.6 percent. A mini-Civilian Personnel Office had to be established in an adjacent empty building to accommodate the overflow. The Civilian Personnel Office was assisted by the local State Employment Office in screening eligible candidates and testing typists and stenographers. A mobile screening van was employed for this purpose, an action which tended to relieve the lines of walk-in applicants. By 4 June, some 300 temporary hires were on the rolls.⁴⁴

Chaplain Support

On 19 May, the first of six Task Force chaplains arrived at Fort Indiantown Gap. Three U.S. Army Reserve chaplains, originally scheduled to support Reserve Component Annual Training, were also pressed into service in the initial operational stages. The installation chaplain turned over five chapels to the Task Force chaplains for their use as well as hand receipting 150 separate items of ecclesiastical equipment. In addition, he provided a number of expendable items such as communion wine and altar bread until they received their own supplies. The Post Chapel was made available to them until they were able to establish their own operations center. By mid-June the chaplains were self-sufficient.⁴⁵

43.

OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, pp. A-5-1 - A-5-2.

44.

Ibid.

45.

HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, pp. A-4-1 - A-4-2.



This mobile canteen is one of many operated by the Salvation Army at the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center.



The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare negotiated a contract with the Pennsylvania State Department of Education for a school system which featured an Adult Education Program in addition to a basic curriculum for grades 1-12.



Refugees found to have medical problems are referred to either the hospital or the community health center.



A young Vietnamese woman has just mailed a letter at a mobile facility of the 553d Army Postal Unit. The volume of refugee mail was completely unanticipated at both Department of the Army and FORSCOM levels.

Communications

The Fort Indiantown Gap communications system was inadequate to even initiate, much less sustain Operation NEW ARRIVALS. The Bell Telephone System of Pennsylvania installed the necessary commercial, AUTOVON, and WATS lines within seventy-two hours of notification. Telephones were completely installed prior to the arrival of the first refugees and all other communications requirements were fulfilled within two weeks of the opening of the Refugee Reception Center.⁴⁶

Public Affairs

Prior to the arrival of the task force at Fort Indiantown Gap, the installation's information office recorded all public affairs questions relating to the refugee program and held them for later answer by task force personnel. FORSCOM appointed the First U.S. Army Information Officer, then stationed at Fort Chaffee as the resident Defense Department spokesman, to act in the same capacity at Fort Indiantown Gap following his transfer to that station. The first public press conference was conducted by the Fort Indiantown Gap Task Force on 20 May. At that time, the refugee program was explained to the local media and General Cannon was introduced. Public affairs operations at the installation, which began fully on 26 May, were conducted in essentially the same fashion as at Fort Chaffee. The 13th Public Information Detachment, Fort Benning, Ga., which formed the base unit, was augmented with information personnel on a temporary duty status. There was one major difference of note between the refugee information program at Fort Chaffee and that at Fort Indiantown Gap. At the former location, the Defense Department spokesman was subordinate to the civilian Interagency Task Force public affairs representative. At the latter installation, however, the Defense Department spokesman and the civilian Interagency Task Force spokesman were co-equal. As a result, internal coordination and the proper staffing of actions were difficult. Consequently, the delegation of authority became confused. Fortunately, there was no public animosity directed toward the establishment of the Refugee Reception Center, a fact which made the overall public affairs task much easier. Press interest soon declined and the Task Force was able to release the 13th Public Information Detachment back to its home station in June. Newspaper operations were gradually transferred to Psychological Operations personnel. A small Public Affairs Office was maintained until the closure of the Refugee Reception Center.⁴⁷

46.

OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, p. 5.

47.

(1) HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS-AAR, pp. N-2 - N-4; (2) OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, pp. G-2 - G-3.




A Vietnamese civilian refugee is assisted by an American National Red Cross caseworker.



A former Cambodian Air Force pilot awaits his turn at the in-processing tables.



A young Vietnamese girl looks up briefly to pose for a quick picture.



Young refugees and U.S. military personnel relax with a friendly game of volleyball.

Processing of the Refugees

Refugee in- and out-processing procedures were essentially the same at Fort Indiantown Gap as at Fort Chaffee. The actual processing at Fort Indiantown Gap was performed by the 401st Adjutant General Company (Personnel Service), Fort Knox, Ky., which was augmented by the 23d Adjutant General Detachment, Fort Benning, Ga. Their mission was to receive, process, and billet the refugees coming into the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Reception Center. They were prepared to receive their first refugees on 27 May after setting up two buildings as processing centers and dividing their personnel into three 8-hour shifts to ensure 24-hour coverage. During the period 28 May through 19 June they processed more than 19,500 refugees, issuing identification cards, billets, and meal cards. At the same time, they made certain that the refugees' personal data forms were properly filled out and distributed. In addition, these two units operated a 24-hour message center which provided reproduction facilities, mail service, and distribution and message pickup for the Task Force headquarters. On 10 June, they opened an out-processing center which processed over 9,000 refugees. Responsibilities in this area included the manifesting of refugee personnel for departure; the collecting of individual data sheets; the billeting of refugee personnel in the transit area; the collecting of linens; and transportation to either the airport or bus terminal. Finally, these two adjutant general units provided assistance to both the Voluntary Agencies and the Task Force through the processing and retrieval of informational data using local computers linked to a main computer at Bethesda, Md. As early as 19 June, the workload had diminished to the point that the 401st Adjutant General Company (Personnel Service) began piecemeal redeployment to its home station, a process which was completed by 31 July. Personnel assigned to the 23d Adjutant General Detachment remained at Fort Indiantown Gap for a somewhat longer period.⁴⁸

Arrival of Refugees

The Task Force was fully prepared to accept the first refugees upon their arrival at Fort Indiantown Gap on 28 May. As at Fort Chaffee, the first arrivals were met at the airport by Task Force officials and local dignitaries, many local citizens, and the community's high school band. Following the ceremonies, the refugees were then taken to the installation to begin their processing. Incoming refugees arrived by either Military Airlift Command (MAC) or charter aircraft at the Harrisburg International/Pennsylvania Air National Guard Airport located about thirty miles from Fort Indiantown Gap. They were then transported by contractor-operated busses to the installation where they were welcomed and given an initial camp orientation. On the same day, the refugees were issued identification and meal cards, linen, and billets. They spent the following days processing through the Immigration and Naturalization Service; Health, Education, and Welfare agencies; the Center for Disease Control; and the Department of Labor. The latter agency was

⁴⁸.

OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, pp. C-1 - C-2, E-1 - E-2.



The first group of Vietnamese to arrive at the Harrisburg International Airport enroute to Fort Indiantown Gap are met by welcoming citizens and the news media.



An escorted group of Pennsylvania school girls wait to welcome the first plane load of refugees at the Harrisburg International Airport, Harrisburg, Pa. on 28 May 1975.



This young woman and son have just arrived with her father, a former CBS employee in Saigon. Her husband was killed while serving with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.



Most visitors were on hand to welcome the refugees at the Harrisburg Airport, however one spectator registers a somewhat different opinion.



A Vietnamese family is interviewed by the news media prior to boarding a bus bound for the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center.



Pennsylvania Governor Milton J. Shapp delivers a welcoming address during the initial arrival of Vietnamese refugees. On his left is Richard E. Friedman, Senior Civil Coordinator for Task Force NEW ARRIVALS - Fort Indiantown Gap.



Vietnamese refugees wait for their names to be called during the initial in-processing period at Indiantown Gap.




Nguyen Chung Ngoc, center, and son, Nguyen Ngoc Trung, left center, discuss future plans with Task Force Commander, Brig. Gen. James W. Cannon, left, along with a translator, right center, and Richard E. Friedman, Senior Civil Coordinator, Task Force NEW ARRIVALS - Fort Indian town Gap.

added because experience at Fort Chaffee showed that marketable skills were of prime importance for speedy resettlement. Subsequently, the refugees were assigned to a Voluntary Agency for placement with a sponsor. During the out-processing phase the refugees' identification cards and meal cards were collected and appropriate transportation tickets were issued. Finally they were taken to their transportation point to begin their journey into American society.⁴⁹

49.

Ibid., p. 6.

COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS



SOURCE: HQ DA, DA AFTER ACTION REPORT: OPERATION NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS -U.S. ARMY SUPPORT TO THE INDOCHINA REFUGEE PROGRAM, APRIL 1975 - 1 JUNE 1976, PP. V-C-7 - V-C-8. (UNCLASSIFIED).

Chapter IV

LATER OPERATIONS

Introduction

Background

After the Army's two Refugee Centers had become operational, FORSCOM shifted its main emphasis toward improving both operating efficiency and economy. As noted above, the State Department had established the Interagency Task Force in April 1975 for the purpose of controlling and coordinating Operation NEW ARRIVALS. On 27 May, proponentcy for the Interagency Task Force was transferred from the State Department to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare under the supervision of Ms. Julia Taft. The Refugee Centers at Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap were each headed by an Interagency Task Force Senior Civil Coordinator who exercised executive authority within his respective center. FORSCOM Military Task Force commanders then had to respond to requirements from both the Senior Civil Coordinators and from U.S. Army Forces Command. The Voluntary Agencies, charged with finding sponsors for the refugees, came under the direction of both their own respective agency headquarters as well as the Senior Civil Coordinator. In turn, the Voluntary Agencies routed their respective support requests through the appropriate Senior Civil Coordinator to the on-site Military Task Force commander. Chart 11 indicates the command and staff relationships for Operation NEW ARRIVALS.¹

The major parties concerned finally developed this command structure in an attempt to cope with the initial confusion which characterized early operations. During the later period (Summer and Fall 1975), it worked well enough. During the early phase, for example, FORSCOM supporting installation and unit commanders received warning orders and reporting tasks from a wide variety of military agencies which led, in many cases, to unnecessary confusion and duplication. This problem was resolved by requiring all participating U.S. Army units to funnel their requirements through the FORSCOM Emergency Operations Staff. However, the Federal civil agencies at the Refugee Centers did not come under the FORSCOM command structure. They placed their individual support requirements directly on the military task force commanders. This particular problem was solved when the Interagency Task Force established the Senior Civil Coordinator system which required the Federal civil agencies to channel all of their support requests through the Senior Civil Coordinator at their respective center. There remained, unfortunately, an additional major problem with the civil agencies at the Refugee Centers — one which was never satisfactorily resolved. This problem arose from the fact that the Federal civil agencies rotated their senior officers generally on a 30-day basis. This constant and disruptive rotation practice caused gaps in the continuity of action, thus requiring a series of

1.

(1) HQDA, AAR-NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, p. 1-D-6; (2) HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS-AAR, pp. C-1, C-2, S-6.



Ms. Julia V. Taft, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and Director, Interagency Task Force, addresses a Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center audience. With Ms. Taft is Richard E. Friedman, Senior Civil Coordinator, Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa.



Donald G. MacDonald, Senior Civil Coordinator, Fort Chaffee Refugee Center, left, is interviewed by Maj. R.A. Alexander, Cdr, 44th Military History Detachment.

time-consuming reorientations. Although the Interagency Task Force attempted to correct this undesirable situation by partially stabilizing the tours for the Senior Civil Coordinators, the problem was never fully resolved.²

FORSCOM Command and Control Element

At the beginning of Operation NEW ARRIVALS, FORSCOM activated its Emergency Operations Staff under the direction of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. As the operation matured and its parameters became known, FORSCOM discovered that the continued use of an Emergency Operations Staff per se imposed an expensive and unnecessary drain on the headquarters staff. In order to alleviate this burdensome situation, the command activated the FORSCOM Refugee Office on 28 May. This office consisted of one action officer from each of the Offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. As the resettlement effort stabilized even further and it became apparent that FORSCOM elements were engaged in purely routine housekeeping and support duties, this small staff soon became excessive and the office was disbanded. The office functions and one action officer were transferred to the Current Operations Division of the Deputy Chief of Staff for operations on 3 November. The latter portion of Operation NEW ARRIVALS, including its termination, was handled by this one staff officer, Capt. A.J. Haas, with assistance from other headquarters organizational elements as required.³

Early Attempts to Reduce Military Support

As early as the beginning of June 1975, FORSCOM initiated a series of actions aimed at reducing its overall military support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS because of the potentially adverse effect it was having on unit readiness. FORSCOM succeeded in some areas but was only partially successful in others. For instance, the command negotiated with the U.S. Postal Service for the assumption of the unforeseen burden of postal support of the refugee operations at both Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap. This effort, as noted above, was only partially successful and resulted in the release of only one of the two Army postal units being used in the operation. The command was also unsuccessful in its attempts to employ Vietnamese refugees, either as paid employees or as volunteers, to support appropriate facets of the operation. The FORSCOM request to the Department of the Army in early June for authority to hire Vietnamese refugees was not approved. The inability of the Department to assist the command in the matter resulted from both Federal statutes and Civil Service Commission regulations governing the recruitment of aliens. These measures effectively precluded U.S. Government agencies from hiring Indochinese refugees who had been admitted to the United States in a

2.

HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS-AAR, pp. C-1 - C-2.

3.

Ibid., p. G-4.

TABLE 14

AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL STATISTICS
FORT CHAFFEE REFUGEE CENTER
MAY - NOVEMBER 1975

Date	No Flts	No Pax
<u>Total</u>	<u>416</u>	<u>50,496</u>
May	155	27,374
June	58	7,909
Jul	65	6,689
Aug	54	4,709
Sep	47	1,601
Oct	26	2,006
Nov	11	208

Source: HQ TFNA Ft Chaffee, After Action Reports,
Vol. I, p. I-IV-E-1. (UNCLASSIFIED).

TABLE 15

MAJOR UNIT ROTATIONS - FORT CHAFFEE - NEW ARRIVALS

Unit (Installation)	Arrival	Departure	Replacement (Installation)
593d Spt Gp (Ft Lewis)	18 May 75	1 Jul 75	TDA ^a
96th Civil Affairs Gp (Ft Bragg)	1 May 75	22 Jun 75	1st Psy Ops Gp (Ft Bragg)
1st Psy Ops Gp (Ft Bragg)	22 Jun 75	21 Dec 75	None
47th Field Hospital (Ft Sill)	30 Apr 75	25 Jul 75	11th Medical Co (Ft Hood)
11th Medical Co (Ft Hood)	25 Jul 75	21 Oct 75	595th Medical Co (Ft Devens)
595th Medical Co (Ft Devens)	21 Oct 75	19 Dec 75	None
720th MP Co (Ft Hood)	30 Apr 75	21 Jul 75	402d MP Co (PSF)
402d MP Co (PSF)	21 Jul 75	14 Oct 75	170th MP Co (PSF)
170th MP Co (PSF)	14 Oct 75	17 Jan 76	None
62d Supply & Svc (Ft Hood)	1 May 75	21 Jul 75	289th Gen Spt Det
289th Gen Spt Det	21 Jul 75	14 Oct 75	None
524th Personnel Svc Co (Ft Benning)	30 Apr 75	28 Jul 75	545th Personnel Spt Co
545th Personnel Svc Co	28 Jul 75	5 Nov 75	None
20th AG Replacement Det (Ft Campbell)	30 Apr 75	28 Jul 75	None
57th Signal Bn (-) (Ft Hood)	1 May 75	28 Jul 75	None
471st Trans Co	30 Apr 75	28 Jul 75	None

a. The 593d Spt Gp replaced the 47th Spt Gp (Ft Hood) which opened Ft Chaffee, then deployed to FIG to open that center.

Source: Briefing Notes, AFOP-RO, 15 Jan 76. (UNCLASSIFIED).

MAJOR UNIT ROTATIONS - FORT INDIANTOWN GAP - NEW ARRIVALS

Unit (Installation)	Arrival	Departure	Replacement
46th Spt Gp (Ft Bragg)	19 May 75	25 Nov 75	None
519th MP Bn (Ft Meade)	20 May 75	15 Aug 75	759th MP Bn
759th MP Bn (Ft Dix)	15 Aug 75	15 Dec 75	None
42d Field Hosp (Ft Knox)	22 May 75	22 Aug 75	15th Combat Svc Hosp
15th Combat Spt Hosp (Ft Belvoir)	22 Aug 75	15 Dec 75	None
401st Pers Svc Co (Ft Knox)	20 May 75	22 Aug 75	None
96th Civil Affairs Bn (-)(Ft Bragg)	22 May 75	24 Jul 75	Indiv USAR Civ Affairs Personnel
23d Repl Det (Ft Benning)	21 May 75	15 Dec 75	None
40th Sup & Svc Co (Ft Carson)	22 May 75	15 Dec 75	None
76th Engr Bn (Ft Meade)	22 May 75	3 Jun 75	None
91st Engr Det (FF) (Ft Rucker)	24 May 75	7 Jun 75	None
Co B, 1st En, 501st Inf (Ft Campbell)	19 May 75	3 Jun 75	None
553d Army Postal Unit (Ft Devens)	22 May 75	15 Nov 75	None
581st Maint Det (Ft Meade)	22 May 75	5 Sep 75	None

Source: Daily Journal, DCSOPS EOC. (UNCLASSIFIED).

parole status, save for a limited number of excepted positions. Attempts by concerned members of Congress to introduce remedial legislation proved to be unproductive and thus the refugees were barred from Federal employment as long as they remained nonresident aliens in a parole status. FORSCOM was successful, however, in its request to the Department of the Army that all inbound refugee flights after 10 June arrive during normal duty hours. This request was honored by the U.S. Military Airlift Command, thus permitting FORSCOM to reduce its three 8-hour shifts per day to a normal schedule. This resulted in an immediate reduction in the number of military personnel committed to the operation. Aircraft arrival statistics were as shown in Table 14.⁴

Alterations in the Force Structure

Background

As previously noted, it was apparent from the very beginning of FORSCOM support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS in the continental United States that the existing garrisons at Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap were too small to meet the task.⁵ As a result, FORSCOM had to organize the two support bases for Task Force NEW ARRIVALS around appropriate table of organization and equipment (TOE) units -- the 593d Support Group at Fort Chaffee and the 46th Support Group at Fort Indiantown Gap. Civilian Personnel offices at the supporting installations hired the required number of civilian employees on a temporary basis. By mid-June 1975, a total of 2,626 Army personnel, 32 Air Force personnel, and 633 civilians were employed in the operation.

Rotation of the Support Units

The rotation of the support units on a 90-day basis was dictated by many factors including the impact on the home stations of the selected support units; the regulatory constraints on the duration of a unit temporary change of station; the restrictive provisions of the All Volunteer Army enlistment contracts in many cases; and the normal requirements to maintain readiness and support training exercises as well as other training activities. (Tables 15 and 16). FORSCOM soon discovered that the problems of selecting similar uncommitted units within the continental United States, the resultant degrading of home installation support, and the lack of suitable replacement units within the Active Army, adversely affected the operation. Since Reserve Component units could not be used in Operation NEW ARRIVALS, the problem of selecting replacement support units was never fully solved.


4.

- (1) Fact Sheet, DCSOPS-RO for Cdr FORSCOM, 9 Jun 75, no subj;
- (2) HQDA, AAR-NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, pp. III-D-1 - III-D-2.

5.

- Unless otherwise indicates, the entire section is based on:
- (1) Fact Sheet, DCSOPS-RO, 17 Jun 75, subj: Operation NEW ARRIVALS;
 - (2) HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS-AAR, pp. A-3, G-3 - G-4;
 - (3) FORSCOM GO 29, 3 Jul 75;
 - (4) TDA FCWOVBAA, U.S. TF/Garrison Fort Chaffee (Prov).

DCMA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FORT CHAFFEE



SOURCE: HQ TFNA & FT. CHAFFEE, AFTER ACTION REPORT, VOL. IV, P. IV-VI-A-1.
(UNCLASSIFIED).

On 30 June 1975, the Interagency Task Force announced that Fort Indiantown Gap would be closed on 1 December but that Fort Chaffee would remain open indefinitely. This decision enabled FORSCOM to employ table of organization and equipment (TOE) units for the Task Force NEW ARRIVALS support base at Fort Indiantown Gap for the duration of the operation. Since Fort Chaffee was scheduled to remain open indefinitely, the continued use of Active Army units there was both impractical and costly. In response to this situation, a FORSCOM joint manpower team -- working in conjunction with representatives from Fort Chaffee and Fort Sill -- developed an expanded table of distribution and allowances (TDA) for the combined garrison and Task Force. This table of distribution and allowances provided appropriate staffing through a directorate organization, which enabled FORSCOM to release many of its Active Army table of organization and equipment units from their support roles. This combined garrison/Task Force table of distribution and allowances was published on 1 July for immediate fill. As a result, the military strength at Fort Chaffee decreased from more than 1,900 in June to slightly more than 500 in August.

Force Structure and Command Changes at Fort Chaffee

During the period May through November 1975, Task Force NEW ARRIVALS at Fort Chaffee had three changes of command. On 13 May, Brig. Gen. Jack V. Mackmull, Assistant Division Commander, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Ky., assumed command of the Fort Chaffee Task Force from General Cannon who had been reassigned to command the Fort Indiantown Gap Task Force. On 22 July, General Mackmull relinquished his command to Col. Bruce L. Hennessy, Commander, 593d Support Group, who turned the command over to Col. George M. Cross. The latter was assigned to Fort Chaffee on permanent orders and remained there through the close of the operation. These command changes were accompanied by rotations in the force structure. For example, elements of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (-) deployed to their home station on 22 June. Their mission and functions were assumed by U.S. Army Reserve volunteers who formed the Directorate of Civil Military Affairs (DCMA) (Chart 12). The 593d Support Group departed on 1 July, but left some personnel behind as fillers until they could be replaced. The 402d Military Police Company (+) replaced the 720th Military Police Battalion (+) on 21 July, while personnel from the 289th General Support Detachment replaced the 62d Supply and Service Company (-) on 25 July. On that same day, the 45th Field Hospital was replaced by the 11th Medical Company (+) which was, in turn, replaced by the 595th Medical Company on 21 October. This latter unit remained through the end of the operation. Finally, on 24 August, the U.S. Postal Service assumed the responsibility for postal activities from the 47th Army Postal Unit.

Force Structure and Command Changes at Fort Indiantown Gap

During the period June through November 1975, Fort Indiantown Gap experienced two changes of command. When General Cannon was reassigned on 4 August as the Department of Defense Representative to the Interagency Task Force in Washington, D.C., Col. R.L. Travis assumed command of the Fort Indiantown Gap Task Force. On 25 November, FORSCOM disestablished the task force and transferred all military and support

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
THE ROLE OF THE US ARMY FORCES COMMAND IN PROJECT NEW
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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

TABLE 17

STATISTICAL SUMMARY MEDICAL
FORT CHAFFEE REFUGEE CENTER
MAY - DECEMBER 1975

Category	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
Admissions	294	233	221	194	205	180	115	15	1,457
Avg Daily Beds Occ	40.9	47.7	53.4	42.2	34.6	30.1	21.6	5.5	28.5
Live Births	32	47	61	45	55	45	24	16	325
Deaths	2	1	3	1	4	2	3	1 ^b	17
Outpatient Visits	8,152	15,059	16,191	13,161	13,799	15,162	10,055	3,076	94,655
OB/GYN Visits	a	1,084	1,054	745	985	442	431	35	4,786
AR Health Nurse Visits	a	3,146	2,238	4,583	750	2,200	1,095	147	14,159
Dental Visits	1,153	a	1,251	1,130	1,149	1,568	1,132	229	7,612
Screening	27,388	7,656	6,562	4,376	2,479	1,357	1,614	0	51,432
Immunizations	13,771	16,714	3,651	12,834	1,389	1,186	1,474	1,619	52,635
X-Ray Procedures	17,339	3,169	2,547	2,072	1,977	1,694	1,731	237	30,766
Lab Procedures	3,592	17,829	19,633	33,862	45,946	21,398	14,763	1,584	158,608
Pharmacy Units	1,191	14,777	15,337	15,001	10,087	8,972	4,654	943	70,962
Operating Room Out-Patient Procedures	22	30	15	20	14	12	8	0	121

a. Figures not available.

b. One death not previously recorded.

Source: HQ TFNA Ft Chaffee, After Action Report, Vol. I, p. I-IV-B-1 (UNCLASSIFIED).

activities to the Commander, U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Indiantown Gap. When it had become obvious that the operation had stabilized by June, the Task force moved promptly to reduce the level of military participation. Troop units returned to their home stations in stages and their functions were taken over by similar lower priority units, temporary-hire civilian employees, temporary duty military personnel, or individual U.S. Army Reserve volunteers. For example, the 91st Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting) departed 7 June. Individual U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs volunteers, organized as the Civil Affairs Support Battalion (Composite/Provisional), replaced elements of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion on 26 July. The 759th Military Police Battalion replaced the 519th Military Police Battalion on 15 August. The 15th Combat Support Hospital replaced the 42d Field Hospital on 22 August. The 401st Adjutant General Company (Personnel Service) also departed on that same date.⁶

Continuing Support


Medical Support

Medical operations continued at Fort Chaffee with few changes during the summer and fall of 1975. A major change did occur on 4 September when the 675th Medical Detachment arrived from Fort Benning to operate the Troop Medical Clinic. This unit provided medical care to active duty personnel at Fort Chaffee; occupational health care for installation and Task Force civilians; and health care for the dependents of the personnel assigned to Fort Chaffee. Medical care for retired personnel and the dependents of temporary duty personnel was specifically forbidden because of the small medical staff and the relatively large number of retirees in the area (Table 17).


Medical operations at Fort Indiantown Gap underwent a significant change during the same period. As the refugee population declined so did the number of patients in the hospital. It soon became evident to medical personnel on duty that a hospital was no longer required. The Task Force Surgeon prepared a position paper to this effect which was approved by both the Task Force and FORSCOM. On 8 August, the hospital was closed and all subsequent diagnoses, treatment, and dispositions of the refugee patients were accomplished at the installation's Community Health Center which consisted of specialty clinics such as Emergency Room, Medical/Surgical Clinic, Pediatric Clinic, and Obstetric/Gynecology Clinic. These in turn, were supported by a Pharmacy, Laboratory, and X-ray unit, and a patient administrative section. The center remained open from

6.

(1) BG Cannon was subsequently hospitalized at Walter Reed Army Medical Center with lung cancer, a condition he had been aware of for three months. This dedicated officer returned to Fort Sill on 15 Nov, retired from the Army on 26 Nov, and died at Fort Sill on 13 Dec; (2) HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, Vol. 2, Sec. 1, pp. 7 - 8 and Vol. 2, Sec. 2, pp. D-1, P-1 - P-2; (3) Ft Indiantown Gap, Operation NEW ARRIVALS, pp. 6 - 7; (4) Daily Journal, DCSOPS EOC.



The Arkansas Army National Guard provides mobile medical support to the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center.



A mobile facility of the State of Pennsylvania furnishes additional medical support to the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center.

22 August to 25 November, with the clinics curtailing their services as the camp population declined. Serious or difficult cases were evacuated to the Public Health Hospital in Baltimore, Md., or the Hershey Medical Center in nearby Hershey, Pa.

Some medical problems surfaced during this time. At Fort Chaffee, an epidemic of chicken pox in the refugee area became a cause for concern because of the arrival of 368 Thai Dams (also known as Black Thais) from Thailand. These refugees had been vaccinated for small pox shortly before their departure from Southeast Asia. These vaccinations subsequently produced open wounds which, coupled with the refugees' lowered resistance resulting from the vaccinations and travel fatigue and the presence of chicken pox in the refugee village, raised the probability of their developing vaccines in the open wounds. In order to preclude the possibility of infection, the Task Force Surgeon ordered them to be isolated for one week in a designated and isolated housing area which contained its own mess hall and medical facility.

In early September, in response to sponsor complaints that many of the refugees had intestinal worms and other parasites, the Task Force Surgeons at both centers made arrangements for a specialist from the Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, Ga., to visit both centers and collect stool samples to determine the spectrum of intestinal parasites within the refugee population. The study conducted at Fort Indiantown Gap, for example, revealed that 40 percent of the refugee population had some form of intestinal parasitic infestation. These cases were referred to the centers' medical personnel for treatment. In another Center for Disease Control survey, a team screened the refugees for Hansen's Disease (leprosy) and found the rate at Camp Pendleton to be at least 1 case per 500 population. FORSCOM Task Force medical personnel were already aware of the possibility of leprosy and had routinely made arrangements to have the necessary screening and treatment performed by the U.S. Public Health Service. Other significant diseases experienced by the refugees included tuberculosis, malaria, pinworms and scabies, renal infections -- which caused sponsorship problems because of the lengthy and expensive treatment required -- and chicken pox which ravaged both children and adults. The latter disease did not constitute a significant illness but did result in an unsightly appearance for a time and required medical holds on sponsored refugees.⁷

Provost Marshal Support

Military Police operations continued as initially planned but problems occurred during this period as the refugees became more settled in their new environment and sponsorship arrangements were slower than originally anticipated. Minor age refugees increased their shoplifting and harassment activities, with visitors and operational personnel as

7.

- (1) HQ TFNA & Ft Chaffee, AAR, Vol. IV, pp. IV-IX-1 - IV-IX-2;
- (2) HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, Vol. 2, Sec. 2, pp. B-3 - B-4;
- (3) Ft Indiantown Gap, Operation NEW ARRIVALS, pp. M-3-1 - M-3-4.

their victims. The military police found this to be a real problem since these minors were not subject to a court trial. At Fort Chaffee, for instance, the Task Force made arrangements with a childrens' home in Little Rock, Ark., and with Sebastian County for holding refugee children who were beyond the control of the staff at that Refugee Center. In some cases, the Task Forces used their military police to hold children temporarily if they presented a behavior problem. The incidents of assaults and shoplifting increased markedly in late August. The military police found it most difficult to prosecute the assault cases since the victims were reluctant to press the issue out of fear of retribution or through fear of being delayed in their out-processing by having to wait around for a firm trial date. Also, in late August the incidence of weekend disturbances by intoxicated refugees reached such proportions so as to be of concern. At Fort Chaffee, these incidents led to a limit on the amount of draft beer which could be sold to an individual at any one time and to a complete ban on the sale of canned beer. Finally, a near riot at a Fort Chaffee post exchange facility on 5 November led to the halt of any further beer sales to refugees for the remainder of the operation.⁸

Educational Support

Early in the operation the Task Forces established educational programs under the direction of their respective Civil Affairs organizations. During the summer months, Civil Affairs specialists placed emphasis on acculturation and the learning of English as a second language. While military personnel were employed extensively to operate the early refugee educational programs, the more formal schooling in the fall employed professional teachers and curriculum. At Fort Indiantown Gap, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare negotiated a contract with the Pennsylvania State Department of Education for a school system consisting of grades 1 - 12 for a total of 2,500 children. The basic curriculum consisted of three parts: basic, intermediate, and advanced English; Transition America -- topics which provided general information about American society, economics, life style, and how to cope with everyday life; and Physical Education. The first classes opened on 15 September and continued until the last student departed. The same contract provided for an Adult Education Program conducted on a voluntary participation basis. The adult curriculum included English and Transition America topics. While a similar program was instituted at Fort Chaffee, a kindergarten was included in the elementary grades and driver's education was added to the adult program.⁹

8.

(1) HQ TFNA & Ft Chaffee, AAR, Vol. IV, pp. IV-VI-1 - IV-VI-2, IV-X-1, Vol. V, p. V-X-1; (2) HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, Vol. 2, Sec. 2, pp. A-15 - A-18; (3) Ft Indiantown Gap, Operation NEW ARRIVALS, pp. J-2-4 - J-2-7.

9.

(1) Ft Indiantown Gap, Operation NEW ARRIVALS, pp. 7 - 8; (2) HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, Vol. 2, Sec. 2, pp. P-2 - P-3; (3) HQ TFNA & Ft Chaffee, AAR, Vol. IV, pp. IV-VI-3, IV-VI-5.

Clothing Support

While both Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap received donated clothing, the latter, which was located in a more densely populated area, received the most, some 200 tons.¹⁰ The S-5 Section at that installation determined, based on a refugee population of 17,000, that 75 tons of clothing would be needed to adequately clothe the refugees, especially in view of the oncoming fall and winter in Pennsylvania. The Fort Indiantown Gap Task Force hoped to issue each refugee two sets of outer garments, a cold weather item — raincoat, sweater, windbreaker, or winter coat — and a change of underwear, socks, shoes, and headgear as the items became available through donations. The initiation of these clothing drives was a prime concern of the Fort Indiantown Gap Task Force from the first day of that operation. Representatives of the Lebanon County Ministerial Association and other volunteer agencies in that part of Pennsylvania expressed their eagerness to assist in making the project a success. The Ministerial Association provided the largest number of volunteers to help in obtaining and distributing the needed clothing. Due to the severe tropical storm Agnes which had lashed the central Pennsylvania area and had caused great damage in 1973, each church in the area had a disaster chairman who was knowledgeable in collecting used clothing. In addition, many of these influential people had established contacts with clothing manufacturers which proved to be most helpful. In many cases the churches had precollected and presorted clothing stocks left over from the 1973 storm which were immediately made available to the Task Force. The largest single donation came from the Seventh Day Adventist Church and Blue Mountain Academy in Hamburg, Pa., on 26 May, which provided 1,200 thirty-pound boxes of sorted clothing. This gave the Task Force S-5 an initial stock from which to begin issuing clothing to the refugees on the first day of their arrival.

The clothing donated by the Seventh Day Adventists and the Blue Mountain Academy was generally of superb quality. However, while an abundance of women's clothing was available, men's and boy's trousers were in short supply due to different wearing habits. Another category of clothing in large quantity consisted of men's and women's sweaters. The refugees particularly appreciated these items of clothing since even the mild days at Fort Indiantown Gap were much colder than the normal weather in Indochina. In late May and early June, for example, there was a cold snap which posed problems for the refugees since most of them lacked warm outer clothing at that point. The Task Force S-5 ordered outerwear pulled from the stocks of donated clothing and, using personnel detailed from other support units at the installation, began distributing the sorely needed items. This outerwear was packed into barracks packages and distributed on a 24-hour basis until the stocks were depleted. Since the donated items were only sufficient to clothe one half of the

10.

The entire paragraph is based on: (1) HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIC, Vol. 2, Sec. 1, pp. D-3 - D-8, D-2-1 - D-2-3; (2) HQ TFNA & Ft Chaffee, AAR, Vol. III, p. III-IV-2; (3) Intvw, Mr. M.W. Stark, FORSCOM Hist Ofc w/CPT A.J. Haas, DCSOPS-RO, 10 Oct 75.

male refugee population, the Task Force took immediate action to obtain 7,000 olive green wool shirts from the New Cumberland Army Depot, Pa. These shirts were then issued by the Task Force on a temporary hand receipt basis to family heads. When appropriate substitute items became available, these hand receipted items were recovered, cleaned and repaired, and returned to the depot.

Clothing distribution proved to be somewhat of a problem. Since the first systems adopted were too slow, the Civil Affairs personnel and civilian area coordinators developed a more expeditious system after some experimentation and after the barracks population had stabilized. They inventoried each barrack's population and then developed a profile showing the number of males and females in each of six age groups. Based upon these profiles, they were then able to construct a responsive barracks bulk system for each age group. Since it was a bulk issue, the Civil Affairs personnel instructed the refugee barrack's chiefs to encourage their respective refugee groups to trade clothing among themselves to ensure some measure of satisfaction. This method continued to be successful until the general distribution of donated clothing ended on 23 July.

It should be noted that the Task Force did not make a general appeal for donated clothing because previous experience in disaster work indicated that any such appeal would result in a landslide of small containers full of remnants from family closets in varying degrees of repair and cleanliness. Thus, the Task Force worked through the local churches and the Salvation Army. There were, however, well intentioned people who began clothing drives without first contacting the Task Force. These people generally failed to organize adequate transportation and when their clothing drives swamped their facilities they turned to the Task Force for help. Some used the threat of adverse publicity if the Army would not provide transport. In some cases this situation required Army vehicles to travel considerable distances for clothing of limited value, i.e., an excessive amount of women's clothing versus actual camp requirements. The whole problem was further compounded by the fact that the individuals who collected the clothing overestimated their transportation requirements. Various commercial trucking firms were willing to help with empty or partially filled trucks, but Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulations required exceptions to be granted. Drayage firms crossing state boundaries were generally restrained from providing free services even though it was for charitable purposes. Red Cross personnel on the camp staff had encountered similar problems with the Interstate Commerce Commission during previous disaster relief operations without gaining responsive solutions. Finally, there was the problem with well-intentioned persons who donated unneeded bundles of clothing at the Task Force headquarters throughout the operation. The Task Force was forced to establish appropriate collection points away from the headquarters site to reduce the adverse impact on its staff.

Task Force interaction with the surrounding communities continued throughout the operation at both Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap. Two broad areas were involved in this effort -- it was necessary that organizations likely to provide volunteer workers, be identified, and it was necessary that sources be developed for the donation of items needed

within the two Refugee Centers. In some areas, donations solicited by the Task Force were handled by the Salvation Army. At Fort Indiantown Gap, for example, solicitations for items from church groups and civic organizations resulted in the donation of such items as sewing machines, transistor radios, toys, additional clothing, and four tons of cheese. Various businesses responded with such items as a semitrailer load of new toys, 225 Girl Scout swim suits, 2,000 decks of playing cards, 80 guitars, books, yarn goods, thread, and an additional 80 sewing machines (some of which were inoperable). One unsolicited but useful donation was made by the Campbell Soup Company which gave the Task Force at Fort Chaffee 60,000 cans of its products. Both Task Forces soon discovered that the most productive approach to obtaining donations from the business world was to telephone the public relations office at the national headquarters of the business concerned. At that level, the donation could be absorbed as an operating cost, and the public relations office needed to avoid any hint of adverse publicity. Public relations managers at that level committed resources to achieve a balance of cost versus benefit from their firm's viewpoint. The Task Force also discovered that factory seconds were a lucrative target when requesting donations.

Food Service and Supply

At Fort Chaffee the Directorate of Industrial Operations gradually took over the services and supply functions from the 593d Support Group as that unit redeployed. The garrison commissary office received authority from Fort Sill and FORSCOM to requisition all food products for both the troop and refugee messes. This combined approach made for a better control over incoming subsistence. As the refugee population began to decline during the fall, the Director of Industrial Operations established a program designed to ensure that excessive subsistence on hand in the refugee messes was turned in through supply channels. A subsistence clerk coordinated the pickup and turn-in of all excess subsistence items one day each week until the messes closed down. This program resulted in the return of over \$40,000 of excess subsistence items to the issuing commissary.¹¹

At Fort Indiantown Gap, the S-4 Food Service Section continued its operations as initially planned with only a few changes instituted during this period. The refugee menu itself underwent some alterations, with the addition of coffee, sweet rolls, fresh milk and ice cream and the reduction in the amount of bread and rice. The addition of ice cream required each mess to buy two home-style freezers for storage. At the request of the Task Force, a 15-day menu was provided by the Troop

11.

(1) HQ TFNA & Ft Chaffee, AAR, Vol. IV, pp. IV-IV-1 - IV-IV-3;
(2) HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, Vol. 2, Sec. 1, pp. C-1-1, C-4-4 - C-4-6, D-2 - D-5.



A U.S. soldier assigned to the Task Force receives emergency dental care at the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center.



Initially, 7 mess halls including an active Officers' Field Ration Mess and 2 U.S. Army Field Ration Messes were earmarked to support Task Force personnel at the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center.

Support Agency at Fort Lee, Va. While the old menu was nutritionally adequate, food service personnel observed that it lacked variety. Once the new 15-day menu had been modified for Asian taste, it was introduced on 22 July.¹²

At Fort Indiantown Gap the S-4, 46th Support Group, continued to act as the liaison between the supporting units and the Directorate of Industrial Operations. That officer was responsible for monitoring the status of critical requirements and expected delivery times for required supplies. All Class II supplies such as individual clothing, administrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment, were stored and issued by the 40th Supply and Service Company. As the refugee population declined during the summer and fall of 1975, logistics personnel of the 46th Support Group coordinated with the installation Director of Industrial Operations to keep overall stockage in proportion to the number of refugees in the camp. The major problem encountered by the 46th Support Group in the supply area was that not everyone who needed supplies went through the proper channels, thus creating unnecessary and duplicative administrative problems.¹³

The 46th Support Group's civil affairs section began preparations to supply sundry health and comfort items such as toothpaste and brushes, shaving items, shampoo, soap, and the like to the refugees. These items were stocked by the 40th Supply and Service Company. On 26 May, the Red Cross donated 8,000 comfort kits containing necessary health and comfort items (except for sanitary napkins). Later in the operation, the Red Cross was able to supply an additional 14,000 such kits for issue. Other sundry items were pre-positioned in the processing areas for convenience, including such items as baby formula and food, diapers, and sanitary napkins. Since the refugees initially took far more of these items for their use than needed, the Task Force enforced restrictive supply discipline in order to reduce consumption to realistic levels.¹⁴

Financial Support

Support of the Refugees. Both Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap contracted for banking facilities for the convenience of both the refugees and Task Force personnel. For the former an additional service was instituted, that of firms approved to purchase gold. At Fort Chaffee, the Director of Financial Management signed agreements with three firms -- Deak and Company; U.S. Silver Company; and Manfra, Tordell, and Brookes -- to trade for gold on that installation. Later in

12.

HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, Vol. 2, Sec. 1, pp. C-1-1, C-4-4 - C-4-6, D-2 - D-5.

13.

Ibid.

14.

Ibid.

the operation, the U.S. Silver Company alleged unfair trade practices and cited advantages enjoyed by one of its competitors. These allegations were investigated by the Senior Civil Coordinator and were deemed to have no basis in fact.¹⁵

At Fort Indiantown Gap the comptroller provided the services of Deak Ferrara Company, an approved gold buying firm, on 29 May. This operation was collocated with the installation banking facilities provided by the American Bank and Trust Company of Philadelphia, the only such concern interested in providing banking facilities at the center. Deak Ferrara ceased operations on 1 July since, in their opinion, the peak influx of refugees had passed. Since this proved not to be the case in fact, the Task Force obtained the services of the U.S. Silver Company to provide a gold buying service effective 14 July.¹⁶

Support for U.S. Military Personnel. U.S. military personnel assigned to the two refugee centers in a temporary duty support role experienced their own financial problems, particularly at Fort Chaffee. The two major problem areas involved differences in per diem rates and bachelor officer quarters rates. The Fort Chaffee Directorate of Financial Management tried to solve the discrepancies in the per diem rate paid to temporary duty personnel. The controversy focused on the rate paid temporary duty officers -- officers paid at the unit rate received \$6.70 per day, while officers paid at the individual rate received \$8.30 per day. The higher individual officer rate exceeded FORSCOM guidance in this matter. Despite a request by the Director of Financial Management to use a flat rate of \$8.30 for all officers in a temporary duty status at that installation, nothing was accomplished until the Officer's Field Ration Mess was closed. At that time, the per diem rate was raised to \$11.80 per day for all officers and senior non-commissioned officers. In a related matter, a complaint was made to the inspector general concerning the inadequacy of the bachelor officer's quarters furnished for temporary duty military personnel. The Fort Chaffee bachelor officer's quarters were a subject of concern to many Task Force officers in light of the fact that civilian employees of the government on temporary duty at the installation received \$33.00 a day and lived in motels. The Fort Chaffee bachelor officer's quarters were very uncomfortable in hot weather and in many cases did not meet common adequacy and space requirements. A satisfactory solution to this particular problem was not reached during the operation.¹⁷

15.

HQ TFNA & Ft Chaffee, AAR, Vol. IV, pp. IV-VII-1 - IV-VII-3.

16.

Ft Indiantown Gap, Operation NEW ARRIVALS, p. D-1 - G-2.

17.

Ibid.

Reserve Components for Cross Training Support

The Civil Affairs Support Battalion at Fort Indiantown Gap developed a plan whereby a number of Reserve Component Civil Affairs units were afforded the unusual advantage of observing an actual civil affairs operation. FORSCOM approved this concept and arranged for the movement of the 357th U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs Brigade from Boston, Mass., to the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center for a weekend drill during the period 5 through 7 September. The reservists were given a 26-hour block of instruction on refugee camp management and civil affairs support in general. The methods of instruction ranged from lectures to practical experience while the topics presented covered all aspects of camp activity including in- and out-processing, public safety, public health, Voluntary Agency operations, staff organization, and the cultural and ethnic background of the Vietnamese. The unit was given a complete tour of the camp and all of its members participated in teaching the refugees in the refugee school system.¹⁸

Preparing for Winter Operations

Background

Although operation NEW ARRIVALS was originally planned as a 90-day operation, FORSCOM soon realized that it would be of longer duration. In early April, the State Department estimated that the total number of refugees would amount to 50,000. However, as the refugee tide continued to swell, the department soon increased this figure to 130,000. In addition, the four refugee centers located in the continental United States reached their initial saturation point in May, largely because out-processing of the refugees remained well below anticipated rates. While the disappointing rate of out-processing threatened to overwhelm the available refugee center capacity, the already bad situation was compounded by other factors. The approaching Pacific typhoon season, which was potentially capable of threatening the lives of the refugees on Guam and Wake Islands, plus diplomatic pressures from third countries to rid themselves of the Vietnamese refugees whom they were temporarily sheltering, made it imperative in the view of the U.S. Government that they be moved out of the Pacific Area as soon as possible. In order to cope with this problem, the United States increased the capacity of its continental refugee centers and initiated direct refugee evacuation flights from third countries. On 14 June, Department of the Army directed FORSCOM to increase the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center capacity from 20,000 to 25,000 and the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center capacity from 15,000 to 17,000.¹⁹

18.

HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, Vol. 2, Sec. 2, pp. P-2 - P-3.

19.

HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS-AAR, pp. A-2 - A-3.

Camp X -- A Proposed Fifth Refugee Reception Center

At this point in time, it was quite clear that the United States would have to find immediate shelter for more than 130,000 refugees until arrangements could be made for their assimilation into American society.²⁰ The situation was such that the Government would either have to operate the four existing Refugee Centers longer than originally planned, or open a fifth center. The Defense Department considered the latter alternative as an important part of their planning for the oncoming winter months, since the refugees would probably need a place for the winter and pressure had to be taken off the existing facilities on Guam. According to Mr. von Marbod, however, the real reason for establishing Camp X was to find a camp into which the residual populations from Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap could be moved. Once this evacuation and resettlement had been accomplished, the Defense Department could turn the camp operation over to some other governmental agency. On 5 June, General Sniffin informed General Todd that the Secretary of Defense had given Mr. von Marbod the authority to visit any service installation. If, in the final analysis, an Army installation was chosen to be Camp X, then FORSCOM would have to organize and manage the operation.

Upon the receipt of information concerning the possible establishment of a fifth Refugee Center, FORSCOM prepared a proper contingency plan. During the period 5 through 7 June, a Defense Department Installation Survey Team visited Camp Parks, Calif., Fort Benning, Ga., Fort Holabird, Md., Fort Irwin, Calif., and Fort Lewis, Wash. The Survey Team made rapid inspections at these sites, and estimated the number of refugees each installation could hold and the facilities available. Escort officers at the visited installations tried to get information from the team concerning how, when, and where the fifth Refugee Center would be established, but the team members avoided any commitment. Matters rested there until mid-July when General Cannon attended a meeting at the Office of the Secretary of Defense to discuss Camp X and several alternatives. Following this meeting, General Cannon informed General Todd that Camp X would be selected by 1 August and that the Refugee Center portion would be in operation by 1 September. General Cannon had no idea as to the extent of the Army's involvement in this matter, and he was not even certain that the Army would be directed to operate Camp X. However the proposal for a fifth Refugee Center was dropped since the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the most likely non-Army candidate for the task, let it be known that it did not want to operate a refugee center.

20.

The entire paragraph is based on: (1) Memo, DCSOPS to Chief of Staff, 16 Jun 75, subj: OSD Installation Survey Team Visits, w/Incls; (2) HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS-AAR, p. G-2; (3) MFR, BG Todd, FORSCOM ADCSOPS, 7 Jul 75, subj: FONECON Between BG Todd, ADCSOPS, and BG Cannon, Cdr, Task Force, FIG; (4) Msg 171037Z Jul 75, JCS to Distr, subj: Taft Statement to House Immigration Subcommittee, Thurs, 17 Jul 75; (5) Memo, DAMO-ODM to DCSOPS, 8 Jul 75, subj: Operation of Army Refugee Centers.

Winterization of the Refugee Centers

Background

While the Defense Department was searching for a fifth Refugee Center site, the Department of the Army was preparing to conduct Refugee Center operations through the winter months. By the end of May FORSCOM had alerted the Department to the possibility of operating its two Refugee Centers during the winter, along with projected costs. In early July, General Sniffen advised Mr. von Marbod of the possibility of winter operations and the need to begin appropriate preparations as soon as possible. At this meeting, he also advised Mr. von Marbod that Fort Chaffee would be the most desirable location for a final Refugee Center from the standpoint of cost and climate. He proposed that Fort Indiantown Gap be closed and that its residual population plus the residual refugee populations from other camps be moved to Fort Chaffee for the winter months. The Defense Department subsequently approved this general concept and the Department of the Army directed FORSCOM to prepare contingency plans for operating Fort Chaffee through the winter. On 30 July, the Interagency Task Force announced that the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center would remain open until 1 December 1975 and that the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center would be kept open indefinitely to process the residual refugees. The U.S. Air Force would close the Eglin Air Force Base Refugee Center on 9 September, while the U.S. Marine Corps would close the Camp Pendleton Refugee Center on 1 November. On 5 August, Department of the Army directed FORSCOM to prepare both Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap for winter operations.²¹

Winterization Costs

The principal objective of FORSCOM's winterization program for the Refugee Centers was to ensure that the living, administrative, hospital, and other facilities at both Fort Chaffee and the Fort Indiantown Gap would be adequately heated during the oncoming winter. In order to increase the required heating capacity in these World War II vintage wooden buildings, FORSCOM was faced with the problem of repairing buildings to eliminate drafts; purchasing necessary safety items such as fire extinguishers and smoke detectors; hiring additional temporary personnel at Fort Indiantown Gap to operate the coal-fired boilers; and transferring both refugees and operational personnel to selected buildings for better fuel efficiency. FORSCOM was well aware that the overall operation and maintenance (OMA) costs would increase. The Task Force commander at Fort Indiantown Gap, for example, estimated that the daily operating costs would be approximately \$5.90 per refugee, exclusive of winterization costs. This figure included an increase in the daily

21.

(1) Msg 092236Z Jul 75, DA to FORSCOM, subj: Contingency Planning - Fort Chaffee; (2) Msg 302238Z Jul 75, SECDEF to Distr, subj: DOD Support for Indochina Refugee Center Operations for Fall and Winter Months; (3) Msg 052120Z Aug 75, DA to FORSCOM, subj: Fall and Winter Operations U.S. Army Refugee Centers.

refugee caloric intake of 3,200 to 4,000 per day, with a resultant rise in food costs from \$1.99 to \$2.25 per day. At Fort Indiantown Gap, the refugee area, which consisted of 16 mess halls, 88 barracks, and 35 support buildings, would have to be heated with coal. The additional temporary heating personnel required for this purpose included 75 boiler firemen and 5 mechanics for a heating season cost of \$400,000. The actual upgrading of the buildings and the provision of sufficient coal would come to \$73,000. The total cost for heating fuels at Fort Indiantown Gap for the heating season was projected to be \$502,600 -- 4,800 short tons of coal at an average cost of \$52.00 per ton and 634,000 gallons of heating oil at \$0.40 per gallon. At Fort Chaffee, the Task Force commander developed similar winterization plans which differed from those of Fort Indiantown Gap in terms of overall refugee numbers since Fort Chaffee had a winter capacity of 17,000 while Fort Indiantown Gap had a capacity of only 6,000. The Fort Chaffee winterization plans were adversely affected by unforeseen difficulties in obtaining natural gas and water during the winter months.²²

Gas Supply Problems at Fort Chaffee

Fort Chaffee's 1955 contract with the Arkansas-Oklahoma Gas (AOG) Company was based on an estimated maximum consumption rate of 5.5 million cubic feet of gas per day. This contract did not, moreover, commit Fort Chaffee to any fixed amount of gas. In fact, Fort Chaffee's monthly winter usage of natural gas prior to Operation NEW ARRIVALS was a mere 6 million cubic feet per month. In a letter dated 7 August 1975, officials of the Arkansas-Oklahoma Gas Company notified the Purchasing and Contracting Officer at Fort Sill, Okla. -- Fort Chaffee's parent installation -- that the company could no longer fulfill its 1955 commitments and was unilaterally terminating the existing contract. According to company officials, the underlying reason for this abrupt action was a currently limited transmission capacity due to increased demands. They also pointed out that if the company gave more than 2.5 million cubic feet per day to Fort Chaffee, the growing industrial activity centered about Fort Smith, Ark., would have to be curtailed.²³

The Fort Chaffee Task Force commander undertook an analysis of the installation's winter natural gas requirements and alternatives with assistance from Fort Sill, Fort Leonard Wood, the Fort Worth District Engineer District, and FORSCOM. This analysis concluded that a combination of a full refugee population and severe cold conditions would

22.

(1) Fact Sheet, TFNA-CS, 15 Jul 75, subj: Impact of Winterization FIG Refugee Resettlement Center; (2) HQ TFNA & Ft Chaffee, OPLAN-Chaffee Winter Ops, 21 Jul 75; (3) HQ TFNA and Ft Chaffee, AAR, Vol. II, pp. 6 - 7; (4) Ft Indiantown Gap, Operation NEW ARRIVALS, pp. 2, 4 - 5.

23.

Ltr, Mr. W.R. Walker, President, AOG, to P&C Div, Ft Sill, 7 Aug 75, re: Fort Chaffee Gas Supply.

result in the consumption of between 6.9 million and 7.2 million cubic feet of natural gas per day. In order to reduce this projected natural gas consumption level to the "former" contractual level, the Fort Chaffee hospital boiler plant was converted to fuel oil and steps were taken to convert the three large consolidated messes to propane fuel. Other alternatives were considered and rejected as either not being economically feasible or requiring excessive time for conversion. The Task Force commander soon discovered how difficult it was to make meaningful analyses in this matter, due to the uncertainty at all levels as to the actual number of refugees to be housed and the length of their stay at Fort Chaffee during the winter heating season.²⁴

Efforts to alleviate the potential problem through legal channels were equally unsuccessful. In addition, the Arkansas-Oklahoma Gas Company used its considerable political influence in presenting its arguments directly to the Department of the Army before any adjudication process could be commenced. As a result, contemplated legal actions to force contract compliance were dropped and other nonjudicial solutions were pursued. Fort Sill initiated an inquiry designed to reduce Fort Chaffee's reliance on the Arkansas-Oklahoma Gas Company by using royalty gas from Fort Chaffee's own wells. That installation had a number of natural gas wells which were leased through the Department of the Interior to commercial firms for payment of royalties in kind or in dollars. Fort Sill's request to collect royalties in the form of gas was forwarded to the Department of the Interior for approval. The Task Force commander believed that this alternative, while costing the Army the Arkansas-Oklahoma Gas Company pipeline, would provide both an immediate solution as well as a long-range continual gas supply base for the installation. The Department of the Interior disallowed Fort Sill's request for fear of setting a precedent.²⁵

At a meeting between the Senior Civil Coordinator, the Task Force commander, and company representatives on 17 September, the Arkansas-Oklahoma Gas Company personnel repeated their earlier declaration and further stated that they would cut off their natural gas supply to Fort Chaffee, if necessary, in order to meet the needs of their local industrial customers. As an alternative, the company proposed a 1-year lease of two nearby gas wells with sufficient capacity to meet Fort Chaffee's needs. If approved, this proposal would have included the release of the company from the contract and would have further required the Government to construct a temporary pipeline. Company officials made it abundantly clear to the Senior Civil Coordinator and the Task Force commander that they intended, one way or another, to have the Army accept their terms. Neither the Senior Civil Coordinator nor the Task Force commander could

24.

- (1) HQ TFNA & Fort Chaffee, AAR, Vol. IV, pp. IV-V-1 - IV-V-3;
- (2) HQDA, AAR-NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, pp. III-A-2 - III-A-3.

25.

- (1) HQ TFNA & Fort Chaffee, AAR, Vol. IV, IV-V-1 - IV-V-3; (2) HQDA, AAR-NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, pp. III-A-2 - III-A-3.

find anything in the company's proposals which provided the Army any room for meaningful or productive negotiation. Following this meeting, the company released a story concerning the "Fort Chaffee Gas Problem" to the local press, which was worded in such a way that it naturally caused some public concern over possible industrial closings in a semi-depressed area due to the alleged natural gas supply problem.²⁶

Faced with this kind of opposition, the Army developed a contingency plan based on supporting a refugee population of 17,000 through the winter months. As of 19 September, the refugee population at Fort Chaffee totaled 16,398 but out-processing was accelerating. By 18 November, the refugee population had dropped to 8,029 and the weather up to that point had been mild. A daily demand of 2.5 million cubic feet of natural gas per day was not achieved until a cold snap occurred in late November. At that time, and until the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center closed on 31 December, the Arkansas-Oklahoma Gas Company was able to supply sufficient natural gas to the installation.²⁷

Water Supply Problems at Fort Chaffee

A second major utility problem at Fort Chaffee concerned its water supplies. On 4 March, before Operation NEW ARRIVALS had gotten underway, the City of Fort Smith had raised the industrial use water rate of 21.3¢ per 1,000 gallons and had assigned the same rate to Fort Chaffee. The Fort Sill Purchasing and Contracting Officer was notified of this unilateral action on 11 March. After considerable delay, a Defense Contract Audit was scheduled to provide a sound cost basis for a Fort Sill recommendation concerning the rate increase. On 6 June, after Operation NEW ARRIVALS was well underway, Fort Sill officials notified the City of Fort Smith that an audit would be conducted which would provide a basis for a counterproposal recommended rate.²⁸

26.

MFR, ATZB-B-C, TFNA Ft Chaffee, 19 Sep 75, subj: Visit to SCC by Officials of AOG.

27.

(1) MFR DAEN-ZC, 24 Sep 75, subj: Meeting Between IATF and Representatives of the Department of the Interior - 23 Sep; (2) Memo, FORSCOM Engr, 9 Oct 75, subj: State of Gas Problem at Fort Chaffee; (3) HQ TFNA & Ft Chaffee, AAR, Vol. IV, pp. IV-V-1 - IV-V-3; (4) HQDA, AAR-NEW LIFE-NEW ARRIVALS, pp. III-A-2 - III-A-3.

28.

(1) Ltr, City Administrator, Fort Smith, Ark., to Ft Sill Proc Div, 11 Mar 75; (2) Ltr, City Administrator, Fort Smith, to BG Cannon, 16 May 75; (3) Ltr ATZR-DIPCB, Cdr Ft Sill to City Administrator, Fort Smith, 16 Jun 75; (4) Ltr, City Administrator, Fort Smith, to Ft Sill Proc Div, 24 Jun 75.

While the Defense Contract Audit was being conducted during the summer of 1975, the City of Fort Smith spent its time contacting its Congressional representatives over the matter. Finally, on 9 September, city officials and Fort Sill representatives met with Senator John L. McClellan (D-Ark) to discuss the water rate problem. Senator McClellan, Chairman of the U.S. Senate's influential Government Operations Committee, told the Army representatives to get on with the resolution of the problem. The Army then countered with a proposed rate of 18.6¢ per 1,000 gallons which the city administrator rejected on 25 September. In his letter rejecting the Army's proposed rate, the city administrator placed considerable emphasis on the hardships which the refugee program was causing the City of Fort Smith and stressed the problems caused by the Army's delay in settling the rate matter. He made no reference of course to the fact that Operation NEW ARRIVALS had resulted in over 300 new temporary jobs in the community and its surrounding areas. Neither did he mention the considerable amount of money the Army was spending locally in support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS. He concluded his letter by stating that the water rate controversy had to be resolved by 10 October or the city would terminate service. Then, without waiting for a reply, the City of Fort Smith released the main points of this letter to the local press on 27 September, scarcely a week after the Arkansas-Oklahoma Gas Company story. As a result of this second press release, the Army received more adverse publicity and further pressure to accept the City of Fort Smith's rate of 21.3¢ per 1,000 gallons regardless of other considerations. On the same day the story detailing the city's water problem hit the press, the Army agreed to pay the 21.3¢ per 1,000 gallon rate demanded by the city. However, the Army did reserve the right to appeal this unilateral rate decision. The problems with both natural gas and water at Fort Chaffee in this time of energy shortages and inflation simply illustrated that a current, detailed evaluation of existing contracts and agreements would have to be made whenever planning and preparing for contingency operations, particularly those which suddenly placed greater demands on the supplier than in past years. In addition, the Defense Department could not simply assume that it would be granted preferential rates and levels of supply from private or civil sources which had to meet the needs of all of their users without specific and binding legislation in the matter.²⁹

29.

(1) Ltr, Mayor, Fort Smith, to Rep. J.P. Hammerschmidt, 29 Jul 75; (2) Ltr, Rep. Hammerschmidt to the Hon. M.R. Hoffman, SA, 6 Aug 75; (3) Synopsis, article, Southwest Times, 26 Sep 75, "If the Army Doesn't Pay Delinquent Bill City May Cut Off Water Supply," for: COL Cramer, C/S Fort Sill and COL Ballard, FORSCOM EOC-RO; (4) Ltr, City Administrator, Fort Smith, to Fort Sill Procurement Officer, 24 Sep 75; (5) HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS-AAR, p. R-4; (6) HQDA, AAR-NEW LIFE-NEW ARRIVALS, pp. III-A-3 - III-A-4.

TABLE 18

SELECTED ITEMS OF REFUGEE WINTER CLOTHING

Item	Cost	Issue Factor	Total Cost
<u>INFANT (up to 28 in long)</u>		<u>Total cost per indiv: 45.30</u>	
Undershirt, lng slv, flannel	.87	6	5.22
Sleepers, flannel w/mittens 7 footlets	2.56	6	15.36
Outdoor suit, water repellent, nylon w/feet, mittens, hood	12.10	1	12.10
Sleeping bag, fleeced	3.58	2	7.16
Blanket	.91	6	5.46
<u>GIRL (6-11 yrs)</u>		<u>Total cost per indiv: 82.20</u>	
PJs w/feet	3.72	2	7.42
Socks (pair)	.50	4	2.00
Underpants	.40	4	1.60
T-shirts	.95	2	1.90
Thermal underwear	2.75	2	5.50
Tights	1.65	2	3.30
Cap	1.38	1	1.38
Shirt, lng slv, flannel	3.30	2	6.60
Sweater, heavyweight	3.96	1	3.96
Coat, knee-length, water repellent, w/zip-out lining & hood	16.50	1	16.50
Sweatshirt w/hood	3.50	1	3.50
Pants, polyester/cotton jeans	4.13	2	8.26
Hard shoes	8.53	1	8.53
Rainboots	5.23	1	5.23
Gloves	1.28	1	1.28
Houseslippers, warm	3.14	1	3.14
Raincoat, clr plastic w/hood	2.28	1	2.28
<u>ADULT MALE</u>		<u>Total cost per indiv: 129.68</u>	
PJs	5.23	2	10.46
Underpants	2.17	2	4.34
T-shirts	2.24	2	4.48
Shirt, lng slv flannel	5.48	2	10.96
Underwear, thermal	5.43	2	10.86
Slacks	5.34	2	10.68
Socks	.55	4	2.20
Shoes	12.05	1	12.05
Galoshes, clr plastic, pull-on	4.95	1	4.95
Gloves	1.93	1	1.93
Cap	1.52	1	1.52
Raincoat, clr plastic w/hood	1.98	1	1.98
Coat, water repellent w/hood & zip-out lining	33.00	1	33.00
Sweater, heavyweight	8.80	1	8.80
Scarf	2.07	1	2.07
House Slippers	3.96	1	3.96
Sweatshirt w/hood	2.72	1	2.72

Note: All items are wash & wear, no dry-clean items. All prices are PX estimates.

Source: Memo for SCC, Headquarters, TFNA-Chaffee, ATZR-B-CDR, 20 Jul 75, subj: Winter Clothing for Refugees. (UNCLASSIFIED).

TABLE 19

WINTER CLOTHING: BASIS OF ISSUE/COST		
Age Group	Number Requiring Issue	Cost
<u>Totals</u>	<u>38,825</u>	<u>\$4,053,308.00</u>
Infants	1,500	67,950.00
Children (Ages 1-5)	5,600	324,352.00
Boys (6-11)	3,275	241,891.50
Girls (6-11)	2,800	230,160.00
Adult Males	14,025	1,818,762.00
Adult Females	11,625	1,369,192.50
The above reflects basic issue costs. The full cost is as follows:		
Basic Issue		\$4,053,308.00
9% AAFES Overhead		<u>389,327.94</u>
		\$4,442,635.94
<u>Source:</u> Msg, 042044Z Aug 75, FORSCOM to DA, subj: Procurement of Winter Clothing - Operation NEW ARRIVALS (UNCLASSIFIED).		

Winter Clothing Problems

In developing contingency plans for winter operations the question of sufficient and adequate winter clothing for the refugees became critical. The Indochinese refugees were neither accustomed to, nor prepared for, the North American winter. What clothing the refugees possessed was suited to their native subtropical climate. The timely procurement of warm clothing became essential if they were to survive the winter in the refugee centers. Using winter refugee population estimates furnished by the Interagency Task Force, and acting in accordance with directives from Department of the Army, FORSCOM assumed the responsibility for developing plans for the procurement and issue of winter clothing for some 30,000 refugees in three Refugee Centers — Camp Pendleton, Calif., Fort Chaffee, Ark., and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa. The Army-Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) assisted FORSCOM by developing the types and amounts of clothing required as a minimum to keep the refugees comfortable in the winter. (Table 18). Because of the short lead time for procurement and the amounts of clothing required, the only feasible source of procurement was the open-end contracts which the Army-Air Force Exchange Service had with suppliers. The Department of the Army approved the FORSCOM clothing plan on 7 August, under which the Fort Chaffee Task Force ordered the winter clothing for all refugees through the Army-Air Force Exchange Service at Dallas, Tex. The command also provided appropriate shipping instructions designed to route appropriate amounts of clothing to each of the three camps. The Interagency Task Force released \$4.7 million for the procurement of this clothing and the Army-Air Force Exchange Service awarded procurement contracts on 11 August in the amount of \$4.3 million. (Table 19).³⁰

While vendors began direct shipments to designated camps on 12 September, some difficulties were encountered in obtaining the clothing as ordered. For example, knit fabrics had to be substituted for flannel goods which could not be obtained at that time. In addition, significant delays occurred since the orders for winter clothing were placed in early August when the normal production schedules for spring clothing lines were in full operation. Winter clothing items not in stock had to be manufactured which meant the contractors had to either reopen production lines or convert open lines to winter items. Quality control inspections revealed more than the usual quantity of substandard items, thus delaying deliveries even more. Still other delays took place when some of the vendors shipped clothing items in unmarked containers which required additional sorting time in warehousing and stockage. Clothing deliveries began the last week of August at Fort Chaffee and were completed in early November. The Task Force started issuing the

30.

(1) Memo, ATZR-B-CDR, Cdr Ft Chaffee to SCC, 20 Jul 75, subj: Winter Clothing for Refugees; (2) HQ TFNA & Ft Chaffee, OPLAN Chaffee Winter Operations, 21 Jul 74, pp. C-1 - C-2, C-1-1 - C-1-6; (3) Msg 082050Z Aug 75, HQ TFNA Chaffee to FORSCOM, subj: Refugee Clothing Winterization Project; (4) HQ TFNA & Ft Chaffee, AAR, Vol. IV, pp. IV-IV-1 - IV-IV-2.

winter clothing on 1 October, when enough of the major items such as overcoats, rain gear, pants, and shoes were on hand to permit most of the refugees to be outfitted. While partial shipments had arrived prior to 1 October, the Task Force commanders intentionally wanted to start the winter clothing issue to prevent an outbreak of petty jealousy and theft among the refugee population. The total camp clothing issue was completed by mid-November. Since sizing problems existed due to the fact that the manufacturers did not employ uniform sizing methods, the Task Force permitted the refugees to exchange items which did not fit properly. However, they were not permitted to exchange items merely because they did not like the color or the style. For those desiring an alternate color or style, an open market was conducted among the camp population.³¹

The completion of the camp issue program did not necessarily mean the conclusion of the winter clothing program. Due to a variety of factors, some \$1.7 million worth of clothing remained at Fort Chaffee. Some surplus was generated since out-processing did not stop to await the issue of clothing. In fact, out-processing accelerated to the extent that the reduced refugee population levels contrasted rather sharply with original projections. Delays in deliveries accounted for still other surpluses and the problem was still further compounded when the Department of Defense acceded to a Marine Corps request that the Refugee Center at Camp Pendleton, Calif., be permitted to issue only footwear to its refugee occupants. This latter decision was announced after the Army-Air Force Exchange Service had awarded its firm refugee clothing purchase orders. Consequently, the clothing items purchased for the Camp Pendleton Refugee Center, less the footwear, were shipped to Fort Chaffee for storage. Normally, the surpluses might have been returned for credit, but the open-end contracts used to obtain the items required a firm purchase order which precluded the return of any unused items. After considering several alternatives, the Interagency Task Force decided to contract with the Salvation Army to distribute the surplus clothing stocks to those refugees who had departed the refugee camps prior to the initial clothing distribution. Under the terms of this contract the surplus clothing was consolidated at Fort Chaffee by the Army and then delivered to the Salvation Army at Fort Smith, Ark., for further storage and distribution. Prior to the delivery of this clothing, the Salvation Army project manager requested that appropriate warehouses and office space be provided by the Army at Fort Chaffee due to the large amount of storage and distribution involved. The Salvation Army subsequently established a mail order system to get the clothing to those refugees previously released who were made aware of the clothing issue by the Interagency Task Force newsletter "New Life," the local offices of the Voluntary Agencies, and other refugee-related organizations. Through the

31.

(1) HQDA, AAR-NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, p. I-D-3; (2) HQ TFNA & Ft Chaffee, AAR, Vol. IV, pp. IV-I-1, IV-VI-5; (3) HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS-AAR, p. R-10; (4) Ft Indiantown Gap, Operation NEW ARRIVALS, pp. 4 - 5.

use of a simple order form the refugees were able to request clothing by age, sex, and size. This program was finally closed out on 23 July 1976, after having distributed the entire \$1.7 million surplus of winter clothing.³²

Additional Refugees at Fort Indiantown Gap

Background

On 31 July 1975, the Interagency Task Force halted the inflow of refugees to Fort Indiantown Gap, basing their decision upon an earlier determination to close the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center by 1 December. In turn, FORSCOM decided that the 46th Support Group, the base support unit at Fort Indiantown Gap, could be released from duty and returned to its home station at Fort Bragg, N.C., on 15 October. At that point in time, the refugee population would be small enough to permit the U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Indiantown Gap, to assume overall Refugee Center support missions. By mid-September, however, the Fort Indiantown Gap Task Force realized that the resettlement of refugees from the Refugee Center was proceeding much more quickly than previously anticipated. In response to this welcome condition, the Task Force closed out one entire refugee housing area at the center and relocated 1,754 of the refugees into low occupancy barracks in two other areas. The Task Force estimated that further portions of the camp would no longer be needed by mid-October. Much to the Task Force's surprise, the Interagency Task Force decided to use this available space by sending some 3,500 refugees from the Pacific Area to Fort Indiantown Gap. This decision meant that once these refugees arrived, the U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Indiantown Gap, would require substantial augmentation in order to execute the support mission. It also meant that FORSCOM had three practical options in regard to its proposed redeployment of the 46th Support Group from Fort Indiantown Gap to Fort Bragg. It could extend the support group's temporary duty status an additional 53 days over the 179-day limit which would require the approval of the Department of the Army. It could transfer the Refugee Center support operations from the 46th Support Group to the U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Indiantown Gap, and provide the garrison with the appropriate augmentation of individual temporary duty military personnel. Or, it could replace the 46th Support Group with a similar unit to provide the estimated 53 days of additional support.³³

32.


(1) MFR AFOP-CDD, 26 Mar 76, subj: Operation NEW ARRIVALS - Salvation Army Insurance; (2) Memo, AFOP-CDD, for BG Todd, 23 Feb 76, subj: Disposition of Excess Clothing - Operation NEW ARRIVALS; (3) HQ DA, AAR-NEW LIFE-NEW ARRIVALS, p. I-D-3.

33.

(1) Msg 071940Z Aug 75, FORSCOM to FIG, subj: Refugee Operations at Fort Indiantown Gap; (2) Fact Sheet, DCSOPS-RO, 2 Oct 75, Purpose: To provide DCSOPS information on the status of HQ 46th Spt Gp at FIG; (3) Ft Indiantown Gap, Operation NEW ARRIVALS, p. P-5.



Access control points and external security of the refugee areas were established by the Military Police in cooperation with state and Federal law enforcement agencies.



Each refugee is issued a photo identification card which includes an assigned identification number, date of birth, and a billet building number.



Refugees receive assistance from Administration employees in completing applications for Social Security cards at the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center.



A quick lesson in Vietnamese is given to an American National Red Cross volunteer by an English-speaking refugee, left.

Extended Duty for the 46th Support Group

After a thorough analysis of the situation, FORSCOM decided that extending the 46th Support Group on temporary duty constituted the most feasible course of action. It was clear that the augmentation of the U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Indiantown Gap, would require both large numbers of military personnel and the retention of individual members of the 46th Support Group to provide necessary orientation to the augmentees. The replacement of the 46th Support Group was not feasible because of the current status of the small number of similar units. Potential candidates included the 43d Support Group, Fort Carson, Colo.; the 45th Support Group, U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii; and the 593d Support Group, Fort Lewis, Wash. The 43d Support Group had replaced the 46th Support Group as a critical element of the high priority Airborne "D" Force Package and was also a dedicated element of still another high priority force package. The 45th Support Group had just returned to Hawaii after performing arduous and sustained duty at the Orote Point Refugee Center on Guam. The 593d Support Group had just returned to Fort Lewis following its operations at Fort Chaffee. In view of this overall situation, FORSCOM sought and gained Department of the Army approval to extend the 46th Support Group at Fort Indiantown Gap in excess of 180 days, to approximately 1 December. As matters turned out, the subsequent out-processing continued to accelerate to the point where the refugees population soon dropped to a level which could be handled by the installation's garrison forces. Consequently, on 25 November, the Fort Indiantown Gap garrison assumed responsibility for Operation NEW ARRIVALS at that installation and the 46th Support Group redeployed to Fort Bragg.³⁴

Impact of the Increased Refugee Load

There were, however, a number of other immediate effects generated by the unexpected influx of Pacific Area refugees. As noted above, when the Interagency Task Force had decided to halt any further flow of refugees to Fort Indiantown Gap on 31 July, the total population had begun to decline. As the overall level of refugees decreased, the Fort Indiantown Gap Task Force was able to close out some refugee housing areas along with their support facilities; reduce some services; and terminate the in-processing lines. In order to accommodate the new refugees both the military and civilian in-processing lines had to be reestablished. Twelve selected military personnel specialists assigned to the 401st Adjutant General Company (Personnel Service), Fort Knox, Ky., were returned to Fort Indiantown Gap on temporary duty to handle military in-processing. At the same time, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Center for Disease Control augmented their staffs at Fort Indiantown Gap to

34.

(1) Fact Sheet, DCSOPS-RO, 2 Oct 75, Purpose: To provide DCSOPS information on the status of HQ 46th Spt Gp at FIG; (2) HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, p. 8; (3) Fact Sheet, DCSOPS-RO, 17 Oct 75, subj: Operation NEW ARRIVALS.




An Army Lieutenant studies assembly instructions for a donated toy at the Fort Indianatown Gap Refugee Center.



Public Health Nurses and medical corpsmen who conduct screening operations see an average of 274 patients per day.

OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS WEEKLY REFUGEE CENTER POPULATIONS



SOURCE: HQ DA, DA AFTER ACTION REPORT: OPERATION NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS - U.S. ARMY SUPPORT TO THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE PROGRAM, 1 APRIL 1975 - 1 JUNE 1976, P. V-C15. (UNCLASSIFIED).

handle their in-processing responsibilities. The first flight of 352 refugees from the Pacific Area arrived at Fort Indiantown Gap on 1 October, with a grand total of 2,568 refugees eventually arriving. These new arrivals were initially quartered in a reopened area of the Refugee Center for the first three days following their arrival. During this quarantine period, the Refugee Center put them through the prescribed in-processing cycle, administered assorted tests, measured them for clothing, and provided them with donated clothing from installation stocks. Refugees in need of medical attention were appropriately treated. After the third day, the new arrivals were rehoused in already inhabited areas of the Refugee Center.³⁵

Transfer of Residual Refugees

While the Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Centers were in the process of preparing for winter operations, the Air Force was preparing to close its center at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. Since Fort Chaffee had been designated to remain open indefinitely, it was scheduled to receive the residual unsponsored refugee populations from the other refugee centers. The transfer of 1,019 refugees from Eglin Air Force Base to Fort Chaffee began on 25 August and was completed on 30 August. Concurrently, a political decision was made at the Washington level to close the Marine Corps Center at Camp Pendleton, Calif. Although the latter installation remained open longer than Eglin, it too transferred its 708 unsponsored refugees to Fort Chaffee before closing on 1 November. These residual populations constituted the "hard core" refugees who had not been sponsored into American society as of that date. For the most part, they fell into one or more of the following categories: repatriates who refused sponsorship; the aged or infirm who required medical support; and large families. (Chart 13).³⁶

35.

(1) HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, Vol. 2, Sec. 1, p. 8 and Sec. 2, pp. P-1, P-4; (2) Fact Sheet, DCSOPS-RO, 2 Oct 75, Purpose: To provide the DCSOPS information on the status of HQ 46th Spt Gp at FIG.

36.

HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS-AAR, p. A-3; (2) Msg 302238Z Jul 75, SECDEF to Distr, subj: DOD Support for Indochina Refugee Center Operations for Fall and Winter Months.

The Repatriation Problem

Background

As expected in such situations, a number of the refugees under United States control had indicated a desire to return to Indochina at some point or other during their in-processing or during their domiciliary phase at the refugee centers.³⁷ In fact, repatriation had always been an alternative open to all refugee since the beginning of the operation. Representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had visited all of those refugees who had expressed an interest in the matter. During the course of the operation, some 400 Vietnamese refugees housed in refugee centers in the continental United States and another 1,400 on Guam indicated a strong desire to return to Vietnam. After several demonstrations supporting repatriation had taken place at Fort Chaffee, Fort Indiantown Gap, and Camp Pendleton, the Interagency Task Force took the necessary actions required to consolidate all professed repatriates within the continental United States at Camp Pendleton. They were subsequently transferred from that installation to Asan Camp on Guam until the United Nations could make arrangements for their return to Vietnam. In July and August 1975, the repatriates became increasingly restive and began agitating for a speedy return to their homeland. This growing agitation resulted in several confrontations between the repatriates and U.S. Marshals on Guam which culminated in the burning of two buildings at Asan Camp during September 1975.

Vietnamese Repatriates

The Vietnamese repatriates suggested using one of the nine Vietnamese evacuation ships anchored at Guam to return to their homeland. In the meantime, the U.S. Government continued to work through the United Nations which was still engaged in discussions with the North Vietnamese for the return of the Vietnamese repatriates. By the latter part of September, the situation among the repatriates on Guam had become so tense that the Defense Department, as a precautionary measure, prepared to exercise control over the refugees under the provisions of the Department of the Army's Civil Disturbance Plan. On 30 September, however, the U.S. Government approved the use of a ship to return the refugees to Vietnam and directed the U.S. Navy to prepare the ship, the Thuong Tin I, for the voyage. On 16 October, the vessel, manned by former naval and merchant seamen among the repatriates, sailed for Vietnam with 1,546 Vietnamese aboard. The ship arrived safely at its destination in Vietnamese waters on 27 October and disembarked its passengers with North Vietnamese permission.

37.

The entire section is based on: HQ CINCPAC, History of Pacific Command Support to Operation NEW LIFE, 1 Apr - 1 Nov 75, pp. II-71 - II-78; (2) HQDA AAR-NEW LIFE-NEW ARRIVALS, pp. I-C-14 - I-C-16 and I-D-3 - I-D-4.

STATISTICAL SUMMARY - REFUGEE DEMOGRAPHY
FORT CHAFFEE REFUGEE CENTER
APRIL - DECEMBER 1975

MONTH	SITREP	CUMULATIVE		CUMULATIVE REFUGEES RELEASED			DEATHS	CUM. BIRTHS
		ARRIVED	DEPARTED	US SOCIETY	3rd COUNTRY	OTHER CAMPS		
	<u>Total</u>	<u>50,809</u>	<u>50,809</u>	<u>48,997</u>	<u>1,121</u>	<u>674</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>325</u>
Apr - May	1-40	27,374	3,601	3,601 ^a				
June	41-70	7,735	7,330	6,475	633	222		
July	71-101	6,926	8,555	8,338	95	116	6 ^b	137 ^b
August	102-132	4,475	7,726	7,400	104	221	1	44
September	133-162	1,704	6,782	6,704	39	35	4	57
October	163-193	2,073	5,281	5,137	62	80	2	44
November	194-223	235	5,452	5,330	119	0	3	26
December	224-243	17	6,082	6,102	69	0	1	17

a. Reflects number of refugees departed into U.S. Society and Third Country.

b. Reflects deaths and births from the time the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center opened until the end of July.

Source: HQ 17NA Ft. Chaffee, After Action Report, Vol. 1, p. I-IV-C-1. (UNCLASSIFIED).

Cambodian Repatriates

In November 1975, a group of 120 Cambodians at the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center also requested repatriation. United Nations representatives visited the center to counsel the repatriates but soon discovered that the new Cambodian Government would neither discuss repatriation nor even indicate when they would entertain such discussions. The Cambodian repatriates were thereupon transferred to a halfway house in Philadelphia, Pa., under the auspices of the United Nations. Finally, in the late spring of 1976, the Cambodians departed for France in the hope of negotiating directly with Cambodian officials in Paris. Table 20 contains a statistical summary of refugee personnel.

Termination of Operation NEW ARRIVALS

Background

With the closing of the Eglin Air Force Base and Camp Pendleton Refugee Centers, only the Army's two Refugee Centers remained open. On 29 October, the Interagency Task Force announced that the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center would be closed by 31 December 1975. This announcement was quickly followed by the establishment of several state-sponsored programs to empty the centers. The success of these programs and a final surge by the Voluntary Agencies resulted in the last refugees leaving the Army Refugee Centers in late December, thus completing the active phase of Operation NEW ARRIVALS. However, FORSCOM's involvement in Operation NEW ARRIVALS did not terminate at this point, since both installations had to be restored to their pre-operation status. Projects such as facilities repair and property disposal began on 31 December 1975. When these and other similar operations were completed, FORSCOM's role in Operation NEW ARRIVALS was finally terminated on 1 June 1976.

Change in Command Relationships

The command structure for Operation NEW ARRIVALS changed after the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Marine Corps closed their Refugee Centers on 30 August and 1 November, respectively. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff terminated their participation on 3 November, the Defense Department designated the Secretary of the Army as the executive agent for all Defense Department matters pertaining to the continued military support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS. This arrangement permitted the Army to deal directly with officials of both the Defense Department and the Interagency Task Force. However, FORSCOM's position in the command structure did not change, since it continued to act as the Army's Executive Agency until 1 June 1976. On that date, the Deputy Secretary of Defense notified the Secretary of the Army that the Army's role as Executive Agent for Operation NEW ARRIVALS had been terminated.³⁸

38.

(1) HQDA, AAR-NEW LIFE-NEW ARRIVALS, p. 1-D-6; (2) HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS-AAR, pp. C-1, C-2, S-6.

Closing the Refugee Centers

On 29 October 1975, the Interagency Task Force announced that the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center would be closed on 31 December, rather than remain open indefinitely as previously announced. At the same time, the agency announced the establishment of several programs sponsored by the states of Iowa, New Mexico, and Washington which would facilitate the resettlement of the refugees prior to the final closing date. In effect these states had offered to take relatively large numbers of refugees and to help assimilate them into American society. The Interagency Task Force announced on 31 October that, after that date, no additional refugees would be admitted into the United States under the resettlement program administered by that agency. It should be noted that, when this announcement was made, there were still several thousand refugees from both Vietnam and Cambodia who had taken temporary shelter in a number of Third Countries in Asia. These refugees subsequently became the responsibility of the Immigration and Naturalization Service which processed them under normal procedures. With this announcement, the Refugee Centers then had a fixed population figure as the focal point for sponsorship and resettlement activities. As previously noted, both of the Army Refugee Centers were still open on 1 November 1975. At that time, the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center had 3,900 refugees and the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center had 10,500 refugees still on hand.³⁹

Closing of Fort Indiantown Gap. Once the Interagency Task Force halted the reception of any more refugees on 31 October, the refugee population at Fort Indiantown Gap diminished quickly, as did the need for support.⁴⁰ On 21 November, the Pennsylvania Department of Education closed the refugee schools located at the center. FORSCOM disestablished the Fort Indiantown Gap Task Force on 25 November, and all military and support functions were transferred to the Commander, U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Indiantown Gap. On that same day, the remainder of the 46th Support Group redeployed to Fort Bragg. Recreational services and branch Post Exchange activities closed out as their customers departed. As the refugee population continued to decline, the installation commander consolidated them into fewer barracks. At the same time, garrison crews restored and repaired the vacated barracks in preparation for the upcoming 1976 Annual Training (AT 76) of the Reserve Components. As the barracks were closed, the supporting messes were also closed. The operating contractor served the last meal and then cleaned the facility and turned it back to the installation. Once the installation's supply personnel had completed the inventory of each mess hall's contents, garrison crews began the work of restoring it for use during Annual Training 1976.

39.

(1) Fact Sheet, DCSOPS-RO, 31 Oct 75, subj: Operation NEW ARRIVALS; (2) HQDA, AAR-NEW LIFE-NEW ARRIVALS, p. I-D-2.

40.

The entire subparagraph is based on: (1) HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, Vol. 2, Sec. 1, p. 11, and Vol. 2, Sec. 2, p. Q-1; (2) Ft Indiantown Gap, Operation NEW ARRIVALS, pp. 6 - 7, A-9-B-1, A-10-B-1, C-7-1 - C-7-3, C-3-2, C-1-A-1 - C-1-A-2.

Fort Indiantown Gap also began returning the 186 vehicles which had been used in Operation NEW ARRIVALS, with the final turn-in completed in early 1976. Of the 99 civilian type vehicles employed, 50 were busses operated under contract by the Capitol Bus Service of Harrisburg, Pa. The last few of these were released in mid-December after the Refugee Center was closed. Of the remaining vehicles, 37 were rental cars from Thrifty Car Rentals of Harrisburg. The Fort Indiantown Gap Task Force had tried to rent the vehicles from a local General Services Administration (GSA) pool, but were refused since the proposed agreement was for less than a year. The Task Force then turned to Thrifty Cars and arranged for the requisite number of cars without specifying size. When Thrifty began deliveries, State Department personnel, who were the major users, refused any but full-sized sedans. This refusal led to the immediate return of fifteen vehicles at additional cost. Since the State Department demanded full-size vehicles, the Task Force incurred additional costs in obtaining and maintaining the rental fleet. All rental vehicles were turned in on 15 December.

As far as miscellaneous activities were concerned, the 15th Combat Support Hospital cut its services back gradually, but maintained effective medical coverage by increasing the use of the Fort Indiantown Gap Health Clinic of the Carlisle Barracks Medical Department Activity. On 1 December, the U.S. Army Communications Command turned all communications activities back to the installation. During the next two weeks the Communications Command removed all of the extra communications equipment which had been installed for the communications support mission for the Refugee Center. On 15 December, the last few refugees had their noon meal and departed shortly thereafter. The Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center then closed after having processed 22,103 refugees since 28 May. In addition, the installation hosted 50,000 Army Reservists and Army National Guardsmen during Annual Training 1975. On 15 December, the last support units deployed to their home stations -- the 23d Adjutant General Detachment, the 553d Army Postal Unit, the 15th Combat Support Hospital, and the 759th Military Police Battalion.

Closing of Fort Chaffee. The closing of facilities and the redeployment of support units characterized the last six weeks of operations at Fort Chaffee. The 545th Adjutant General Company (Personnel Service) ceased operations and departed on 5 November. The Fort Chaffee Director of Personnel and Community Affairs (DPCA) assumed this unit's former in- and out-processing responsibilities until they were no longer required. The local Vietnamese newspaper, "Tan Dan," published by FORSCOM Psychological Operations personnel, ceased publication on 11 December and the installation Vietnamese language radio station followed suit two days later. The radio station had been established with equipment which had been purchased and provided by the U.S. Catholic Conference. Once the station closed, Fort Chaffee shipped the equipment to the Diocese of Cincinnati at the request of the Conference. Army equipment used for broadcasting was inventoried and stored for future use. On 19 December, the City National Bank of Fort Smith closed its doors and the 595th Medical Company closed the Station Hospital and departed for its home station. The 1st Psychological Operations Battalion (-) and the Military Police also ceased operations. Post Exchange facilities and recreational services facilities used to support the refugees were phased out when no

DOD AND CIVILIAN AVERAGE DAILY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS
FORT CHAFFEE REFUGEE CENTER
MAY - DECEMBER 1975

MONTH	Army				Air Force			Civilian				AVG Daily Strength
	OFF	WO	EM	Total	OFF	EM	Total	PERM ^c	TEMP	Contract	Total	
May	218.6	14.2	1685.3	1981.1	2	18.5	21.5 ^a	154	285	256	695	2634.6
Jun	199.1	8.5	1282.4	1489.9	1.3	12.7	14.0	150	409	529	1,088	2591.9
Jul	157.8	5.6	910.6	1074.0	1	10	11	148	434	663.8	1,245.8	2330.8
Aug	126.4	6.5	755.3	888.2	1	10	11	145	357.5	685.4	1,187.9	2087.1
Sep	117.3	6.9	659.5	783.7	1	10	11 ^b	144	468.5	683.3	1,295.8	2090.5
Oct	112.2	6.2	615.2	733.7	NA	NA	NA	137	506.6	527.1	1,170.7	1904.4
Nov	102.6	7	508.1	617.7	NA	NA	NA	136	338.3	510.5	984.8	1602.5
Dec	71.7	7.8	306.9	386.4	NA	NA	NA	133	454.4	236.2	823.6	1210.0

a. All USAF personnel arrived on 23 May 1975.

b. All USAF personnel departed on 8 Sep 1975.

c. Includes permanent personnel from USACC, CPO not on Ft Chaffee permanent TDA.

Source: HQ TFNA Ft Chaffee, After Action Report, Vol. I, p. I-IV-D-1. (UNCLASSIFIED).

longer needed. The first refugee mess closed on 22 September, while the last closed on 20 December. Due to careful ration management and closely monitored turn-in procedures, Operation NEW ARRIVALS achieved an under-drawn ration status by the end of the operation. The total monetary value of excess foodstuffs returned to Fort Sill between 1 November and 31 December amounted to \$41,253. As each refugee mess hall was closed, the operating contractor cleaned it and processed the mess equipment for temporary storage -- all within five hours after the last meal was served. The two troop messes remaining as of 1 November were consolidated due to declining troop strengths. Fort Chaffee assumed responsibility for the consolidated facility on 2 January 1976 and subsequently made it available to all personnel on the post, both temporary duty and permanent party. The continued troop reductions resulted in the closing of all troop billets on 5 January. At that time, the Fort Chaffee Billeting Office assumed responsibility for billeting all temporary duty personnel and moved them into Bachelor Enlisted Quarters or Bachelor Officers' Quarters. The daily military and civilian employee strengths for the period were as shown in Table 21.⁴¹

As the refugee population declined, the need for other services also diminished. The 233 vehicles required over and above Fort Chaffee's authorized level of 117 were disposed of. In October 1975, 138 tactical vehicles were turned in and the remaining 95 vehicles, all commercial types, were disposed of by 1 February 1976. The 21 rental cars used in support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS were turned in during December 1975. The U.S. Army Communications Command began removing telephones in November, pausing temporarily to install additional data processing cables in the Fort Chaffee Task Force headquarters so that the State Department representatives could use visual data displays in Washington to monitor the final refugee processing. U.S. Army Communications Command personnel then removed most of the automatic voice network (AUTOVON), telefax (TFX), and wide area telephone service (WATS) lines as the use of these means of communication declined. The Fort Chaffee Communications Center for Operation NEW ARRIVALS terminated operations on 31 December and the installation's communications capacity was reduced to its original condition.⁴²

On 17 November the Task Force surgeon met with the Task Force Chief of Staff, the installation Director of Industrial Operations, and representatives of the Fort Sill hospital and the U.S. Army Health Services Command to decide the closeout procedures which would be followed. From that date until 20 December when the Fort Chaffee Station Hospital closed, a carefully scheduled program of consolidation and supply management was followed. FORSCOM assisted in this process by providing medical

41.

HQ TFNA and Ft Chaffee, AAR, Vol. V, pp. V-1-1 - V-1-2, V-XIV-1, V-VI-1 - V-VI-3, V-II-B-1, V-II-1, V-III-1.

42.

Ibid., pp. V-IV-2 and V-I-2.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES FORT CHAFFEE AND FORT INDIANTOWN GAP

	Fort Chaffee	Fort Indiantown Gap
<u>Significant Dates</u>		
OPLAN Executed	30 Apr 75	19 May 75
Support Units Closed	1 May 75	24 May 75
First Refugees Arrive	2 May 75	28 May 75
Closure Date Announced	29 Oct 75	30 Jul 75
Last Refugee Departs	20 Dec 75	15 Dec 75
<u>Operating Differences</u>		
Number of Refugees Processed	50,809	22,034
Days of Operation	233	208
Continuity of Command	No	Yes
Reservists Supported AT-75	20,000	58,000
<u>Installation Comparisons</u>		
Major Command	TRADOC	FORSCOM
Type Installation	OMAR	OMAR
Active mission	No	Yes
Ownership	TRADOC-Ft Sill	FORSCOM
Number of buildings used	708	645
Refugee housing	307	171
Upgraded barracks	147	-0-
Garrison size	136	588
Year-end funds available for restoration projects	No	Yes

Source: FORSCOM, After Action Report - NEW ARRIVALS (Int). (UNCLASSIFIED).

supply and maintenance technicians. On 15 December, for example, the Task Force Surgeon closed the dining facility and, on the following day, he closed the combined patient ward, with the hospital itself, closing on 20 December.⁴³

In a similar fashion, Military Police support was reduced proportionately as the refugee population and housing areas were reduced. Although a small number of Military Police returned to their home stations prior to 1 November, the majority returned in three increments concurrent with the closing of the Refugee Housing Areas III, II, and I, which occurred during the period 16 November through 22 December. During the course of these closings, 184 Military Police personnel deployed to their home stations. Inasmuch as the Military Police force consisted of a composite company of personnel from both the Presidio of San Francisco and Fort Carson, Colo., the Task Force Provost Marshal took steps to ensure the fair and equitable return of individuals to their home stations. The final contingent of 53 military police personnel consisted of volunteers from the 170th Military Police Company, Presidio of San Francisco. By 21 December, all Task Force Military Police commitments had been terminated and security responsibilities had been released to the garrison staff.⁴⁴

On 20 December, as the last 24 refugees departed, the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center was closed with a small ceremony. Numerous state and local dignitaries, including Senator Dale Bumpers, and Governor David Pryor of Arkansas, attended. Colonel George M. Cross, the Fort Chaffee commander, and Mr. Donald MacDonald, the Senior Civil Coordinator, delivered a few remarks and then dedicated a monument to the refugee operation. During the period 2 May through 20 December 1975, a total of 50,809 Indochinese refugees had passed through Fort Chaffee. In addition, over 15,000 Army Reservists and Army National Guardsmen attended Annual Training 1975 (AT 75) at the same installation.⁴⁵

The Termination Phase: Restoration and Costs

Background

On the surface it would appear that direct comparisons between Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap were both feasible and desirable. Both of the activities which were used to house refugees from Indochina during Operation NEW ARRIVALS were funded under Army Reserve Operation and Maintenance (OMAR) appropriations. (Table 22). Although these two installations shared some similarities, there were essential differences

43.

Ibid., pp. V-IX-1 - V-IX-2, and V-IX-A-1.

44.

Ibid., p. V-X-1.

45.

Ibid., Vol. I, Part III, pp. I-III-9 - I-III-10.

which made outright comparisons difficult. In the absence of an understanding of these differences, it would appear to the uninitiated, for instance, that some of the closure costs discussed below were invalid. In terms of similarities, both installations were semiactive and both were used essentially to support Reserve Component training. The majority of the buildings at both sites consisted of the World War II wooden temporary variety. However, there were a number of major differences between the two installations. Fort Chaffee was a subinstallation of Fort Sill, Okla., a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) activity, with no active mission. Fort Indiantown Gap was an activity of the U.S. Army Forces Command with both active and inactive missions. Fort Chaffee was given three days notice to open its Refugee Center operations, while Fort Indiantown Gap was given nine days notice. Fort Chaffee had no experience factors to use in establishing its Refugee Center operations while Fort Indiantown Gap, on the other hand, benefitted from the early lessons learned at Fort Chaffee. During the course of operations, Fort Chaffee had four Refugee Center commanders while Fort Indiantown Gap had three. Fort Chaffee was more fortunate, perhaps, in having but one Senior Civil Coordinator while Fort Indiantown Gap had two. The FORSCOM Task Force at Fort Indiantown Gap was informed in July that the Refugee Center operation would close out in December, giving them plenty of time in which to make the necessary implementing plans. The FORSCOM Task Force at Fort Chaffee was under the impression that it would remain open indefinitely. This impression, was rudely shattered on 29 October when Ms. Julia Taft, the Interagency Task Force chief, announced over the Vietnamese language radio station at Fort Chaffee that the Refugee Center would be closed by 31 December 1975. Both Refugee Centers received additional refugees in the fall of 1975. Fort Chaffee received 1,727 residual "hard core" refugees from Camp Pendleton and Eglin Air Force Base when those centers closed. Fort Indiantown Gap received 2,568 refugees from the Pacific Area in October 1975. Although both installations used World War II temporary buildings to house the refugees, those at Fort Chaffee had been upgraded somewhat during the 1950's while those at Fort Indiantown Gap remained as originally constructed. Thus, there was more in the Fort Chaffee buildings (partitions and built-in lockers, for example) to be vandalized than in those at Fort Indiantown Gap. Finally, the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center processed more than twice as many refugees (50,809) than the Fort Indiantown Gap Center (22,034). This meant, of course, that Fort Chaffee was subjected to considerably more traffic and other usage than Fort Indiantown Gap.⁴⁶

Restoration and Costs

The departure of the last refugees completed the active phase of Operation NEW ARRIVALS. Still remaining were those actions required to restore Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap to their former state of preservation. Three major categories of actions were required to fully

46.

(1) HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS-AAR, pp. A-1 - A-5, Incls to Tab Q, G-1 - G-4; (2) HQ TFNA and Ft Chaffee, AAR, Vol. 1, pp. I-III-1 - I-III-10; (3) HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, Vol. 2, Sec. 1, pp. 4 - 11.

terminate the overall operation -- those actions required to repair or restore the facilities and dispose of or replace both Defense Department and other government agency supplies and equipment used in support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS; those actions required to dispose of Federally owned winter clothing purchased for the refugees; and, finally, the disposition of unclaimed or abandoned refugee baggage. Since most of the termination costs were directly related to actual refugee operations, FORSCOM did not anticipate any problems in gaining reimbursement. This, however, proved to be untrue. Planning for the termination of Operation NEW ARRIVALS and the restoration of Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap began in September 1975. By late December both Refugee Centers had developed firm plans and cost estimates for their respective projects. In both cases, the Interagency Task Force approved the plans. Based upon its original understanding with the Interagency Task Force concerning the reimbursement responsibilities and commitments of the State Department and other governmental agencies, FORSCOM believed that all it had to do at this point in time was to review the plans, make any required changes, and forward the plans to the Department of the Army for further action. Unfortunately, matters did not proceed in quite that fashion. First, the installations discovered they needed to revise some of their cost estimates and projects. The Interagency Task Force representative at Fort Chaffee entertained second thoughts about the extent and cost of road repairs -- some \$373,000 worth -- and decided that the agency headquarters in Washington, D.C., had to approve that item. Finally, Fort Sill, Fort Chaffee's parent installation, demanded that all actions between FORSCOM and Fort Chaffee be routed through their Director of Plans and Training at a time when FORSCOM was already coordinating such matters with Fort Sill's comptroller. This latter action had the adverse effect of further slowing things down, although FORSCOM finally acceded to this request. After a great deal of staff work at the multi-major command organizational levels involved, FORSCOM succeeded in getting the original estimates purified and presented a briefing to the Department of the Army on 13 February 1976. Following this briefing, the Department of the Army reduced Fort Chaffee's road repair request from \$373,000 to \$363,000. Following this review, the Department of the Army sent the plans to the Defense Department for final review and submission to the State Department for reimbursement.⁴⁷

On 17 March 1976, Captain A.J. Haas, the FORSCOM Refugee Officer, attended a final review briefing at Department of the Army, to present a brief overview of the situation and the actions required for proper reimbursement. In addition, he was prepared to answer any specific questions the attendees -- representatives from the Department of the Army, the Interagency Task Force, the Defense Department, and the State Department

47.

(1) HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS-AAR, p. Q-1; (2) HQDA, AAR-NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, pp. I-D-1 - I-D-5; (3) Memo, Mr. MacDonald, SCC, IATF-FIG, to TFNA Fort Chaffee, subj: Completion of Operation NEW ARRIVALS; (4) Fact Sheet, DCSOPS E&R Br, 10 Feb 76, subj: To provide estimates of, and the rationale for, closure costs for Operation NEW ARRIVALS at Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap.

TABLE 23

INSTALLATION CLOSURE COST COMPARISON
(As of 13 FEBRUARY 1976)
(In \$000)

Fort Chaffee		Fort Indiantown Gap
<u>\$2663.9</u>	<u>Total^a</u>	<u>\$1315.9</u>
95.2	Completed and Reimbursed	259.0
<u>2568.7</u>	<u>Sub-total</u>	<u>1056.9</u>
639.0	Personnel	464.6
621.0	Logistics	441.5
1307.3	Engineer	150.8
1.4	Miscellaneous	0.0
50,809	No. of Refugees	22,034
\$52.43	Cost per Refugee	\$50.90

a. Does not count the \$332,000 held in a FORSCOM miscellaneous account.

Source: TAB A to Fact Sheet, DCSOPS E&R Div to AFOP-CDD, 10 Feb 76.
(UNCLASSIFIED).

-- might have. The Department of the Army dictated the style of the briefing on the assumption that the State Department representatives had read the data provided prior to the meeting. In fact, the State Department representatives were totally unfamiliar with the FORSCOM closure and reimbursement plans forwarded earlier. Once this situation became apparent, the Department of the Army changed its briefing format so as to present a detailed explanation of the background of the operation, the characteristics of the Army installations used as Refugee Centers, and a line by line explanation of the actions required, cost estimates, and their rationale. In general, the State Department's response to this briefing was negative. Mr. Walker Smith, the Comptroller for the Inter-agency Task Force, and the senior Department of State representative, made several critical comments and observations. He noted that Mr. Donald MacDonald, the Senior Civil Coordinator at Fort Chaffee, had no authority to agree to that installation's restoration plan, and therefore, any commitments he made were invalid. He then stated that he himself had no authority to agree to any of the estimates presented by the Army. He went on to observe that the General Accounting Office (GAO) was beginning to question the State Department's expenditures in this area and that the Army had failed to provide all of the required backup data in support of their reimbursement billing forms. When Department of the Army representatives requested that specific examples be produced, Mr. Smith retracted this statement, indicating that he meant it applied to the Marine Corps' costs. He then questioned the estimates relating to exterior painting and road repairs at Fort Chaffee quite closely, demanding additional data and justification for these costs. Then, in an apparent repudiation of earlier Interagency Task Force guidelines, Mr. Smith stated that the State Department should receive credit for any residual benefits the Army realized as a result of its Refugee Center operations. Needless to say, this briefing did not accomplish the desired result of gaining final approval and reimbursement for the Refugee Center restoration projects. As a matter of fact, the conferees never did get to discuss the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center restoration costs as planned. This had to be accomplished at a later meeting.⁴⁸

Subsequent negotiations continued on a much more positive note. On 29 March and again on 2 April, the State Department granted FORSCOM the authority to begin work on all but some selected projects. As far as these reserved selected projects were concerned, the State Department requested additional information along with additional rationale for the repair and replacement of equipment at both installations and the interior and exterior painting and road repairs at Fort Chaffee. After further review, the Department of State authorized FORSCOM on 15 April to obligate a total of \$4.045 million in appropriated funds for termination projects. After meeting with representatives from Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap, FORSCOM allocated \$2,663,900 to Fort Chaffee and \$1,315,900 to Fort Indiantown Gap, with \$332,000 placed into a miscellaneous account at FORSCOM. (Table 23). Upon granting the authority to

48.

Fact Sheet, DCSOPS E&R Br, 19 Mar 76, subj: Trip Report.

obligate these funds on 6 May 1976, FORSCOM noted that they applied to total billing costs and included costs already incurred and billed by Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap as closing costs. Initially, FORSCOM had anticipated that all reimbursement requirements would have been met and all costs obligated by 31 March 1976. As events progressed, however, both the actual completion dates of the termination projects and the fund obligations remained open past that date. In fact, the last three restoration project contracts were let in late June 1976.⁴⁹

Termination Projects and Costs - Fort Chaffee. Termination costs were divided into four broad categories -- personnel, logistics, engineer, and miscellaneous. Ninety percent of the personnel costs of some \$639,000 were incurred in completing the engineer and logistics functions, with the remaining 10 percent allocated for administration. In the logistics area, a total of some \$620,000 was expended for several items, with the replacement or repair of equipment amounting to \$430,000 -- \$157,000 worth of bed linens either ruined or carried off by the refugees; \$190,000 to replace 6,000 mattresses rendered unserviceable; and \$22,000 for the replacement of two steam tables in the mess halls. In addition, \$12,000 was used to repair the tents (temporary housing) used by U.S. Army Reserve units during Annual Training 1975 (AT 75) which were badly damaged by a violent storm. The remaining \$50,000 was used to replace miscellaneous lost, destroyed, or damaged items such as water fountains, office equipment, tools, bunk frames, lockers, and the like. An additional \$53,000 was used for laundering and cleaning mattresses and bedding. A total of \$120,000 was allocated for transportation costs to dispose of equipment belonging to other governmental agencies; to move or return Defense Department owned equipment to owning installations and activities; and to pack and crate both categories of equipment for shipment or storage. Some \$20,000 was used to repair or replace those table of organization and equipment (TOE) items which had been used in the operation.⁵⁰

Engineer projects and costs were again subdivided into several categories. Some \$11,400 was required for winterization of the buildings, while restoration of the buildings to their previous condition cost some \$247,000. This latter excessive amount was due to extensive damage to the barracks during the course of the operation. For example, more than \$72,000 was required to repair the built-in lockers which had been damaged by the refugees. Other work included extensive repairs to damaged doors, windows, screens, walls, and the removal of privacy partitions. The rehabilitation of roads and grounds cost some \$337,000 for

49.

(1) Msg 061930Z May 76, FORSCOM to Ft Sill and Ft Indiantown Gap, subj: Restoration and Closure of Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap;
(2) MFR, AFOP-COR, 24 Jun 76, subj: Contracts for Termination Projects - Operation NEW ARRIVALS.

50.

Ibid.

the repair of more than 13,000 feet of roadway and 18,800 feet of shoulder. The principal cause of failure of this portion of the roadnet was due to the passage of loads heavier than specified in original designs. Interior and exterior painting of all the buildings used in the operation cost an additional \$805,600. Some \$700 was expended to shut down and prepare for layaway the hospital boiler plant which had been opened for the operation. A total of \$1,400 was spent for miscellaneous items, including \$1,000 for temporary duty costs at Fort Sill and Fort Chaffee related to the termination program and \$400 for the rental of necessary office equipment.⁵¹

Termination Projects and Costs - Fort Indiantown Gap. The termination costs at Fort Indiantown Gap were categorized in the same fashion as those at Fort Chaffee -- personnel, logistics, engineer, and miscellaneous. Personnel costs at Fort Indiantown Gap amounted to \$464,600 for termination work including temporary employees at the New Cumberland Army Depot required to complete the supporting laundry operations. The total amount expended in the logistics field was \$441,500. Again, as at Fort Chaffee, the replacement and repair of equipment required most of the logistics money -- \$252,000. The largest single item within this latter category was the replacement of 4,500 steel wall lockers which were too badly damaged to repair. Laundry costs amounted to some \$44,500 for the cleaning of 2,481 mattresses and the laundering of bedding. The transportation costs for packing, crating, and returning both Defense Department equipment and that of other governmental agencies to its suppliers amounted to \$109,000. Fort Indiantown Gap spent \$16,000 to terminate a contract for office equipment which had been awarded to support operations of the Interagency Task Force. Engineer termination costs amounted to some \$409,000, including \$259,000 used to close out the 645 buildings employed for the operation and to prepare them for winter. A contract for custodial services to clean and remove refuse from the buildings cost an additional \$77,000. Another \$11,700 was required to restore the buildings to their previous state. A total of \$56,200 was required for interior painting but exterior painting was not charged to the Interagency Task Force since the installation expended \$222,061 in year-end funds for this latter project. The rehabilitation of roads and grounds required some \$200 to replace grass in several areas. Fort Indiantown Gap did not charge the Interagency Task Force for road repairs since roads in the Refugee Center area were resurfaced with \$23,920 in year-end funds.⁵²

51.

Ibid.

52.

Ibid.

Disposition of Unclaimed or Abandoned Refugee Property

Fort Chaffee collected and stored large amounts of baggage which had been left behind by the refugees as they departed to join their sponsors. This situation created a disposal problem once all the refugees had departed. FORSCOM requested guidance from Department of the Army as to proper disposal procedures but they, in turn, requested disposal guidelines from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The latter agency directed that any lost, abandoned, or unclaimed refugee property should first be checked for some indication of ownership. The Army was to take every effort to return identifiable items to their proper owner and all costs incurred in this process were borne by the Army. Unidentified property was considered to be abandoned and was disposed of through normal property disposal channels as outlined in Chapter V, Defense Disposal Manual.⁵³

Financial Management

Background

The Indochina refugee operation required a great deal of money to accomplish its aims.⁵⁴ President Gerald Ford provided the initial funds for moving South Vietnamese refugees from the war torn areas of Vietnam to safe zones within that country through Presidential Determination 75-13 on 8 April 1975. This determination resulted in the transfer of \$5 million from the Agency for International Development (AID) to the State Department's Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs (ORM). This latter agency was responsible for evacuating and resettling Southeast Asian refugees. In addition to this program, the Agency for International Development had already allocated \$31,272,000 of its funds to its Mission Program for the Humanitarian and Refugee Relief Program. Approximately \$16 million of this latter amount was earmarked for air and sea lift evacuation costs, which included expenditures arising from Operation

53.

(1) Msg 182027Z Feb 76, DA to FORSCOM, subj: Disposal of Unclaimed Refugee Property (Operation NEW ARRIVALS); (2) Msg 252035Z Feb 76, FORSCOM to USAFACS, subj: Disposal of Unclaimed Personal Property (Operation NEW ARRIVALS); (3) Msg 012038Z Mar 76, FORSCOM to USAFACS, subj: Disposal of Unclaimed Personal Property.

54.

Unless otherwise indicated, the entire section is based on: (1) Comptroller of the U.S., Report, 27 May 75, p. 17; (2) Comptroller of the U.S., Report, 16 Jun 75; (3) Comptroller of the U.S., Report to the Congress: Evacuation and Temporary Care Afforded Indochinese Refugees - Operation NEW LIFE, 1 Jun 76, pp. i-v, 15 - 17, 24 - 26; (4) IATF, Report to the Congress, 15 Sep 75, pp. 95 - 97; (5) HEW Refugee Task Force, Report to the Congress, 20 Jun 77, pp. 104 - 110; (6) Congressional Quarterly, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975, Vol. XXXXI, pp. 315 - 320.

BABYLIFT. As matters grew worse in Vietnam, the U.S. Government decided to evacuate as many Vietnamese and Third Country nationals as possible, a decision which required even more money. Thus, the President, on 28 April, issued Presidential Determination 75-17 which reallocated \$98 million in Indochina Postwar Reconstruction Funds to the State Department's Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs. This amount did not include the previously transferred \$5 million so that the total amount of money available for refugee evacuation and corollary matters was \$103 million as of that date. Of the \$5 million transferred by Presidential Determination 75-13 in the early days of the Indochina refugee crisis, \$2.3 million was immediately obligated for Indochinese refugee needs. On 5 August 1975, Presidential Determination 76-2 removed the remaining \$2.7 million from the program for Cambodian and Vietnamese refugee activities and made it available for the support of Laotian refugees. While the Laotian refugees were counted as part of the quota for Indochinese parolees allowed to enter the United States, evacuation, temporary care, and resettlement services for them was not financed from funds made available specifically for Cambodians and Vietnamese. The handling of Laotian refugees was part of the regular program of the State Department's Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs (ORM).

As noted earlier, the collapse of South Vietnam came so quickly that Congress took immediate action to establish and fund a refugee assistance program. Reversing the normal procedures mandated by the rules of both the House and the Senate, Congress cleared the appropriations bill (PL 94-24) providing the actual funds for the refugee resettlement program prior to enacting the authorization bill (PL 94-23). On 23 May 1975, the President signed into law the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 (PL 94-24), thereby making available \$405 million for refugee care and resettlement. Of this amount, \$305 million was given to the State Department to reimburse the various agencies for costs incurred in the evacuation, temporary care, and resettlement of the refugees. The remaining \$100 million was allocated to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare for carrying out its role in the resettlement of Indochinese refugees. On the following day, the President signed the authorization bill (PL 94-23), which authorized the expenditure of up to \$455 million for the relocation and resettlement of Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees in the United States as provided for in the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 (PL 87-510). After 30 June 1976, these funds would be made available only to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare for services performed under the 1962 act. No funds could be obligated after 30 September 1977. This latter provision was inserted due to Congressional concern that the refugee relocation and resettlement program would develop into a long-term Federal undertaking similar to the Cuban Refugee Program. This act further expanded the definition of a refugee to cover the Indochina situation. It also required the President to report to the Congress on a regular basis concerning the use of funds and activities authorized by the bill, and to maintain a regular status report on the program. Later on in the program, the State Department transferred an additional \$53 million to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which also received an additional \$50 million from PL 94-441 on 1 October 1976, thus making a grand total of \$203 million available. The total amount of all funds allocated for the emergency relief program amounted to \$555,277,454 as follows:

Total Funds Allocated for Indochina Refugee Program	
<u>Source</u>	<u>Total Available</u>
<u>Grand Total</u>	<u>\$555,277,454</u>
AID Funded by Presidential Determination 75-13, 8 Apr 75.	2,277,454
AID Funded by Presidential Determination 75-17, 28 Apr 75.	98,000,000
Department of State Portion of Refugee Act of 1975 (PL 94-24), 23 May 75, including INS and DOD portions.	252,000,000
HEW Portion of Refugee Act of 1975	203,000,000

The State Department permitted the Interagency Task Force to administer the special funding for refugee evacuation, temporary care, and initial placement. It should be noted also that, in June 1975, Congress passed, and the President signed into law, PL 94-44 which authorized temporary assistance to destitute U.S. citizens who had returned from Vietnam. The act authorized the expenditure of \$8 million through 30 September 1976 to give such Americans and their families emergency help. The act also provided for an additional expenditure of \$300,000 a year after 30 September 1976, the extension of Social Security coverage, and continued benefits of the Supplemental Security Income Program.

Defense Department Reimbursable Costs

A number of other governmental agencies and organizations, principally the Defense Department, provided refugee program support on a cost-reimbursement basis. The Defense Department claimed the vast majority of costs, some \$223,006,000, for its participation in the program. Costs and programs administered by the Defense Department were as follows:

Department of Defense Reimbursables Costs
Operation BABYLIFT, NEW LIFE, and NEW ARRIVALS

<u>Program</u>	
<u>Grand Total</u>	<u>\$225,460,299</u>
Evacuation and Movement. Sealift and Airlift charges. Does not include some extraordinary charges levied directly against the Department of State.	100,231,000
Camp Establishment, Refugee Maintenance, and Camp Closeout.	120,929,299
Medical Support.	4,300,000

It should be noted that some funds previously authorized and appropriated for assistance to South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia but not expended by the Agency for International Development and the Defense Department were retrieved. By 20 June 1977, the Agency for International Development turned back a total of \$118,800,000 to the U.S. Treasury while the Defense Department turned back a total of \$141,948,786. Funds turned back by the Agency for International Development included funds from the Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia Indochina Postwar Reconstruction Assistance Program. The Defense Department funds included those from the Military Assistance to South Vietnamese Forces Program.

Investigation by the Comptroller of the United States

On 1 July 1976, the Comptroller of the United States published the results of his investigation of expenditures for the overall refugee support operation. In general, he found the execution of the program to be successful in terms of its stated objectives, but questioned some obligation of funds. Specifically, the General Accounting Office (GAO) questioned by the Navy's and Air Force's transportation charges for sealift and airlift during that phase of the overall refugee support operation. They also uncovered what they believed were weaknesses in the control of supplies and equipment used at the Refugee Centers. While the auditors found that the FORSCOM Task Force procurement system was generally adequate for quickly acquiring supplies and equipment needed in the program, they also uncovered what they believed were weaknesses in supply procedures. It was true that during the 8-month Refugee Center support operation, requests for supplies and equipment originating from the Refugee Centers were filled without considering cost, duration, the importance of need, or the correctness of the quantity requested. Because of the emergency nature of the operation, almost any item was authorized for purchase. Individual items of supply and equipment were not usually identified on the billings and neither the State Department

nor the individual Task Forces were always fully aware of what had been purchased or what was on hand. Inevitably, given the circumstances, some high cost items had been purchased, the auditors found, even though the refugee support program was expected by Task Force personnel to have a short life. Such items included garbage trucks, recreational items, special books and periodicals, and specialized office and communications equipment.

Defense Department officials informed the Comptroller that, although cost effectiveness was an integral part of the decision making process, too many uncertainties existed to make definitive cost comparisons on all items. The auditors also found that some expendables were obtained in excess of requirements because actual requirements were not determined or errors were made in the requisitions. Examples of such overpurchases in the FORSCOM operated Refugee Centers included plastic cups at Fort Chaffee and table napkins and Polaroid film at Fort Indiantown Gap. In this particular case, the Defense Department informed the Comptroller General that the excess items were returned through proper supply channels for full credit, thus precluding any significant losses. General Accounting Office auditors also determined that Refugee Center supplies were not adequately guarded. The Defense Department replied that the transient nature of the Refugee Centers made pilferage difficult to control and the emphasis placed on processing refugees out of the camps overrode the need to account for supplies. Consequently, this practice resulted in the loss of many small, portable items. A prime example was the large amount of bedding and linen taken from the centers by departing refugees. The investigation further revealed that there was no uniform criterion for identifying major items of equipment for which the Defense Department would not charge but would loan to the refugee support program. In this regard, they discovered that only the Air Force had a criterion, \$1,000 or more, for a major item of equipment. The Defense Department defined major items of equipment as ships, aircraft, and the like, the purchase of which required Task Force approval. Consequently, the auditors noted, a number of major items of equipment were purchased such as large trucks, radios, and other high cost pieces of materiel and billed to the refugee program. Once the overall program closed out on 31 December 1975, the General Services Administration and the Defense Supply Agency began determining which items could be taken into the supply system and which items could be disposed of. By January 1976, the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force had already taken some \$286,000 worth of supplies into their own systems and had made corresponding adjustments to outstanding reimbursements due from the refugee support program. The State Department had also placed refugee support equipment costing \$600,000 into its inventory stocks. Adjustments continued until over \$1 million in returns had been made.

U.S. Army Costs and Reimbursements

Included in the mission to operate the Army's two Refugee Centers was the inherent responsibility for sound financial management. At the very outset of the refugee support operations, the Secretary of Defense directed the Department of the Army to prepare an emergency cost estimate by appropriation and element of expense (EOE) for initial planning purposes. The Army's original cost estimate, as furnished to the Office of

TABLE 24


OPERATION NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS
U.S. ARMY SUPPORT: INCREMENTAL COSTS
(MILLIONS)

Object Class	Description	Crote Point Camp Guam	Fort Chaffee	Fort Indiantown Gap	Total
	<u>Total</u>	<u>\$6.0</u>	<u>\$37.2</u>	<u>\$18.7</u>	<u>\$61.9</u>
11	Personnel Compensation	.1	4.7	3.1	7.9
21	Personnel Travel & Transportation	.4	1.6	2.3	4.3
22	Transportation of Supplies & Material	.0	.2	.0	.2
23	Rent, Communications & Utilities	.0	1.4	.9	2.3
24	Printing & Reproduction	.0	.0	.0	.0
25	Other Contract Services (Includes food service)	.4	10.6	3.9	14.9
26	Supplies & Materials (Includes refugee subsistence and other supplies)	4.7	18.4	8.2	31.3
31	Equipment	.4	.3	.3	1.0

Note: Medical support costs were an additional \$1.6 million.

Source: HQ DA, After Action Report, NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, pp. II-D-5, II-H-4. (UNCLASSIFIED).

ARMY INCREMENTAL COSTS BY RECEPTION CENTERS (IN \$ MILLIONS)



SOURCE: HQ DA, DA AFTER ACTION REPORT: OPERATION NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS - U.S. ARMY SUPPORT TO THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE PROGRAM, 1 APRIL 1975 - 1 JUNE 1976, 25 JAN 77, P. V-C-1. (UNCLASSIFIED)

the Secretary of Defense, forecast an expenditure of \$60 to \$65 million. To complicate fiscal matters in the event of such an operation, the Department of the Army did not include reserve funds for contingency operations in its normal budget. Moreover, none of the Army's major commands retained funds for such purposes. Operations of this general nature were undertaken by the Army on the assumption that expenses beyond normal operating costs -- i.e., incremental costs -- would be reimbursed by the Federal agency outside the Defense Department making the request for military participation, in this case the State Department. Those Army major commands providing assistance in such a situation absorbed the costs initially from available existing funds using automatic reimbursement procedures. Department of the Army funds were used temporarily to defray costs which accrued beyond normal Army operating expenses and which were directly chargeable to or caused by the refugee support operations. Such charges billed for reimbursement fell into one of three broad categories -- Opening Costs, Incremental Costs, and Closing Costs.⁵⁵

The Army's reimbursement requests (billings) were submitted to the State Department with an indication of the location, code name, and so on, of the expenses. An addendum sheet which specified a breakdown of the elements of expense by appropriation was attached to each bill. In the Indochinese Refugee Program, expenses categorized as incremental costs included the following: temporary civilian help; overtime; travel and per diem of military and Army civilian personnel; consummable items issued, such as comfort kits; transportation of personnel, supplies, and equipment; port loading and offloading; handling - air, ocean, and inland waterway; repair or reconditioning of returned nonconsummable items; nonreturned supplies or equipment; and petroleum, oils, and lubricants including aviation products. A breakout of incremental costs by object classification was as shown on Table 24. In addition to the costs reflected on this table, the U.S. Army also incurred \$1.6 million in reimbursable medical support costs stemming from refugee support operations at the Orote Point Camp on Guam, at Fort Chaffee, and at Fort Indiantown Gap. Procedures for installation accounting were established for contingencies in accordance with Army Regulations 37-108, 37-110, and 37-111. The total value of charges were separately calculated for each agency outside the Defense Department. Charges and collections were recorded and reported in the normal manner as prescribed by regulations. Returned supplies and equipment were credited toward the applicable account for all returns to the Army Stock Fund. Billings were submitted on Standard Form 1080 with supporting documents to respective major commands which in turn consolidated the billings for submission to Department of the Army. Department of the Army eventually billed the refugee support program for a total of \$61.9 million for all of its support activities. (Chart 14).

55.

(1) Intvw, Mr. M.W. Stark, FORSCOM Hist Ofc, w/Mr. F.F. Griffin, DCSCOMPT F&A Div, 11 May 77; (2) Intvw, Mr. M.W. Stark, FORSCOM Hist Ofc, w/Mr. P.J. Meyer, DCSCOMPT F&A Div, 4 Jan 78.

REIMBURSEMENT BY INSTALLATION - OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS
(30 SEPTEMBER 1976)

SUPPORTING INSTALLATIONS	AMOUNTS-Cumulative 1080's
<u>Total</u>	<u>\$48,527,343.01</u>
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.	1,485.27
Ft. Belvoir, Va.	53,172.84
Ft Benning, Ga.	64,869.84
Ft. Bliss, Tex.	8,551.27
Ft. Bragg, N.C.	302,220.19
Ft. Buchanan, CZ	1,337.22
Ft. Campbell, Ky.	163,158.75
Ft. Carson, Colo.	158,283.50
Ft. Clayton, CZ	20,100.00
Ft. Devens, Mass.	129,239.22
Ft. Dix, N.J.	68,963.04
Ft. Drum, N.Y.	75.55
Ft. Eustis, Va.	5,611.58
Ft. Gordon, Ga.	1,270.00
Ft. Hamilton, N.Y.	1,413.56
Ft. B. Harrison, Ind.	261.29
Ft. Hood, Tex.	298,591.22
Ft. Sam Houston, Tex.	53,286.98
Ft. Indiantown Gap, Penn.	16,095,159.02
Ft. Jackson, S.C.	5,254.09
Ft. Knox, Ky.	142,001.95
Ft. Lee, Va.	9,324.08
Ft. Lewis, Wash.	203,380.56
Ft. McPherson, Ga.	5,039.31
U.S. Army Forces Command	55,133.45
Camp McCoy, Wisc.	181,579.35
Ft. Meade, Md.	263,137.48
Ft. Ord, Calif.	31,074.52
Ft. Polk, La.	4,675.12
Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.	206,497.66
Ft. Richardson, Alaska	5,476.55
Ft. Riley, Kan.	47,843.16
Ft. Rucker, Ala.	2,639.80
Ft. Shafter, Hawaii	1,057,332.55
Ft. Sheridan, Ill.	178.47
Ft. Sill, Okla.	28,829,738.67
Ft. Stewart, Ga.	16,158.70
Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo.	33,827.14

Source: DCSCOMPT Working Papers, Mr. F.F. Girfin, Jr. (UNCLASSIFIED)

TABLE 26

COST RECAPITULATION BY ITEMS OF EXPENSE
OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS - FORSCOM
(30 NOVEMBER 1977)

Elements of Expense	Costs
<u>Total</u>	<u>\$48,761,051.32</u>
EOE 10: Pay & Benefits	8,018,141.69
EOE 21: Travel & Transport of Persons	3,750,134.61
EOE 22: Transport of Things	151,539.97
EOE 23: Rents, Communications, & Utilities	1,157,374.92
EOE 24: Commercial Reproduction	13,018.57
EOE 25: Other Contractual Services	9,119,649.06
EOE 26: Supplies & Materials	25,352,239.50
EOE 27: Service Charge Function	95,648.36
EOE 31: Equipment	1,059,959.64
2162010: Family Sep. Allowance	43,345.00

Source: DCSCOMPT Working Papers, Mr. P.J. Meyer. (UNCLASSIFIED).

FORSCOM Costs and Reimbursements

FORSCOM established monthly reporting and billing procedures at the very beginning of Operation NEW ARRIVALS and implemented a system of detailed accounting codes under reimbursement procedures to identify all transactions pertaining to the operation. The command then forwarded monthly reports to the State Department with information copies to the Department of the Army reflecting all incremental costs incurred by object classification for refugee support operations at the Orote Point Camp on Guam, at Fort Chaffee, and at Fort Indiantown Gap, and an identification of items or services rendered. For purposes of internal control, FORSCOM also required an identification of costs as gross, normal credits, and incremental. FORSCOM received the Standard Form 1080 billings, with supporting documents, from all installations expending FORSCOM funds for Operation NEW ARRIVALS (Table 25). FORSCOM consolidated this financial data into its monthly billings to the State Department with information copies to the Department of the Army. FORSCOM also prepared a monthly report for the Department of the Army which contained a consolidation by item of expense (Table 26), a listing of stations for reimbursement by appropriation, as well as schedules providing the description of items and services rendered to the supported activities. The total cost of FORSCOM's participation in Operation NEW ARRIVALS as actually billed, less charges submitted by the U.S. Army Communications Command and the U.S. Army Health Services Command, amounted to more than \$48 million by 30 November 1977. This total amount included some \$5 million for opening costs, \$37 million for operating costs, and \$6 million for closing costs.⁵⁶

56.

(1) Intvw, Mr. M.W. Stark, FORSCOM Hist Ofc, w/Mr. F.F. Griffin, DCSCOMPT F&A Div, 11 May 77; (2) Intvw, Mr. M.W. Stark, FORSCOM Hist Ofc, w/Mr. P.J. Meyer, DCSCOMPT F&A Div, 4 Jan 78.

Chapter V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

Background

Operation NEW ARRIVALS represented the Army's largest peacetime humanitarian effort. Fortunately, it was conducted during a relatively uneventful period, although it had to be mounted and supported within the context of the All Volunteer Force and the Army's efforts to staff, train, and deploy two additional combat brigades to Europe under the Brigade 75/76 Rotation Program. By tradition, the Army had sought to avoid lengthy and involved participation in American domestic situations and it was not until after the Civil War that the Army played an important role in such matters as disaster relief. Even then, the Army limited its activities largely to exploration, medical research, construction, and the suppression of domestic disturbances. Until Operation NEW ARRIVALS, the Army's major domestic efforts had been devoted to supporting the Civilian Conservation Corps in the 1930's and Operation MERCY in 1957.

Civilian Conservation Corps

In 1933, during the worst part of the Great Depression, Congress had established the Civilian Conservation Corps as a means of providing employment for thousands of young men in reforestation and other reclamation projects. President Franklin D. Roosevelt directed the Army to mobilize these men and to operate their camps without making the Civilian Conservation Corps program a military project in disguise. Within seven weeks time, 3,000 Army officers and noncommissioned officers mobilized 310,000 men into 1,315 camps, a mobilization more rapid and orderly than any in the Army's long history. For more than a year, the War Department kept a large number of Regular Army soldiers assigned to this task, which resulted in the stripping of key leadership from many tactical units. Regular Army training came to a standstill and unit readiness for immediate military employment was virtually destroyed. Fortunately, in the second half of 1934, the War Department received authorization to call to extended active duty some 9,300 reserve officers who were used to replace the Regulars in operating the Civilian Conservation Corps program. Many of these reserve officers continued in this service until 1940 and the general mobilization for training prior to World War II. Although the Civilian Conservation Corps was disruptive to Army training and readiness at the start it did furnish thousands of trained officers and disciplined young men to the American military forces in World War II.¹

1.

Maurice Matloff (ed.), American Military History (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 413 - 14.

Many of the hardships which the Army endured with the Civilian Conservation Corps emerged once again, although on an admittedly smaller scale, during its support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS. The Army's involvement in the operation and logistical support of three of the Indochinese Refugee Centers (Orote Camp on Guam, Fort Chaffee, Ark., and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa.) became a military duty which used the talents of over 6,000 officers and enlisted personnel of both the Active and Reserve Components. Since many of these personnel were employed in operations quite similar to those for which they had trained, there was some practical value to their employment. Hardest hit of the Army's Major Army Commands was the Health Services Command, which had a limited number of personnel to deploy for support of such a large, long-term domestic emergency. Many Army hospitals throughout the nation experienced cut-backs of their staffs with an attendant reduction in the amount and quality of care normally provided military personnel and their dependents. FORSCOM's Strategic Army Forces were also hard-pressed from time to time to maintain optimum readiness and deployment standards.²

Operation MERCY

Background. Until its assignment to conduct Operation MERCY in 1956 - 1957, the Army's involvement with refugees had historically been confined to wartime operations.³ During the course of World War II, U.S. Army military government units followed the combat units in Europe and helped to reestablish normal living conditions in war-shattered cities and cared for large numbers of displaced persons until they could return home, or other arrangements could be made. Consequently, outside of wartime conditions, the Army had little to do with refugee problems, all of which had occurred outside the United States. In all of these cases, either the Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration (ICEM) or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) took care of the refugees. While some of these refugees eventually came to the United States, they did not come in such numbers as would require special processing. As a matter of fact, the first large-scale influx of refugees to the United States took place following the ill-fated Hungarian Revolution of 1956. This event also marked the first time the United States used U.S. Army military government units in peacetime and the first time such units were employed within the continental United States.⁴

2.

Intvw, Mr. M.W. Stark, FORSCOM Hist Ofc, w/MAJ R.B. Judy, FORSCOM Surg Ofc, 5 Mar 76.

3.

Unless otherwise indicated, the entire paragraph is based on: (1) HQ U.S. Army Refugee Reception Center, Historical Report: 41st Military Government Company in "Operation MERCY" (Phase II, 1 Jan through 11 Mar 57), 11 Mar 57; (2) 41st Military Government Company, Military Government Report: Operation MERCY, 1957.

4.

U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, Special Text 41-174; "Operation MERCY," 26 Jan 57.

Soviet Intervention. In late October 1956, student demonstrations and street riots in Hungary escalated into outright rebellion and the communist government of that country requested Soviet aid. On 24 October, Russian forces seized Budapest. The governing communists then replaced the Premier, with Imre Nagy who promised to oust the Russians. Soviet forces withdrew on 1 November but returned on 4 November in force, shooting freely and killing many civilians. After seizing the city once again, the Soviets erected a puppet government. Meanwhile, masses of Hungarians fled the country and by the end of April 1957, approximately 175,000 Hungarians had sought asylum in Austria. Normally, the relocation of such refugees had been accomplished in the past by the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. However, this situation proved to be rather unprecedented for peacetime conditions and the committee was unable to provide proper care for the refugees. The sheer numbers involved made it impractical for the Federal Republic of Austria to shelter them for any length of time since it was still in the process of recovering from ten years of post-World War II occupation by the Soviets and the three major Allied Powers. On 5 November, the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration appealed to the Free World for offers of asylum for these people. Twenty-five nations responded with offers varying from the acceptance of a few hundred to an unlimited number.⁵

Executive Order Number 9. On 9 November, President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued Executive Order Number 9 which permitted the immediate entry of 6,500 Hungarian refugees who were fleeing Soviet military occupation. The President then invoked a little used section of the McCarran-Walter Act to permit an additional 15,000 Hungarian refugees to be admitted to the United States in a "parole" status. Since this action did not in itself guarantee permanent residence, Congress later passed special legislation which permitted most of them to apply for that status. Subsequently, the President directed that the United States would continue to grant entry to these refugees until the Congress passed legislation which would either limit the number authorized for entry or simply open the doors to all who were fleeing communist rule.

U.S. Army Responsibilities. In order to evacuate the Hungarian refugees from Austria, the United States arranged for transportation on a large scale, using both ships and aircraft. In view of the fact that existing relief agencies in the continental United States did not readily possess the required organizational and material resources to deal with the numbers of refugees expected, President Eisenhower directed the Army to provide the necessary facilities and logistical support for both the refugees and some twenty-five governmental and Voluntary Agencies charged with processing and resettling the refugees under the provisions of the Hungarian Refugee Relief Program (Operation MERCY). In order to coordinate the activities of all of these agencies, the President formed the President's Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief which, like the

5.

Ibid.

Interagency Task Force formed to conduct Operation NEW ARRIVALS, coordinated the entire refugee relief operation. Unlike the later Interagency Task Force, the President's Committee did not have a senior civil official commanding at Camp Kilmer, N.J., the site of the Hungarian Refugee Reception Center.

Mission of First U.S. Army. The Department of the Army assigned the task of housing, feeding, and providing medical care for the Hungarian refugees to First U.S. Army, Governors Island, N.Y., with Lt. Gen. Thomas W. Herren in command. First U.S. Army selected Camp Kilmer, N.J., as the reception center, since it was equipped with excellent facilities for such an operation and was situated in close proximity to two major ports of entry -- McGuire Air Force Base, N.J., and Brooklyn Army Terminal. The camp was also located conveniently close to New York City where the majority of the Voluntary Agencies were located. Brig. Gen. Sidney C. Wooten commanded the Camp Kilmer Refugee Reception Center during the operation.

Use of Civil Affairs Military Government Units. Among the military units deployed by the Department of the Army to Camp Kilmer was a Civil Affairs Military Government (CAMG) Provisional Detachment, formed from elements of the 41st Military Government Company, Fort Gordon, Ga. This unit arrived at Camp Kilmer on 16 November 1956 and was given the mission of supporting U.S. Government agencies by receiving, housing, feeding, caring, and providing statistical coverage of the Hungarian refugees during their processing and making them available to the Voluntary Agencies at the earliest possible moment for the purpose of resettlement. The influx of refugees was such by 8 December that the Provisional Detachment was discontinued and replaced by the 41st Military Government Company which, in turn, was later augmented with additional personnel from other military government units. Among the governmental agencies supported at Camp Kilmer was the U.S. Border Patrol, an element of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. While the Army Military Police secured the camp as a whole, the Border Patrol secured the refugee areas and the refugees themselves. Border Patrolmen handled the arrest or detention of the refugees since the government maintained that the Military Police had no jurisdiction. Since many refugees had friends and/or relatives living in the United States they were disposed to leaving the Refugee Reception Center before they completed their out-processing procedures. The Border Patrol was charged with finding them and returning them to Camp Kilmer.

Procurement of Interpreters. Many of the refugees did not speak English so that the Army had to employ interpreters throughout the operation (as with Operation NEW ARRIVALS). At the peak of Operation MERCY, 51 military and 31 civilian interpreters were employed. The civilian interpreters, primarily local housewives, were recruited by both the Army and the Voluntary Agencies. A large percentage of the military interpreters were Lodge Act enlistees who were themselves only a few months removed from refugee status. Unlike operation NEW ARRIVALS no problems arose with regard to incompetency among the interpreters.

In-processing Procedures. Initially, Hungarian refugees arrived from Austria by way of Germany via the Military Air Transport Service. Later, as the refugees continued to grow in number, the Military Sea Transport Service used five of its ships to augment the airlift. When the refugees arrived by air, Hungarian speaking military government personnel met them at McGuire Air Force Base and gave them a brief orientation during the bus trip to Camp Kilmer. Upon their arrival at the Refugee Reception Center, they were received by the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS). That agency was concerned with ensuring that none of the refugees had a communicable disease or one which would exclude them from entry under normal conditions. In either case, those requiring medical treatment were placed in quarantine until the condition was cured or they could be cared for on a long-term basis. The necessity for these measures was supported by the fact that 8 percent of the refugees screened had either tuberculosis or venereal disease. Routine smallpox vaccinations, required for all persons entering the United States, were administered by an Army medical team attached to the 41st Military Government Company. This team also rendered emergency medical and dental care and sent refugees requiring further care to the Camp Kilmer Hospital which was operated by the 17th Field Hospital. Those Hungarian refugees arriving at the Brooklyn Army Terminal by sea received their preliminary physical checks and vaccinations from U.S. Public Health Service teams on board during the voyage. Additional screening procedures were conducted by the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The Camp Kilmer Hospital opened a living area for long-term patients and their families to keep them together. Other refugees were assigned to overnight, temporary, or long-term billets, segregated by family -- or by sex in the case of single men and women -- depending upon their time of arrival during the day and their processing status. Each refugee over ten years of age was furnished a Post Exchange coupon book worth \$2.50 on a weekly basis to enable them to purchase necessities. The Red Cross distributed comfort items and clothing items which had been donated by individuals and service organizations.

Refugee processing at Camp Kilmer was relatively simple compared to that of Operation NEW ARRIVALS, since it involved only four stations. At the first station each refugee was interviewed by a representative of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the information gathered was entered on the refugee's Alien Registration Form. At the second station all refugees over fourteen years of age were fingerprinted for identification as required by law. At the third station the refugee's identification picture was taken. In the beginning, this requirement delayed the completion of the required processing due to the 3- to 4-day photo processing time required. This problem was solved with the introduction of a new Polaroid camera which produced four prints in less than a minute. The last station was manned by the Department of Labor where each refugee of employable age was interviewed for information concerning job skills. This was necessary since there was a marked difference between the terminology used regarding professional status in the United States and that currently in use in Hungary. Also, at this station, the Social Security Administration issued social security numbers to facilitate the refugee's employment and to prevent the crowding of regional offices. Since a large number of Hungarian refugees already had friends or relatives in the United States, the finding of sponsors, unlike,

Operation NEW ARRIVALS, posed no great problem. In fact, when the refugees first arrived at Camp Kilmer, the Red Cross gave each a free phone call anywhere within the country. These calls frequently resulted in immediate offers of sponsorship. During the period 16 November through 31 March 1957, the Camp Kilmer Refugee Reception Center processed a total of 30,673 refugees, 6,238 of whom entered the country with visas, while the remaining 24,435 entered under the parole program.

Conclusions. Taken as a whole, Operation MERCY, like Operation NEW ARRIVALS, reflected well on the Army's ability to meet an emergency situation of large proportions. As with the Indochina refugee problem, a situation arose quickly which could not be handled by other than the military services, particularly the Army with its manpower and expertise in handling large numbers of people. Despite some initial confusion over how many refugees were coming and exactly what was to be done for them, the operation flowed smoothly. Once the operation was concluded, the Military Government people concerned reviewed their experience and drafted several recommendations for similar future operations. They emphasized that Military Government experts should be included in the early planning phases for any similar operation. They recommended that the Military Government unit commander should be made responsible for all phases of refugee control and administration. In addition, civil affairs personnel should take charge of all supervision of and accounting for the refugees and, finally, they recommended that their supply personnel be considered for training in basic supply procedures at appropriate service schools.

Operation NEW ARRIVALS

Background. In the initial stages of Operation NEW ARRIVALS, the Army was uncertain as to just how many Indochinese refugees would require support in much the same way as in Operation MERCY. On 8 April 1955, Maj. Gen. Charles R. Sniffen, Director of Operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Department of the Army, submitted a staff study to the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Fred C. Weyand concerning the possible use of U.S. Reserve Civil Affairs units for Refugee Center operations. This staff study recalled that Civil Affairs units -- formerly known as military government units -- had been responsible for handling refugees in the field during World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. They had also been used to process refugees in the continental United States in support of Operation MERCY as outlined earlier. The staff study pointed out that, if 1.5 million refugees were brought into the country as some earlier forecasts had suggested, the Department of the Army had the capacity -- in the form of its Army Reserve Civil Affairs units -- to cope with the task, provided that it was designated

the Executive Agent for the operation. Otherwise, the Department planned to use these same reserve units as part of a combined governmental effort.⁶

Use of Civil Affairs Personnel. General Sniffen emphasized the fact that the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Bragg, N.C., was the only such unit in the Active Army and that it had a strength of only 119 officer and enlisted personnel. He believed that the fifty-two Army Reserve Civil Affairs units, which totaled 6,964 officer and enlisted personnel, would have to handle emergency requirements and outlined three options for their possible use. He noted that a selective mobilization of Army Reserve Civil Affairs units would be one way to meet the refugee problem. This mobilization could be established under Section 672 and 673 of Title 10, U.S. Code, if authorized by either the President or the Congress. He stated, however, that such a course of action might prove to be disadvantageous in that the possibility existed that it would produce a number of adverse political repercussions since it represented a selective Army Reserve mobilization for a Vietnam related purpose. General Sniffen's second option involved the use of Civil Affairs Army Reservists in the course of their Annual Training. During these 12 to 14 day periods, the U.S. Army Reserve units could be employed successively from May through September. He believed that by overlapping the Annual Training tours the various Civil Affairs units could, in fact, handle the required Indochinese refugee support operations. However, this option also had its disadvantages. The use of these units at full strength would not be cost effective, since that would require the use of every member of a particular unit. He observed that it would be much more practical to tailor these units into operational teams with each team containing appropriate functional elements. This however, did not provide for continuity of operations. The last option, and the one finally chosen, was to order individual volunteer reservists to tours of 90 - 120 days to augment the Active Army Civil Affairs forces. It was in this fashion that the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion was chosen to serve as the nucleus of civil affairs operations first at the Orote Point Camp on Guam and then at Fort Chaffee, Ark., and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa. General Sniffen believed that this option had the advantage of providing a degree of flexibility absent in the other two options. The Civil Affairs volunteer reservists would thus augment the four task force elements of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, or could be organized into teams for attachment to the task forces. In supporting this third option, the Department of the Army took the position that the use of these individual volunteer civil affairs reservists would not constitute simply a training

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(1) Intvw, CPT E.D. Miller, FORSCOM Hist Ofc, w/Mr. Anthony Auletta, Civil Affairs, DA DCSOPS, 8 Apr 75 (hereafter referred to as the Auletta intvw); (2) Information Paper, MG C.R. Sniffen, DA DCSOPS, to CSA, 8 Apr 75, subj: Feasibility of Using Reserve Civil Affairs Units in Refugee Aid Program (hereafter referred to as the Sniffen Study).

exercise but would constitute the practical use of these personnel in the type of assignments for which they had been trained. The Department was confident, in later April 1975, there would be enough volunteers to support the entire operation, both that operated by the Army, as well as by the other Services.⁷

Deployment of Civil Affairs Packages. Emerging Congressional opposition to the mobilization of U.S. Army Reserve units to support the Vietnam Refugee Program made it quite clear to the Army that the use of individual civil affairs volunteers was the only immediately available way in which to meet the civil affairs support requirements of the oncoming flood of refugees. In the course of Operation NEW ARRIVALS, staging camps were established in the Philippines and on Guam and Wake Islands while four Refugee Centers were established within the continental United States. The Defense Department selected the Department of the Army to operate the Orote Point Camp on Guam and the Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Centers in the continental United States. Within these locations the assigned civil affairs elements were responsible for logistical operations in the refugee areas and for ensuring that the refugees were properly supervised in their day-to-day activities and routine camp life. Without the order established by these civil affairs elements, other phases of camp operations might have become disorganized. The Department of the Army alerted FORSCOM's 96th Civil Affairs Battalion for deployment on 22 April 1975 when it became obvious that it would be needed for the Refugee Center operations. The unit immediately began reviewing its deployment plans and procedures and prepared an estimate of the augmentation which would be required for a refugee support operation of this nature. At that point in time, the battalion commander had no idea where his unit would be deployed. Consequently, not knowing its destination, the number of refugees to be supported, or their general condition, the battalion formulated estimates in general terms of medical augmentation, legal augmentation, language qualifications, finance and accounting, contracting operations, public information, and security deployment guidance. On 25 April, the Department of the Army notified the battalion that it would probably be split between one or more locations. Based upon this information the battalion commander split his unit up into four company size "packages," each of which held a balanced civil affairs capacity. On 30 April, one of the four balanced packages deployed to the Orote Point Camp on Guam while another prepared for deployment to Fort Chaffee.⁸

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(1) Sniffen Study; (2) Auletta intvw.

8.

Intvw, MAJ R.A. Alexander, 44th Mil Hist Det, w/LTC R.M. Weekly, Cdr 96th Civil Affairs Bn, 19 May 75 (hereafter cited as the Weekly intvw).

Use of Army Reserve Civil Affairs Volunteers. During the latter half of May, the first Army Reserve volunteers began arriving at Fort Chaffee to begin the transfer of civil affairs support operations from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. By 28 June, most of the Active Army personnel had been phased out of the operation and had returned to their home station at Fort Bragg, N.C., to resume their Airborne "D" Force Package responsibilities. Active Army civil affairs personnel at Fort Chaffee were replaced by 25 Army Reservists -- 13 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 11 enlisted personnel. On 3 July, Lt. Col. John R. Kearsley, Jr., Commander of the U.S. Army Reserve 358th Civil Affairs Battalion, Area B, Northtown, Pa., assumed command of the Army Reserve civil affairs element at Fort Chaffee. Later on in July the Fort Chaffee Garrison and the Task Force merged under the table of distribution and allowances (TDA) provided by FORSCOM and the former civil affairs element became the Directorate of Civil-Military Affairs.⁹

The third package from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion deployed to Fort Indiantown Gap on 23 May with 11 officers and 21 enlisted personnel augmented by 6 officers and 35 enlisted personnel of the 4th Psychological Operations Group. On 24 May, the package formed the Civil Affairs Composite Support Battalion (Prov), commanded by the Civil Affairs Team Chief, Maj. Ormond C. Cunningham. This unit was placed under the operational control of the 46th Support Group, which provided the overall guidance while the civil affairs personnel directed the actual establishment and fill of the refugee living areas. By the second week of June, Army Reserve volunteer personnel began to arrive. By late July, they had replaced all but three of the Active Army personnel. The battalion headquarters, in keeping with basic civil affairs doctrine which stressed minimum Army personnel and maximum civilian volunteers to run the Refugee Center, withdrew from the day-to-day administration of the center as soon as practicable. This administration was gradually transferred to the military and civilian area coordinators within the four Refugee Center sections. This element was redesignated as the Civil Affairs Support Battalion (Composite/Provisional) on 23 July. Two days later, this unit, now manned entirely by Army Reserve volunteers, assumed operational responsibilities from the remaining Active Army personnel of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion who departed for Fort Bragg and the resumption of their normal duties.¹⁰

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(1) Ibid.; (2) Intvw, CPT E.D. Miller, FORSCOM Hist Ofc, w/CPT W. Bowers, DCMA-Ft Chaffee, 11 Aug 75; (3) HQ TFNA & Ft Chaffee, AAR, Vol. IV, pp. IV-I-1, IV-VI-1.

10.

(1) Staff Paper, CPT J. Clark, 8 Aug 75, subj: Civil Affairs Operations During Operation NEW ARRIVALS, Ft Indiantown Gap, Pa. (on file at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Wash, D.C.); (2) HQ 46th Spt Gp, AAR-NEW ARRIVALS-FIG, Vol. 2, p. P-1.

Conclusions

General

Operation NEW ARRIVALS turned out to be the largest peacetime humanitarian operation in which the U.S. Army had ever been involved. U.S. Army Forces Command and its subordinate units bore the brunt of supervising the Army's portion of this massive effort, providing needed support, and dispensing guidance. FORSCOM's involvement in this historic effort really began with Operation BABYLIFT, the evacuation of some 2,715 Vietnamese orphans from the war torn nation. During the period 3 April through 25 June 1975, FORSCOM units supported this effort at the Presidio of San Francisco, Calif., and Fort Lewis, Wash., where 2,077 orphans (77 percent of the total) were cared for and processed for entry into American society. Shortly after the inception of Operation BABYLIFT, when the Vietnamese collapse was but a few days away, the numbers of refugees soon swelled far beyond all early forecasts, thus forcing the U.S. Government to find immediate suitable safe havens. The first safe haven constructed on American soil was at Orote Point Camp on Guam. This camp was hastily constructed by the U.S. Navy which subsequently turned it over to the U.S. Army to operate. FORSCOM units from the 25th Infantry Division (-), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, along with other units furnished by the U.S. Support Command, Hawaii, as well as from installations in the continental United States, operated under the control of the U.S. Navy. These units received, processed, and otherwise supported 112,000 refugees -- 81 percent of the total of 138,000 refugees who passed through Guam in Operation NEW LIFE. This proved to be the largest single refugee camp in operation, requiring some 1,800 troops at its peak point. This number was rather large, considering the fact that the presence of the Federal civilian agencies was held to a minimum and that hospitalization was provided by the Navy.¹¹

As the number of refugees grew even larger, the U.S. Government initially established three Refugee Centers within the continental United States, with a fourth added later on. Two of these four Refugee Centers -- Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap -- were operated by FORSCOM acting as the Army's Executive Agent. Of the 138,869 Indochinese refugees processed through the Refugee Centers in the continental United States, 73,021, or 53 percent, passed through the FORSCOM operated centers -- 50,809 at Fort Chaffee and 22,103 at Fort Indiantown Gap. At its peak, this processing effort required the services of some 1,800 military personnel and over 1,000 civilians including those from other Federal agencies and Voluntary Agencies. The total cost of FORSCOM's participation in the three programs amounted to more than \$48 million by 30 November 1977. This total amount included some \$5 million for opening costs, \$37 million for operating costs, and \$6 million for closing costs.

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This entire section is based on: (1) HQDA, AAR-NEW LIFE/NEW ARRIVALS, pp. 1-A-1 - 1-A-14; (2) HEW Task Force, Report to the Congress, 15 Jun 76, pp. 3, 12 - 15; (3) HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS-AAR, pp. A-1 - A-5, S-1 - S-6, R-6 - R-8; (4) Public Law 94-286, 14 May 76.

At the conclusion of Operation NEW ARRIVALS, the U.S. Army as well as the U.S. Army Forces Command received numerous congratulatory messages on the handling of the project. In addition, Senator Edward F. Kennedy's critical investigation of the entire operation had nothing but praise for the Army's role. All recognized that the success of the operation hinged primarily on the military departments which were responsible for the transportation and the continued basic support of the refugees in both the Pacific Area and the continental United States. The military inherited this responsibility because the civilian agencies lacked the expertise, flexibility, and resource capabilities for the immediate management of large numbers of people. This of course, was the reason why the U.S. military, especially the Army, had been called upon in the past to provide disaster relief, refugee support operations, and other large-scale operations. Operating the Civilian Conservation Corps camps during the Great Depression, supporting the Hungarian refugees in the latter fifties, and providing disaster relief at home and aboard had all required varying degrees of Army support. This sort of activity, valuable as it was, was not one of the Army's major missions and could adversely affect the Army's overall readiness for deployment and combat. Fortunately, Operations BABYLIFT, NEW LIFE, and NEW ARRIVALS had very little adverse effect upon the readiness of the U.S. Army Forces Command.

Emergency Nature of Operation NEW ARRIVALS

Operation NEW ARRIVALS was carried out on an emergency basis from the very beginning. Matters developed so quickly that the civilian agencies involved, especially the State Department, which was supposedly in charge, could not react fast enough. This put the military departments in the position of having to provide all of the required support while the civilian agencies generally supervised and directed the operations and paid for the services. The direction provided, however, was frequently fragmentary and inaccurate due to the chaotic circumstances surrounding the downfall of Saigon. For example, the State Department originally announced that 20,000 Vietnamese were to be evacuated. This number suddenly increased to 200,000 without any explanation because the State Department had no clear idea as to how many were being evacuated. The U.S. Ambassador in South Vietnam deliberately interpreted the authorized evacuation figures given to him by the Department of State to mean heads of households thereby increasing the potential number of evacuees by a factor of eight. When South Vietnam suddenly collapsed, the U.S. Embassy was unable to control the mass flight of panicked Vietnamese and over 130,000 fled to American safe havens. Although the U.S. Government set up a civil-military operation under civil control to administer the program, it soon proved to be unable to keep up with the fluid, fast moving situation. Thus, the military departments had to transport and support the refugees until they could be assimilated into American society. This meant that the feeding, shelter, medical care, and recreation of the displaced peoples all came from military sources.

FORSCOM's Role

Mission. At the inception of the operation, the Department of the Army directed the U.S. Army Forces Command to provide and coordinate all support from the continental United States for the Army's Refugee Centers, including the effort on Guam. As part of this mission, the Department of the Army authorized FORSCOM to direct other Major Army Commands to provide personnel. Other forms of support from the major commands were provided by either mutual coordination or through direction by Department of the Army on request from FORSCOM. This arrangement often caused confusion or delay in response, particularly in the early stages of Operation NEW ARRIVALS when speed was of the essence. FORSCOM quickly adopted the position that, in future operations of this nature, the authority to direct support from other major commands should be more clearly defined and announced to all concerned. If such authority were granted in the future, it should cover all areas of support, and the Department of the Army should only intervene to resolve major problems. The coordination problem was complicated by the fact that, in the space of three days, FORSCOM had to prepare contingency plans for refugee operations at three different installations, nominate the installations to be used as Refugee Centers, and obtain and deploy troop units and individuals to Guam. It was no wonder that, under such circumstances, a major problem arose during the site selection process. The original concept of the refugee operation, as presented by the State Department, called for a short-term requirement to house and otherwise support some 20,000 Vietnamese refugees for no more than 90 days. Consequently, FORSCOM planners did not evaluate any cold weather capabilities or requirements for natural resources. FORSCOM did, however, heed the State Department's request to keep the Refugee Centers in relatively mild climates. On the basis of subsequent and largely unforeseen events, FORSCOM soon discovered that the real possibility of extended operations should be included as a factor in selecting an installation. Furthermore, FORSCOM learned that, if the installation or installations selected for Refugee Centers were semiactive in nature, then existing utilities contracts must be immediately re-evaluated to determine their current validity. FORSCOM encountered further unanticipated problems in May when the original concept of a short-term operation became obsolete in the face of a huge and sudden increase in the actual number of refugees. At that time, FORSCOM requested further guidance from Department of the Army concerning possible preparations for cold weather operations. The Department of the Army responded in the negative; as far as the Department was concerned, the 90-day operational limit was still in effect. Consequently, FORSCOM's planning for cold weather operations did not begin until July 1975. By that time, action was already overdue in order to prepare the Refugee Centers and their estimated populations for winter. For instance, normally available procurement procedures such as requests for bids to supply winter clothing could not be used, thus causing greater expenditures than might otherwise have been encountered. In this area, FORSCOM learned that timeliness was essential in planning the continuation of an on-going action. Plans had to be developed, reviewed, and approved as soon as a change in the situation became apparent. Delays in this process resulted in increased costs, slow deliveries, and hasty measures.

Chain of Command Problems -- Fort Chaffee. As soon as the Department of the Army directed FORSCOM to open the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center to receive incoming refugees from the Pacific Area, events moved rather well. The FORSCOM units moved quickly into place and immediately began the necessary preparations to receive the first refugees. However, while a FORSCOM Task Force was in charge of the operations at Fort Chaffee, that post was, in fact, a subinstallation of Fort Sill, Okla., an installation commanded by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Fort Sill soon interposed itself between FORSCOM and the Task Force at Fort Chaffee, thus creating an additional and unnecessary layer in the command structure. This undesirable situation frequently slowed FORSCOM's response to fast developing new requirements and confused matters by requiring FORSCOM to pass those requirements through this additional and quite unnecessary layer of command. FORSCOM strongly felt that if such operations in the future required one major command to use another major command's installation, the command charged with the primary operational responsibilities should be given operational control of the installation to ensure unity of command and immediate response to mission requirements.

Opening of the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center. Shortly after the Fort Chaffee Refugee Center had begun operations, the rapidly growing number of refugees in the Pacific Area dictated the opening of a fourth Refugee Center within the continental United States. Authorities in Washington decided that the Army should open a second Refugee Center rather than the Navy or Air Force. The Department of the Army directed FORSCOM to open Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa., as its second Refugee Center, although it was located in a region noted for its severe winter. Once again FORSCOM units deployed quickly and began preparation to receive the refugees. The establishment of the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center was greatly facilitated by the transfer of the experienced 46th Support Group from Fort Chaffee as well as the initial Fort Chaffee Task Force commander and a number of key staff personnel for bus operations. This rapid deployment of units from FORSCOM installations to the two Refugee Centers was accomplished with no significant adverse effect on their home installations except in the area of personnel administration. Two Adjutant General Personnel Service Companies were so involved in installation functions on a day-to-day basis that their departure to the refugee centers resulted in a significant degrading of personnel administration at their home installations. In addition, both companies had to leave key personnel behind to accomplish a minimum of essential installation functions. To no one's surprise, the lesson was again learned that the involvement of table of organization and equipment (TOE) units in essential installation support activities impacted unfavorably on their ability to meet immediate deployment objectives. Other problems adversely affecting immediate deployment were the pregnancies of some female soldiers and contractual restrictions imposed by Station of Choice and Unit of Choice enlistments.

Problems Created by the All Volunteer Force. Soon after deployment, the two Refugee Centers discovered that a significant number of their female enlisted personnel were pregnant. This caused great concern among Army medical personnel since the women were assigned to duties in which they dealt directly with the refugees and were thus exposed to a broad

range of refugee diseases not normally encountered. As a result, these female soldiers had to be replaced at additional cost to the Government. FORSCOM informed its participating units that they should not deploy pregnant personnel to support humanitarian operations which would bring them in contact with contagious diseases. It should be noted, however, that the women deployed with their fellow soldiers and units and that there was hardly time, given the circumstances under which the deployments were carried out, to determine who was and who was not pregnant at the time of deployment. Another problem engendered by these rapid deployments was the not surprising discovery that a large number of Station of Choice and Unit of Choice enlisted personnel had been included in the Task Forces. Under the contractual obligations in effect in those two areas, Station of Choice enlistees were guaranteed a stabilized tour of duty at the post of their choice for twelve months, while Unit of Choice enlistees were guaranteed a stabilized tour of duty with their unit of choice for sixteen months. It was true that both enlistment contracts contained provisions for the waiver of these guarantees in a time of national emergency, but stringent definitions of an emergency made deployment of these personnel most difficult in any situation short of war. The Station of Choice problem was particularly evident in the support specialties such as cooks and medical personnel. The Unit of Choice problem was most noticeable with filler personnel used to round out deploying units. Under these circumstances FORSCOM requested that the Department of the Army declare an emergency for a 30-day period to avoid contract violations while replacements could be located or the individual soldiers involved could be prevailed upon to sign waivers permitting them to continue with the operation. Clearly, the ideal solution to such a problem would be the automatic issue of the appropriate authorizations by the Department of the Army to the major command controlling such an operation which would permit them to adjust the expiration date of the individual soldier's guaranteed period of stabilization to incorporate the number of days of temporary duty required in excess of thirty.

The Changing Role of the Task Forces. At the time when Operation NEW ARRIVALS was begun, the Defense Department directed the Department of the Army to provide logistical support for the Interagency Task Force and to provide housekeeping support services such as billets, security, messing, and health and comfort services for the Vietnamese refugees. As the operation developed at Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap, however, the Task Force commanders found themselves increasingly involved in the general processing and administration of the refugees. This situation arose because the Federal civil agencies on site primarily charged with these responsibilities lacked the capability to implement them. A case in point involved the two previously mentioned Adjutant General Personnel Service Companies. Initially, FORSCOM deployed these two units to Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap to provide required military administrative services for the FORSCOM military personnel assigned to these two centers. Upon their arrival, however, FORSCOM diverted the units to conducting refugee in-processing duties in order to maintain the flow of processing. In the absence of any guidelines from the concerned Federal civil agencies as to how to conduct the in-processing system, each unit established its own processing procedures using its own forms. However, this approach subsequently caused difficulty in the event of intercamp transfers. In addition, the Federal civil agencies did not hesitate to

present additional requirements to the Task Force commanders such as census taking and the compilation of various statistical data. Once again, those agencies provided no specific guidance. In another particularly critical area of operations FORSCOM was barely able to support its own linguistic requirements, much less provide interpreters for the Federal civil agencies. Not even the State Department could supply its own needs in this area. Needless to say, therefore, Operation NEW ARRIVALS required the support of large numbers of Army linguists fluent in Indochinese. Most of the linguists identified as such by the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center were found to be less than proficient in actual practice. FORSCOM tried various means to develop other sources, but had little success. The obvious on-site source of appropriate linguists -- the refugees themselves -- could not be used because current Federal law prohibited the hire of these badly needed people. FORSCOM did achieve some success in soliciting volunteer military personnel who were more or less bilingual because they were married to Vietnamese. FORSCOM recommended that, in future operations of this nature, all linguists be screened at their home installations prior to deployment in order to determine their actual degree of basic language proficiency.

Lack of Federal Civil Agency Guidelines. Other examples of the lack of guidance from Federal civil agencies as well as clearcut areas of responsibility, came to light when the Task Forces commanders had to negotiate directly with other Federal agencies such as the U.S. Postal Service, the U.S. Public Health Service, and the Department of Labor on matters of support for, or the use of, the refugees even though the Interagency Task Force supposedly had overall responsibility for the operation. Once again, FORSCOM's Task Force commanders had to fill a vacuum created by Federal civil agencies in order to keep the operation moving. This general lack of guidance was aggravated by the practice of the Federal civil agencies which rotated their key personnel every thirty days, thus causing a lack of continuity in the direction of their activities. The FORSCOM Task Force commanders were often required to sustain activities of a civilian agency during the transition period between civilian directors rather than permitting the activity to falter. Matters were further complicated by the fact that neither the State Department nor the Interagency Task Force had described in detail the scope of authority of the Senior Civil Coordinator, thus causing confusion as to the approval level for projects. In short, FORSCOM soon learned that the Army, by its very nature, was the only agency present in the Refugee Centers which possessed the personnel and materiel resources, as well as the inherent organizational flexibility, to respond adequately to the everchanging operational needs of a Refugee Center. It was obvious, based on experience in Operation NEW ARRIVALS, that Refugee Center commanders must expect and be prepared to assume immediate responsibility for diverse nonmilitary actions which could not, for one reason or another, be accomplished by other Federal agencies. FORSCOM believed that, in future humanitarian operations such as Operation NEW ARRIVALS, its Task Force commanders would have to be prepared to assume responsibility for such operations as the in-processing and general administration of refugees from the very outset. Even if memorandums of understanding (MOU) were concluded prior to the establishment of Refugee

Center operations by all of the Federal departments and agencies concerned defining precise lines of authority and responsibility, the fact that the centers were located on military installations would make the military, as far as the general public was concerned, responsible for the smooth functioning of the centers.

Employment of the Refugees. A number of vexing administrative problems could have been solved immediately if FORSCOM had had clear authority to employ the refugees themselves for such tasks as interpreters, food handlers, mail sorters, recreational aids, and, particularly in the case of Operation NEW ARRIVALS, Buddhist clergy. Upon requesting authority to hire refugee personnel for these purposes, Department of the Army informed FORSCOM that both Federal and Civil Service Regulations forbade the hiring of refugees who had not as yet achieved resident alien status. Since the refugees had not even achieved parolee status when they arrived at the centers, direct hire was out of the question. FORSCOM then considered using volunteers to perform these functions. The Department of the Army indicated that volunteers who possessed unique skills clearly unavailable in the local area could be used at the discretion of the local Task Force commander. While FORSCOM understood the need to protect American labor as far as Federal Government employment procedures were concerned, it was in need of skills which the local labor pools could not supply -- unlike Operation MERCY experience at Camp Kilmer, N.J., in 1957 when an ample supply of Hungarian speaking Americans was easily obtainable -- and thus it perceived these regulations as being overly restrictive. FORSCOM observers felt that unfair labor competition could not exist per se when the skills required were not available in the labor market on a responsive basis. Moreover, there was not enough time to train American workers for these jobs. It was obvious to Task Force personnel that some relaxation of the applicable laws and regulations in this matter must be considered in future operations when labor supply difficulties hindered the accomplishment of the mission.

Food Service Problems. A major problem area which affected both FORSCOM and the Army as a whole was the provision of adequate food service at the Refugee Centers. As soon as operations at Fort Chaffee had begun and while those at Fort Indiantown Gap were being established, it soon became apparent that there were not enough military food service personnel to go around and still properly feed the Active Army. Food service personnel were in short supply on an Army-wide basis in early 1975 and the additional demands for such personnel generated by the Orote Point Camp on Guam and Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap had depleted the supply of available food service personnel in the Army. The situation became so bad by the time that the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center was opened, that many FORSCOM installations were forced to feed their military personnel in shifts since so many cooks had already been deployed. FORSCOM immediately recognized that the refugees at Fort Indiantown Gap could not be fed exclusively with Army food service personnel except at the very beginning of the operation. FORSCOM's only realistic solution was to contract with civilian catering firms at both refugee centers but to leave the troop messes at the two installations in Army hands. Unfortunately, those Army cooks deployed to the Orote Point Camp on Guam had to remain there until the Army closed the camp since

there was no feasible way to replace them with civilian contract cooks at that location. Through this predictable experience, FORSCOM learned that, while the initial urgency of such an operation might dictate the use of military food service personnel, planning for refugee center operations should include the conversion of the food service to contract status as soon as possible. This same approach should be applied to other functional areas which lent themselves to contracting arrangements, especially in view of the current emphasis on the Army's readiness as well as the contractual restrictions of the All Volunteer Force's enlistment programs.

Acquisition of Specialized Personnel. Another major difficulty encountered during the operation was the acquisition of specialized personnel from the high priority Airborne "D" Force Package to support Operation NEW ARRIVALS. All but one of these was temporarily replaced within the package by a similar unit. The one exception -- the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion -- was the only such unit within the Active Army and its expertise was needed to administer the refugees on a day-to-day basis when they were not actively engaged in processing activities. Since all three refugee centers operated by the Army required their services, FORSCOM was compelled to break the battalion up into several tailored packets. Because this civil affairs battalion represented one of a kind, as well as for other reasons noted above, these packets could not continue operations at the refugee centers indefinitely without seriously compromising the deployment capability of the unit. FORSCOM's solution to this potentially grave problem was to use individual volunteer reservists who possessed the required civil affairs military occupational specialties. As the volunteers arrived at the Refugee Centers they replaced comparable personnel from the Active Army packets. The full and immediate use of U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs units would have greatly facilitated the overall operation but this was out of the question. Current federal legislation covering the matter did not permit a call-up for a contingency of this sort. Subsequently, the President gained the authorization in Public Law 94-286, 14 May 1976, to call up a total of 50,000 reservists for ninety days if he determined that it was necessary to augment the active forces for an operational mission. While this legislation might facilitate the staffing of future Refugee Centers with specialized personnel, it remained to be seen if any future President would invoke the law for that purpose. It would appear that the call-up of individual volunteers would remain the most probable and viable course of action for the immediate future.

Scheduling and Statistical Problems. As the operation continued through the summer and fall of 1975, the two Refugee Centers settled into a practical routine. FORSCOM continued its executive functions with a smaller staff since there was no longer a pressing requirement to keep a large number of personnel employed. As matters developed, FORSCOM supplied additional Army personnel and communications facilities to the Voluntary Agencies to enable them to speed up their resettlement rates. Major problems incurred included both the scheduling of incoming refugee flights and an accurate accounting of those refugees on hand in the centers. As far as the scheduling of incoming refugee flights was concerned, FORSCOM was unable to find any central scheduling authority. Requests to both the Twenty-first Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

to regulate the flights had the effect of temporarily alleviating the situation but no long-term changes took place. As far as FORSCOM was concerned, someone should be given authority in future operations to schedule the flow of refugees into the Reception Centers in the most efficient, economical, and optimum fashion. The second major difficulty involved the matter of keeping an accurate refugee census. Since both the Interagency Task Force and the military Task Forces submitted daily Situation Reports which included population figures which never agreed, there were constant and futile attempts to reconcile the figures. FORSCOM took the position that, in future operations requiring such counts, the agency charged with overall responsibility should determine the official daily population count.

Closing of the Refugee Centers. As the operation reached and passed the original 90-day limit, the Army let it be known that it could not support the Indochinese Refugee Centers on an indefinite basis. The Federal civil agency in control -- the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare -- let it be known that it had no intention of operating the Refugee Centers on their own. The result of this impasse was that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare announced the closing of three Refugee Centers in the fall of 1975, with the fourth Refugee Center at Fort Chaffee to be kept open indefinitely under Army auspices. At the same time, a sudden acceleration of refugee out-processing occurred, accompanied by the mass adoption of many refugees by several of the state governments. The rush to clear the Refugee Centers became more frantic as the end drew near. Families of over eight were broken up and parceled out among separate sponsors while single men were grouped together in groups of four or six with an employable English speaking leader. Some refugees ended up in halfway houses operated by various charitable organizations. Fort Chaffee, the last of the Refugee Centers, closed in December 1975.

However, this accelerated out-processing may have had a higher price than anticipated, since many of the refugees were sent into U.S. society before they were ready for assimilation. This was demonstrated by the fact that, as of 1 May 1977, 36 percent of the total number of refugees out-processed still received some portion of their income from federally funded refugee cash assistance programs. Moreover this percentage indicated an increasing trend in this area. On 2 September 1975 only 15 percent of the refugees received some form of federally financed assistance; on 1 June 1976, the figure had risen to 30 percent and, by 1 March 1977, it increased still further to 35 percent. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare noted that many (unspecified) of these refugees were employed at very low wages, hence they continued to qualify for assistance.

Closing Problems. Because the Federal civil agencies delayed the decision to close the Refugee Centers, FORSCOM was unable to develop realistic plans until late in the operation. Both Task Force commanders immediately initiated planning as soon as they had some idea of a closure date. Even this relatively simple matter was made more complicated, since the constant rotation of personnel by the other Federal agencies naturally produced conflicting opinions from a succession of their executive representatives concerning the requirements, responsibilities, and

reimbursement for termination projects. In addition, the lack of knowledge on the part of the Senior Civil Coordinators concerning their actual scope of authority led to further problems. At the Fort Chaffee Center, for example, the Senior Civil Coordinator approved some installation restoration work on a reimbursable basis as part of the overall termination project. Only after the work was partially accomplished using Army funds -- some time after the center had closed -- FORSCOM learned that the decision of the Senior Civil Coordinator had been overturned by the Comptroller of the Interagency Task Force. These two organizational and functional problems led to several additional months of negotiations between FORSCOM, the Department of the Army, and the Interagency Task Force to determine what could and could not be done as part of the termination process on a reimbursable basis in order to restore the Refugee Centers to their original configuration.

Accomplishments. Despite the manifold problems encountered, FORSCOM successfully concluded its assigned duties in support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS ahead of schedule and at less than the estimated cost. Working under less than ideal conditions, the command conducted its part of the operation with minimum effort and maximum efficiency. Headquarters, FORSCOM, managed to continue its daily routine with only a small portion of its staff actually engaged in Operation NEW ARRIVALS. The whole operation was managed in such a way that only a minimum effort was required once the assigned Task Forces put their respective Refugee Centers into operation. None of the participating FORSCOM units suffered any major degrading of readiness and none of the Reserve Component units, originally scheduled to perform their Annual Training at either Fort Chaffee or Fort Indiantown Gap, lost any training time. FORSCOM processed most of the Indochinese refugees passing through Guam, more than one half of the orphans evacuated to the United States for adoption, and over one half of the refugees seeking assimilation into U.S. society. Despite this formidable accomplishment, the fact remained that FORSCOM, the Department of the Army, and any other Federal agencies likely to be called upon to manage another refugee operation should get together at the earliest possible moment and develop clearcut memorandums of understanding concerning their respective responsibilities and measures of authority. The Army should have the greatest interest in seeing that such a commonality of agreement was reached since its installations would be used as Refugee Centers and the success or failure of each and every aspect of the operation was indissolubly linked in the public mind with the Army. In this respect, the Army was indeed fortunate that the vast majority of the Indochinese refugees were processed in an unusually orderly fashion. Except for some relatively minor acts of vandalism and petty theft, they were law abiding and cooperative. Other future refugee groups might not prove to be so positive in their actions, thus causing undeserved embarrassment for the Army. Appendix A lists the commanders of the Task Forces; Appendix B is a chronology of significant events; Appendix C presents selected problem areas; and Appendixes D and E present selected demographical and educational level data.

APPENDIX A

COMMANDERS FOR TASK FORCE NEW ARRIVALS	
<u>COMMANDER</u>	<u>DATE OF TENURE</u>
<u>Fort Chaffee</u>	
Brig. Gen. James W. Cannon	28 April - 20 May 1975
Brig. Gen. Jack V. Mackmull	20 May - 22 July 1975
Col. Bruce L. Hennessey	22 July - 23 August 1975
Col. George M. Cross	23 August - 20 December 1975
<u>Fort Indiantown Gap</u>	
Brig. Gen. James W. Cannon	20 May - 4 August 1975
Col. Robert L. Travis	5 August - 25 November 1975
Col. Edwin Johnson ^a	25 November - 15 December 1975
a. Colonel Johnson was the Commander, Fort Indiantown Gap.	

APPENDIX B

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1975

- 1 April State Department requests U.S. Army assistance in the temporary care of Vietnamese and Cambodian orphans scheduled to arrive in the United States; approval is granted by the Secretary of the Army on 2 April.
- 3 April First orphans in Operation BABYLIFT arrive at the Presidio of San Francisco, California.
- 4 April Secretary of Defense tasks the JCS Logistics Directorate (J-4), to coordinate Defense Department support for Operation BABYLIFT and refugee movement within Indochina.
- 8 April State Department officials consult with Congress in regard to the use of the Attorney General's parole authority to admit Indochinese refugees to the United States.
- 15 April
- 12 April JCS tasks the U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), to provide assistance in evacuating U.S. nationals, their dependents, and refugees from Indochina.
- U.S. Embassy, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, closes as official U.S. presence terminates; Operation EAGLE PULL is executed to evacuate U.S. mission personnel and their dependents.
- 18 April President Ford establishes an Inter-agency Task Force for Indochina (IATF) to coordinate all U.S. Government activities concerning the evacuation, movement, processing and resettlement of the Indochinese refugees under State Department leadership.
- The U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific, tasks military commands to plan for the movement to, and reception of, evacuees on Guam.
- 22 April JCS directs the establishment of Refugee Centers on Guam for Operation NEW LIFE; CINCPAC establishes an Army operated tent city capable of supporting up to fifty thousand evacuees at Orote Point, Guam.
- 23 April The first group of evacuees arrives at Andersen Air Force Base at 1730 hours, commencing support of Operation NEW LIFE on Guam. FORSCOM begins EOS Operations -- contingency planning for refugee operations commences.

24 April Department of the Army tasks FORSCOM to plan for possible support of as many as 200,000 refugees in the continental United States and to identify potential sites for Refugee Centers to accommodate them.

25 April Augmentation of the Army Operations Center (AOC) at Department of the Army to coordinate the Army refugee support mission.

FORSCOM identifies Fort Pickett, Va.; Camp Roberts, Calif.; and Fort Chaffee, Ark.; as the potential Refugee Center sites.

FORSCOM Emergency Operations Staff (EOS) activated.

DA directs FORSCOM to deploy medical units and activities to Guam.

26 April Wake Island Refugee Center opens; airlifts to Guam are temporarily suspended but then resumed on 27 April.

JCS announces use of military posts in the continental United States as Refugee Centers.

27 April JCS directs the Army, Navy, and Air Force to identify two sites each in the continental United States for refugee reception centers.

FORSCOM nominates Camp Roberts, Calif., and Fort Chaffee, Ark., as possible Army refugee center locations; Department of the Army approves nominations.

28 April The Joint Chiefs of Staff select Camp Pendleton, Calif.; Fort Chaffee, Ark.; and Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.; as the Refugee Centers in the continental United States.

Brig. Gen. James W. Cannon is designated the Commander of Task Force NEW ARRIVALS, Fort Chaffee.

Guam and Wake Island are saturated with evacuees; the Joint Chiefs of Staff alert Camp Pendleton to be prepared to accommodate up to 18,000 incoming refugees.

Elements of 45th Support Group, Hawaii, arrive on Guam to support Refugee Center operations under the direction of the U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific.

29 April Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) heads Defense Task Force for Vietnamese Refugees, a Departmental level task force to oversee, monitor, and coordinate Defense Department activities in support of the Indochinese refugee program.

 The first group of Indochinese refugees arrives at Camp Pendleton, Calif.

 The 46th Support Group, Fort Bragg, and 47th Field Hospital, Fort Sill, arrive at Fort Chaffee for refugee support.

 U.S. Embassy, Saigon, is closed; Operation FREQUENT WIND evacuates remaining Americans, their dependents, selected Vietnamese, and other third country nationals.

30 April Mr. Donald G. MacDonald arrives at Fort Chaffee to serve as the Senior Civil Coordinator of the Refugee Center.

 Last of the FORSCOM medical units arrives on Guam.

 The Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that Fort Chaffee be prepared to receive the first refugees on 2 May 1975. Department of the Army directs FORSCOM to execute the operation plan for Fort Chaffee to receive up to 20,000 refugees.

 Name of the operation in the continental United States changes from NEW LIFE to NEW ARRIVALS.

1 May 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (-), 1st Psychological Operations Battalion (-), and 720th Military Police Battalion arrive at Fort Chaffee; supporting Active Army strength at Fort Chaffee exceeds 2,000 personnel.

2 May First refugee airlift arrives at the Fort Smith, Ark., airport; Operation NEW ARRIVALS officially begins at Fort Chaffee.

 Fifty FORSCOM cooks arrived on Guam; FORSCOM directed to provide seventy-five more.

4 May First group of refugees arrive at Eglin Air Force Base; the facility is prepared to receive up to 2,500 refugees (later increased to 6,000).

6 May First Vietnamese baby born at Fort Chaffee.

13 May The 100,000th evacuee from Indochina arrives on Guam.

Brig. Gen. Mackmull replaces Brig. Gen. Cannon as Commander, Task Force NEW ARRIVALS - Chaffee.

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (PDASD(C)) assumes leadership of Defense Task Force for Vietnamese Refugees replacing the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA).

Department of the Army directs increase in Fort Chaffee's capacity to 24,000.

14 May Total refugee population on Guam peaks at 50,430 evacuees.

The principal Assistant Secretary of Defense (C) inspects Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa., as a potential site for the fourth Refugee Center in the continental United States.

18 May Secretary of the Army, Hon. Howard H. Calloway, visits Fort Chaffee to observe Army Refugee Center operations.

19 May DA directs FORSCOM to establish Fort Indiantown Gap as a Refugee Center with a capacity of 18,000 refugees by 28 May.

20 May Brig. Gen. Cannon is designated as Commander, Task Force NEW ARRIVALS, Fort Indiantown Gap, and deploys with staff members from Fort Chaffee.

22 May 46th Support Group deploys from Fort Chaffee to open the Fort Indiantown Gap Refugee Center.

23 May President Ford signs the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 (PL 94-24), appropriating \$405 million for refugee care and resettlement.

24 May President Ford signs Public Law 94-23 authorizing the expenditure of up to \$455 million for refugee care and resettlement; this is a reversal of normal procedure to sign the appropriation before the authorization.

27 May Mrs. Julia V. Taft, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare is appointed as acting Director of the Interagency Task Force.

28 May First refugees arrive at Fort Indiantown Gap.

FORSCOM Emergency Operations Staff is inactivated, replaced with the FORSCOM Refugee Operations Office.

4 June The Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office (JRICO) becomes operational.

9 June FORSCOM opens negotiations with U.S. Postal Service to transfer responsibility for refugee mail service at the two Refugee Centers.

14 June Department of the Army directs increases in refugee center capacities -- 25,000 at Fort Chaffee and 17,000 at Fort Indiantown Gap -- to rapidly reduce the refugee population on Guam.

24 June Fort Chaffee reaches its peak refugee population -- 25,055.

25 June Army support for Operation BABYLIFT officially terminates.

26 June Fort Indiantown Gap maximum program refugee population is reached with 16,809 persons receiving Army support.

Eglin Air Force Base refugee population peaks at 5,997.

9 July Department of the Army directs FORSCOM to develop contingency plans for the winterization of Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap.

14 July The Joint Chiefs of Staff announce commencement of repatriation flights from centers in the continental United States to Guam beginning on 18 July.

18 July Brig. Gen. Cannon is reassigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Col. Travis assumes temporary command of Task Force NEW ARRIVALS - Fort Indiantown Gap.

21 July President transfers responsibility for refugee resettlement program from the State Department to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Mrs. Taft becomes Director of the Interagency Task Force.

22 July Col. B.L. Hennessey assumes command of Task Force NEW ARRIVALS - Fort Chaffee, replacing Brig. Gen. J. Mackmull.

29 July Interagency Task Force approves the FORSCOM plan for issuance of winter clothing to 30,000 refugees.

30 July Interagency Task Force announces the decision to keep Fort Indiantown Gap open until 1 December 1975, and to keep Fort Chaffee open indefinitely.

4 August Col. R. Travis assumes command of Task Force NEW ARRIVALS - Fort Indiantown Gap.

FORSCOM requests authority to spend \$4.7 million for refugee winter clothing.

5 August Department of the Army directs FORSCOM to begin winterization of the two Refugee Centers.

7 August FORSCOM receives authorization to spend \$4.7 million for refugee winter clothing.

The Arkansas-Oklahoma Gas Corp. informs FORSCOM that it will not honor its contract to supply natural gas in specified amounts to Fort Chaffee.

11 August FORSCOM signs contracts for winter clothing with the Army Air Force Exchange Service.

22 August Defense Department concurs in the U.S. Marine Corps request that only the footwear portion of the refugee winter clothing be shipped to Camp Pendleton, and the remainder diverted to Fort Chaffee.

23 August Col. G. Cross replaced Col. Hennessey as Commander, Task Force NEW ARRIVALS - Fort Chaffee.

25 August The transfer of unsponsored refugees from Eglin Air Force Base to Fort Chaffee begins.

The U.S. Postal Service assumes responsibility for mail and postal operations at Fort Chaffee.

26 August The first shipment of refugee winter clothing is received at Fort Chaffee.

30 August The transfer of refugees from Eglin Air Force Base to Fort Chaffee is completed.

31 August Repatriates on Guam conduct violent demonstration.

8 September Brig. Gen. Cannon is designated as the overall coordinator of Defense Department support for the refugee operation.

15 September Eglin Air Force Base closes as a Refugee Center after processing 10,085 refugees in 20 weeks.

The Fort Indiantown Gap center is reduced to its winter capacity of 4,800 refugees.

20 September Army capitulates to Arkansas-Oklahoma Gas Corp. ultimatum concerning natural gas supplies to Fort Chaffee.

25 September City of Fort Smith threatens to cut off Fort Chaffee's water supply unless the Army agrees to pay higher water rates and alleged delinquent bills for water service.

27 September Army agrees to pay contested water bills at Fort Chaffee under protest pending an appeal.

30 September After several violent demonstrations and prolonged negotiations, repatriates on Guam are offered the option of using the ship, Thuong Tin I, to return home.

1 October Fort Chaffee is reduced to its winter capacity of 17,000 refugees.

More refugees placed into Fort Indiantown Gap. Fort Chaffee begins issue of refugee winter clothing.

15 October Thuong Tin I sails for Vietnam with 1,546 repatriates aboard.

17 October Fort Indiantown Gap completes the issue of refugee winter clothing.

25 October Thuong Tin I is reported in Vietnamese waters.

29 October Mrs. Taft announces that Fort Chaffee will close by 31 December 1975.

31 October Camp Pendleton completes the transfer of unsponsored Cambodian refugees to Fort Chaffee.

Fort Indiantown Gap receives its last refugees.

1 November Camp Pendleton Refugee Center closes.

Military support on Guam terminates.

3 November Department of the Army becomes the Defense Department Executive Agent for Refugee Operations.

The FORSCOM Refugee Office closes and the functions are transferred to the Current Operations Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.

14 November Fort Chaffee completes the issue of refugee winter clothing.

25 November Col. Ervin W. Johnson, Commander, U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Indiantown Gap, assumes command of refugee operations there.

15 December Last refugees leave Fort Indiantown Gap.

20 December Last refugees leave Fort Chaffee.

31 December Termination phase begins at both Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap.

Interagency Task Force suspends its activities and is disestablished; residual financial management office remains operational.

1976

1 January	Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Task Force for Indochina Refugees is established to support the resettlement program for an initial period of six months.
2 January to 31 January	Plans for the restoration of installation facilities at Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap are prepared in order to return the posts to their pre-reception center condition.
9 February	FORSCOM submits refugee installation restoration plans to Department of the Army.
17 March	Restoration briefing is conducted jointly by Department of the Army and FORSCOM for members of the residual Inter-agency Task Force Financial Management Office.
15 April	Residual Interagency Task Force financial management office approves restoration plans and projects that will be fully reimbursed.
19 April	Restoration of former Operation NEW ARRIVALS facilities is begun at Forts Chaffee and Indiantown Gap.
1 June	Secretary of the Army's role as the Defense Department Executive Agent for the Indochinese refugee program terminates.

APPENDIX C

SELECTED PROBLEM AREAS

Any large-scale military operation develops problems and challenges which defy the normal process of internal solution.¹ Such difficulties require either resolution from outside the normal channels or resolution by extraordinary means, with a few problems defying any attempts at solution. These difficulties concerning Operation NEW ARRIVALS were engendered by the fact that this was an emergency operation involving large numbers of people who had to be transported, sheltered, fed, given medical care, and assimilated into American society in a short period of time. Complications were added by the fact that this was a civil-military operation under the control of the civil element. The latter, while well-meaning, were somewhat confused by the large numbers of people and the speed at which the situation developed. Consequently, their guidance lagged behind events in many cases.

Most of the operational problems have already been discussed in the foregoing narrative, however, some are reiterated briefly for convenience sake. This appendix is divided into two sections: those problems encountered and solved by the several staff sections at Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command, and major problems which required a larger effort for solution. The problems encountered in the day-to-day operation of the refugee centers are delineated fully in the several after-action reports prepared by both the units and the Task Forces involved, and are not repeated here unless they required FORSCOM assistance in solution.

Problems Encountered by FORSCOM Staff Elements

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel encountered four major problems, two of which -- the Linguist and the Enlistment Options problems will be dealt with at length in the following section. The remaining difficulties were with the Standard Installation Division Personnel Systems (SIDPERS) and the procurement of cooks. Since none of the refugee center sites had SIDPERS support, all reports were handled at home installations using mail service between the refugee centers and the personnel office, a method which resulted in delays and some errors in transmission. The other problem dealt with cooks. An Army-wide shortage of food service personnel (MOS 94 series) caused a major problem. In order to meet the needs of so many refugees, installations which were already below acceptable fill levels were tasked to provide cooks, further reducing their capability to feed their troops. To alleviate this situation, the Task Forces let contracts to civilian firms to provide food service for the refugees.

1.

Unless otherwise indicated, the entire section is based on HQ FORSCOM, NEW ARRIVALS-AAR (Int), pp. E-2, G-3 - G-4, H-2 - H-3, J-1 - J-2, K-2, N-3 - N-4, O-1, P-1 - P-2, R-1 - R-10.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations handled a number of significant problems during Operation NEW ARRIVALS since they were the action agency for the headquarters.

Impact on Reserve Component Training. The primary mission of both installations used as Refugee Centers was to conduct training for the Reserve Components. At the beginning of Operation NEW ARRIVALS, Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap had full training schedules for the summer months. By rearranging these schedules, both installations were able to successfully accomplish their training mission. The major adjustment concerned the billeting of the Reservists in tents rather than in barracks at Fort Chaffee, a decision which did not in any way affect the quality of training.

Impact on the Airborne D Package. The reaction time for deployment to support the opening of the Army's two Refugee Centers and the Refugee Center on Guam, required the use of units from the Airborne D Force Package. To compensate for this, alternate units were directed to assume the Airborne D mission and readiness posture. The only unresolved replacement was caused by the fact that the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion was the only such unit in the Active Army. This particular problem was partially alleviated when the civil affairs element returned from Guam in mid-June. The problem was finally solved when the two refugee centers replaced the Active Army Civil Affairs element with individual volunteer Reserve Civil Affairs personnel.

Installation Staffing. Since neither of the two Army installations chosen to support the operation were staffed at the level required to sustain the numbers of refugees, FORSCOM used table of organization units and equipment as the Task Force bases to provide the required staffs. These units remained at Fort Indiantown Gap throughout the operation since a firm closure date was known. At Fort Chaffee, however, the decision to remain open indefinitely made the continued use of such units both impractical and costly. Therefore, a joint Fort Chaffee-Fort Sill-FORSCOM manpower team developed an expanded table of distribution and allowances (TDA) to provide appropriate staffing for the operation and affect the release of most of the TOE units. This TDA was published in July 1975 and immediately filled by the FORSCOM Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

Unit Rotation. The use of table of organization and equipment (TOE) units to form task forces at the resettlement centers solved the problem of providing a support base. However, the impact on the parent installation, regulatory constraints on the length of temporary duty, and other requirements to support exercises and training activities mandated the rotation of units on a 90-day basis. The difficulties encountered in replacing units ranged from finding a similar uncommitted unit in the continental United States, through the degrading of home installation support, to lack of replacement units in the Active Component. Since Reserve Component units could not be used, this latter problem was never resolved.

FORSCOM Staff Organization for Operation NEW ARRIVALS. At the onset of operations, the large initial buildup required the activation of the FORSCOM Emergency Operations Staff (EOS). As the operation settled into a routine, the continued use of that special Staff imposed an unnecessary drain on the headquarters. A ministaff was then formed, with one action officer each from the Offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. The new FORSCOM Refugee Office reported directly to the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Brig. Gen. W.R. Todd. This office then served as the coordinating point for all actions concerning the refugee operation. As the resettlement effort waned, even this small staff was considered too large and was disbanded. The office functions and one action officer, Capt. A.J. Haas, were transferred to the Current Operations Division of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. As it turned out, however, this action was somewhat precipitous since the magnitude of the termination tasks were unforeseen.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, as might be expected, encountered a number of problems during the course of Operation NEW ARRIVALS. These could be categorized as readiness, food service, transportation, and supplies and equipment.

Readiness Impact. With the exception of the 25th Infantry Division which was directed to provide a large share of its resources to the operation on Guam, there was no significant impact on the logistical readiness of major Active Component units.

Supplies and Equipment. Three items were in short supply, causing some problems. Shortly after Fort Indiantown Gap began preparing for the reception of refugees the installation discovered a critical shortage of beds and mattresses. After exhausting the resources of the National Inventory Control Point, the Task Force still required 3,000 mattresses and 3,500 beds. These items were eventually obtained from both FORSCOM and TRADOC installations. The Task Force at Fort Chaffee also needed some Vietnamese typewriters. The FORSCOM DCSLOG arranged with the Defense Language Institute to provide these items as required.

Food Service. The problem did not concern the cooks, but the menus, commissary support, and storage. Since the initial Defense Department menu for Operation NEW ARRIVALS was deficient in vitamins A, B, and C, menu changes were necessary to prevent vitamin deficiencies and to provide a more nutritional and palatable diet. The initial menu was initially altered by FORSCOM, while Department of the Army later provided a cyclic menu which provided both nutrition and variety. This latter menu was supplemented by the centers to add further variety by such means as introducing ice cream. In another matter, FORSCOM amended the Fort Chaffee Installation Manning Document at Fort Sill's request. The document was altered to reflect that the issue commissary at Fort Chaffee was a subfunction of Fort Sill; a Deputy Commissary Officer was then stationed at Fort Chaffee to provide operational control of the facility. Finally, FORSCOM solved a storage-issue problem at both centers by providing refrigerator vans, weight scales, and issue personnel to augment the cold storage and issue points there. These resources were later replaced by contractual support.

Transportation. Refugee flight arrivals were scheduled by a number of agencies without any apparent central coordination. The DCSLOG element within the Emergency Operations Staff constantly monitored these schedules and tried to influence the proper spacing of arrivals, but with little success. The result was a constant alternating of periods of overloading and periods of idleness in the resettlement center's processing system.

The FORSCOM Engineer

The FORSCOM Engineer was involved in all phases of the operation from the evaluation of installations as potential refugee centers to the final restoration phase. During the course of their involvement the Engineers encountered a number of problems.

Refugee Privacy. The use of older World War II mobilization-type barracks to house the refugee families did not provide the desired level of privacy. To counter this, temporary plywood partitions were added to divide the barracks into family sized cubicles.

Upgrading of Facilities. The utilities systems -- electric, water, and sanitary -- required extensive upgrading to handle the sudden influx of population. Of these, the sewage disposal systems required the most work. Both Fort Chaffee and Fort Indiantown Gap required rebuilt and enlarged sewage lagoons to meet standards set by the Environmental Protection Agency; in addition, the sewage lines at Fort Indiantown Gap required repair.

Refuse Disposal. Both refugee centers required assistance in refuse disposal. This resulted in the purchase of two garbage trucks and the hiring of temporary personnel at Fort Indiantown Gap since the purchase of such equipment was less expensive than the other options open to the Task Force.

The FORSCOM Surgeon

The FORSCOM Surgeon monitored the operation's medical phase from the start. At the very outset, the Surgeon decided that the security classification assigned to the program had a significant impact on the morale of deploying troops since dependents and others were not aware of the nature of the operation until after most of the personnel had departed. The same security problem hampered the coordination of professional filler requirements and, in some instances, the acquisition of medical supplies and equipment not normally available to a deploying unit. The Surgeon recommended that for future operations of this humanitarian nature the security classification be downgraded as quickly as possible.

Public Affairs

In the course of Operation NEW ARRIVALS the FORSCOM Public Affairs Office encountered problems in delegation of authority, obtaining personnel, and the changing roles of the Press Centers.

Delegation of Authority. At Fort Chaffee, the military Public Affairs Officer, who was also the designated spokesman for the Defense Department, was subordinate to the Interagency Task Force's civilian public affairs representative. At Fort Indiantown Gap, however, the Defense Department spokesman and the civilian public affairs representative were "co-equal." As a result, internal coordination and proper staffing of actions at the latter post were difficult and the delegation of authority became confused. The FORSCOM Information Officer recommended that in future joint civil-military operations a well-defined chain-of-command be established.

Replacement Personnel. Finding information and public affairs replacement personnel, especially for the Lt. Col. Spokesman and the Major or Captain Deputy Spokesman positions, was extremely difficult. Officers of those grades operating in Military Occupational Specialty 5505 were scarce in FORSCOM. Assistance from the TRADOC Information Office provided some relief but that command's assets were even more limited than those of FORSCOM. Extended Active Duty for Training tours for Reserve officers were sought with little success. The difficulty was partially due to the fact that temporary duty periods in excess of thirty days would impose severe burdens on the installations or units providing the Information Officers. The result was that Public Affairs continuity was limited because of the constant rotation of critical personnel in the Press Centers every thirty days. The FORSCOM Information Office reviewed this 30-day rotation policy in September 1975, but decided only in a longer period of temporary duty for the Defense Department spokesman at the two centers.

Press Centers. FORSCOM's initial objective in planning the Press Centers was to provide support for the expected high number of news media representatives. The planners did not anticipate that the Press Centers would become the focal point for Public Affairs support of the sponsorship program. Original staffing eventually proved to be the minimum required for the support of this important mission. Consequently, the FORSCOM Information Officer recommended that planning for future Press Centers should provide for adequate Information and Public Affairs staffing and simultaneous Press Center operation.

The Staff Judge Advocate

The Staff Judge Advocate participated in the initial planning by preparing the legal subappendices to the operations plans. For the rest of the operation the FORSCOM Staff Judge Advocate provided opinions on specific questions which could not be resolved by legal counsel at the centers. The two major difficulties involved jurisdictional problems. Shortly after Operation NEW ARRIVALS began, the FORSCOM Staff Judge Advocate reviewed the Fort Chaffee law enforcement memorandum. He noticed that a provision for an official of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to appoint military police as "designated Immigration Officers" was in apparent violation of the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S. Code 1385), and took immediate corrective action. Similar problems of a jurisdictional nature arose at the beginning of operations at Fort Indiantown Gap. This situation, however, was more complicated since the Army had only a proprietary interest in that installation. Consequently,

the Assimilative Crimes Act² did not apply and the categories of cases subject to referral to the U.S. Magistrate were severely limited. While no simple solution was found, representatives from both FORSCOM and Department of the Army met with General Cannon and provided guidance on such law enforcement problems as arrests and investigation of offenses committed by nonmilitary personnel on the Fort Indiantown Gap military reservation.

Chaplain

The FORSCOM Chaplain provided religious personnel, military chaplains, and contract clergy to support both military support troops and the refugees at the two centers. The Chaplain encountered a number of problems related to this support, among them were obtaining religious equipment and ensuring the pay of contract clergy.

Buddhist Religious Needs. The scarcity of Buddhist religious equipment and the absence of guidelines on the requirements of their religious practices resulted in a relatively slow development of the Buddhist portion of the religious ministry. The lack of cohesion among American Buddhist organizations resulted in severely limited support from non-military organizations.

Payment of Contract Clergy. Some of the contract clergy did not receive timely payment from the contracted organization for services rendered. The FORSCOM Chaplain recommended that the clergy be paid directly and arrangements were made to have the Army Finance Center at Fort Sill make out all checks to the Chaplain's Office and payments were then disbursed by cash or cashier check, thus alleviating payment problems.

Contractual Problems. Problems in obtaining contracts for the Catholic clergymen resulted in an embarrassing delay in the remuneration of these clergy. The FORSCOM Chaplain also found that the lack of uniformity in contracts let among the civilian clergy resulted in some feelings of inequity among them.

Task Force Staff Chaplain - Span of Control. Some friction resulted from the failure on the part of unit commanders to comply with the Task Force policy which placed all chaplains under the operational control of the Task Force Staff Chaplain. This was true only in those instances in which chaplains accompanied their units to serve with the Task Force.

2.

Simply put the Assimilative Crimes Act applies to areas over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction and extends the provisions of the state -- i.e., the state in which the installation resides -- penal code to the installation or other area of exclusive jurisdiction; this is done because military law and the Federal law do not cover many instances of criminal behavior, control of these being left to the states by the Constitution.

Significant Problems

Negative Reaction to the Refugee Centers

In opening the Refugee Resettlement Centers, the Army encountered resistance from state and local political leaders who expressed concern over the impact of Operation NEW ARRIVALS on their constituents. Although the Congressional delegations had been briefed, the information had not been passed to the local levels. Compounding the matter were the fears of local businessmen who derived a considerable percentage of their annual income from Reserve Component Annual Training in both areas. The local resistance was primarily based on concern for the unemployment problem and loss of sales during a recession year. There was also some apprehension caused by the distrust of an unknown ethnic group and the fear of their carrying communicable diseases. To alleviate local misunderstanding and apprehension, the Interagency Task Force and military Task Force personnel met with local leaders to explain the political, social, and economic ramifications of Operation NEW ARRIVALS. These briefings by concerned officials resulted in a general withdrawal of opposition. As the operation progressed, the economic impact on the areas around the centers proved to be beneficial. Annual Training 1975 was held as scheduled at both installations, and the refugee operation generated employment in both the public and private sectors. Logistical requirements resulted in significant expenditures for contractual services and local procurement, both of which created jobs.

Recommendation. FORSCOM recommended that, in future operations which would impact on civilian communities, the briefing of local leaders be done concurrently with the announcement of the operation.

Station of Choice/Unit of Choice Enlistments

Initially, the deployment of Station of Choice and Unit of Choice (SOC/UOC) personnel created difficulty for the Task Force, the parent installations, and units. Current regulations guaranteed personnel who enlisted for the Station of Choice (SOC) option, or who reenlisted for their current duty assignments, a period of stabilization which precluded temporary duty in excess of thirty days. In a similar manner, Unit of Choice (UOC) enlistees were guaranteed stabilization with their units. Both enlistment contracts contained provisions for waiver of these guarantees in times of national emergency, but stringent definitions of what constituted such an emergency made deployment of these personnel difficult in any situation short of war. The Station of Choice problem was particularly evident in support specialties -- cooks, medical personnel, etc. -- where large-scale commitments of personnel on temporary duty were unusual. The Unit of Choice problem basically involved filler personnel used to round out deploying units. Eventually, the Department of the Army declared an emergency situation to resolve the problem for the first thirty days.

Recommendation. The FORSCOM staff recommended that the major Army command responsible for such an operation be authorized to adjust the expiration date of the guaranteed period of stabilization to incorporate the number of days of temporary duty in excess of thirty days.

Qualified Linguists

Requirements existed for Vietnamese and Cambodian linguists to support the operation from the very beginning. Large numbers of personnel were identified as linguists, with specific proficiencies indicated in personnel records maintained by the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN). Upon arrival at the resettlement centers, more than 75 percent of those identified as proficient were unable to speak or understand the languages. This required extensive search for, and movement of, replacements at considerable cost. In fact, the majority of linguists successfully employed were not listed on official rosters, but had been located at installations in the continental United States through advertising in the Daily Bulletin and by word-of-mouth requests through unit command channels to identify personnel with Vietnamese wives. This process of resource identification was inefficient since it placed the fulfillment of mission requirements at the mercy of individual volunteers. What is more, it did not provide enough interpreters to fill the requirements. However, Federal law precluded the hire of refugees to act as interpreters. To resolve this problem, the worldwide assets of the Army Security Agency were employed to fill some requirements, and the number of linguists required at the centers was reduced, causing some slowdown in processing.

Recommendation. Here again, FORSCOM suggested that the Army review the linguist rosters periodically to determine whether the linguists listed therein had the correct proficiency levels as shown. Further, it was recommended that the Federal hire of alien personnel for nominal fees be authorized as an emergency measure.

Shortages of Qualified Civil Affairs Personnel

Military Civil Affairs personnel were needed to provide internal control and organization in the refugee living areas. A shortage of qualified Civil Affairs personnel developed early in the operation, and occurred as Refugee Center population ceilings increased and the average stay of the individual refugee lengthened. Since there was only one Civil Affairs unit -- the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion -- in the Active Army, it was essential to make use of Reserve Component personnel qualified in that specialty. The Army was precluded from activating whole Reserve units because an emergency had not been declared. Thus, the Army had to use individual Reservists who volunteered for Active Duty for Training. Once called up, these men were sent to either refugee center on an individual basis. This resulted in many mismatches in military occupational specialties and an excessive amount of administrative processing.

Recommendation. FORSCOM's initial recommendation was to authorize the call-up of whole Reserve Component Civil Affairs units to support humanitarian operations, and subsequent congressional legislation endorsed this suggestion. A proposal to allow the President to call up no more than 50,000 Reservists for 90 days whether or not a declaration of war or national emergency was announced passed the Congress and was signed into law (PL 94-286) by the President on 14 May 1976. Aside from the statutory limitations set, the major limit set forth in the use of

these troops was that they could not be used to provide assistance to either Federal or State Governments in time of a serious natural or man-made disaster, accident, or catastrophe. This legislation made it possible for Army planners to tap a large number of highly trained specialty personnel in case of another such humanitarian operation.

Natural Gas and Water Supply Problems at Fort Chaffee

In preparing Fort Chaffee for winterization, the Task Force determined that the existing contract for delivering natural gas was sufficient to meet all requirements. The contractor, however, refused to honor that contract. Army efforts to both force compliance and find alternative gas supplies were unavailing. The Army converted some of the refugee facilities to alternate fuels for heating and, while this measure partially alleviated the problem, only the relatively mild weather and early camp closure precluded a resource crisis. In another action of similar nature, the City of Fort Smith, Ark., under valid contract to supply Fort Chaffee's water, unilaterally raised the cost rate for water in violation of the contract. When the installation balked at the increase Fort Smith served notice that water service would be suspended until the new rate was accepted and the arrears paid. Faced with discontinuance of the water supply the Army capitulated to their demands. Granted that the contract rate may have been outdated, the city used unethical means to gain renegotiation. The city action was taken without warning, and was apparently a political ploy intended to appease private users whose water rates had also been raised.

Recommendations. In these cases FORSCOM had three suggestions for future operations. First, when an installation was nominated for such usage the contracts for delivery of essential services should be reviewed and included in the nomination studies; it should be noted here that this was the first time that such a matter had occurred and the early planners on the FORSCOM staff never thought there was a need to review the contracts for essential services. FORSCOM also recommended that seasonal requirements for natural resources and the availability of supply be considered as one of the essential factors in selecting an installation; caution was in order here, since other factors would have to be balanced against those of natural resources. If the availability of natural resources and usage rates were the only factors, those installations in mild climates -- i.e., those in the South and far West -- would be chosen for use over those in the rest of the country where the winters were especially severe. FORSCOM's final recommendation was that judicial inflexibility be pursued to preclude the discontinuance or degrading of services during the renegotiation of contracts.

The Understaffing of Civil Agencies for Processing Refugees

Under the initial concept of operations, the Federal civil agencies were to accomplish all in-processing pertinent to the identification of the refugees and their entry into the United States. As the refugees began to arrive at Fort Chaffee, the civil agency staffs proved to be too small to handle all the requisite administrative actions. As a consequence, the 524th Adjutant General Company (Personnel Service), which had deployed with the Task Force to support military requirements, was

diverted to accomplish refugee in-processing. This unit was an appropriate choice, since in-processing actions were analogous to its normal mission. However, the requirements of the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service differed considerably from those of the military. Thus, the company was left to improvise the in-processing procedures to be used. Recognizing that, in a joint operation, it was the military who could react faster than the civil agencies, it was logical to assign an in-processing mission to a military unit. However, civil agencies would have to establish essential processing requirements, a basic method of operation, and provide technical assistance to the unit assigned the mission.

Recommendation. FORSCOM recommended that in-processing requirements be included in the mission statement in future operations so that the units could be tailored to accomplish the task. The command also suggested that the civil agencies provide the units commander with a permanent technical assistant.

Announced Demographics Proved to be Fallacious

At the outset of the operation, the State Department announced that the Vietnamese who entered the system would be those so-called "high risk" individuals whose lives were endangered because of their close association with Americans during the Vietnamese conflict. Consequently, it was assumed that refugee family heads would have a basic knowledge of the English language, American ways, and possess salable skills, making their assimilation into society relatively easy. Unforeseen, was the massive influx of Vietnamese who had experienced little or no contact with Americans, who possessed limited job skills, and who were unfamiliar with our language. Compounding the situation, was the inclusion of significant numbers of Cambodians and other ethnic groups. This difference between the actual and "design" characteristics of the refugee population resulted in increased support requirements and extended stays in the Refugee Centers. The refugees who fit the "high risk" category generally had American contacts, and helped arrange their own sponsorship. These people, however, actually represented only a small percentage of the total refugee population. The remainder required a more extensive effort.

Communication with the refugees became a problem. Since the American camp personnel had no knowledge of the Vietnamese and Cambodian languages and the number of available linguists was limited, both resettlement centers published national language newspapers to carry announcements and items of interest. At Fort Chaffee a Vietnamese language radio station was opened by Army psychological operations personnel, assisted by refugee volunteers. Both programs were instrumental in improving communication, but the language problem caused a general slowdown in out-processing. The general unfamiliarity of the refugees with American ways had not been foreseen. Accustomed to a standard of living generally below ours, the refugees were often confused or unsure about things which Americans took for granted. A continuous education process by all agencies and personnel concerned was required to resolve problems as they arose. Unfortunately, since most Task Force personnel did not understand the refugees' unfamiliarity with the American way of life, some problems

with damage to the facilities resulted, as well as some being exploited by their better informed peers. On the other hand, American processing personnel of the Federal civil agencies and the Voluntary Agencies lacked an appreciation of the refugees' cultural background. To a lesser extent, this condition existed among junior military personnel who had not served in Vietnam. Since they did not understand the refugees' Oriental philosophy, personnel involved in processing often became frustrated over the lack of urgency on the part of the refugees. In addition, failure to understand the oriental religious practices caused occasional embarrassment to logistics managers.

Recommendations. FORSCOM had two suggestions for this difficulty. Support personnel should be given an orientation briefing on the cultural, philosophic, and religious differences of the people concerned. In addition, the agencies involved in the operation should make a concerted effort to ensure that the refugees understood the intentions of the host country.

Federal Law Prohibited Federal Employment of Refugee Aliens

As the refugee centers filled up and the true demographics emerged, requirements were generated for specific skills to support the health, comfort, and processing of the refugees. Some of the skill requirements were filled from American military assets but, in many areas, the supply of expertise available was exhausted before all requirements could be met. Other required skills were not available in either the military or civilian labor pools. Primary areas of difficulty encountered were interpreters, mess hall personnel, and religious and recreation workers. As already described above, the supply of trained military linguists to act as interpreters was insufficient to meet the needs of the Resettlement Centers. With the change in the demographic characteristics of the refugee population, the need for interpreters became more urgent. The military mess personnel who operated Fort Chaffee's refugee dining facilities did an outstanding job of preparing and serving complete and nutritional meals on time for massive numbers of refugees. Refugee acceptance of meals, however, became a matter of concern. Although menu items had been selected as compatible with Oriental tastes, the preparation of food was, understandably, American. This caused complaints from the refugees, particularly with regard to the preparation of rice. Then, too, with the increased population ceilings and the lengthened average stay in the centers, recreation and religious requirements increased, requiring personnel to design programs of support compatible with the backgrounds of the refugees.

The logical solution to these problems was to use the refugees themselves as interpreters, within the billeting areas (releasing military linguists for duty in the processing centers), as rice cooks, as recreation supervisors, and as Buddhist clergy. When FORSCOM requested authority to hire refugees for these purposes, the Department of the Army responded that Federal law in general, and Civil Service Commission (CSC) regulations in particular, forbade the hire of refugees who had not achieved legal status as resident aliens. Since the refugees in the centers had not even become parolees, their employment, even for nominal wages, was out of the question. Faced with the continuing problem, the next step considered was to use volunteer refugees to perform these

functions. The use of volunteers precluded the element of control obtainable through hire, but alleviated a part of the problem. Again, the Department of the Army informed FORSCOM that use of voluntary services in lieu of employment was a criminal offense. When FORSCOM requested reconsideration the Department provided clarification of their reply -- the criminal offense statement had not been intended to preclude either the "self-help" type work which the evacuees could perform at refugee camps in order to ameliorate their situation, and maintain conditions essential to their health, safety and morale, or related tasks considered essential for their well-being. Nor did it preclude the use of individuals on a volunteer basis who possessed unique skills clearly unavailable in the local area. This latest guidance permitted the local military commander to assume responsibility for decisions on the volunteer use of refugees.

While Civil Service Commission regulations were intended to protect American labor, they were overly restrictive in those cases where the American labor market could not supply the skills required. Unfair labor competition could not exist if the required skills were not available in the labor market. Furthermore, the immediate nature of the requirements precluded the training of Americans for the jobs. It would appear that the hiring of aliens in clear-cut cases such as this was in keeping with the spirit of the law, if not in accordance with the letter of the law.

Recommendations. FORSCOM recommended that both the law and Civil Service Commission regulations be amended to permit the hire of aliens in clear-cut cases where the indigenous labor market could not supply the requisite skills.

The Lack of Accurate Camp Census Statistics

Throughout the existence of the Refugee Centers, differing methods of determining population size were used. At no time did census figures from different sources within the camp ever agree. The simultaneous inflow of refugees and the out-processing of parolees kept population figures in a continual state of flux. Attempts were made to determine population by balancing inflow and outflow figures, by mess hall headcount, by totaling the caseloads of the Voluntary Agencies, as well as by other means. Although the different census figures never did agree exactly, they usually were relatively close. Thus, a fairly accurate approximation was possible on a daily basis which provided an adequate gauge to be used in planning resettlement center operations. The basic problem was that higher authority demanded pinpoint accuracy which, in fact, was impossible without halting operations for a daily muster. Complicating this problem were the periodic reports submitted to higher headquarters by each of the agencies involved, both civil and military. Repeated requirements to reconcile the numbers placed an undue administrative burden on the operators at all levels.

Recommendations. FORSCOM made two recommendations which were intended to solve the problems. One agency, preferably that of the Senior Civil Coordinator, should publish a daily official population figure to be used by all agencies concerned. In addition, population size be published as a "round" number -- e.g., 17.6 thousand -- until such time as the population level decreased to a manageable size.

The Winter Clothing Problem

In developing contingency plans for winter operations, FORSCOM noted that the refugees would need winter clothing, since they were neither accustomed to, nor prepared for, the North American winter. Their existing clothing was best suited for the subtropical environment of their homeland. Therefore, the procurement of warmer clothing was essential if they were to survive the winter. Using winter population estimates furnished by the Interagency Task Force, FORSCOM developed plans for the procurement and issue of winter clothing to some 30,000 refugees in three Refugee Centers -- Fort Chaffee, Ark.; Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa.; and Camp Pendleton, Calif. Due to the short lead time for procurement and the amount of clothing required, the only feasible sources of procurement were the open-end contracts which the Army-Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) maintained with clothing manufacturers. Both the Department of the Army and the Interagency Task Force approved FORSCOM's concept and funds were allocated to purchase the clothing. However, obtaining the clothing items created problems since winter clothing was being ordered at a time when the items were not being manufactured. As delays in deliveries occurred, the Task Forces stockpiled the clothing so that complete issues could be made at one time. This stockpiling occurred at the very time that the out-processing of refugees was being accelerated. In addition, the Marine Corps received permission from the Defense Department to issue only shoes at Camp Pendleton, with the clothing items being sent to Fort Chaffee for storage. Both of these factors soon created a large stockpile of clothing at that latter location. Clothing issues began on 1 October 1975, and were completed in mid-November. Because of delays in deliveries and the decision to issue only shoes at Camp Pendleton, an excess amount of clothing valued at \$1.7 million still remained.

Delays in the decision to outfit the refugees for winter made competitive bidding for contracts infeasible. Since existing sources had to be used in procurement, selection of items was made from those normally provided for Post Exchange sale. The quality of goods -- and therefore the cost -- sold in the Post Exchanges was mid- to upper-level. The total cost was greater than that which would have been obligated had a choice of quality been available. Another factor in using the open-end contracts was the requirement for firm purchase orders which precluded the return of unused goods.

Recommendations. FORSCOM made four recommendations which, if followed in future operations, would result in considerable savings. First of all, decisions requiring procurement lead time should be expedited so as to permit cost effective purchasing. In addition, the delivery of standard items which could be easily returned to the manufacturers' stock -- i.e., socks, underwear, pajamas, and other such items -- should be accepted on a consignment basis. Products which met serviceability and durability requirements at the lowest cost should be procured under a competitive bidding system and, finally, procurement contracts should include cancellation clauses to allow for changes in plans or populations.

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THE ROLE OF THE US ARMY FORCES COMMAND IN PROJECT NEW
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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

APPENDIX D

SELECTED REFUGEE DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS PRIMARY JOB SKILLS OF INDOCHINA REFUGEE HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS

<u>Occupational Categories</u>	<u>All^a Heads of Households</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Heads of^b Household Family Unit One Person</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Cases^c On Cash Assistance</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>30,628</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>12,712</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>5,521</u>	<u>100.0</u>
Medical, Professional, Technical, and Managerial Occupations	9,578	31.2	2,712	21.3	962	17.4
Clerical and Sales Occupations	3,572	11.7	1,307	10.3	532	9.6
Service Occupations	2,324	7.6	964	7.6	535	9.7
Farming, Fishing, Forestry, and Related Occupations	1,491	4.9	253	1.9	262	4.8
Processing Occupations	128	.4	49	.4	19	.3
Machine Trades Occupations	2,670	8.7	1,713	13.5	289	5.2
Bench Work Occupations	1,249	4.1	528	4.2	280	5.1
Structural Work Occupations	2,026	6.6	1,026	8.1	279	5.0
Miscellaneous Occupations (includes Transportation)	5,165	16.9	2,647	20.8	1,300	23.6
Not Indicated	2,425	7.9	1,513	11.9	1,063	19.3

- a. A computer survey indicated a total of 37,844 Heads of Households. Primary job skills were indicated for 30,628.
- b. A computer survey indicated a total of 16,819 Heads of Households of Family Units consisting of one person. Primary job skills were indicated for 12,712.
- c. A computer survey indicated a total of 6,725 cases entered on the Cash Assistance Data Bank for the period March through June 1976. Primary job skills were indicated for 5,521.

Source: HEU Refugee Task Force, Report to the Congress, 21 Mar 77, pp. 25, 30.

APPENDIX E

HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF 67,033 EVACUEES EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND OVER

(Based on Sample of 124,457 People)

<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>67,033</u>	<u>100.0%</u>
None	1,384	2.1%
Elementary	11,979	17.9%
Secondary	25,432	37.9%
University	11,150	16.6%
Post-graduate	1,955	2.9%
Data not available	15,133	22.6%

Note: HEW statistics do not differentiate between graduates and those enrolled at the time of the nation's collapse.

Source: HEW Refugee Task Force, Report to the Congress, 21 Mar 77, pp. 25 - 30.

APPENDIX F

GLOSSARY

AAFES	Army-Air Force Exchange Service
ACS	Army Community Service
ADT	Active Duty for Training
AFB	Air Force Base
AG	Adjutant General
AID	Agency for International Development, State Department
ALCE	Airlift Control Center Element
APU	Army Postal Unit
ASA	Army Security Agency
ASD (ISA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
ASOPD	Army Special Operations Pictorial Detachment
BABYLIFT	Operation BABYLIFT -- Evacuation of Vietnamese Orphans
CA	Civil Affairs
CDC	Center for Disease Control
C-E	Communications-Electronics
CONUS	Continental United States
COR	Contracting Officer Representative
CPO	Civilian Personnel Officer
CINCPAC	U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI	U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Representative for Guam & the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
CSC	Civil Service Commission
CSG	U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DIO	Defense Information Office/Directorate of Industrial Operations
DOD	Department of Defense
DOL	Department of Labor
DOMS	Director of Military Support (Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations)
DOS	Date of Separation
DSA	Defense Supply Agency
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOE	Element of Expense
EOS	Emergency Operations Staff
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FIG	Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa.
GAO	General Accounting Office
GSA	General Services Administration
HEW	Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
HHC	Headquarters and Headquarters Company
HHD	Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment
HSC	U.S. Army Health Services Command

IATF	Interagency Task Force
ICEM	Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
IO	Information Officer
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCS-J4	J-4, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Director of Logistics)
JRICO	Joint Refugee Information Clearing Office
KP	Kitchen Police
LOI	Letter of Instruction
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MACOM	Major Army Command
MEDDAC	Medical Department Activity
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MERCY	Operation MERCY -- Evacuation and Reception of Hungarian Refugees
MILPERCEN	U.S. Army Military Personnel Center
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MSC	Military Sealift Command
NEW ARRIVALS	Operation NEW ARRIVALS -- That portion of the Indochinese refugee program in the continental United States
NEW LIFE	Operation NEW LIFE -- The Pacific portion of the Indochinese refugee program
NICP	National Inventory Control Point
OASD	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OMA	Operations and Maintenance, Army
OMAR	Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve
OPLAN	Operation Plan
ORM	Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, State Department
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACAF	Pacific Air Force
PACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PDASD(C)	Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
PID	Public Information Detachment
PL	Public Law
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
PSF	Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PWRS	Pre-positioned War Reserve Stocks'
PX	Post Exchange
RC	Reserve Component
RO	Resident Office
RVN	Republic of Vietnam

SAAM	Special Assignment Aircraft Mission
SA	Secretary of the Army
SCC	Senior Civilian Coordinator
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SIDPERS	Standard Installation/Division Personnel System
SITREP	Situation Report
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SOC	Station of Choice
SPOVO	Support Plan for Vietnamese Orphans
STRAF	Strategic Army Forces
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TDY	Temporary Duty
TF	Task Force
TFNA	Task Force NEW ARRIVALS
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UOC	Unit of Choice
USAG	United States Army Garrison
USAINIA	U.S. Army Intelligence Agency
USC	United States Code
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USPHS	United States Public Health Service
VOLAG	Voluntary Agency

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			<u>200</u>

